Com. v. Baggetta, R.

J-A14003-22 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : RUTH ANNA BAGGETTA : : Appellant : No. 893 MDA 2020 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 14, 2020 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-35-CR-0001286-2018 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 09, 2022 Appellant, Ruth Anna Baggetta, appeals from the aggregate judgment of sentence of 30 to 72 months’ incarceration, followed by 7 years’ probation, imposed after a jury convicted her of institutional sexual assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3124.2(a.2)(1), endangering the welfare of a child, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1), corruption of a minor, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(ii), furnishing alcohol to a minor, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6310.1(a), and failing to report or refer, 23 Pa.C.S. § 6319(a)(1). Appellant raises various issues on appeal, including challenges to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, and the discretionary aspects of her sentence. After careful review, we affirm. Appellant was convicted of the above-stated offenses based on evidence that she and her husband abused a minor, female victim over the course of ____________________________________________ • Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-A14003-22 several months.1 More specifically, Appellant’s husband, who was a former substitute teacher at the victim’s high school, began a sexual relationship with the victim during her sophomore year in high school. The victim testified that Appellant, who was also a teacher and the band director at the school, knew about the victim’s sexual relationship with Appellant’s husband and, on one occasion, Appellant participated with the victim in performing oral sex on her husband. The victim testified that she regularly stayed overnight at Appellant’s home, sometimes sleeping in the bed between Appellant and her husband. The relationship culminated with Appellant, her husband, and the victim getting matching wrist tattoos. Ultimately, the victim told her psychologist about the relationship, who then reported it to authorities. Appellant and her husband were arrested and charged with various offenses. They were tried together before a jury in June of 2019. After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Appellant of the above-stated crimes, and her husband of similar offenses. Appellant was sentenced on January 14, 2020, to the aggregate term set forth supra. She filed a timely post-sentence motion, which was not ruled on by the court within the requisite 120 days. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a). Appellant preaciped the clerk of courts to enter an order denying her post-sentence motion by operation of law pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c). Instead of the clerk of courts doing so, ____________________________________________ 1 Appellant’s husband was her co-defendant at trial, and his appeal from the judgment of sentence imposed after he was convicted is before this Court at docket number 892 MDA 2020. -2- J-A14003-22 however, the trial court entered an order on June 25, 2020, denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion. Appellant then filed a notice of appeal on June 29, 2020.2,3 Appellant also complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. The court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on October 7, 2021. Herein, Appellant states the following issues for our review: A. Weight of the Evidence i. Whether the trial court incorrectly denied Appellant’s Motion for a New Trial/Judgment of Acquittal when presented with the following regarding the weight of the evidence: that the jury’s determination that Appellant committed the crime of institutional sexual assault, is so contrary to the evidence presented, or lack thereof, as to shock the conscience, so as to warrant a new trial, in light of the fact that there was no physical or corroborative evidence of sexual activity, no digital evidence suggesting ____________________________________________ 2 Appellant incorrectly stated in her notice of appeal that she is appealing from the June 25, 2020 order denying her post-sentence motion. An appeal properly lies from the judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001) (en banc). We have corrected the caption accordingly. 3 Because the clerk of courts never entered an order denying Appellant’s post- sentence motion by operation of law, and the court’s order was entered outside the 120-day period, Appellant’s June 29, 2020 notice of appeal could be considered untimely. However, this Court has held that a breakdown in the operations of the court occurs when the clerk of courts fails to enter an order deeming a post-sentence motion denied by operation of law as required by Rule 720(B)(3)(c). See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 498-99 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we decline to quash this appeal. -3- J-A14003-22 sexual activity, and both Appellant and [her] co-defendant denied said sexual activity? ii. Whether the trial court incorrectly denied Appellant’s Motion for a New Trial/Judgment of Acquittal when presented with the following regarding the weight of the evidence: that the jury’s determination that [Appellant] engaged in a course of conduct that violated a duty of care to the victim, is so contrary to the evidence presented, or lack thereof, as to shock the conscience, so as to warrant a new trial, in light of the fact that [Appellant] repeatedly encouraged [the] alleged victim to seek psychiatric help, repeatedly consulted with the alleged victim’s parents regarding her mental health, took steps to check on the health and well-being of the alleged victim, and the fact that although there were thousands of contacts between [co-] defendant and the alleged victim, none were shown to have placed her in danger, or were shown to have either established a duty of care or that duty of care was violated? iii. Whether the trial court incorrectly denied Appellant’s Motion for a New Trial/Judgement [sic] of Acquittal when presented with the following regarding the weight of the evidence: whether the jury’s determination that [Appellant] corrupted the morals of a minor by committing the crime of institutional sexual assault, is so contrary to the evidence presented, or lack thereof, as to shock the conscience, so as to warrant a new trial, in light of the fact that there was no physical or corroborative evidence of sexual activity, [and] no digital evidence suggesting sexual activity? iv. Whether the trial court incorrectly denied Appellant’s Motion for a New Trial/Judgment of Acquittal when presented with the following regarding the weight of the evidence: that the jury’s determination that [Appellant] furnished alcohol to a minor, is so contrary to the evidence presented, or lack thereof, as to shock the conscience, so as to warrant a new trial, in light of the fact that there was no evidence of the alleged victim being under the influence of alcohol, or testimony as to the effects of the purported alcohol on the alleged victim such that one could infer her ingestion of an actual alcoholic substance? v. Whether the trial court incorrectly denied Appellant’s Motion for a New Trial/Judgment of Acquittal when -4- J-A14003-22 presented with the following regarding the weight of the evidence: that the jury’s determination that [Appellant] committed the crime of failure to report, is so contrary to the evidence presented, or lack thereof, as to shock the conscience, so as to warrant a new trial, in light of the fact that there was no physical or corroborative evidence of sexual activity, no digital evidence suggesting sexual activity, and both [Appellant] and [her] co-defendant denied said sexual activity, such that there would be nothing to report? B. Sufficiency of Evidence i. Whether the adjudication of guilt for endangering the welfare of [a] child[] is based upon insufficient evidence where the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there existed a duty of care and support for the alleged victim and/or that the duty of care and support was violated? ii. Whether the adjudication of guilt for furnishing alcohol to minors is based on insufficient evidence where the Commonwealth failed to establish by either direct or circumstantial evidence that … any alcohol was provided to a minor in that there was no testing of the purported alcoholic substance, there was no testimony of impact suffered as a result of substance, nor any testimony regarding the minor’s prior experience or knowledge of effects? iii. Whether the adjudication of guilt for failure to report is based upon insufficient evidence where the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was anything to report, in that the Commonwealth failed to present physical or corroborative evidence of sexual activity, no digital evidence suggesting sexual activity, and both Appellant and her co-defendant denied said sexual activity, such that there would be nothing to report? C. Denial of pre-trial Motion for Review of Psychological Records Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying Appellant’s request that an in[-]camera review of [the victim’s] psychological records be conducted, when there was no showing that the entirety of the requested materials -5- J-A14003-22 would be covered … pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 5944 and Appellant was therefore denied full and fair cross- examination? D. Denial of Request for Mistrial following Pedophile Comments in Closing Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant [Appellant’s] request for a mistrial, following the prosecutor twice referring to the Appellant and her co-defendant as “pedophiles” during closing arguments; thereby prejudicing the jury in such a manner as it was impossible for jury people to render a fair and impartial verdict? E. Sentencing i. Whether the trial court erred in sentencing Appellant to an aggregate sentence of thirty to seventy-two (30-72) months[’] total confinement, followed by seven (7) years[’] probation, [which,] while in the standard range of the applicable guideline[s,] was not “necessary” to address “the nature of the circumstances of the crime” in light of “the history, character and condition of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. §[]9725. To the contrary, the extent of the confinement imposed was not “consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community[,] and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” [42 Pa.C.S.] §[]9721(b)? ii. Whether the trial court erred in the imposition of sentence, in failing to give adequate weight to the mitigating factors offered in favor of [Appellant] and a mitigated range sentence, specifically the length of time [Appellant] spent in prison and on home confinement without incident, her young child, her family support, the community support evidenced both at trial and in sentencing letters, her lack of a prior record or any involvement with the criminal justice system? Appellant’s Brief at 10-14 (some unnecessary capitalization omitted). In assessing Appellant’s issues, we have reviewed the certified record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law. Additionally, we have -6- J-A14003-22 examined the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Michael J. Barrasse of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County. We conclude that Judge Barrasse’s 58-page, comprehensive opinion accurately disposes of the issues presented by Appellant. Accordingly, we adopt Judge Barrasse’s opinion as our own and affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence for the reasons set forth therein. