Sabin v. Vermont Central Railroad

The opinion of the court was delivered by Redfield, Ch. J. Perhaps the only question of any difficulty in this case, is that in regard to the jurisdiction of the commissioners appointed to estimate land damages under the defendants’ charter, in respect to the appraisal of consequential damages to land not taken. It will be noticed that the words of the act are of very great extension, in regard to the appraisal of consequential damages to all owners of land or real estate, any portion of which is taken; which is the plaintiff’s case. The owner .is to have appraised to him all damages which he shall be likely to sustain by the occupation of his land for a railway. This must include, not only all direct loss, in being deprived of the use of the land taken, but all consequential damage to the remaining lands, which may fairly and reasonably be supposed to have been within the contemplation of the commissioners in making their appraisal. This, too, must have reference not only to the running of the road, but to all special and peculiar annoyances during the construction of the road. But it must be, of course, the ordinary and probable consequents of such acts and operations; that which is not of the ordinary course of conséquents is not to be taken into the account; and what is not to be taken into the account in making the appraisal, is not of course barred by the appraisal and payment of the damages. The claim for the use of plaintiff’s land by defendants, for a cartway during the construction of their road, would seem to come clearly without the limits of the appraisal. The most that could be said to come fairly within the appraisal, in regard to the use of the adjoining lands, for passage during the construction of the railway, would only extend to gaining access to the land taken. It could scarcely be claimed, that the use of the adjoining land, for a cart-way, could be fairly within the contemplation of the appraisal. It could not then be known, with any degree of practical approach towards certainty, how much material at any given point it would become necessary to bring from a distance, or at what point it would be necessary to use the adjoining land as a cartway, or whether [369] any sucli necessity would occur. And indeed, it is ordinarily supposed, that the cartways will he upon the six rods taken for the railway. And where a different course is pursued, it is ordinarily done for convenience, and not of necessity. So that such a use, without permission, is ordinarily a mere trespass. There seems, therefore, to be made out a right of recovery to this extent. But the other portion of the plaintiff’s claim seems not to come fairly, certainly not clearly, within the same general principle. And it presents a question undoubtedly of very considerable difficulty, when we are inquiring for the mere equity of a particular case. But all cases, and especially cases involving such mighty interests, and ultimately such vast consequences, in the infinity of their number and variety, must be decided upon, such general principles of reasoning and justice, as commend themselves to the common mind, regardless of those trivial inequalities in detail, which no degree of finite labor or wisdom can fully prevent or equalize. In this case, if ledges, or loose stone of considerable size, are upon the land taken for the track of the road, at the time of the appraisal, it would naturally be in the mind of the appraisers, that the stone must be removed in the course of constructing the road; and being of a character only removable ordinarily by blasting, it must occur to them, that fragments, more or less, must be thrown upon the adjoining lands, and that it would be necessary to go upon the land, to remove such fragments. It would be the duty of the company, no doubt, to conduct this blasting in such a way as to do the least possible injury to the adjoining lands; and when, by such operation, stones were thrown without the limits of the land taken by the road, by unavoidable necessity, to remove them as soon as it could reasonably be done. And the fact, that such fragments were embedded in the soil, could make no difference. It could not be allowable for them to suffer the stone to remain thus. There is no necessity for this, but there is for throwing them, to some extent, upon the adjoining land. It seems probable enough, from the facts detailed in the present case, that the damages sustained arose chiefly from not removing the stone in due season. But the recovery below went upon the ground, that the defendants had no right to throw the stone upon the plaintiff’s land. It therefore becomes necessary to consider that question. The Massachusetts courts seem to have considered, [370] that for damages of this character, no action will lie, if there is no want of ordinary care on the part of the company. And no doubt, for any such want of common care, whether in conducting the operations of construction, or in not relieving a party from necessary temporary loss or inconvenience, the action should be case, and not trespass. And the party is not to be made a trespasser, ah initio, by mere nonfeasance. (Stoughton v. Mott, Boston Law Reporter, Oct. 1853.) Indeed, it has not been claimed that the plaintiff might maintain trespass for this injury, except upon the ground that the defendants had no right to throw the stone upon the plaintiff’s land. It seems to us very obvious, that the right of the defendants to blast these rocks, in a reasonable and prudent manner, did exist, and was conferred by the decision of the commissioners appraising the plaintiff’s damages. And if we test the effect of that adjudication by the ordinary test of the extent of judgments, in merging claims, viz. that every claim is barred which was presented, or which might have been presented under the particular question before the commissioners, there will be little ground of question remaining. The plaintiff had the right to claim, and was of course bound to present his claim, for all damages he was likely to sustain, not only in the running of the road, by fires of engines, and the like, but in the building of the road, in the ordinary mode, where blasting is universal, and this not in respect of the land taken only, but of the remaining land, as has been repeatedly decided. And if this claim was not presented, when it might have been, it is barred upon general principles universally recognized, that no one shall be again called in question for what was, or what might and should have been, adjudicated. It seems to us, that to deny the defendants the right to excavate by blasting, is to deny them the right to construct their road; and if they have the right to blast, they are no more liable, or in any different form, from what all citizens are, for the prudent conduct of their legal business, which may be attended with injurious consequences to others. If the throwing of fragments of. rock is an unavoidable consequence, then so far as the owner of land taken is concerned, his probable and prospective damage as to his remaining land is to be appraised; and if he does not make such claim, or if more damage occurs than was anticipated at the time, he is [371] equally barred, as if his claim had been presented, orless damages had occurred than was appraised. As we have intimated, it is clear, that for blasting at improper seasons, thereby causing unnecessary damage to crops, and for doing it in an imprudent or unskillful manner, or for not removing the stone in due time, — and that must be considered the shortest time in which it can be done, and with the least injury to the land, — • the party is entitled to his remedy in the proper form. But if the defendants’ charter confers the right to do the act, of which, as we have said, there can be no doubt, it seems to us impossible to allow the action of trespass for the original act, thereby treating it as unlawful. And it is too well settled, to be now brought in question, that no mere omission, or want of care or skill, in doing a lawful act, will render such act a trespass by relation. In a late English case, (Sharod v. London and Northwestern Railway Co., 4 Law and Equity E., 401,) it is held that a railway train being under the control of a rational agent, the company are never liable in trespass for any damages done by such train. This is undoubtedly by the general rule in relation to master and servant, unless where the master gives express command to the servant to do the act. But if that rule is to be applied to railway companies, to the fullest extent, they are never liable in trespass, for it is scarcely supposable that they would, by a corporate vote, direct an act which should prove unlawful. Certainly they would seldom do this. Most of the acts of railway companies, in their construction and operation, are done by their servants and agents, without any corporate vote. It would be absurd to conjecture for a moment, that the multifarious detail of the business of such a company came even before the board of directors. It is almost of necessity, in order to secure efficiency and dispatch, with any tolerable degree of safety, intrusted, almost without restriction, to one directing and controlling mind. All the acts then of this superintendent, and of his subordinates, which are from necessity the merest instruments, and the more so the better, as railroad men tell us, should be regarded as the acts of the company. (The Vt. C. R. Co. v. Baxter, 22 Vt. 365.) The case of Dodge v. The County Commissioners, 3 Met. R., 380, goes to the full extent of the decision we here make, possibly further. And the Mass, statute in regard to appraisal of damages [372] to the owner of the land, a portion of which is taken, is the same as the statute of this State. The result is, the judgment of the court below must be reversed, as to all the damages awarded upon this latter point; and if the party chooses to waive this portion of his claim here, the judgment for the remainder will be affirmed in this court.