Coffey v. Northwestern Hospital Ass'n

McBRIDE, C. J. 1. Plaintiff’s evidence tended to show that she was taken sick, as alleged in the complaint, and that she mailed a card to defendant, as alleged. There is a strong presumption that a let [110] ter so marked was received, and whether this presumption was overcome by the evidence of defendant was a question of fact for the jury. The receipt of the letter of November 15th is admitted by defendant, in which the condition of the plaintiff was fully described, and there is no question raised in the testimony that it was not substantially a correct statement of her condition. 2. The reply was substantially a refusal to treat her under the contract for the disease under which she was suffering, upon the ground that it was chronic and therefore not within the contract. It said in effect, “Tour disease is chronic and not subject to treatment under our contract, but come down and if we find it is not chronic we will treat you.” No person in plaintiff’s then condition .would have gone after having been informed that if she had the sickness which she claimed to have had she would not be treated. Defendant claimed, then, claimed at the trial, and claims here that plaintiff was afflicted with a chronic disease which it was not required to treat, and it is plain that if she had gone to defendant after receiving this letter it would have declined to treat her. If the trouble was, in fact, a chronic one, defendant was justified; otherwise, its refusal was a breach of the contract which renders it liable in damages. 3. The evidence introduced as to the disease from which plaintiff was suffering indicates that in 1910 plaintiff suffered from prolapsus uteri, and that as a result of an operation she was completely cured of that trouble and was in sound health when she became a party to the contract with defendant; that this condition continued for about two and a half years; that later, when plaintiff did hard work or lift [111] ing, she had temporary prolapsus, hut that her condition always becomes normal upon ceasing such work. The effect of plaintiff’s testimony is, that she has had frequent attacks or recurrences of the trouble at intervals, produced by overwork or lifting, but that the trouble is not continuous. The evidence on behalf of plaintiff indicates that she is much more susceptible to attacks of this character than the ordinary woman, but this fact alone does not render the disease chronic. It is a fact well known even to laymen that there are persons whose bones are so brittle from disease or malnutrition, that they are broken by blows or falls which would do no particular injury to a person whose bones are normal; but it does not follow that such persons have chronic broken arms or legs. Some persons are poisoned by the slightest contact with poison ivy while others are not at all affected by it; but it does not follow that the susceptible person is afflicted with chronic ivy poisoning. It appears here that plaintiff’s first attack was cured in three weeks by an operation; that she remained in good health for over two years, and that subsequent attacks were cured by avoiding the causes which produced them. A chronic disease is one of long duration or characterized by slowly progressive symptoms: Section 2, Words & Phrases, “Chronic.” Whether plaintiff’s ailment was chronic was a question of fact for the jury, who were instructed in substance that the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to show that she was not suffering from a chronic ailment. 4. The fact that plaintiff did not pay her assessment due on November 15th is immaterial, as Article X of the contract provides that “No cancellation [112] of Membership shall be made while the member is sick, or under treatment by the association, for any reasons.” 5. It is urged the court erred in not giving the following instruction requested by defendant: “You are further instructed that under the terms and conditions of the contract herein the defendant was not bound to render any services to the plaintiff outside of the City of Portland, Multnomah County, Oregon.” It is a forced construction of the contract to say that it requires defendant to render services in the City of Portland only. Article I of the contract stipulates for furnishing hospital services “where provided, ” by which we understand that such services were to be rendered only where the defendant had provided hospitals; but Article II provides for medical or surgical services by any one of the physicians of the association staff, and does not limit such services to a place where hospitals have been provided. Three things are promised the members of the association: (1) Free hospital service where a hospital is provided; (2) free medical treatment without any specification as to where it is to be rendered, and (3) free surgical treatment under the same conditions. In addition to this defendant had practically refused to treat plaintiff for prolapsus anywhere, and had unlawfully canceled its contract with her while she was sick, so it is in ,no position to claim immunity because plaintiff did not come to Portland to receive their refusal to treat her. Plaintiff’s final demand was for treatment in Portland, coupled with an offer to come to Portland to be treated. Defendant’s response was a refusal to treat her in Portland for the disease from which [113] she was suffering, coupled with a crafty invitation to come and he examined and treated, in ease defendant found that she was afflicted with some different ailment than that from which she claimed to be suffering; and with the assumption that if she were suffering from the ailment described in her communication, she would not be entitled to the treatment stipulated in the contract. The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. Affirmed. Burnett, Benson and Haréis, JJ., concur.