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 08/09/2022 -7- QQ ,, •• xx • 1 r'CirVAPA 07'H72CY22 0 : COMMON FALTS OF 8.N THE COtR'T'OF CO1MON'PLLAS PENNSYLVANIA OF1A.CKAWANNA COUNTY V4 CRBHNALDIVXSION RUTH A.BAGGETTA 18 CR 1286 PP.IIl roN BAItRASSF. J This opinion is fitted pursuant to Rule 1_925(a} of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure and pursuant to the request of the Superior Court,The Appellant' s.issues for appeal are as follows: L Whether the trial court incorrectly denied Defendant' sNotion for aNew TrIaUJndgement of Acquittal when presented with the following regarding the weight of evidence and/or whether the jury's determinadoia is so contrary, to the evidence presented or the lack thereof, shocking the Conscience,such as to warrant a new trial[ as to the offense of Instituti onal Sexual Assault when there was no physleal or corroborative evidence of sexual activity,no digital evidence suggesting sexual alAvitT3 Vnd-_bn*_Ddn*mta "~endsiut dcuidlwaaTe=al activity: Z. Whether the trial court incorrectly denied Defendant' sMotion for aNew • • Trial/Judgement o£Acgaiittal when presented with the following reg@irding,the weighty of evidence andlor whether the jury' sdetein&atton is so contrary to the evidence presented or the lack thereof,shocking the consdence,such as to warrant a new trial as to the offense of Endangering Welfare of Children,finding a "course of conduct,°' when the Defendant repeatedly.encouragedall egedvictim to seek psychiatric help, repeatedly coundted with the alleged victim'spareuts regarding, .her mental health,took steps to check on the health and well-being of the alleged victim,. and the.fact. that.although.there.w+ere.thousands. of contacts between Defendant and the alleged victim, none were shown to have placed her in danger, or were shown to have either established aduty of care or that aduty of care was violated? 3. Whether the trial court inco gd•Gdenied Defendant's Motion for aNew Tri&JudgeZnent of Ac , ttV:1tJt the following regarding the weight of evlclenee p I•a f terminatiou. is. sa contrary to. tha evidence presented or t elack %,' ¢¢ s the consdence, such as to w;arrasta new trial as to the offVVe 3)f&o•p •bn•ors, finding aviolation of asexual offense under the crimes code I I•• no physical or corroborative evidence — 2 — of sexual activity,no digital evidence suggesting sexual activity,and both Defendant' and Co-Defendant denied sexual activity? 4. Whether the trial court incorrectly denied Defendant' sMotion for aNew THRUJudgement of Acquittal when presented with the following regarding the weight of evidence and/or whether the fury's determination is so contrary to the evidence presented or the lack thereof,shocking the conscience,such as to warrant a new trial as to the offense of Famishing Alcohol to a1Vlinor,when there was no evidence of the alleged victim being under the influence of alcohol or testimony as to the effects of the purported alcohol on the alleged victim such that one could infer her ingestion of an actual alcoholic substance? S. Whether the trial court incorrectly deuced Defendant's Motion for aNew Trlol/Judgqmnt of Acqulttal when presented with the following regarding the weight of evidence and/or whether the fury's determination is so contrary to the evidence presented or the lack thereof,shocking the conscience, such as to warrant a new trial as to the offense of Failure to Report,when there was no physical or corroborative evidence of sauml activity, no digital evidence suggesting sexual activity,and both Defendant and Ca-Defendant deni edsaid sexual activity, such tha# there would be nothing to report? 6. Whether the trial. court Incorrectly denied Defendant's Motion for aNew TrIall.Tudgement of Acquittal when presented with the following regarding the sufficiency of the evidence anchor whether the evidencewas i nsuffici en t to support tho fty'a ;G,ad•tng guilt" a ta-khe-offeus oft rdaYrgeritrg bd-- who nthe Comrnantvealth failed to present evidence establishing that there existed a dotty of care and support for .the alleged victim and/or that the duty of care and support was luau. way vlolated? 7. Whether the trial court incorrectly denied- Defendant'sMotion for aNew Trial/Judgement of Acquittal when presented with the following regardnig the sufgcleney of the evidence and/or whether the evidence was Insufficient to support the fury's finding of guilt as to the offense of Furnishing Alcohol to aWinor when the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence that an actual alcoholic beverage was-fumbhed• to•& minor in that dwewas. na testimony.regarding victun's knowledge of or prior ezperience with alcoholic beverages,or testimony regarding any impact suffered as sresult of ingesting the purported "alcoholic" beverage? 8. Whether the trial court incorrectly dented Defendant' sMotion for aNew TriaVJudgement of Acquittal when presented with the following regarding the saffifctency of the evidence and/or whether the evidence was insufficient to support thenfaryls finding-of gent as to the offense of Faffure to-Reportwben the Commonwealth failed to present physical or corroborative evidence of sexual activity,no digital evidence suggesting sexual activity,and both (Defendant and Co-- Defendant denied said sexual activity, such that there would be nothing to report ? — 3 — 9. Whether the trial court erred iin failing to grantDUefendant''s pretH i ' motfun for Lamination or in camera examination of the alleged victim's psychological records when the mental health of the victim was at issue in the trial, the records could have supported elements of Defendant' s, defense,and when there would have been no harm to the victim,as the defense sought ap in camera review,and that any perceived harm to the victim would be substantially outweighed by the harm posed to the Defendant in not disclosing said records resulting in the abrogation of the Defendant' sSixth Amendment confrontation rights under bothi ff6 United' States and the Pennsylvania constitutions? 10. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant Defendant' srequest for amIstrial, following the prosecutor twice referring to the Defendant as a "pedophHe," during closing arguments prejudicing the jury, so as to render aTair and impartial verdict? 11. Whether the trial court erred In the imposition of sentence of 2 % to 5years and 2 months total confinement,while in tie standard range was not "necessary" to address the " nature and circumstances of the crime"in light of the history, character and condition of the Defendant and was not "consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the comminity and rehabfflb fve needs of the defendant?" U. Whether the trial court erred in the imposition of sentence;in failing to give adequate weight to the mitigating factors.offered in favor of1)efendant and a. mitigated range sentenee,specifically the length of time Defendant spent in prison andmEr went-withoutiucfdEca•lreryoungchild;herfamiiy-support-th community support evidenced both at trial and in sentencing letters, her lack of prior record or any involvement with the criminal justice system? 13. Whether the trial court erred regarding the.sentencing ofthe Endaugerkg the Welfare of Children count as athird degree felony,when the Criminal hiformation failed to allege ai°course of conduct"required for the enhanced grading, regardless of the specific question posed to the fury on the verdict slip? 14. Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's Motion for Ball Pending Appeal .when there was already asignificant amount of time in j4 served,,. and Defendant presents no threat to the community and/or victim, has both family and commnnity support, presents no flight risk,as evidenced by the feet that while previously on bail and on home confinement she appeared' for all required court appearances and committed no bail or home confimeinent violations,and desires to both begin the process of rebuilding her life and actively participate in the preparation of her appeal? — 4 — FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL IIMSTQRY Appellant, Ruth A. Baggetta, music teacher, and band director at Lakeland High School in Scott Township, Pennsylvania became the focus of an investigation conducted by the Lackawanna County District Attoiney's Office "Special'Victim's Unit,"" when. eighteen (18) 1C•1Yh year old disclosed incidences of abuse to her counselor. Being amandated reporter, the counselor refelsed.the incidences of abuse to C'l, WLine zUpon receipt of the ChildLme referral and report, Lakeland School District resource officer Frank Rapoch of the Scott Township Police Department contacted Deflective Michelle Mancuso ofthe Lackawanna. County District Attorney's Office, "Special Victim's Unit." - Detective Mancuso extensively • vli YYl , interviewed 4mW w&o provided detailed descriptions of amanipulative and intimate sexual relationship involving thesAppellaniy.hex band teacher, and the Appellant's husband,,Nicodemo Baggetta3berg in 2015 through 201$. Ask1 e dt vfIhoiu vcstigattu , 0 C ,Bo or. i F Commonwealth charged the Appellant with the following offenses: one (1) count of Institutional Sexual Assault 18 Pa. C. S. §31U.2; one (1) count of Endangering the Welfare of Children Parent/Givardian,18 Pa. C.S. §43 04 (it) (1); one (1) mount of Comaption of Minors- Defendant age 18 or above, 19 Pa C.S. §6301(a)(l)CA); one (1) count of Failure to 11pportlRefer, 23 Pa. C.S. §6319(a)(1); (2)(i)(ft and due (I)-count of Fuuniab-11q xor or WtBev ataa Minou,.I& Pa. C.S. §6310.1,(a). On June 10, 2019, the Commonwealth amended the Criminal Information to I IThe "Special. Victim's Unit" investigates orin w against ohildrea, including physical and sexual abuse against children. "CliMine is aobild ' abuse hotUw dmrrovides ameans f ormaudated• reportem to•report ehild•abuso in PenMlvania. 3The Commonwealth also charged Mcodeaxo Bagge2ta with the following offenses: School-hdmvowwAexnal Contact with Student; 18 Pa. C.S. §3124.2(a.2)(1); Endangering Welfare of Children- Pamt/Cruardian,18 Pa. C.S. §43Oga)(1); Corruption of Minors- Dependant age 18 or above, 18 Pa. C.S. § 6301 (a)(1)(hT, an4 Fkmmbh Liquor or Malt Beverage to aMimr, 18 Pa. C.S. §6310.1(a). Nicodemo Baggefta is the listed Appellamtin Commonwealth v, NlcodemoBagwttN 2020 WDA 892. — 5 — i the following offmses:School htercoauselSexual Contact with Student,18N. C.S. §3n4:2' (a.2)(1); Endangering the Welfare of Children-Parent/ Guardian,18 ]Pa.C.S. §4304( a)(1); one (1) count of Convption of Wmors- Defendant age 18 or above,18 Pa C. S. 630I a 1 one (1) count of Failure to Report/Refer, . 23 Pa. C.S. §6319( a)(1), (2)(i)(iii); and one ( 1) count of Furnish Liquor or Malt Beverage to aMinor, 19 Pa. C.S. § 6310.1(a). Subsequently, the Appellant proceeded to athree ( 3) day juy trial4on each of the above- cited offenses. (Notes to Testimony hereinafter, "N.T." June 17,20319- June 19, 2019). During trial,the Commonwealth presented five (5) witnesses and admitted multiple exiu'bits, including avoluminous PertLink database report documenting text and call uen des between " and the Appell=4 and a and the Appellant' shusband,icodemo N ggetta.Ba The Pen- Link database report also included the dates and times in which the text and call, frequencies 'occtured.At the conclusion of the Commonwealth' sevidence,counsel for the Appellant made •irforj•rdgmentofacquittal-•vhi•ehrt3aix- GonrMd mte-••Q + • - 14). The Appellant testified as well as the Appellant's husband, Mcodemo Baggetts, and four (4) character witnesses testifying Jointly as to both the Appellant's character and her husband, Nicodemo Baggetta's character; Accordingly,after observing all testimonial evidence and exhibits presented, including receiving several-instractions .Provided . by this.COUtt,. the.Jury. found the Appellant guilty, on all five (5) Counts of the Criminal Information.Relative to the grading of the Bndangering Welfare of Children offense,the jury Sound the additional fact that the Appellant engaged in a "course of conduct." Also, relative to the grading of the Corruption of Minors offense,the jury found the additional fact that the Appellant engaged in a "course of conduct." To that end this Court aThis Court granted the COJUMOnwaalths Motion fur Joinder and joined for trial the above-captioned Appellant with her husbaud, Nc:odeato RWetm on November 9,20 18. — 6 — xequested apre-sentence investigation report (hereinafter `TSI") as well as an assessment'by the Pennsylvania Sexual Offenders Assessment Board. Inpreparation forsenteneey this Court thoroughly reviewed the Sentencing Guidelines, as well as the PSI, aSentencing Memo dated. _ September 27, 2019, the Pennsylvania Sexual. Offender's Assessment Board report; including all mitigating and aggravating factors, as well as the victim impact statement, and oral statements by the Appellant's parents, including several letters authored by extended family members and friends. Additionally, this Court carefully comdared the Appellant's underlying criminal conduct, the abuse of authority, manipulation, seriousness, and frequency ofthe Appellant's offenses, as well as the particularized facts associated with the Appellant' sconduct,placing an th6':mu "ve'at's teaclierand already vulnerable. student at risk. T eAgpellant'a,pasitdhl' s .bandtins ructiir" rio5iedthe.basis,whereb ,th Appellant'oli lined iimpx er anddestraC#ve coati—Wawr=lheMeWn, who needed to be protected. Tli"ppellant occupied-asaf (Went p_.. ... ty`ti `lOu iWIC."to-UQWaL``the vii:fleL.forrep'olting"the-Se succinctly stated: "you did not have the adolesc 'sbest interest as your priority." (N.T January 14, 2020 p. 13). Therefore, this Court sentenced in the standard gauge on each offense for an ggrgg •sentieai•`ofthirty` (30) `lo seventy 'lvva"(72)`moitths iiI' a' late cmreetional. Id' Subsequently, on January 24, 2020 the Ap eltaut filed aPost-Sentence Motion challenging the-wei&t.and.suffzcienay. of die evi ce, evidentiary. rulings, and discrationary aspects of sentencing. The Appellant requested a educed sentence, visitation with her child, and bail. pending appeal or house arrest. This Court h ld ahearing on the Appellant's Post-Sentence Motions on March 10, 2020. Subsegaeutly, this Court denied the Appellant's Post- Sentence Motion on June 25, 2020, and the Appellant tamely filed aNotice ofAppeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. — 7 — DISCUSSION I. Whether the trial court incorrectly denied Defendant' sMotion for aNew Trial/Judgement of Acquittal when presented with the following regarding the weight of evidence and/or whether the fury's determination is so contrary to the evidence presented or the lack thereof;shocking the conscience,such as to warrant a new trial as to the offense of Institutional Sexual Assault when there was no physical or corroborative evidence of sexual activity,no digital evidence suggesting sexual activity,and both Defendant and Co- Defendant denied said sexual activity? 