Burlington & C. R. v. Schweikart

Elbert, J. Whether the existence of a public highway, affording ingress and egress to and from the premises of the defendant, would have been a fact to be considered by the commissioners in estimating the defendant’s damages resulting from the destruction of his private way by the appellant company, is an inquiry we need not enter upon. We are of the opinion that no such public way existed. It is not claimed that the [183] agreement between Clougb and the appellant company resulted in the establishment of a public way under the statute concerning highways in force at the date of the agreement. Gen. Laws, § 237o. This statute deals only with highways established in accordance with law. Nor can it be said that the agreement in question resulted in the establishment of a public way by dedication. In such case acceptance by the public is as essential as appropriation by the owner of the fee. Ang. Highw. § 157. The agreement bears date January 20, 1882, and was offered in evidence before the commissioners June 29, 1882. It does not appear to have been recorded, or in any other way brought to the attention or knowledge of the public, nor had there been any use of the premises as. a way by the public. So far as the public at large was concerned it was an unknown and unaccepted appropriation. The agreement appears to have remained in the possession and under the control of the appellant com-pan jr, and was subject to surrender and cancellation by the parties thereto. Washb. Easem. 139, and cases cited. Nor can it be said that, by virtue of the agreement, an easement attached as appurtenant to the estate of the appellee. Such an easement lies only in grant, or by implication of grant, or by prescription which supposes a grant by the owner of a servient estate, upon which the obligation rests, to the owner of a dominant estate, to which the right belongs. A parol license is insufficient. Washb. Easem. pp. 3, 6, 18, 28. The offer of the appellant company, through its agent, McCullough, to allow the defendant a right of way over the premises mentioned in the Clough agreement, was a mere verbal license, revocable at will. Washb. Easem. 5, 19. It is claimed, however, that had this right of way offered to the defendant by the appellant company been considered by the commissioners in estimating and determining the damages to which the defendant was entitled, that the defendant would thereby have acquired a [184] right of way over the premises mentioned in the agreement by estoppel. It is unnecessary to go into the question of estoppel. Upon the part of the appellant company this was substantially a proposition to compensate the defendant, either in whole or in part, his damages for the destruction of his private way, by giving him another way which it claimed would equally serve his purpose. It is sufficient answer to say that the constitution (sec. 15, art. 2), and the eminent domain act (Code Civil Proc. 74), clearly contemplate compensation in money. It follows that the right of way over other premises offered by the appellant company was not an admissible compensation, either in whole or in part, under the constitution or the statute. In the absence of the assent of the parties, the commissioners had no power to consider the offer, or allow for it in their assessment of damages. As said in the case of Hill v. Mohawk & H. R. Co. 7 N. Y. 157: “Privileges of this kind must depend upon the agreement of the parties. The appraisers had no authority in the premises. They could neither compel the corporation to make the agreement, nor the owner to accept it.” Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Melville, 66 Ill. 329; Chesapeake & O. R'y Co. v. Patton, 6 W. Va. 147; Railroad Co. v. Halstead, 7 W. Va. 301; In re Morse, 18 Pick. 443; Central O. R. Co. v. Holler, 7 Ohio St. 222. The court did not err in refusing to set aside the report of the commissioners on the ground assigned. The judgment of the court below is affirmed. Affirmed.