Quentin Young v. City of Chicago

PER CURIAM. In 1996 the Democratic national convention was held in Chicago and the city authorities, determined to prevent a repetition of the riots that had occurred in 1968 (the last time the Democratic convention was held in Chicago), established a security perimeter around the convention center and excluded all protesters, in alleged violation of the First Amendment. Would-be demonstrators obtained an injunction against the City. The City waited until the convention was over before appealing the injunction, and we therefore dismissed the appeal as moot, the injunction having been limited to demonstrations at that convention. The plaintiffs then moved in the district court for, and obtained, an award of attorneys’ fees. The City appeals from that award, arguing that since the suit became moot before a definitive determination of its merits by this court, the plaintiffs cannot obtain fees. Not so. A defendant cannot defeat a plaintiffs right to attorneys’ fees by taking steps to moot the case after the plaintiff has obtained the relief he sought, for in *1001 such a case mootness does not alter the plaintiffs status as a prevailing party. E.g., National Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia Board of Elections & Ethics, 168 F.3d 525, 528-29 (D.C.Cir.1999); Associated General Contractors of Connecticut, Inc. v. City of New Haven, 41 F.3d 62, 68 and n. 9 (2d Cir.1994); Martinez v. Wilson, 32 F.3d 1415, 1422 n. 8 (9th Cir.1994); Dahlem v. Board of Education, 901 F.2d 1508, 1512 (10th Cir.1990); Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1108-09 (D.C.Cir.1986); Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics, 686 F.2d 1278, 1289-91 (8th Cir.1982). And the amount sought here was reasonable. AFFIRMED.