2. Whether the trial court incorrectly denied Defendant' sMotion for aNew Trial/Judgement of Acquittal when presented with the following regardtnng the weight of evidence and/or whether the jury's determination is so contrary to the evidence presented or the back thereof,shocking the conscience,such as to warrant a new trial as to the offense of Endangering Welfare of Children,ftndixig a"course of conduct," when the Defendant repeatedly encouraged alleged victim to seek psychiatric help, repeatedly consulted with the alleged victim' sparents regarding her mental health, tdok steps to check on the health and well-being of the alleged victim,and the fact that although there were thousands of contacts between Defendant and the alleged victim,none were shown to have placed her in danger, or ware shown to.have either established aduty of care or that aduty of care was violated? 3. Whether the trial court incorrectly denied Defendant' sMotion for aNew 'x't•iaUJudgement-ofA•gni•₹alwhen resented- 9v•rfihe•oIlowing•eg•rdling-the weight of evidence and/or whether the jury' sdetermination is so contrary to the evidence presented or the lack thereof shucking the conscience, such as to warrant a new-trial-as-to - the offehse. of C6=upxidux.ofMlnors,.tlnding. aviolation of asexual offense under the crimes code when there tias no physical or corroborati ve evidence of sexual act vlty, no digital evidence suggesting sexual activity, and both Defendant md. Co- Defendant denied sexual activity? 4. Whether the trial court incorrectly denied Defendant' sMotion for aNew Trial/Judgement of Acquittal when presented with the following regarding the weight; of evidence and/ar whether- the Jwyl s.determfnation.is so contrary to the evidence presented or the lack thereof,shocking the conscience,such as to warrant a new trial as to the offense of Furnishing Alcohol to aMinor, when there was no evidence of the alleged victim being under the influence of alcohol or testimony as to the effects of the purported alcohol on the alleged victim such that one could Infer her ingestion of an actual alcoholic substance? s. Whether the trial court incorrectly denied Defendant' s. Notion for aNew Trial/Judgement of Acquittal when presented with the following regarding the weight of evidence and/or whether the jmy's determination is so contrary to the evidence presented or the lack thereat;shoeldng the conscience, such as to warrant a new trial as to the offense of Failure to Report,when there was no physical or — 8 — corroborative evidence of sexual activzty, no digital evidence suggesting sexual activity, and both Defendant and Co-Defendant denied said sexual activity, such that there would be nothing to report? The Appellant's claims one (1) -- five (5) challenge the weight of the evidence and have been consolidated herein, by ft Covert. The weight of the evidence supports the jury's verdict as to all offenses charged, including the additionOIldoiffse ` of t impfict Wense "gr"a iiig: See Commonwealth v. Sjp4ers, 42 A..3d 325, 331 (Pa. Super. 2012)(quedng CowwonweaM Y. ]hies, 949 A.2d 873, 880 (Pa. 2008)("[A] trial courNs denial of apost-sentence,motion 'based on aweight of the evidence claim is the least assailable of its rulings.'j. The determination of whether to grant anew trig because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence rests with the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless the trial-court has abused•its.disc nfm. Commonwealth v. Pronldopk4e,.445 A.2d 1203,1206 (Pa. 1982). A claim that the evidence presented at trial was contradictory and unable to support the so contiranyto-the-evxden ce-as-co shock one's sense ofJustice. Commonwealth v. Saksek, 522 A.2d 70, 72 (Pa. Super. M7). Moreover, the weight to be accorded conflicting evidence is exclusively for tie fact Ender, whose findings will not be disturbed on appeal if they are supported by the record. !Pomwonwealtb v. Zgpa% 290 A.2d 114,117 (Pa. 1972); See also Pe mmouiweaItb Y. ,PAPMtoa;• 546'•A:.2d 90•, 9"6 (Fas Saner-. 1988), a)ilocator d Wed ,.558 A.0 531 (1989)(holding that the scope of review for aclaim that averdict is against the weight of the evidence is very narrow, especially where issues of credibility are concerned, it is not the fitnction of the appellate courtf to substitute its judgments based on acold record for that of the trial court), Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 402,40$ (Pa. 2003)(the weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of the — 9 — evidence and to determine the cre(libiliiy of the witnesses j... ] 'an appellate court's role is not' to consider the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim); Commonwealth Y. Sanders, 42 A.3dl 325, 331 (Pa. Super. 2012)C`A jury decision to credit certain evidence and reject other testimony is appropriate; therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that its sense ofjustice was not shocked by the verdict."). Applying the above standards to the instant case, the Appellant' sguilty verdict does not shock ore's sense ofjustice such that it its against the weight of the evidence. The record supports the jury's finding of guilt;including the additional " course of conduct"factor. In this case, the Commonwealth presented five (5) witnesses, including the victim.At trial, the jury heard detailed,and traumatizing testimony from Idelta Leader, the victim,who revealed an nai7elatro rs i p 'oa r#] ` _'. an i6a•dbpd instnxctgr,•:and the Appellmot's husband,Nicodemo Baggetta fueled by vulnerabilities and positions,carM by elgtven ih6usand ( 11;000)phone contacts via text or•caii • and=ultimatelys. - marrhirig• tatfoos•, testified that during her sophomore year at Lakeland High School,iu the spring of 20-16fshe assisted w9h. the.school's.procb1atien o£"Annie" as amember of the lighting crew. V. Ohm (Notes to Testimony, June 17, 201.9 p. 28, 66). recalled,Hid the- Aw!.!J%pt's husband, Nicodemo Baggetta also, assW with the play' sproduction,,. and #heir_ re flfship # developed, She'stafe "Throughout the Aor, playa started talking to Nick more outside of school usually, tlrciilgh' Sriapclitit:" mod. at 31., 67. At the same time, described a "hectic," home life with VicfIM her parents,who decided to divorce.dg. M testified that she cofrimuiueate3 *omiatey with — 10 — ttie ,Appellaut' §liiisliaild' through talking and'textiEng on his cellphone and'tbrough Facebook messenger.Td. at 32,70. She i ndicated that the private texting increased in frequency when the Appellant's husbad. cgaxed liar iritn 6realing:up•wiGth her boyfriend. Id, at 33-34,42-43. The ..• - Vi vti rn Appellant' slsla•d" eitpressed-that " nobody was going to be able to treat [,O {getter than he would." .at 43. BY the play'sconclusion, tes•ed that she had dinner with. the .Appellant and the Appellant' shusband, and while only sixteen (16) years old,she had been retained by the couple to photograph their engagement,among other thing.4. a at 35- 36, 74.Shortly thereafter, the jLLati Appellant and the Appellant' shusband would randomly visit mat her jobs. She stated; "Ido know that they did visit meat pretty much, every job that Ihad" j(j at 38, On other occasions, the Apgellaiif Uri drew pe11' it3s'lit Vand ' WQWId° iii. "`II•yt O:the AWql " xt'.s•.alrartme3•t and.: eventaally;the coUtple'•b s' fte. taestiffted: Id. st 38. • `Tmean,once Istarted seeing them uutskk-ofsclroOAHt wa sprobalrly-weeldy-that I vas- diumv oxIwa t we- wenttb- dinnrr ox-lh: iii 0i M there outside school." Ldd at 41. Meanwhile,' recalled that theZppelladt. $again to.- prrvately , 66m- municate. with•hei'mbbe freguentiy She noted that the Appellant privately t , Vi ( Am co. minks# vnth her everyday. Ld. IM testified that the Appellant' shusband admitted he discussed his "feelings"towards Joella with the Appellant.In response,theeAppeltRnt xd6f t ii6ded that her husband a Joe Ia "W•dri'filiose feclin sfl to kind of sweep t1ae- under the-mg..[ : <Jtkind 6 tiissIaad-get pvei• it." Id. at43-44. Vi ct\w To that end, the A,ppel J IW' s•hWbadd begau'a.'sexual relationship with •. She testified that the sexual relationship i nitiated with " sexual"Snapehats from the Appellant's husband,who directed her to delete the chats_Id. at X57; (N''.T.June 18, 2019 p. b). V'i O\M Specifically, 4M testified that in May 2016, the Appellant' shusband began kissing her, pniting — 11 — Vi (-firn down her pants and touching the outside of her vagim lyd. at 4,145.IM explained: -once, I' was there Ruth had kind of said' that there was not to be-anything more thaw kissing.So when that was happening Nick was land of like, well,why should there be boundaries on emotions or feelings VialM [ ... ] why don' tyou let me, [ ... ] makp,you feel better." P. at 45. Afterwards, ! testified to at least ten (10) additional sexual incidences with the Appellant's husband, including perfomaing oral sex on the Appellant's husband,receiving oral sex from the Appellant' shusband and engaging in and sex with the Appellant's husband. Ld,. at 4b-50, 78. V, CAI M recalled that the Appellant's husband pressured her into having anal sex steiting that "it was something that Rath wouldn't do with him and that he had never done that with anybody and that lwas his last chance [ ... ] it was afirst that he, wanted to have with me; and Ibelieved Vii vtiYr- that at' the time." dT. at 49 Additionally, UM recalled that the Appellt. also engaged iu sexualactivitywherein; the, - pellan ,and;1 ella.both-performed ordl•sex on the:Appellmt's Vi GAY" ..}2' liubU ..... t •ithcLe-to-visit- before3w utwitlrfiiends= [... ] Ruth and Nick were supposed to go to dinner with Ruth' sparents. And when Igot there, she had told me that she. told:Niek i Mf--ifhe.went_ to hex: parents'- . house, for,that dinner that we would both give: ; him;oraL"M. at 50.MOM testified that she - and theWpfellant`sivaiiltaaeously oral 'V1 Ohm performed sex i s •husband,Id, at 51, 83. OftexTIained that she would m the Appeant' regularly_ sleep at the Appellant' shouse oven- tight.L at 51,.75. She stated: "Iwouldn' tbe able to remember how many times. It was often.Luce,if Iwas seeing then, usually Iended up sleeping there quite abit [... ] Iiisu0y would sleep in then bed. with:them [ ... ] there were a •rn few times where Islept in the middle between the two of them. - Id. at 58. also explained that on some occasions,the Appellant' shusband groped her on the outside of her clothes and underneath her clothes,all over her stomach, butt, and in between her legs, while she slept next — 12 — to him and the Appellant. Id. at 5g-59. •9even discussed moving into the couples douse. V, at 57. She recalled other occasions wherein the Appellant would be downstairs while V , t*YY! -:... . smoked marijuana with the Appellant's husband - upstairs. L at 59. 'also noted an occsiuh vvlteteiri:theAppellantrovidel lies' witfi wine: Id. Finally, to solidify and symbolize the intimate and sexual relationship that transpired, the V101Al —W I" •an •obta mafcftk tattoos. Td. at 54-57. She descnbed previously researching aparticular tattoo with the Appellant and the Appellant's husband and then traveling to Blectric City Tattoo, whereupon they obtained atattoo with three birds on abranch. L at, 57. V%0 -PA The Commonwealth also produced evidence thatUft attended Lakeland High School through her sophomore year, during which the Appellant was employed as amusic. teacher and band-director:. fiti June 18,260. a. m.•sasslon p. ]LG,.