Bach, Cory & Co. v. Boston & Montana Consolidated Copper & Silver Mining Co.

Per Curiam. The case seems to have been tried by counsel on both sides upon the theory that for any goods not returned there was a liability under the contract. This proposition being therefore accepted as correct, it is plain that from and after the date of the execution of the contract, to wit, January 28, 1892, McDonald & Brand assumed such liability, until Bach, Cory & Co., with the consent of the defendant, agreed to faithfully perform all the terms and conditions of said contract, for and in the place and stead of said McDonald & Brand. One of these conditions and requirements was to replace all the goods delivered under the contract to McDonald & Brand, at the time of the execution of the contract, January 28, 1892. [470] The replication having denied that the goods claimed to have been missing ever went into the possession of McDonald & Brand, the defendant assumed to prove just what property was delivered to McDonald & Brand, under the contract. The de-, fendant offered an itemized list of goods for the purpose of ■showing that the goods and chattels described therein came into the possession of McDonald & Brand, under the contract. The plaintiff objected to the introduction of this evidence, upon the ground that it was immaterial and irrelevant. Defendant further offered to show that J. H. Brand ran this same boarding house, under a contract like the one sued on, up to January 28, 1892, and that this contract and said Brand were succeeded by the contract of McDonald & Brand, under which Bach, Cory & Co." claim, and that the goods mentioned in Schedule A, attached to defendant’s answer, passed from the possession of Brand to McDonald & Brand, and that Bach, Cory & Co. are liable for the return of said goods. The court sustained the objection. Clearly this was error. It was a most essential feature of the case, and the ruling prevented defendant from interposing a main defense. The offer was direct, and made to sustain issues made by the pleadings. Our view of the law applicable to the case is that when Bach, Cory & Co. accepted the assignment of the contract, and entered upon the performance of it, they not only assumed the performance of all acts to be performed by McDonald & Brand, had they remained parties to the contract, but that they expressly agreed to carry out the terms and conditions of the agreement £ £for and in the place and stead of McDonald & Brand. ’ ’ By this assumption they agreed to replace all property which had been turned over to McDonald & Brand by defendant, and for which McDonald & Brand could have been held liable at the expiration of the life of the contract. The defendant offered evidence tending to show that Brand had run the mess before, and that he had had possession of these various goods, and had delivered them to his successor. If there were a more expeditious way of arriving at exactly what goods were delivered to McDonald & Brand, or were in [471] their possession at the date of their contract in January, 1892, we should say that that testimony became immaterial, but as a matter of inducement, and leading up to the material point just mentioned, it was appropriate and ought to have been admitted. By instruction No. 5 the jury were charged as follows: ‘ ‘The plaintiff, being assignee of the contract of McDonald & Brand, was under the same obligation (after such assignment) that McDonald & Brand were under to carry out and fully perform the terms and conditions of said contract, and unless plaintiff shall prove, by a fair preponderance of evidence, that it has in all material things kept and performed the terms and conditions of said contract to the same extent that McDonald & Brand were required to keep and perform the same, it cannot recover. ’ ’ If the instruction had omitted the parenthetical modification, we think it would have been proper as a succinct statement of the law; but, by limiting the liability or obligations of Bach, Cory & Co. to the period after they agreed to fulfill the contract of McDonald & Brand, we think the court erroneously construed the legal attitude of plaintiff towards the defendant, it being our opinion that plaintiff’s liability related to the date of the instrument, January, 1892. It did not extend further back, but commenced at that time. The judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to the district court to grant a new trial. Reversed.