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The State, ex rel. Board of Township Trustees of Nile Township v. Brown, Secretary of State
Per Curiam.
R.C. 3501.05(J) imposes upon respondent the duty to “[ajpprove ballot language for any local question or issue * * *.”
R.C. 5705.25 sets forth the form of the ballot to be used in the submission of a proposed levy-to the voters and provides in relevant part:
“The form of the ballots cast at such election shall be:
“ ‘An additional tax for the benefit of (name of subdivision) * * * for the purpose of (purpose stated in the resolution) * * * at a rate not exceeding * * * mills for each one dollar of valuation, which amounts to (rate expressed in dollars and cents) * * * for each one hundred dollars of valuation, for * * * (life of indebtedness or number of years the levy is to run) * *
<<* * *
“If the levy submitted is a proposal to * * * replace * * * an existing levy, the form of the ballot specified in this section may be changed by substituting for the words, ‘An additional’ at the beginning of the form; the words * * * ‘A replacement of a’ in the case of a proposal to replace an existing levy in the same amount; * *
[154] Relator argues that “[t]he Secretary of State is under a mandatory duty to approve ballot language designating a proposed tax levy as ‘a replacement’ tax when such language is specifically authorized by law.”
Although R.C. 5705.25 requires a replacement levy to be designated as such, relator has made no showing that its levy is, in fact, a replacement levy rather than a renewal levy. Similarly, relator has not demonstrated any prejudice from respondent’s action in designating the levy at issue a renewal levy.
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. It will not lie unless relator has a clear right to the relief sought and clearly demonstrates its entitlement to the writ. State, ex rel. McGarvey, v. Zeigler (1980), 62 Ohio St. 2d 320, 321 [16 O.O.3d 363]. Relator has not met this burden.
Accordingly, the writ prayed for is denied.1
Writ denied.
Celebrezze, C.J., Sweeney, Locher, Holmes, C. Brown, Douglas and Wright, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
[1] In view of our determination herein, it is unnecessary to rule on respondent’s motion to join a necessary party.
