Calvert v. Rice

JUDGE PRYOR delivered the opinion op the court. This is a controversy between the appellants, who are the life tenants, and the appellees, who own the inheritance, and are entitled to the possession when the tenancy expires. It is a petition in equity, with an injunction to stay waste. W. H. Duvall owned at his death a tract of three hundred and twenty-five acres of land lying on the Maysville and Mt. Sterling Turnpike, in the county of Mason. At his death seventy-five acres of this tract, including the dwelling, was allotted to his widow as her dower. She subsequently married the appellant, Jesse Calvert, who has been cutting the timber on the dower land, and converting it into rails for the -use of the dower- tract. The first husband, Duvall, left one child surviving him, who married the appellee, Rice, and they instituted this action, asking that the appellants be enjoined from cutting any trees on the dower and from committing waste. The testimony is conflicting as to the number of trees cut and used on the premises by the appellants in repairing the buildings and the fencing. The ap [535] pellant admits the cutting about fifteen trees, and the appellees say that he cut at least twenty. The main contention arises from the scarcity of timber on the entire farm, it appearing that all the timber is on the dower tract, and covers only about ten or twelve acres of the dower land, and some of that timber is in the yard. It. appears that only one tree was cut that was standing in the yard, and that seems to have been decayed, and in such close proximity to the dwelling as subjected it to danger if the tree should fall. If this case is to. be determined upon the idea that there is not a sufficiency of timber on the dower to keep in repair the entire tract, then the injunction ought to go, for it is evident that there is not more than a sufficiency of timber to keep up and continue in permanent repair the dower tract. The scarcity of timber, however, does not prevent its use by the life tenant in repairing the buildings and fencing on the premises. It only requires that he should be the more careful in its use, and only cut so much as would be used by a prudent man when in possession and the owner of the fee, and necessary to keep the premises in repair. It is the duty of the life tenant not to permit the premises to go to destruction for the want of repairs, and particularly when there is timber on the place from which the repairs may be made. It is better for those in remainder that the life tenant should keep the premises in repair, so that when the term expires the owner of the fee receives it in good condition, than to be compelled to receive it as a ruined and dilapidated, farm, There is np [536] doctrine better settled than that of the right of the tenant for life to take reasonable estovers from the estate, bnt not to snch an extent as to work an injury to the inheritance; and what is meant by this injury is, that the tenant shall not make an unreasonable use of this right. The right to timber for fire-wood and repairing buildings is an incident to every life estate to be used for such purposes when on the land. The tenant has no right to cut and use rail timber for fire-wood when there is other timber that might be used for that purpose, or to even cut and use young and growing timber that would not make more than four or five rails to the cut for fencing purposes. This would be an unreasonable use of it. The proper use of the timber by the tenant, as is said in the text-books and reported cases, “is to give the tenant necessary fuel that he may remain on the premises, and sufficient timber to keep the fences and buildings in repair.” (2 Black. Com.; Padelford v. Padelford, 7 Pick., 152; Miles v. Miles, 32 N. H., 147; same case, 64 Amer. Dec., 362.) Why is it not to the advantage of the remainder-man that the premises should be kept in repair? It is not required or expected of the tenant that, he shall expend his money in buying plank or lumber to improve fences and keep the premises in repair, so that the timber may pass from him to the inheritance untouched, although its judicious use may lessen the value of the estate. The owner of the fee would use this timber if without means to purchase other material, and so would any prudent farmer. He would not cut the timber in the yard left for ornamental [537] purposes, nor could the tenant, without being guilty of waste; but ordinary woodland can be used in a prudent manner for the use of the premises, and that use or the right to use the timber not having been abused by the tenant, we see no reason for an injunction, the effect of which would be to enrich the inheritance at the expense of the life tenant. The judgment is, therefore, reversed, with directions to dismiss the petition.