holding that courts do not construe a pleading drafted by counsel with the same leniency afforded to pro se litigants
Adams v. Huntsville Hospital
holding that, even in the case of a pro se litigant, the district court cannot “serve as de facto counsel for a party” or “rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action”
Cassandra Renee Nichols v. Volunteers of America, North Alabama, Inc.
holding that a plaintiff failed to pass the first part of the qualified immunity inquiry on an equal protection claim "even without the additional hurdle of the heightened pleading standard" where the complaint contained only "bare allegations" of dissimilar treatment
Weissman v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc.
holding that a plaintiff failed to pass the first part of the qualified immunity inquiry on an equal protection claim “even without the additional hurdle of the heightened pleading standard” where the complaint contained only “bare allegations” of dissimilar treatment
Weissman v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc.
finding that the absence of the words “equal protection” to be grounds for dismissing a complaint based on qualified immunity at the pleading stage
Hornfeld v. City of North Miami Beach
explaining that because the plaintiff “was represented by counsel; it was not necessary for the court to read [the] complaint with such indulgence”
Aida Rios v. MSC Cruises, SA
explaining that the leniency shown to pro se litigants “does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party”
Broach v. Thomas
noting that the leniency due to pro se litigants “does not give a court license” to do those things
Freites C v. Medina
explaining that, although courts construe pro se filings liberally, “this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party[.]”
Rooney v. Mercedes Benz Financial Services
dismissing the class-of-one claim where the complaint failed to “present a single instance” in which the comparator was similarly situated to the plaintiff
Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc.
holding that while “[c]ourts do and should show a leniency to pro se litigants not enjoyed by those with the benefit of a legal education,” a court may not “serve as de facto counsel for a party” or “rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action”
EL v. KEMP
holding that while “[c]ourts do and should show a leniency to pro se litigants not enjoyed by those with the benefit of a legal education,” a court may not “serve as de facto counsel for a party” or “rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action”
DAKER v. WARD
