Snow v. Parsons

The opinion of the court was delivered, at the circuit session in October, by Redeield, Ch. J. The important and, as I think, the only question in this case, is whether it is proper for extensive tanneries, upon moderate sized streams, to expend their refuse, or spent bark, into the stream. In regard to many uses of the water in streams, it has been so long settled by common consent, or is so [462] obvious iii itself, that it is determinable, as matter of law. Such are the uses for irrigation, for propelling machinery, and for watering cattle, and some others. And in regard to some debris or waste deposits in such streams, there would seem to be no question. The uniform practice, the convenience, and in some instances the indispensable necessity, would seem sufficiently to decide such cases. Among these may be named the infusion of soap dyes, and other materials used in manufacturing, into the streams by which the machinery is propelled. The deposit of saw-dust, to some extent, is nearly indispensable in the running of saw-mills, and most other machinery used in the manufacture of wood, and propelled by water power. The reasonableness of such use must determine the right, and this must depend upon the extent of detriment to the riparian proprietors below. If it essentially impairs the use below, then it is unreasonable and unlawful, unless it is a thing altogether indispensable to any beneficial use at every point of the stream. An extent of deposit, which might be of no account in some streams, might seriously affect the usefulness' of others. So, too, a kind of deposit, which would affect one stream seriously, -would be of. little importance in another There is no doubt one must be allowed to use a stream in such a manner as to make it useful to himself, even if it do produce slight inconvenience to those below. This is true of everything which we use in common with others. The air is somewhat corrupted by the most ordinary use ; large manufacturing establishments affect it still more seriously; and some, by reason of their vicinity to a numerous population, become so offensive and destructive of comfort, and health even, as to be regarded as common nuisances. Within reasonable limits, those who have a common interest in the use of air and running water, must submit to small inconveniences to afford a disproportionate advantage to others. It seems to us that this question of the reasonableness of the use of a stream, when it is not settled by custom, and is in its nature doubtful, should always be regarded as one of fact, to be determined by the tribunal trying the facts. In the present case it does not seem to have been treated in that light, unless we regard tjie judgment of the county court in favor of the plaintiff, as deterniin [463] ing it. And, as much, of the testimony rejected might have had an important bearing upon this question, and no notice is taken of this point either in the report or the judgment, we must suppose it was not the purpose of the county court to decide the case upon that ground. Indeed, the report furnished no adequate materials for such a determination. That portion of the defendant’s offer which tended to show that tanneries could not be operated to any useful purpose, without thus disposing of their wmste bark, was almost a cardinal point, in determining the main question, and, if shown to the extent offered, might justify the court in finally requiring the proprietors below to submit to some inconvenience that those above might not be deprived of all benefit of the stream for this kind of manufacture. And the reasonableness of plaintiffs submitting to this inconvenience must depend upon its extent, and the comparative benefit to the defendants, to be judged of by the triers of the facts. This must be determined upon general principles applicable to the entire business of tanning, and the importance of discharging its waste materials in this mode, and the probable inconvenience of those below. And if, in this view, they regard the use as an unlawful one, then surely the defendants are liable to all damage sustained by the plaintiff, whether he blight have used a wheel less liable to such injury, or not. But if the use is fairly to be regarded as a lawful one, then, probably, the plaintiffs should have conformed their machinery to the altered circumstances of the stream. And if the defendants use of the stream is a lawful and allowable one, it will make no difference that the plaintiff’s mill was first erected, if it had not been in operation a sufficient length of time to acquire any prescriptive right to use the water in an extraordinary manner. And as the plaintiff’s present wheel was put into his mill after the defendants’ tannery was in operation, and his other wheel would not have been unfavorably affected by bark, nothing, by way of prescription, or license, or prior occupancy, can probably be claimed. And upon the question of the reasonableness of the defendants’ use of the stream, it seems to me the uniform custom of the country for generations, would be of some significance in determining its reasonableness. A uniform general custom upon this subject, [464] ought, upon general principles, to have a controlling force. We think, therefore, the case should go back to be determined, upon the question of fact, of the reasonableness of the use by the defendants ; 1st, upon general grounds; 2d,1 the peculiar facts, if any, affecting the reasonableness of the use in this particular case. In regard to the usage in the country as to tanneries, for generations, without controversy, if shown as offered to be, and if it is all one way, it would have almost the force of law. For all the cases which we have, where reasonable care and diligence can be determined as questions of law, without going to the jury, have grown up out of the practice of particular classes of persons, which, becoming settled and uniform, and known to all, is declared by the court as a rule of law; which, while it was uncertain, was matter of fact to be determined by the jury. A familiar instance of this is the demanding payment, and giving notice of dishonor of bills and notes, which is now fixed to the day the note or bill becomes due, and giving notice by the mail of the next day. Formerly this was submitted to a jury of merchants, who determined the reasonableness of demand and notice upon the particular facts in the case, with reference to the more common usage of merchants. So, too, in this particular business, if the court were 'tanners, we might be able to say that bark must, of necessity, be spent in the stream in order to carry on the work at all, or that, in fact, the bark did not essentially injure the proprietors below, or we might know the contrary of both propositions. But not being such, it seems to us as much matter of fact as any other question of reasonable care and diligence. It is settled law, that every riparian proprietor may use the water for purposes of manufacture, but so use it as not unnecessarily to abridge the use to others; i. e., every such proprietor may use it with care and prudence. What care and prudence is, in such case, must depend upon the facts of each case, the conclusion to be drawn by the triers of the fact. And to assist them in making this conclusion, if they are not themselves experts in the business, they are entitled to have the experience and wisdom of such as are experts, to enable them to judge of the reasonableness of the particular use. The measure of reasonable care and prudence in such cases, is [465] that which prudent and careful men exercise in the management of their own business. And how are we to know this without proof, in those departments of business with which we are not familiar ? Proof that all prudent and careful men, in the management of this business, pursued a given course, and that others acquiesced in that course, without objection, would seem to be of the very essence of the inquiry before the jury, in such cases. Judgment reversed, and case remanded.