Gonzalo-Garzon v. Ashcroft

MEMORANDUM ** Yanez Gonzalo-Garzon, a native and citizen of Colombia, appeals pro se the district court’s order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 2253. After de novo review, Murphy v. Hood, 276 F.3d 475, 477 (9th Cir.2001), we affirm. When Gonzalo-Garzon pled guilty to his firearms offense in 1994, a deportee could seek relief under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act only if the ground for deportation had an analogous ground for exclusion listed in section [349] 212(a). See Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir.1988). Firearms convictions under section 241(a)(2)(C) had no analogue in section 212(a). Cf Cabasug, 847 F.2d at 1323 (“[a]liens convicted of weapons offenses are not among [the] ex-cludable classes” listed in section 212(a)). Therefore, Gonzalo-Garzon was statutorily ineligible for section 212(c) relief at the time of his firearms conviction and the district court properly denied his habeas petition. See Cabasug, 847 F.2d at 1322-24; cf. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (“ § 212(c) relief remains available for aliens ... who ... would have been eligible for § 212(c) relief at the time of their plea under the law then in effect”). We deny Gonzalo-Garzon’s motion for appointment of counsel on appeal. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir.1990). We lack jurisdiction to consider the district court’s order denying Gonzalo-Garzon’s motion for reconsideration because he failed to file an amended notice of appeal. See Fed. RApp. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii). AFFIRMED. Footnotes [**] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.