>E8}. Lakeland School Distrint superintendent; William fling, testified that the Appellant's occupation deemed her a ` mandated •eporter"•fsuspected-dYid3'ab 1 9-•VIrl%ing-explainecl. "iwt-oni• Woil ' I w educators, [but] anyone that works with children are required, if there's any suspicion whatso ever of someone stepping over the line and doing something that is inappropriate with a child, whether that's sending inappropriate text messages, whether it's touching achild inappropriately or doing anything that's considered not appropriate or professional within their CertifieaAM" M at U Addition A1{y, Pzmarpal• of Fell, Charter Elementary. School,. Mary. Jo Walsh described how easily a "mandated reporter," could make areport of suspected child abuse. She explained: "There's multiple ways to do that. You can do that on-line through ChildLine. You can make aphone call. The goal is to get to--to make the report as soon as I possible" Id. at 28. Hypothetically, Ms. Walsh noted that i£ she were to become aware of a teacher having any type of inappropriate sexual conduct with astudent, she would "absolutely" — 13 — report the abuse.Ld. at 39. Similseiy,Detective Miclielle Mancuso testified.'that anyone under the age of eighteen ( 18) is considered achild.dI. at 43. Moreover,the Commonwealth also produced extensive evidence corroborating the magnitude of communications between the Appellant and Detective Mancuso testified Vi0i Ws that she obtained • cellphone number, the Appellant' scellphone number, and the Appellant' shusband' scellphone number. Yd. at: 46. Detective Mancuso confirmed the authenticity through the respective ceIlphone providers. Yd. at 47- 48, 50-53. She related that she obtained a "volurnirous" amount of Joella's phone records for the five ( 5) month period of June 11, 2016 through Novembdr 12, 2016.Id, at 48. Although unable to retrieve the content of the communications,Detective Mancuso testified that she employed asoftware program named PenLink, :which parsed out times, dates, _and frequency, of communications dI, at 53-54. Accordingly,Detective Tom Davis employed by the Lackawanna County District euty( 28jyea•r ofi'err= •i ciiYin S̀ software, testified that he utilized • phone records to create a "frequency lot number list." Id. at 106. Detective Davis explainers that Ỳrequency"connotatcs incoming and outgoing calls as well as text messages.Id. He further explained how he parsed out the "frequency"into time of day, day of week, and incoming or outgoing calls. Ld. at 11'7,1. 19. Detective Davis testified xhat. thhe frrequency between the.Appeflnot ands fr the period of Jim 11,. 2016 through November 11, 2016 totaled 11,227 contacts either voice or text Id. at 119,121. Detective Davis noted that: acontact occurred every day of the week with the most contact occurring on Thursdays and at all hours o£the day or night.Id. at 123. He stated: "starting at midnight and working your way from one, two, three, four, 5a. m. and so on up to 11 amL [ ... the most [call frequency]was between 10:00 a.m. and lp.m. and then starting again at 9p. m. to 11" Id. — 14 — at 124. i• n•1 Lastly, the Appellant testified that she became more talkative with upon the conclusion of the production o£ "Annie." ( N.']i'. June 18, 2019 pm. sesdon p. 38). luitially, the •V1 Appe lADt,communicated with•dhrou&hher husband. gd. at 39,79.. As the relationship progressed,the AppeIlanfi testified that photographed her erugagernent,attended the, Appellant's Wedding, stayed at the Appellant's house during their honeymoon, helped the Appellant move into her hous-,and stayed overnight at the Appellant' sDouse on several occasions. gd. at 47-48, 54-56, 59, 62, 72-73. The Appellant admitted that she communicated with V' c.1n via phone or text daily and "around the clock." Id. at 66, 68, 71. The Appellant also admitted that she communicated with other students through a » "app," while she communicated withOW directly and pr- ivatdy.She .stated:."1contactthem flnough an app thhat1had." 1d. at 68. The Appellant did not dispute that approximately 11,000 , frequency contacts occurred with V&IM Vi (AWA and • 1d.at 74.While the Appellant desmi- bed her communications with IG as "mentoring," the CommonweaM produced communications,topics, and behavior that demonstrated otherwise.For example, the Commonwealth presented texts wherein the tCA VIA Appellant advised to punch her co--worksr, sMng: "Fuck her, Bitch," as well as naming a teacher-culleaguaa " pussy," and: responding ".A- sFf:rk," to the amount of alcohol the Appellant V* C,fi nA consumed dx, at 77-79. Ultimately, while the Appellant expressed concern for" and a desire to mentor hte Appellant admitted that she did not consult aguidance counselor nor refer, "i, to tothe guidance counselor.L at 45,80. In £act, the Appellant admitted that she did chi not notify administration of her concerns far mental health and well-being. L at 84. Nevertheless,the Appellant chAenges the weight of the evidence by arguing that there is — 15 — no physical or corroborative evidence of sexual, activity regarding Count 1, IntercoiuselS' exual' Contact with Student, 18 Pa. C.S. §3124,2 (a.2)(1). Upon review, this Court found the victintSA vj(,•M , j testimony to be credible,and reliable enough for the jury to return averdict of guilty on Count Z As within its province,the jury believed that the Appellant and 110 engaged in oral ch sex withher rhhu•. sband,simultaneously,and in the presence of each other,during atime in which while• was astudent and the Appellant was ateachey,The,jmy heard Detective Mancuso and Detective Davis testify about the f requencyofcontact b he Appellant andf etween t V • K approximately 1.1,000 contacts within afive ( 5) month period.In fact, the Appellant testified Vi ahm that she did not contact students in the same way she contactedOW The jury was well aware of the unusual circumstances and inappropriate grooming behaviors initiated towards aminor shkle4j.e. .The. Appellant admitted to purchasing acamera lens as agift dinners, invitations to gang out," approximately a.-dozen or more sleepovers,obtAinir gmatching tattoos, s Vi60 I Vtictim 'Vi G•ilm yrtuMWuu ,mvi iuy,-wmhmrging--, ,, jurors listened to the Appellant tell them that she did not notify admi•nistratiort, nor ref to IM s the guidance counselordespite being concerned about mental health or suicidal ideabons throughout atwo ( 2) year period. The jury was well within its province to decide how much weight to give all the evidence presented at trial. Ccm#licts• between the testimonies . ofthe, vidimiand the Appellant are for the jury to resolve and not for the trial court to undertake. Anew vial should not be granted because of amere conflict in the testimony. Commonwealth. vWidmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 ( Pa, 2000). The jury weighed the evidence presented,evaluated the testimony of the victim and the witnesses,and made adate minstion thereupon It was entitled to believe the victim and to find the Appellant incredible.Although the Appellant' sversion of events denies — 16 — UIi lM sexual activity, the jury found and her testimony ereale and disoredifed that of the ►(hi►, Appellant's. While the ,appellant established an alternative theory that contradicted en testimony, it did not require the coadmion that the App ellantand" did not simultaneously engage in oral sex with the Appellant's husband Finally, the lack of corroborating physical evidence does not undermine testimony, found to be credible by the jury. rn' Indeed, Pennsylvania couiU have "long-recognized that the ancozroborated testimony of asexual, assault victim, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to convict adefendant, despite contrary evidence from defense witnesses." Commonwealth v Qarhon,902 A.2d 554, 562 (Pa. Super. 2006). The jay credited testimony as truthful and did not believe the i Appellant' sclaim that the allegations against the Appellant and the Appellant's husband were fabricated.See. • ComnwniWealth v SmA.741 Aid666,.672 (?a.190)(Notablx, the jury as the fact finder "is five to believe all, part or none of the evidence and to deWnnine the credibility n bt4, .- T :,• 11;, " . 0114. Commonwealth Y ;ette, 818 A. 2d 533, 534 ( Pa. Sup or. 2003)crt/ng Commonwealth Y,, Owens, 549 A.2d x29,133 (Pa.Super.1994); Commonwealth v. Castelhrm,889 A. 2d 1228, 1232 (Pa. Super.2005). This Court did not abuse its discretion, by denying the Appellant's Post-Sentence Motion for- au acquittal: or for. 4 -new,trial based, on the-weight of the- evidence. regarding. Count:x. Similarly, the Appellant challenges the weight of the evidence regarding Count II; Bndangering the Welfare of Children- Parent/Guardian,,18 Pa. C.S. § 4034(a)(1), by arguing VI m that the Appellant's actions were proactive and did not place in danger or violate aduly of care as no duty of care exiled. This Court is unconvinced by the Appellant's azgument, which is V IM based upon the Appellant's testimony that she directed! to seek counseling This is outside the purview o€ this Court as the jury is free to believe all, park or none of Die evidence and I6 determine the credibility of the witnesses. Mere, the fact finder was free to believe the testimony of MWwho testified that the Appellant and booth performed oral sex on the Appellant's v;GfiYYk husband.• stated: "Ihad stopped there to visit before Iwas going to hang out with friends [ ... ] Ruth and Nick were supposed to go to dinner wig Ruth's parents. And when Igot there; she had told me that she told Nick that if he went to her parents' house for that dinner that we V`ti`•fi•►n would both give him oral." (N.T. June 1.7, 2019 p. 50). AM testified that she and the Vic, Appellant simultaneously perfonned oral sex on the Appellant' shusband L at 64 83. 6W explained she saw the Appellant and the Appellant's husband weekly, and that she would regularly sleep at the Appellant' shouse ovemight The Appellant provided her access to' mue VIofinn .inthe, house ofta. The Appellant even allowed to shower at the mouse. Ld. at 41, 51, 75. She stateed; "Iwouldn't be able to remember how many times. 7.t was often.Like, if Iwas seeing fly Iraxal upzaleCpiug tlxc•c •uitti dUit .. y-wo-trl dwitlr— them [ ... ] there were afew times where Islept in the middle between the two of them." Ld,,. at YYL 58. also explained that on some occasions, the Appellant's husband groped her on the outside of her clothes andund=w& hex clothes,all over her stomach,butt, and in between her legs, while she slept next to him and the Appellant Id. at 58-59.• tstifled that the \1ictiryt V ictim Appellant's•husbandpur•ubwed•awUator for Mftaud.operatedOmvibratoron•. She noted that the vibrator was kept in the Appellact's upstairs bathroom drawer, easily within the purview and access of the Appellant Id. at 60. ViCAiViA At the outset of the relationship, M& recalled aconversation with the Appellant's cairn husband, wherein he to that the Appellant believed they should act on their urges and Vt (Ai M kiss. Icl. at 43.90 testified: `he had told me that they had kind of talked about it and that she 1.7. 