Purviance v. Glenn

Tuck, J., delivered the opinion of this court. We are of opinion that the petition of the appellant was properly dismissed, for the reason stated by the Court of Common Pleas. It, is very clear, as shown by the appellant’s counsel, that [206] the Court of Common Pleas has exclusive jurisdiction in the distribution of insolvents’ estates in the city of Baltimore, and that it may proceed in a summary way against trustees, under the circumstances mentioned in the acts of Assembly referred to on this point. But it does not follow, that these powers may be exerted against their executors or administrators for the purpose of compelling them to account in that court for the trust estate. This action of the court against the trustee is based on some alleged default or neglect of duty in his capacity as such, which cannot be imputed to his executor or administrator. ■ The latter derives no. authority from the insolvents’ court, is not under its control nor accountable to it, any more than the trustee is to the orphans court. Although trusts are peculiarly the subject of equity jurisdiction, this particular class of trusts has been confided to courts of common law, in regard to which, in the exercise of a special authority, they proceed upon principles of equity without being courts of equity. Carter vs. Dennison, 7 Gill, 157. We must not mistake this control of the court over the trust funds, for the power of the trustee to institute proceedings in the proper tribunals for the purpose of collecting them together. Property belonging to the insolvent may be in different places, or suits in equity may be necessaiy to vacate assignments; in all which cases it is manifest; that the trustee can proceed only in the courts having jurisdiction over thesubject matter, as in other controversies. But when the suits are terminated, the funds must be accounted for in the court from which the trustee derives his authority. So exclusive is this jurisdiction, that where a bill was filed in equity to vacate a fraudulent deed and the deed avoided, that court was not allowed to retain the case and grant complete relief by distributing the proceeds, nor even to the extent of making sale of the property by a trustee of its own appointment, but the case was left to the power and action of the trustee in insolvency. Jamison vs. Chesnut, Ante, 34. The prevention of confusion and possible conflict of jurisdictions is one of the reasons assigned for confining the settlement of these trusts to one and the same tribunal. 5 Gill, 138. Waters vs. Dashiell, 1 Md. Rep., 471. This consideration [207] applies with, equal force in restraining these courts from drawing within their special jurisdiction matters more properly cognizable in other courts, and thereby, as incident to the duty of making distribution of the insolvent’s estate, possessing themselves of the power to marshall the assets of deceased trustees, when the laws have appointed different tribunals for the settlement of their estates. If the estate be insolvent, (and we do not think the principle is affected by the admission of assets in this case,) the common law court, sitting in insolvency, cannot ascertain the amount due by it on account of the trust without investigating the whole personal estate, determining questions of priority and making a ratable dividend among the creditors. This, it is argued, can be done as readily as a plaintiff’s proportion of assets is ascertained in suits at law. Probably, looking to the different manner of taking the account, it may be accomplished with greater justice to the parties than in a suit at law; but we must pay regard to judicial systems as we find them established. At law, relief is granted in the exercise of common law powers by courts of general jurisdiction, in which administrators have always been impleaded; whereas, these courts, in matters of insolvency, proceed under special powers conferred by acts of Assembly, and the authority invoked must be shown to be within the limited jurisdiction. Bowie vs. Jones, 1 Gill, 208. Besides, if this proportion of assets can be determined by the court, sitting in insolvency, as in cases at law against the executor or administrator, why may not the proceeds of the real estate be made applicable there also, as in suits in equity when the personal estate is insufficient? Indeed, if the appellant’s present pretensions be acknowledged as within the purview of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Common Pleas, as a court of equity, pro hae vice, it would seem to be quite as appropriate that it should determine the claimant’s dividend of the proceeds of the realty as to call for an account of the personal assets. Executors and administrators are liable only in respect of their relation to the personal estate, and on the same principle the heirs and devisees would be responsible as representing the real assets, and therefore subject to be called on to make good [208] thereout any deficiency of the fund primarily liable for the payment of debts. But it is manifest, that these courts have no such jurisdiction over the real estate of a deceased debtor. It may be, as urged on the part of the appellant, that defences will be relied on by the appellees, if sued elsewhere, by which the claim may be defeated altogether. On this point we intimate no opinion. But if the remedy is gone by lapse of time, the fault is not with the present trustee. The creditors had ample redress under the acts of Assembly against the former trustee for any supposed default, and cannot now offer this suggestion as a ground for clothing the Common Pleas with powers not granted by the constitution and laws. Order affirmed, with costs.