Howard Fire & Marine Insurance v. Cornick

Walker, J. It is urged that there was a breach of warranty by the assured, because a portion of the representations regarding the occupancy of the building which contained the goods, was untrue. By the policy, the application, the survey and conditions annexed, are made a part of the contract, and it is justly conceded, that in so far as they relate to the goods insured, they must be true, or the policy will be void. In this case, however, it is not claimed that any part of the description or representation of the goods covered by the policy, is untrue. The false representations relate alone to the building in which they were contained, and to its occupancy. The building was not insured by this policy, and the question is presented, whether a false representation of something outside, and independent of the property insured, can affect the validity of the contract, when the misrepresentation has not contributed in any degree to the loss. This depends upon the construction to be given to the conditions annexed to that instrument. The first, second and third of these conditions, manifestly relate alone to the insurance of buildings. The fourth, with the exception of the last clause, relates to the insurance of goods, wares and merchandise, and only requires a description of the building which contains them, but contains no requirement as to its occupancy. It seems to us, that by no fair construction can it be held that this clause containing the conditions of the insurance of chattels, was designed to require anything more than a true description of the building in which the property insured is situated, with a description of the property covered by the policy; and we can perceive no reason for extending the terms of the warranty beyond what they were evidently designed by the parties to embrace. The body of the policy also declares the insurance to be “ on the following property, as described in the application and survey number fourteen, which is hereby declared a part of this policy and a warranty on the part of the assured.” What was a part of the policy and a warranty ? Why, the description of the property insured. The relative in that sentence obviously refers to the description of the property insured, and that description is warranted to be true, and it is not pretended that the description of that property is otherwise than strictly true. If this warranty, then, only engages for the truth of that description, it cannot be broken by a misdescription of something outside of the warranty. Under this warranty, the assured had only engaged for the truth of the description and representations of the property insured, and the warranty has been performed. We are fully sustained in these views by the following adjudged cases: Sales v. North Western Ins. Co., 2 Curtis C. C. R. 610; Kentucky and Louisville Ins. Co. v. Southerland, 8 B. Mon. 634; Farmers’ Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 16 Wend. 481; Trench v. The Chenango Mut. Ins. Co., 7 Hill, 122; Howard Fire Ins. Co. v. Bruner, 23 Penn. (11 Harris) 50; Roth v. The City Mut. Ins. Co., 6 McLean, 324; Masters v. Madison County Ins. Co., 11 Barb. 624. In the case of Trench v. The Chenango Ins. Co., which was a policy on both the building and goods, and the representations of the building were proved to be untrue, the court, under similar conditions in the policy, held it to be void as to the building, but valid on the goods. The Pennsylvania case referred to, (Howard Ins. Co. v. Bruner,) holds, that when the survey is made by the agent of the company, and a mistake occurs in the application, the insured is not bound by it, but may show by parol the knowledge of the fact by the agent. And in the case of Masters v. The Madison County Ins. Co., it was held that a verbal notice of a mortgage against the property, given to the agent, was sufficient, notwithstanding the policy required it to be in writing. If the loss had been occasioned by the thing falsely, although unnecessarily, represented, or from its concealment when interrogated as to its existence, then that fact might be shown, for the purpose of establishing a fraud on the company, and would be a matter proper for the consideration of a jury, but no such question is presented by this record. On the contrary, it appears, from the evidence, that the agent who made this survey, had made a survey of this building a few days previously, and was then fully informed of its situation and occupancy. And the evidence fails to show that any change had taken place subsequent to that time. This seems to rebut all evidence of concealment, but even if there had been, there is no pretense that it contributed in the slightest degree to the loss, or was in any way material. Good faith is essential in the contract of assurance, and we see nothing to induce us to believe it has not been observed in this case. There was no evidence showing that the misrepresentations misled the company in taking the risk, or that they were induced to accept it at a lower premium, and as their agent knew all the facts, it could not have misled them in granting the policy. The evidence of Bunker, while it may not have been material to the issue, tended to show good faith on the part of the assured, and was not calculated in any manner to prejudice the appellants in their rights, and its admission was not such an error as should reverse the judgment. It is likewise objected that the court erred in modifying the instructions asked by, and given for the appellants. The modification complained of, authorized the jury to determine whether the company had done any act which estopped them from insisting upon the false representations, contained in the application, without having, by any of the instructions, informed them what acts would have that effect. We' have no hesitation in saying, that had the instructions asked been proper, then the qualifications would have been erroneous, unless they had’ also announced what would create an estoppel. But all the instructions, basing the defense upon the want of accuracy in the description of the manner in which the house was occupied, were unwarranted by the evidence, and should have been refused, as we have seen the truth of these representations were not in issue. The modifications could not have misled the jury, to the injury of plaintiffs in error. They operated in their favor, as the jury was informed that these false representations constituted a defense, unless the company had done some act which estopped them from its assertion. There was no error in giving these instructions as modified, of which the ■plaintiffs in error have any right to complain. It is likewise urged, that the judgment should have been arrested, for the want of an averment in the declaration, that the company had failed to replace the property destroyed. They had reserved the right to pay or discharge their liability in this mode, or by paying the money in case of loss. If this right related to the loss of chattels, they should have shown it by way of defense, but no such effort was made. The averment that the money had not been paid, or any part of it, though not formal, and though not sufficient on demurrer, is, we think, aided after verdict, as the plaintiffs could not recover until they showed the loss of the property, and a breach of the covenants by the defendants. Upon the whole of this record we perceive no. error requiring a reversal of the judgment of the court below, and it appears to us that substantial justice has been done, and that the judgment must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.