'said tbiat at some point that eve should kind' of act on those feelings C ... ]'diat she had ' said'that we should just kind of kiss and get over it" dI. at 44. Clearly, the Appellant's instructions were not for the purpose of safeguarding or protecting the weelar•far}• e•of iGhYVI In fact, 4•' m noted the Appellant' sawareness of the i niti alsexua lencounter.iii explained that white the Appellant conducted afi amusic festival, " and the Appellant's husband engaged in sexual activity .She Nick ended up telling her what had any stated that upon the Appellant's retmn home, " happened, because he said that he felt bad [ ... ] that it wasn't supposed to go that far." Id. at VI 46. Since that initial sexual encounter, Gh'VIA "more than ten" other sexual encounters with the Appellant's husband,involving oral sex, d{gitarl. penetration,and anal sex P. at 46.56. Comparh sly, the jurors listened to the Appellant tell them that she did not notify administration, nor refer t wothe guidance counselor despite being concerned about i c,•i'M S mental health Or suicidal ideations throughout atwo ( Z) year period ( N-T. June l8, 2019 p.m. ae•afoxrp. , cnenveasthejur -hnP 3gound- thal th•efi nt-provi&d-mntraland supervision ofd assuinin such astatus relatiowhip to MM so as to impose aduty to act. iuh M h• The AppPllanf that stayed overnight on several occasions, desenb,I ngas an "adapted daughter;" The Appellant stated: "when she stayed over we would be watching TV, we would play games;we would feed her dinner.Sometimes we even gave her dinner to' take home so that she had some ." Ld. at 57', 59-60.The Appellant,"DWS cher,.testified to • m lG•ov providing with ahome environment,resp onsiblef or the welfare of . T erefore, the Appellant held aduty to act and did more than merely disregard her husband' sactions and communications towards IM.Indeed, the Commonwealth presented evidence that the AppeIlanfi encouraged an intimate relationship,possessing awareness of the sexual activity occurring with her husband. The Appell antbefriendeddan exploited the teacher/student is — 19 — relationship she had with Joella, especially any tug and competence G• family had bestowed upon P the • Appellant due to her position.She privately communicated with m frequently and inappropriately, blurring boundaries between ateacher and student by promoting .bad behaviors and permitting unrest doted access to personal life and home, separate from school activities or peers. In fact:the Appellant initially contactedVI (,ti ('through her husband. Yd. at 39, 71.Ultimately, the Appellant actively participated in sexual activity by simultaneously performing oral sex on her husband wit'l l • The Appellant failed to take protective action, instead she ;fostered opportunities for sexual activity to occur within her home and knowingly ivhlrn placed in cirmm ubuWa alone with her husband off several occasions, knowing that her Vi husband would engage in sexual activity with • It,at 45, 47-50058..59. The jury's verdict- aad Wding. ofa course of conduct as to Count 1.1 was clearly not against the weight of the evidence. This Court did not abtrs•f•rtlttirbprt for an acquittal or for anew trial based on the weight of the evidence regarding Count Z The Appellant' schallenge to the weight of the evidence regarding Count inComiption of Minors Defendant age 18 or above, 18 Pa C.S. §6301(a)(1)(1% also lacks merit; despite no physical corroborative evidence as the Appellaot alleges.Upon review,this Conn found the testimony Of I• to-be amble and-reliable enough. for. the JM'Y to- return. averdictof gailty and afinding of acourse of conduct. v •Nestled with si gnificant specificity concerning the kxUal encounters with the Appellant's husband occurring over two ( 2) years.As previously i LRrA cited above,the uncormboraW testimonyof VW if believed by the trier of fact is sufficient to support aconviction of asexual offense.See Commonwealth V. Bishop,742 A. 2d 1789189 (Pa. Super,1999); Commonwealth y, Day-6, 650 A.2d452, 455, 477 (Pa. Super. — 20 — 1994)(uncorroborated testimony of sexual assault victim if believed by the trier of fact; is sufficient to support convictions evert if the defense presents countervailing evidence), Commonwealth v. Trimble,615 A. 2d. 48, 50 (Pa.Super. 1.992) (testimony of child victim alone. suf ident to support conviction for sex offenses). Also, medical evidence is not required if the fact finder believes the victim.Commonwealth v Jette, 818 A.2d 533, 534 ( Pa. Super. 2003)cW49 Commonweealth Y._ Owens, 549 A- M 129,133 (Pa.Super. 1994); Commonwealth v. Castelhun,889 A..2d 1228,1232 ( Pa. Super. 2005). Additionally,the definition, of the conniption ofminors, includes, "[ actions that] would offend the common sense of the community and the sense of decency,propriety and morality, which most people entertain." Commonwealth v. Leatherbv,U6 A.3d 73,82 (Pa. Super. 2015).Pennsylvania courts- fim-determined thatadx of sexual abuse fall under this diefnition of actions that would offend `the sense of decency, propriety and morality,which most people M"d. Victim In the instant case, • established that the Appellant encouraged her husband to act on his urges or feelings towards IM stated: "he had told me that they had kind of talked about it and that she said that at some point that we should Had of act on those feelings that she had said that we should just kind of kiss and get overit." (N.T.June 17, 2019 p. 44). 1n. fac4; noted the Appellanes awarenew of the initi al sexual encountm. 0M explained VVIVhM that while the Appellant conducted at amusic festiv4l aud the Appellant's husband g engaged in sexual activity. She meted that upon the Appellant' sreturn. home, "Nick ended up telling her what had actually happened,because he said that he felt bad [ ... ) that it wasn't V,v•iYvb supposed to go that far." xd. at 46. Since that niitial sexual encounter,49 testified to 'Snore than ten" other sexual encounters with the Appellant's husband, involving oral sex, digital. — 21 — penetration,and anal sex, dI. at 46- 56. Correspondingly,the Appellant knew that her husband 1ohm separately communicated privately with NVhodaily Yand " at all hours" ' via social, media or V,c* lM cellphone. Ii.l fact, the Appellant i nitially contacted Ww privately through her husband, and .then to addition to her husband,.the Appellant developed her own means of communicating privately ,• ` Ifi'{Y` with `11 Detectives Mancuso and Davis testified that Appellant Al'P con ntact wither j every d ayof the weep, with the mast contact occurring on Thursdays anal- at all hours as Well. (N.T. June 18, 2019 a. m. session p. 48,1I7-]!23). V al The Appellant created opportunities for • 6 and her husband to spend periods of time together alone as well as is the Appellant's App Presence.• W O testified that the Appellant and 44 both performed oral sex on the Appellant' shusband.ow ssWed: `Ihad stopped pp fi$ere to -visitbefere Iwas- going to-hangout with. friends. Rpu i and Nick were supposed to go to dinner with Ruth' sparents.And when 1got there,she had told ine # hat she told Nick that if he t'ove-vaavrid-2019 P. 50). 'testified that she Qnd the Appellant simultaneously per carved oral sex on the Appellant's husband.Id. at 51, 83.O m explained she saw the Appellant and the Appellant's husband weekly,and that she would regularly sleep at the Appellant' shouse overnight~ The 10 01 Appellant provided her access to `Mang" is the house often. The Appellant even allowed• = to Show r`r' .Td: at 41; 51, 75:She state& " ame -house. I- wouldn' tbe able-to. remember- how mauy. times. It was often.Like, if l 'was seeing them, usually iended up sleeping there quite abit[... ] Xusually would sleep in their bed with them r. _ . ] there were afew times where Islept in the middle between the two of them." ]Crl. at 58. aols explained that on some occasions, the Appellant' shusband groped her on the outside of her clothes and underneath her clothes,all over her stomach,butt, and in between her legs, while she slept next to him and the Appellant. Id. at — 22 — 5859, q= testified that the Appellant' shusband purchased avibrator f6r IM and operated the vibrator onU W L She noted that the vibrator was kept in the Appellant' supstairs bathroom n drawer, Ld. at 60. A lalso indicated that she would smoke marijuana upstairs with the Appellant's husband while the Appellant remained downstairs.Id. at 59. The Appellant has given aparallel account of events, yet denies any criminal acts, and iGfiY•'s this does not necessitate afinding of not guilty.The jury chose to credit testimony and her testimony alone establishes acom4 dioa of minors conviction.It is clear t hat the Appellant's V u+W actions encouraged, asixteen ( 16) year aid girl to engage in sexual conduct with an adult couple, the Appellant and her husband, which most people would find offensive to their common v'it fine% sense of decency. INM testimony revealed that the Appellant' sactions and the Appellant's U`Gfim husband' s-actions,especially their daily. communications conditioned to accept the sexual of cti refs conduct and be deterred from reporting the abuse.This Court does not find that any o• rarti•tcxi iu n• uu•ux-that'wotrl•arnse-flris-COurtvto-imd~tke-vex the weight of the evidence.Therefore,this Court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Appellant' sPost- sentence Motion for an acquittal or for anew trial based on the weight of the evidence regarding Count M. The Appellant challenges the weight of the evidence regarding Count N Failure to •epmt/f•efer,• Pa: t a3(•);( ✓.S<. §b•i•9( 2)(i•) ;by caiming ti•at. uo.sexuaLactivity accutced so V the Appellant did not have abuse to report However, r testified that instances of sexual activity began. in May 2016 through December 2017. (N.T. June 17, 2019 p.= p. 44, 51). She also testified that the Appellant's husband notified the Appellant immediately after their initial sexual encounter in May 2016.Since that time, v described at least ten (10)sexual encounters with the Appellant' shusband,including sleeping i nthe carne bed as the Appellant — 23 — and the Appellant's husband •and siinulfaneously perf6naing oral•sex on the Appellant's husband' • Ui cfi•1'k'S with the Appellant • testimony reveals that the Appellant held direct kmwledge of the nature of the sexual activity and willfully railed to report or make referral to the appropriate authorities. The Appellant's own testimony established that she and her husband had the means tc/ YV\ V IVkA ` S and access to and that she did not report any concems to • guidance counselor or admivistrators. (N.T. June 18, 201.9 p.m. p. 39, 71). The Commonwealth. presented Lakeland School District Superintendent WSiam King, who testified that the Lakeland School District employed the Appellant in September 2014 through March 2018 as amusic teacher and band director. (N. T. June 18, 2019 a.m. p.18). The Appellant's employment rendered the Appellant a "mandated reporter," required to report suspected sexual abuse. a May 16 Walsh,. principal of Fell Charter Elementary School testified that a `S nndated reporter," can mats areport in "multiple ways [ ...jyou can do that i1xlL' . aphzrn[e call. Thu gu dis to get to report as soon as possible." 1d. at28. The circumstances underlying the Appellant's conviction were related to her teaching position and aLakeland School District student. The Appellant's teaching job involved a. position of trust and aduty to report, which was compromised by her i0im coverup o£ aseamal relationship between INW asixteen (16) year old girt, and the Appellant's husband. `1'he•v r&ct shows that thajury found the Commonwealth's witnesses more compelling and that testimony, on its own, supports the conviction finding that the Appellant willfully failed to report the occurrence of asexual relationship that occurred over an wended period of time between an adult couple and asixteen (16) year old girl. Therefore, this Court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Appellant's Post Sentence Motion for an acquittal or for anew trial based on the weight of the evidence regarding — 24 — Count IV. The Appellant challenges the weight of the evidence regarding Count V Furnish Liquor or Malt Beverage to aIVIinor,1S Pa. C.S. §6310.1(a), by arguing that there was no evidence of A• influence, ingestion or effects of alcohol. • testified that the Appellant and the Appellant's husband `Usually" provided wine or liquor as well as "'Peed" Specifically, UM recalled one night wherein the Appellant poured her wine. JW stated: "Iwent there after an argument that Ihad with my fa her she poured me aglass of wine." (N.T. June 17, 2019 p.m. p. 59). The Commonwealth presented evidence that the Appellant engaged in communications with regarding alcohol use, indicating that the Appellant was drunk "AY." The Appellant later testified that "A.F." meant "as flick." (N.T. June 18, 2019 p.m. p. 79). The facts elicited ByAe.Commonwealth raveal.that knowing was underage, the Appellantprovided wine to 4m and allowed consumption on at least one occasion. In fact, utilized the team `usually,"which areasonabieiary -coiWiffftrilmt the Aplelram-and-the Appuilan am s providedOW with alcohol on more than, one occasion. Proof of influence, ingestion or effects of alcohol on OW are not required for ajury to convict the Appellant under X8 Pa. C.S. §6301.1(a). The jury's fiq*g was supported by the'factual rrewxd. Therefore, this Court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Appellant's Post S ce Motion -for,an acxp iifa ..or- for anew trial based, on tha weight of the evidence regarding. Count V. Ultimately, this Court will not substitute its judgement for the finder of fact; who is free to believe all, party or none of the evidence, and assess the credibility of the witnesses. See Pommanwealth v.1DeJesn% 860 A.2,d X02,107108 (Pa, Z004)(holding that questions concerning inconsistent testimony trigger the credibility ofthe witnesses). Clearly, the jury *25 found the testimony of the Commonwealth's witnesses, including the victims to be consistent, credible and reliable enough to return averdict of guilty on all charged offenses. As such, the jury's decision to credit the witnesses' respective statemeants does not render the verdict_contrary. to the evidence presented. A review of the record does not indicate that the verdict is "so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense ofJustice." Accordingly, #his Court concludes that the Appellant's claims are without merit as this CourtAid not abuse its discretion.. See Commonwealth v Cramer,195 A.3d 594, 601 (Pa.Super. X(S) (when, trial. court fords verdict not against weight of evidence, appellate court must give gravest conside,ration to trial court's conclusion because it had opportunity to hear and see evidence present)., 6. Whether the trial court Facorrectly denled - I•efendant's 1Vfo0W fdtr -wNeW - TriaUJudgement of Acquittal when presented with the following regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and/or whether the evidence wasp insufficient to support the Juryla'Anding of guilt as to.the offense of Endangerigg of Welfare. of CHdren when the Commonwealth - failed to present evidence establishing that there existed a duty of care and support for the alleged victim and/or that the duty of care and support was in anyway violated? 