Caldwell v. Jenkins

John E. Jennings, Chief Judge. The appellees, Roger and Patricia Jenkins, filed suit in Phillips County Circuit Court against Jim Caldwell, the appellant, seeking damages based on Caldwell’s sale of a car to them, allegedly with knowledge that the odometer had been turned back. The complaint set out two theories of recovery: common law fraud (with a claim for punitive damages) and violation of Ark. Code. Ann. § 4-90-204 (Repl. 1991), which prohibits the sale of a motor vehicle with knowledge that the mileage registered on the odometer has been altered. The jury returned a verdict in favor of appellees and awarded them $4,635.00 in compensatory damages. Although the jury did not assess punitive damages, the circuit judge, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 4-90-203 (Repl. 1991), increased the amount of damages awarded to $9,270.00 and awarded attorney’s fees in the sum of $4,904.50. For reversal, three arguments are made: that the attorney’s fees awarded were excessive; that the court abused its discretion in doubling the amount of damages awarded by the jury; and that the trial court should have granted a directed verdict for the appellant. We find no error and affirm. Appellant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting appellees’ attorney an unreasonable amount of attorney’s fees. Arkansas Code Annotated § 4-90-203 provides that “[a]ny person injured by a violation of this subchapter shall recover the actual damages sustained together with costs and disbursements, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. . . .” When attorney’s fees are authorized by statute, the amount to be awarded lies within the broad discretion of the trial court. While there is no fixed formula to be used in setting a reasonable fee, Federal Life Insurance Co. v. Hase, 193 Ark. 816, 825, 102 S.W.2d 841, 845 (1937), the supreme court has adopted the list of factors to be considered set out in the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility. Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Rummell, 257 Ark. 90, 92, 514 S.W.2d 224, 226 (1974). These factors include the time and labor required and the results obtained. New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Quilantan, 269 Ark. 359, 361, 601 S.W.2d 836, 837 (1980). We have recognized the superior position of the trial judge to determine a reasonable attorney’s fee because of his acquaintance with the record and the quality of services rendered. Briscoe v. Shoppers News, Inc., 10 Ark. App. 395, 401-02, 664 S.W.2d 886, 890 (1984); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kizziar, 1 Ark. App. 84, 613 S.W.2d 401 (1981). The case at bar was tried to a jury, the record on appeal is 400 pages long, and the recovery in the trial court was substantial. On these facts, we cannot say the trial court’s award was an abuse of discretion. Appellant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by doubling the amount of damages awarded by the jury. In addition to providing for the award of attorney’s fees, § 4-90-203 provides that the court in its discretion may increase an award of damages to an amount not to exceed three times the actual damages sustained or $1,500.00, whichever is greater. Appellant contends that, because the jury refused to assess punitive damages, it was error for the circuit judge to double the amount of compensatory damages pursuant to this section. His argument is that, by requesting punitive damages, the appellees waived any rights they might have under Ark. Code Ann. § 4-90-203 to treble damages. This argument was not made to the trial court, and no authority is cited to support it. Had the appellees obtained an award of punitive damages the situation might be different, but given the fact that only compensatory damages were awarded by the jury, the trial court clearly had authority under the statute to double the amount of damages. See Currier v. Spencer, 299 Ark. 182, 185, 772 S.W.2d 309, 311 (1989). Finally, appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence presented to support a verdict against appellant. We do not agree. The statute in issue, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-90-204(d) (Repl. 1991), provides that no person shall sell or offer for sale any motor vehicle with knowledge that the mileage registered on the odometer has been altered so as to reflect a lower mileage than the motor vehicle has actually been driven without disclosing such fact to prospective purchasers. Appellant does not argue on appeal that a disclosure was made. Appellant testified that he had no knowledge that the odometer on the car sold to appellee had been rolled back and showed a false reading. However, appellee Patricka Jenkins testified that, subsequent to appellees’ purchase of the vehicle, she confronted appellant about appellees’ suspicions in that regard. She stated that appellant told her that he did not turn back the odometer but that he knew who did. Appellant testified that the man that sold him the car gave him an odometer statement dated November 28, 1989, which showed the mileage on the car to be 40,090 miles. However, the record reflects that the invoice appellant gave appellees when they purchased the car was dated the following day, November 29,1989, and showed the mileage to be approximately 8,000 miles less than the statement dated the previous day. The car actually had been driven more than 79,000 miles. The odometer statement dated December 1,1989, given by appellant to the appellees shows the car’s mileage as 40,352. Whether a person has sold a motor vehicle with knowledge that the mileage registered on the odometer has been altered is a question of fact and evidence of such alteration is often circumstantial. Boren v. State, 297 Ark. 220, 224-25, 761 S.W.2d 885, 887 (1988). Evidence of alteration is shown by contrasting a previously higher odometer reading and the lower reading at the time the vehicle is sold to the complaining party. See Boren v. State, 297 Ark. at 224, 761 S.W.2d at 887. It is the responsibility of the jury to determine credibility and to settle disputed questions of fact. Neugebauer v. Marlin, 268 Ark. 1070, 1072, 598 S.W.2d 446, 447 (1980). Furthermore, it is the jury’s sole prerogative to evaluate the conflicting evidence and draw its own inferences; the jury may draw any reasonable inference from the evidence presented. Boren v. State, 297 Ark. at 225, 761 S.W.2d at 888. The record reflects that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the appellant sold the vehicle to appellees in violation of § 4-90-204. Affirmed. Mayfield, J., concurs in part; dissents in part. Cooper, J., dissents.