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MUNICIPAL GAS AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TETON FUELS MID-GEORGIA, LLC, EI Fuels Corp., Mid-Georgia Cogen, L.P., the Bank of Nova Scotia, Caithness Teton Operating Services, LLC, Aquila Fuels Mid-Georgia, INC., Caithness Operating Co., LLC, Caithness Energy, Defendants-Appellants, Teton Services, LLC, Defendant
PER CURIAM:
Teton Fuels Mid-Georgia, LLC (“Te-ton”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on behalf of the Municipal Gas Authority of Georgia (“MGAG”).
Teton contracted with MGAG for its natural gas supply. The district court granted MGAG summary judgment on its contract interpretation claim, concluding that only quantities or volumes of gas requested prior to the 4:15 deadline set forth in the second paragraph of the Dispatch Procedures qualify as nominations of gas. Mun. Gas Auth. of Ga. v. Teton Fuels Mid-Georgia, LLC, No. 1:06-CV-186-JTC (N.D.Ga. Mar. 26, 2008) (order granting summary judgment on the intra-day issue). We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Mangieri v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 304 F.3d 1072, 1075 (11th Cir.2002). We review a district court’s interpretation of a contract de novo. Daewoo Motor Am., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 459 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir.2006).
Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that the district court correctly interpreted the contract. “It is well established that a court should avoid an interpretation of a contract which renders portions of the language of the contract meaningless.” Bd. of Regents v. A.B. & E., Inc., 182 Ga.App. 671, 357 S.E.2d 100, 103 (1987). Here, the interpretation urged by Teton reads Section 3.2’s nomination language out of the contract. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
AFFIRM.