7. Whether tine trial court incorrectly denied Defendant' sMotion for aNew Trial/Judgement of Acquittal when presented with the following regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and/or whether the evidence was insufficient to support the Jurys' funding of gaunt as to the offense of Furnishing Alcohol to aMinor nor when the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence that an actual alcoholic beverage was furnished to amanor in that there was no testimony regarding victim's knowledge of or prior experience with alcoholic beverages,or testimony regarding . any impact suffered as aresult ofingesting the purported "alcoholie"beverage? S. Whether the trial court Incorrectly dented Defendant:P sMotion for aNew Trial/ Judgement of Acquittal when presented with the following regarding the sufSeleucy of the evidence and/or whether the evidencewas insufficient to support the Jury' sfmding,ofguilt as to the offense ofFailui e' to Reportswhen the Commonwealth failed to present physical or corroborative evidence of sexual activity, no digital evidence suggesting sexual activity, and both Defendant and Co- Defendant dented said sexual activity, such that there would be nothing to report ? The Appellant's claims six (6) — eight (8) contend that there is insufficient evidence to *26 sustain her convictions on Count A Endaaged gthe Welfare of Children Pawntleuardiau; Count N, Failure to RepordRefer; and Count V, Furnish Liquor or Malt Beverage to aMinor. The standard of review in assessing whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain Appellant's convictions is well settled. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, [the Court] must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as.verdi.ct winner, is sufficient to prove every element o£ the offense beyond areasonable doubt [ ... j. (the Court] may. not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Any question of doubt is for the factfinder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as amatter of law no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 989 A.2d 699,670 (Pa. Super. 2009), apped defined 4A.3d 1001"W. 28x83; Communweafthv: Wood% MA,3d 1013.,' 035(Zo..Super. 3G99QjC`The entire trial record must be evaluated a and all bvidenoe received must he considered"} Viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the verdict winner, this Court finds that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that the Appellant was guilty as to County C=t IVY; mid Count V. As- such; thus C:om incorporates the aforementioned reasoning for the Appellant's weight of evidence chairos, in issues two, four and five in this section, respectively. Endangering the welfare of achild, which is defined, is relevant part, as follows: §4304. Endangering Welfare of Children (a) Offense Defined- - (1) A. parent, guardian or other person supervising the welfare of a child ruder 18 years of age, or aperson that employs or supervises such aperson, commits an offense if he knowingly endangers the welfare of the child by violating aduty ofcare, protbction. or support: 18 Pa. C.S. §4304. — 27 — An individual is not required to be aparent or legal guardian of achild to be found gaik of endangering the welfare of achild Commonwealth v. Trippett 932 A.2d 188,195 (Pa. Super. 2007). " The language of the statute indicates that any 'other person' who supervises the child is eligible to be charged and convicted under the statute," Id. Linder the supervision element of the statute, it is not the child that the appellant must have been supervising but, rather, the child's welfare, and the requirement of supervision of achild's welfare is not limited to only certain forms of supervision, such as direct or actual, but, by its plain terms, the statute encompasses all forms of supervision of achild's welfare. Commonwealth v. Lvnn,114 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2015). Pennsylvania courts have established athree-part test that must be satisfied to prove Endangering the Welfare of Children; (1).MheL accused [was].aware of his/her duty to protect The child; (2) [T]he accused [was] aware that the child (was] in circumstances that could threaten the child's physical or psychological welfare; and (3) ne accused has either faded to act or has taken action so lame or meager that sash actions cannot reasonably be expected to protect the child's welfare. Commonwealth Y. PA4 689 A.2d 963,964 (Pa. Super.1497)(quodug MCanwealth V. CardFAV, 515 A.2d 311,315(1t a. Super. 1986). In Commonwealth v. Tavlor, 471 A.24 428 ON. Super.1984), the Pennsylvania Superior Court discussed the legislature's intent in enacting section 4304 and its broad statutory purpose: The Supreme Court has said that [election 4304 was drawn broadly to cover - awide range of conduct in order to safeguard the welfare and security of children. It is to be given' mewing by reference to the common sense of the community and the broad protective purposes for-which it was exacted C©m mouwealth-v. Mae 4359 A.7A 770,. 772. (Pa.. ]976).. Thus, the "common sense of the community, as well as the sense of decency, propriety and the morality which most people entertain is sufficient to apply the statute to each particular case, and to individuate what particular conduct is rendered criminal by pit." Id., quoting — 28 — Commonwealth_►. Marlin,305 A. 2d 14,18 (Pa.1973). After areview of the record, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence which, if believed,would support the jury' sEndangering Welfare of Children verdict. Although the Vi Gfim'1 Appellant claims to have violated no duty of care,• testimony as well as the Appellant herself, established thatf spent ixwummmble meals and nights at the Appellant' shouse including over adozen sleepovers,attending events together',visiting r• at her job, ( exchanging gifts, and joining on atrip together,as well as obtaining matching tattoos. (,files! testified while under the supervision of the Appellant, and the Appellant's husband would engage in sexual activity, and on one occasion the Appellant participated in the sexual activity. testified that her and tide Appellant both'performed oral sex on the Appellant's husband at the Appellant' adesign and direction in furtherance of abribe the Appellant employed to coerce her husband into attending afamily dinner. stated: "2had stopped there to visit before I was goinYW - lr withTrieYds-(. r. ] Ruth and NiL;k weie-sup •er wi Ruth's parents.Atd when Igot there,she had told me that she told Nick that if he went to her •pare•n( tss'' house for that dinner that we would both give him oral." (N.T. June 17, 2019 p. 50). testified that she and the Appellant simultaneously performed oral sex on the Appellant's husband.Id. at 51,83. explained she saw the Appellant and the Appellant's husband ex weeKy;and-that she would regularly sleep. at the.Appellant!'s.housc ovemight. The Appellant provided her access to "hang"i nthe house often.The Appellant even allowedQ1 to shower at the house.Id. at 41, 51,75. She stated: "Iwonl&'t be able to remember how many times. It was often. Like, if Iwas seeing them, usually Iended up sleeping there quite abit [... ] I usually would sleep in their bed with them [ ... ] there were afew times where Islept in the V UM middle between. the two of their." riL at 58, also explained that on some occasions, the — 29 — Appellant' shusband groped her on the outside of her clothes and imdmineath her clothes, all over her stomach,butt, and in between her legs, while she slept next to him and the Appellant. Id. at 1wM Gll W VI 58-59. recalled aconversation with the Appellant's husband,wherein he told that Vi(,fim the Appellant believed they should act on their urges and kbu%. Yd.at 43. • testified: "he had told me that they had kind of talked about it and that she said that at some point that we should kind of act on those feelings j... ] that she had said that we should just kind of kiss and get over it." Ld,at 44. Clearly,the Appellant's insttuctions were not for the purpose of safegaarding or •fir protecting the welfare of• n In fact, 7oella noted the Appellant' sawareness of the initial Vi ubrn V c•m sexual encounter.Ift explained that while the Appellant conducted at amusic festival, i and the Appellant' shusband engaged i nsexual activity. She'stated that upon the Appellant's return home, "Nick ended up telling her what had actually happened, because he said that he felt b- ffd-j . , . ]th Ssud tstir•lfur."-i••ttt4 . xual encounter, 1 testified to "more than ten" other sexual encounters with the Appellant's husband, t (.fi rY, involving oral sex, digital penetration,and analsex. dx. at 46-56.Moreover, testified that (Myl 114 CjirA the Appellant's husband purchased avibrator for and opeiuted the vibrator ontOW She noted that the vibrator was kept in the Appellant' supstairs bathroom drawer.Id. at 60. It is apparent that the Appellant took actions that cannot reasonably be expected to V; vhm protect the welfare ofMW specifically,as it was her responsibility to protect • rnfrom her sexually abusive husband, that the Appellant facilitated conversations,living anw9ements, and tiYV1 situations that gave her husband and herself inappropriate access toU,while knowing that she and her husband engaged in sexual activity with • and that the Appellant did not inform law enforcement or school counselors/administrators of the misconduct. See Commonwealth V. — 30 — Circulate,O,),I.ggA :,• P OA Umi,114 A. 3d 796 ( Pa. 2415"); Commonwealth v. Drvant,57 A.3d 191 (Pa.Super. 2012)(sufficient evidence of duty ofcare to the victim and that duty was violated in asexual abuse conviction where the defendant, a34 year old man, and the victim a13 year old girl were frequently present in the residence together alone, the defendant was the sole adult present in the home during the sexual assaults, the victim testified that she considered the defendant afamily member, and the defendant testified that he was at the victim' shome 4-5 days out of the weep occasionally picked the victim up from school, and was involved in the victim' scare). .in the instant case the Commonwealth proved all Three elements of Endangering the m Welfare of aChild beyond areasonable doubt. The Appellant had aduty of care towar, the sixteen ( 16) year old student she taught and wai supervising. As astudent and minor, it became imZierative that obey and accept the Appellant' sdirection and counsel. To that end, the Appellant was entrusted with control ove in her parents'absence, responsible for Vi(AM . hours at atince,cvelrove ghf:Thr, AppeiYdat violated-that-duty-ofrcare-acmrdin Om f6t'Y , - the testimony of both Ift and the Appellant, when she placed in circumstances that endangered her physical and psychological well-being and deliberately act m amanner that did `S not protect •Pwelfare. The Appellant's arguments to the contrary are entirely unavailing. Therefore,this Court concludes that the evidence was mffiicient to find App - Vint guilty of Endangering the Welfare of aChild. N'eA the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to her Furnishing Alcohol to aMinor conviction. "Selling or fmnishiug liquor or malt or brewed beverages to minors," provides i npertinent part: [A]'person commits amisdemeanor of the third degree if [s)he intentionally and knowingly furnishes any liquor or matt or brewed beverages to aperson who is less than 21 years of age — 31 — 18 Pa. C.S. § 6310.1(a). For purposes of Section 6310. 1(a), "furnishing" means "°(t]o supply, give or provide to, or allow aminor to possess on premises or property owned or controlled by the person cbarged." 18 Pa. C.S. § 6310. 