Morgan I. Levy v. Miami-Dade County

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR TH E ELEV ENTH C IRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT February 5, 2004 No. 03-11589 THOMAS K. KAHN ________________________ CLERK

D. C. Docket No. 01-00101-CV-UUB

MORGAN I. LEVY, ROL AND O OS ES, et al.,

Plaintiffs -App ellants,

versus

MIA MI-D ADE COU NTY , a political subdivision of the State of F lorida,

Defen dant-A ppellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _________________________

(February 5, 2004) Before DU BINA, B ARKE TT and CO X, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:

Residen ts of the U nincorp orated M unicipal S ervice A rea (“UM SA”) within Miam i-Dade Coun ty (“the Co unty”) ap peal the d istrict cour t’s dismiss al of their claims for violations of the Equal Protection C lause. Miami-Dade C ounty has a two-tiered governing structure with a thirteen-member County Commission that functions both as the UMSA municipal government (the “first tier”) and the government for the C ounty as a whole (the “second tier”). In its first-tier capacity, the County regulates development, provides local services, and levies local taxes within UMSA . In its second-tier capacity, the County provides other services funded by county-wide taxes, including airport, transportation, and environmental services. Approximately 1.2 million Miami-Dade residents live within UMSA, forming some 52% of the County’s population.

The Ap pellants’ claims are m ore fully set forth in the district court’s opinion. Essentially, however, the Appellants argue that, as residents of unincorporated areas, their votes for municipal government have been uncon stitutionally diluted b y residen ts of inco rporated areas w ho also v ote in county elections. Because the County Commission also acts as the municipal govern ment fo r the unin corpor ated areas , the incor porated residents effectively vote for that first-tier government when they vote for the Commission. The Appellants contend that the configuration of the single-member Commission *3 districts 1 means that a majority of Commission members have a majority of incorporated residents in their districts, effectively giving majority control over UMSA municipal areas to non-UMSA residents. The Appellants allege a multitude of pernicious consequences from this arrangement, including the diversion of UM SA revenues to inco rporated and county-w ide services.2 In addition, the Appellants argue that the County imposes impermissible conditions upon any unincorporated areas that now wish to incorporate.

After trial, the district court dismissed the Appellants’ constitutional claims on two separate g round s. First, the court co ncluded that the vo te dilution claim was no t justiciable b ecause th e App ellants did not offe r a viable r emedy. Levy v. Miam i-Dade Coun ty, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1284-87 (S.D. Fla. 2003). In an alternative analysis, after assuming that UMSA w as a distinct geopolitical jurisdiction, the district court examined the merits of the Appellants’ Equal Protection claims with respect to both vote dilution and to the conditions imposed upon newly incorporating areas. It concluded that rational bases existed for the Coun ty’s existing electoral an d incorp oration s chemes .

1 The current, single-member district scheme was established following this Court’s decision in Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 908 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1990). 2 The Appellants concede that the County has devised new policies to address some of these concerns but insist that the conflicting interests of County Commission members mean these efforts will not be successful.

Although justiciability presents a central issue in this case, the nature of the term has been so mewh at difficult to define p recisely. In general, ju sticiability “is the term of art employed to give expression to [the] limitation placed upon federal courts by the case-and-controversy doctrine.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). In essence, justiciability asks whether “a claim . . . may be resolved by the courts.” Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993). However, as the Supreme Court has noted, the concept of justiciability “has become a blend of constitutional requirements and policy considerations” with “uncertain and shifting contours.” Flast, 392 U.S. at 97. Generally, justiciability encompasses a range of doctrine s such as standing , see Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U .S. 316 , 329 (1 999) (“T hus, the o nly open justiciability question in this case is whether appellees satisfy the requirements of Article III standing .”); moo tness, see City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000) (describ ing mo otness as a questio n of justic iability); ripe ness, see Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 123 S. Ct. 2026, 203 0 (2003) (“Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed ‘to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements’”); political qu estion, see Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228 (“A controversy is nonjusticiable — i.e., involv es a politica l question — w here ther e is ‘a textua lly demo nstrable *5 constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it...’”); and the proh ibition ag ainst adv isory op inions, see Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U .S. 1, 9 (1973) (“ no justiciable controversy is presented when . . . the parties are asking for an advis ory opin ion”). See also Erwin Chem erinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 44-48 (3d ed. 1999) (describing justiciability as comprising these doctrines). A t times, howe ver, the S uprem e Cour t has imp lied a sligh tly differen t categoriz ation. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U .S. 186 , 198-2 09 (19 62) (trea ting stand ing sepa rately from b oth sub ject matter ju risdiction and justic iability).

Regardless of the precise contours of justiciability, there is no doubt that the Appe llants mu st demo nstrate tha t the feder al courts h ave the p ower to grant a viable remedy. Before adjudicating a matter before it, a federal court must decide “wheth er the du ty asserted can be ju dicially iden tified and its breach judicially determin ed, and w hether p rotection for the rig ht asserted can be ju dicially molded.” Id. at 198. In this case, the only aspect of justiciability at issue is the concern that a judic ially mold able rem edy exist to protect th e App ellants’ righ t to vote that has allegedly been infringed upon by the current County electoral scheme. Like the district court, we can see no viable remedy under the circumstances here that could be granted by a federal court to redress the *6 Appellants’ alleged constitutional injury.3 We thus conclude that their voting rights claim is not justiciable. However, even if it were justiciable, we would agree with the district cou rt’s thoro ugh an alysis of th e merits o f the claim . See Levy, 254 F. S upp. 2d at 1 288-129 1. In addition, w e agree with th e district court’s conclusion that the County has shown a rational basis for the County’s current incorpo ration sch eme. See id. at 1292-96 . We therefo re affirm the district co urt’s judgment in favor of the C ounty.

AFF IRM ED.

3 We note that some of the cases cited by the district court concern appropriate remedies in the special context of claims brought under the Voting Rights Act rather than questions of justiciability. See, e.g., Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992); Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1199 (11th Cir. 1999). However, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that the Appellants failed to meet their general burden of demonstrating that a viable remedy exists.