Stimson v. Helps

Elbert, J. The law holds a contracting party liable as for a fraud on his express representations concerning facts material to the treaty, the truth of which he assumes to know, and the truth of which is not known to the other contracting party, where the representations were false, and the other party, relying upon them, has been misled to his injury. Upon such representations so j made the contracting party to whom they are made has a right to rely, nor is there any duty of investigation cast upon him. . In such a case the law holds a pafty bound to know the truth of his representations. Bigelow, Fraud, 57, 60, 63, 67, 68, 87; Kerr, Fraud & M. 54 et seq.; 3 Wait, Act. & Def. 436. This is the law of this case, and, on the evidence, warranted the judgment of the court below. The objection was made below, and is renewed here, that the complaint does not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Two points are made: (1) That the complaint does not allege that the defendant knew the representations to be false; (2) that it does not allege intent to defraud. [36] It is not necessary, in order to constitute a fraud, that the party who makes a false representation should know it to be false. He who makes a representation as of his own knowledge, not knowing whether it be true or false, and it is in fact untrue, is guilty of fraud as much as if he knew it to be untrue. In such a case he acts to his own knowledge falsely, and the law imputes a fraudulent intent. Kerr, Fraud & M. 54 et seq., and cases cited; Bigelow, Fraud, 63, 84, 453; 3 Wait, Act. & Def. 438 et seq.; 2 Estee, Pr. 394 et seq. “Fraud” is a term which the law applies to certain facts, and where, upon the facts, the law adjudges fraud, it is not essential that the complaint should, in terms, allege it. It is sufficient if the facts stated amount to a case of fraud. Kerr, Fraud & M. 366 et seq., and cases cited; 2 Estee, Pl 423. The complaint in this case states a substantial cause of action, and is fully supported by the evidence. The action of the county court in refusing to allow the appellant to appeal to the district court after he had given notice of an appeal to this court, and time had been given in which to perfect it, cannot be assigned as error on this record. If it was an error, it was error not before, but after, the final judgment from which this appeal is taken. The judgment of the court below is affirmed. Affirmed.