6. The Appellant cnntends that there was insufficient evidence as to whether the beverage served was alcohol given the victim' slack of experience and lack of physical impact after ingesting. However, 75 Pa C.S. §63]2 (a), provides, in pertinent part: In an action or proceeding... in which amaterial element of the offense is that a substance is liquor or wmalt or brewed beverage, all of the following apply: (1) Chemical analysis is not required to prove that the substance is liquor or amalt or brewed beverage. (2) Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove that the substance is liquor or amalt or brewed beverage. ML cfirn • The evidence reveals th recalled one night wherein the Appellant poured her 1(•IirY► wine. stated;I went there after an argument that Ihad with myfather she poured me a glass of wine." (N.T..luke 17, 2019 p. m. p. 59). • clearly testified that the Appellant `loured" her sglass of wine and that she Imew the type o£ alcohol provided.Id. She also t recAlled "ully" sua be provided with "thwineeir or liquor." d I . testimony and observations, both direct and circumstantial is sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that the Appellant furnished wine to aminor.See Commonwealth v. Oliver,- 693 A. 2d 1324,1326- X327 ( Pa. Super.1997). Importantly, proof of intoxication,ingestion,or impact of alcohol is not required to sustain acoaviction under 18 Pa. C.S. § 6301.1(a). Lastly, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to her Failure to Report conviction 23 Pa. C.S. § 6319 penalizes the failure to report suspected cbild abuse or make areferral io the appropriate a uthorities if the person or official willfully Ails to do — 32 — so or has direct lmowledge of the nature of the abuse.The statute imposes an af£rnaative fluty to report such cases on mandated reporters and punishes the lack of action or willful failure to report in those Wbo are mandated reporters.The Appellant asserts there was no abuse to report. Here, Lakeland School District Supe&tendent Vrdfi artt King testified that the Lakel and School District employed the Appellant as amusic teacher and band instructor beginning in. September 2014 through March 201 8. (N.T. June 18, 2019 a.m. p.18). Based neon the . Appellant' sposition,Superintendent King categorized the Appellant as a `Snaaudated reporter," requited to report i nstances of sexual abuse, especially suspected sexual abuse of students. L& Therefore,the Appellant hold aduty of care to report the ongoing sexual activity between the Vvift, V'j •W Appellant's husband and a15-year-old student. dM testified that the Appellant was aware of the sexual activity between her and the Appellant' shusband and became actively involved in that sexual activity. "ItesOedthat i nstances of sexual activity begin in May 20M-duough₹? =bcx 2017. •eirg;2o- -pm. , . She-alsotests̀red-tha , Appellant' shusband notified the Appellant immediately after their initial sexual encounter in rn May 2016.Since that time," described at least ten ( 10) sexual encounters with the Appellant' shusband,including sleeping in the same bed as the Appellant and the Appellant's husband and simultaneously perforraing oral sex on the Appellant's husband with the Appelfiert. rntestimony •S reveals that the Appellant held direct knowledge of the natu3re of the sexual activity and wdlfiilly failed to report or make re&mal to the appropriate authorities. The Appellant' sown testimony established that she and her husband bad the means and access to MW The Appellant's own testimony established that she and her husband had the memos and I N access to and , that she did not report any concerns to) guidance counselor or administrators. (N.T. June 15,2019 p. m. p. 39,'71). — 33 — I The Commonwealth introduced additional evidence of innumerable calls/text or social media contact between, the APp V 1' 6i-1,approximately 1.1,{1411 contacts, and betwe en th e ellant and•, VICfiry ►approximately 12,000 contacts during afive month period. Appellant°s husband anddM (N-T- June 18, 2019 a.m. 43-54;106-124). The Appellant had sufficient information and authority to act and she failed to do so. By failing to act the Appellant showed deliberate indifference to the welfare of G rh V Gil CN•I testimony on its own is stTcient evidence. of the ApPellant's yriffill failure to.report the occurrence of ongoing sexual abuse. 9. Whether the trial court erred in .faring to grant (Defendant' spretrial motion for examination or in camera examination of th e alleged victim's psychological records when the mental health of the victim was at issue in the tiria4 the records could have supported elements of Defendant' sdefense,and when tl te re would h ave keen no harm to the victiw,as the defense sought an in camera review,and th atany r perceived harm to the vi dU would be substantiali•p oniwelghed by the harm posed n not,diseloging said records resull•g in the abrogation of to the Defenidaut i the Doff ndant' eSixth Amendment confrontation rights under both the United States and the 1?enasylvimb constitutions? •2•:•-5getsfoxfh-t3urgxi•ebetwven-pspchi-an•lpafi•errts-••---•--..• states: NO Psychiatrist,__ ghall be, without the written consent of his client; examined in any cxa31 or criminal matter as to any infarmation acquired in the course of his professional services in behalf of such client ~The confdentlial relations and in between apsychologist or PsychiaULticfd his GUent shall be on the same basis as those provided or prescnbed by law between an att6mey and client 42 Pa. C-&§ 5944. The psynhiatist-p atientprivilegey modeled after the attorneyclient privilege, codified a. Fong public policy that confidential communication made by apatient to her psychiatrist should be absolutely protected from, disclosure. "7nfotmation which is protected by an, absolute statutory privilege is not subject to disclosure." Commonwealth v. Eck, 605 A.2d 1248, 3252 ON. Super. Y992j. The privilege afforded by § 5944 intends to inspire confidence in the client — 34 — and to encourage full disclosure to the psychiatrist,preventing the latter from mailing public any information which would result in humiliation,embarrassment or disgrace to the client, the privilege is designed to promote effective treatment and to insulate the client's private thoughts from public disclosure.Commonwealth v. We, 533 A.2d 120,128 (Pa.Super.1987). To that end, Pennsylvania courts have unequivocally held that "the statutory privilege pursuant to Section 5944 is not outweighed by adefendant' sright to cross-examine witnesses or his due process rights." Commonwealth v. Dowling, 883 A.2d 570,575 (Pa.2005); CgmniouwWt:h v. Segarra,228 A. 3d 943,957 (Pa.Super.2020)(holding that acriminal deffendai taccused of sexual offenses denied access to the alleged victim's records is not aconstitutional violation as the records are statutorily privileged)citing,Commonwealth v. Smith,606 AM 939, 942(Pa. Super.19.92)([ P]sychiatric records [ that] are statutorily protected are not subject to discovery); Conuhonwealtb v. Counterman,719 A. 2d 284, 295 (Pa. 199W"The statutory privilege set forth in Section 5944 i snot outweighed by either adefendant' sSixth Amendment right to cross- examine awitness or his right to due process of law.' ); Commonwealth v. PatoskY,656 A.2d 499, 502- 03 (Pa.Super.1995)(cidug numerous cases in which acriminal defendant's constitutional rights to confrontation and due process must yield to privilege,an4 holding that the trial court' srefusal to allow defendant' sattorney to conduct in camera roview of sexual assault victim' spsychiatric records under section 5944 did not violate his constitutional rights to confrontation,compulsory process, and due process). V"ciirn'S As such, communications wish her counselor/ psychiatrist were protected by the psychiatrist-patient privilege.• communications with her counselor/psychiatrist were made in confidence while she sought professional psychiatric help.This Court must preserve the 1G{lm confident ial relationship between the victims, and her psychiatrist in order to promote the — 35 — essential purpose of the statutory privilege,-4o encourage and foster full disclosure during psychiatric trea₹ment,See Commonwealth Y. Rennedv,604 A. 2d 1036,1046 ( Pa. Super. 1992)(holding that the trial court's in camera review of these records constituted error); Commonwealth v. Moore,584 A. 2d 936,940 (Pa.1991)(the general powers of courts do not include the power to order disclosure of materials that the legislature has explicitly directed be kept confidential, especially statutorily protected records of avictim). cbm`S i Thus, because mental health records ate not subject to exception or discovery, and becaus has not consented to the records' disclosures the Appellant's constitutional rights are not violated in protecting the records from disclosure and in camera review. For all of the aforementioned reasons, the ,Appellant's claim is without merit; mental `S health records are privileged, and cannot be disclosed to anyone, orbe subject to an in camera review Ut OM` S by anyone, without • consent. opportunity to c ross-examine• roas to her inental health, which satisfied the Appellant's confrontation rights. Because the privilege only limits access to statements made during the course of treatment by the psychologist; it does not foreclose all lines of defense questioning, M which did ;indeed occur in this case. Counsel for the Appellant elicited testimony from regarding the encouragement she received from the Appellant's husband about consulting a therapist. (N.T. June 17, 2019 a.m. p.'71). Counsel for the Appellant also elicited from that her family problems were taking atoll on her mentally, and that she suffered from depression and would engage in self barm specifically cutting. d1. at 71-72. Counsel elicited the length of timeand regularity in which •Tc..sulted with the therapist, approximately two 'See Commonwearth v, A *aw, 666 A.?d 1062 ( lea. Super.x9n( fiading no waiver where the counselor reports a victim`s allet ati,= of sexual abuse to the police). — 36 — (2) years, as well as the year and month in which Joella disclosed the sexual abuse to her therapist df. at 80- 81. Accordingly,counsel for the Appellant effectively raised inferences i•firn'S helpful to the defense as to' credibility,and potential bias, or motives. ,Lastly,this Court i c,•im'S believes that mental condition was not at issue in this case and was irrelevant to the defense of the charges alleged Under these circumstances,this Court properly denied an in cmnera review of the victim' sprivileged records, 16. Whether the trial court erred fat refusing to grant Defendant's irequest for amistrial, following the prosecutor twice referring to the 1DefendaAt as a "pedophile," during closing arguments prejudicing the jury so as to render afaqir and Impartial verdid? A motion- for tistrial is Within the discretion of the trial court and is required only when an incident is of such anature that i ts unavoidable effect is to deprive of afair and impartial trial causing prejudice to. the defendant.It is within the trial court' sdiscred(im to determine prejudice. 2exefore,the standard ofreview is whether the trial court aliused that discretion . NoMMMTHN ,,r •s • •d"cu ideracbiu•Iati•ud • prosecutor' sarguments are deemed fall i fthey are supported by the evidence or use inferences that can reasonably be derived , from the evidence.Closing arguments must be evaluated in the context,in which they were made and in light of statements made during defense counsel's summation to which the prosecutor may respond.Commonwealth v L1Oanis,773 A2d 1231, 1238 ( Pa. 2001). In advocating their case, .`•nwecuting attorneys have leeway to present their argumeuts with logical force and vigor, and they are permitted adegree of oratorical flair. ,, Commonwealth V. Laird, 1.19 A. 3d 972,1010- 1f Q?a.2015). Accordingly,prosecutorial, misconduct i sevaluated under aharmless e= standard, and does not does not take place unless the unavoidable effect of the comments at issue prejudiced the jurors by forming in their minds afixed bias and hostility toward the defendant, thus — 37 — impeding their ability to weigh the evidence objectively and render atrue verdict. Commonwealth v. CaldweA 117 A. 3d 763, 774( Pa. Super. 