holding that the presumption of regularity applies to official acts of public officers absent clear evidence to the contrary
David J. Harms v. R. James Nicholson
holding that the date of actual receipt was the date on which the 120-day period of section 7266(a) began to run
Ivan R. Sellers v. Eric K. Shinseki
recognizing that it is presumed that government officials "have properly discharged their official duties"
17-05 237
providing that the “presumption of regularity” applies to the official acts of public officers, and in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, it must be presumed they have properly discharged their official duties
191121-44920
stating that the Court must apply a “presumption of regularity” to “official acts of public officers, and in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties”
Harvey v. Gober
providing that “the presumption [of official regularity] operates in reverse. If [the action] appears irregular, it is irregular, and the burden shifts to the proponent to show the contrary” (quoting United States v. Roses Inc., 706 F.2d 1563, 1567 (Fed.Cir.1983))
James A. Halcomb v. Eric K. Shinseki
“There is no need for us to decide what the result would have been had [the claimant’s representative] never received the decision.”
Ivan R. Sellers v. Eric K. Shinseki
"There is no need for us to decide what the result would have been had [the claimant's representative] never received the decision."
Ivan R. Sellers v. Eric K. Shinseki
Court initially presumed October 24, 1990, date of BVA decision to be date of mailing
Ryan v. Derwinski
Secretary’s breach of statutory duty to mail BVA decision to claimant’s representative cured by actual receipt
In re the Fee Agreement of Smith
claimant arguing that “the 120-day filing period ... did not begin to run ..., because the B[oard] failed to meet its statutory obligation to mail a copy of the decision to her representative”
Ivan R. Sellers v. Eric K. Shinseki
Court must apply the “presumption of regularity” to “ ‘the official acts of public officers, and in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, [must] presume that they have properly discharged their official duties.’”
Marciniak v. Brown
