Folger Coffee Company v. International Union, et a

PER CURIAM: * Plaintiff-appellant Folger Coffee Company (“Folger”) appeals the district court’s decision to uphold the Arbitration Award entered by Arbitrator Diane Massey on January 21, 2008. In a written opinion, Arbitrator Massey sustained the defendant-appellees’ (International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America and its local union, Local No. 1805 (“Union”)) grievance and determined that Folger did violate the 2002-2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) by outsourcing and/or subcontracting certain cap dumping work and that the continued outsourcing and/or subcontracting of said work violates the 2002-2005 CBA or any subsequent CBA. The Arbitrator ordered that the contested cap dumping task be assigned back to bargaining unit employees. On April 14, 2009, 2009 WL 1033777, the district court upheld Massey’s January 2008 Arbitration Award and entered judg *606 ment in favor of the Union. 1 Folger appeals, contending that the arbitration decision should be vacated because Arbitrator Massey exceeded the scope of her authority pursuant to the CBA when she ordered Folger to re-assign the subcontracted work back to bargaining unit employees. Folger also argues that the district court erred when it relied on this Court’s decision in The Folger Coffee Co. v. Int'l Union, et al., 905 F.2d 108 (5th Cir.1990) (“Folger I ”), a decision that — according to the Plaintiff-Appellant was called into question and/or overruled by this Court’s subsequent decision in Beaird Indus., Inc., v. Int'l Union, et al., 404 F.3d 942 (5th Cir.2005). We reject Folger’s arguments presented on appeal, and as a result, we affirm the district court’s decision to enforce the Arbitration Award. First, our decision in Beaird did not overrule this Court’s earlier decision in Folger I. 2 Second, we remain bound by our decision in Folger I, as it is the earlier of the two. Rios v. City of Del Rio, Tex., 444 F.3d 417, 425 n. 8 (5th Cir.2006) (“Where two previous holdings or hnes of precedent conflict the earlier opinion controls and is the binding precedent in this circuit (absent an intervening holding to the contrary by the Supreme Court or this court en banc).”). Furthermore and most significantly, we note that the parties presently before the Court in the current dispute are the exact same parties that presented to the Court in Folger I, and the CBA is essentially the same contractual agreement. Folger has failed to adequately explain why this Court’s prior decision regarding Folger’s ability to subcontract out bargaining unit positions should no longer apply to evaluate the current dispute. Consequently, we find ourselves bound by our decision in Folger I. And as a result, we cannot conclude that Arbitrator Massey exceeded her arbitrative authority or violated the express terms of the CBA in determining that the CBA prohibits Folger from subcontracting out the cap dumping work. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision to enforce the Arbitration Award. Footnotes [*] Pursuant to 5th Cir R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cm. R. 47.5.4. [1] Plaintiff-appellant first brought this action in the district court under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (“LMRA”), asking the district court to vacate the Arbitration Award. [2] See Resolution Performance Products, LLC v. Paper Allied Indus. Chem. and Energy Workers Int’l Union, et al., 480 F.3d 760, 767 (5th Cir.2007) ("We distinguished Folger on the ground that the CBA in Beaird was explicit in permitting subcontracting and contained no limitation on subcontracting!/] ... [whereas although the CBA in Folger'] explicitly gave management the right to subcontract, ... that clause was contradicted by others.”).