2015) quoting Commojaweaitb V., Jrudy, 978 A. 2d 1015,1020 ( Pa. Super.2009). A haunlew error standard evaluates "whether adefendant received afair trial, not aperfect triaL"Judy,at 1,019-1020. Proper ammaination. of the Commonwealth's comments in closing requires review of the arguments advanced by the defense i ndefense summatioiL As indicated,here, the defense was Ulufi•A based essentially upon the notion that fabricated the allegations against the Appellant and the Appellant' shusband.The defense, actively sought to portray the vied mas dishonest and sought to characterize the Commonwealth' scase as based on nothing more than the unsupported allegations of atroubled child. The defense closing included argument in the following particulars: that the case centered around the uncorroborated allegation of one girl, (N.T. June, Yi Gfi+M 19, 2019 p. 51-54); that recounted the allegations of abuse in on unbelievable-and YN inconsistent znamier; xd. at 51- 54, 57-58;that was particularly troubled and particularly likely to lie.11, at 60. %then,as mitigating circumstances the defense closing referenced character evidence staling that " When you talk about the woman who is the in effect superintendent of the Fell Charter School gushing with praise for Nick:You talk about the counselor at the Charter School or the secretary at the Charter School gushing with praise. They are of good character [ ...I 1attest to the good across-section of characow witwsses can (. - . character of these people [ ... ] people of good character,rm paraphrasing do not normally commit crimes. Onthat evidence aloney y oucan vote no guilty. That's the thing with character!" dI. at 66. Defer ae counsel devoted asignificant portion of closing argument to portraying the Appellant and the Appellant' shusband as moral,upstanding,law-abiding teachers — 38 — in the community who could never commit such offenses. He argued that the teachers and administrators who taught with the .Appellant and the Appellant's husband attested to these traits. In response to defense counsel's argument;the prosecutor's remark was offered to counter character evidence by highlighting potential witness bias towards protecting the reputation of Fell Charter. In response, the prosecutor suggested, among other things, that sexual abuse occurs without witnesses and "behind closed doors," thus outer t=hexs or adminislxators would be embarrassed to team they work with apedophile, especially afellow educator. The consequences of Fell Charter employing a "pedophile," would be catastrophic to their employment; impacting their own livelihood. Thexefore, the comments of the prosecutor represented afair response to the defense' ssummation regarding character evidence. See Commonwealth v. Judy, 978 A. 2d 1015 ( Pa. Super. 2009)(holding that reference to defendant as pedophile and argument that tended to personalize these circumstances for jury did ' •o•+P+fL:nSE". •(lontentlD represented fair means of attempting to persuade jury with avigorous response to the defense); Commonwealth V. Ragland, 991 A.2d 336 (Pa. Super. 2010)(4ding that the comments made by the district attomey constituted permissible oratorical #lair when viewed in the context of defense counsel's contention that L.B, was atroubled child not worthy of belief, especially where the trial. court promptly sustained Appellant's objection and properly instructed the jury). Here, the prosecutor argued: And then you have the rest ofthe crew from Pell Charter testifying to Nick's good character, of course, the Baggettas are going to have good character; right? You want to talk about women who want to save -- trying to get egg of their face, the three women from Fell Charter who are going to get up here and tell you, `Rte never knew we had a pedophile working amongst us.' Of course they don't want that out about Fell. They don't want that to be the reputation of their school. Of course they are going to get up there and say they had no idea Nick — 39 — would do some6ing like this. That he was salt of the earth.The best teacher up at Fell; right? He was such strong character f. . .) you cannot be an educator in this state if you do those things, so for them to say at the time 2016 to 2018 they had good character of course they did, they were teachers, they had to legally. (N.T. June 19, 2019 p. 84). Clearly, the prosecutor was arguing that the Fell Charter character evidence was unreliable and npe with personal, motivations, urging the jury to view the character evidence with disfavor. As suds, this Court found the prosecutor' sstatement permissible rebuttal of the Appellant's mitigation evidence. It is afair i nference that poll Charter colleagues would be concerned about the consequences of the Appellant and the Appellant' shusband' sactions,'especially as educators and how that would impact on the reputation ofFell Charter and their own employment.Given such context;this Court declined to couciude that the remark so prejudiced the jury that it could not weigh the evidence objectively and render atrue verdict Amistrial was a Wo tl•ite•af —S'efixwtl> ]ardcarstl6- 2d•301;-6 (Pa.1988)(holding that [ a] new trial is not maadated every time aprosecutor makes an intemperate or improper remark). The Appellant' sremaining claim also concerns the following: And Isubmit to you you have heard all o£ the evidence. Not just V1 6mXW righC„h, by the way, what the judge is going to tell you if you believe sf you believe she told you beyond a reasonable doubt her word alone is enough to convict the defendants. Now, we do have — you know,we went ; - it, there is a awnber of other things that corroborate &a version of events. rJ Of course there is not going to be aperson that saw this happen other than the two defendants; right? This is happening in the safety and the confines of th ' home. This is happening in the safe space that they built fvyr o, of course, there is not going to be an independent witness; right? That's not how child abuse works and that's not how pedophiles operate.They don' tdo it out in the middle of the street. No. — 40 — at 101-102. 7h this context, the prosecutor is explaining the respective burden of proof as to uncorroborated.vicLim testimony regarding asexual offense and the dynamics, and realistic environment in which asexual offense likely occurs. When viewed in alarger coantext, the prosecutor's two refwen=6 to the term " pedopht11e," in fact, was the prosecutor urging the jury to consider that realistically, sexual abuse is typically secreted. The only witness being the victim, and how that bears on the credibility of the victim and others who testify to the improbability of abuse given an otherwise outwardly. upstanding disposition of the alleged perpetrator. See Commonwealth v. Ragland, 991 A.2d 336 (Pa. Soper. 2010)(finding that the comments made by the district attomey constituted permissible oratorical flair when .viewed in the context of defense counsel's contention that L.B. was atroubled child not worthy of beHef especially where"the trial court promptly sustained Appellant's objection and properly instructed I Moreover, any potential prejudice occurring by virtue of such term was ameliorated by this Court's instructions, which prohibited the jury to consider the term in their deliberations. This Court instructed: "Ladies and gentlemen, you've heard the term pedophile used in the closing. You are to disregard the termm. There is no evidence in this case wha#soever in regard to legal or medical definition ofpedopbile in this case and so it's not appropriate to be considered in your jury deliberations." Id. at 103. The isolated and incorrect use of this tern was perhaps unfortunate but it did-not work to prejudice the jurors by forming in their minds afixed bias and hostility toward the Appellant. The jury's ability to weigh the evidence objectively and render a true verdict was not impeded and most importantly this reference did not deny the Appellant the fair trial to which she is entitled. Thus, the Appellant's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct — 40 — Td. at 101-102. In this context, the prosecutor is explaining the respective burden of proof as to uncorroborated victim testimony regarding asexual offense and the dynamics, andrealistic environment in which asexual offense h1mly occurs. When viewed in alarger context, the prosecator's two references, to the term "pedophile," in fact, was the prosecutor urging the jury to consider that realistically, sexual abuse is typically secreted. The only witness being the victim, and how that bears on the credibility of the victim and others who testify to the improbability of abuse given an otherwise outwardly upstanding disposition ofthe alleged perpetrator. See . Commonwealth v. ]Ragland, 991 A.2d 335 (Pa. Super. 2010)(firift that the comments made by the district attomey constituted permissible oratorical flair when viewed in the context of defense comsePs contention tbatL.B. was atroubled mild not worthy ofbeH4 especially where the trial court promptly sustained Appellant's objection and properly instructed Moreover, any potential prejudice occurring by virtue of such tempt was ameliorated by this Court's instructions, which prohibited the jury to consider the term in their deliberations. This Court instructed: "Ladies and gentlemen, you've heard the term pedophile used in the closing. You are to disregard the term. There is no evidence in this case whatsoever iaregard to legal or medical definition of pedophile in this case and so it's not appropriate to be considered in your jury deliberations." L at 103. The isolated and incorrect use of this term was perhaps unfortunate but it did not work to prejudice the jurors by forming in their minds afixed bias and hostility toward the Appellant. The jury's ability to weigh the evidence objectively and render a true verdict was not impeded and most importantly this reference did not deny the Appellant the fair trial to which she is entitled. Thus, the Appellant's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct — 41 — are without merit and this Court did not abuse its discretion in refimiag to grant amistrial on this basis. This Court properly instructed the jury and the jury is presumed to have followed such instruction. See Commonwealth v. Thommoan,660 A. 2d 68, 76 ( Pa. Super.1995);See also Commonwealth v. Sanchez,82 A.3d 943 ( Pa. 2013)( It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine whether acurative instruction, in response to aprosecutor's improper reference during closing argument', is nemsmy). 11. Whether tie trial court erred in the Imposition of sentence of 2 % to 5years and 2 months total confinement,while in the standard range was not "necessary" to address the ChWa re and circumstances of the crime"in light of the history, character and condition of the Defendant and was not "consistent with the pro#ectioxr of the public,the giavlty of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the chi muni#y and rehabilitative needs of the defendant?" 12. Whether the finial court erred in the imposition of sentence,iu falli ng to give adequate weight to the mitigating factors offered in favor of ]Defendant and a mitigated range sentence, spedOwAUy the length of time Defendant spent in prison and on home coulmement without imcidenfi,her young child, her family support, the community support evidenced both at trial and in sentencing letters, her lack of priivr-re•rord•ai`any3mvoivententt vrl#la-thevr justi - . - -, The Appellant's claims eleven (11) and twelve (12) challenge the discretionary aspects of sentence.As observed in Commonwealth v. McLaine,150 A. 3d 70,76 (Pa. Super.2816), "Na appellant is not entitled to the review of rhaltenga to the discretionary aspects of asentence as of#OV"Rather, ar-b-Olentgeto the discretionary aspects of sentence, requires an appell mt satisfy the following four-part test(l) whether appellant has filed atimely notice of appeal, (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in amotion to reconsider and modify sentence, (3) whether appellant's brief has afatal defect, and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code. mod. — 42 — Accordingly, the appeal is timely, and preserved in the Appellant's Post Sentence Motion, therefore, this Court examines whether the Appellant raises asubstantial question. A substantial question as to the . inappropriateness of sentence under the Sentencing Code is present "only when the appellant advances acolorable argument that the sentencing judge's actions were either. (1) inconsistent with aspecific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental nouns which underlie the sentencing process." Commonwealth Y. Mass, 50 A.3d 720, 727 (Pa. Super. 2012). In the present case, the Appellant cannot demonstrate that this Court acted inconsistently with aspecific provision of the Sentencing Code or contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process. Importantly,, the sentence is aguideline sentence, and imposed within the statutory limits. See Commonwealth V. Podge, 77 A.3d 1263,1272 n. 8 (Pa. Super. 2013)( ("Careful litigants should note that arguments that the sentencing court failed to consider the factors proffered in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721 does not present asnbstazntW question). On COUNT EIntercourse/Sexual Contact with Student, 18 Pa. C.S. §3124.2 (a.2)(1), this Court sentenced the Appellant to twelve (12) — thirty- six (36) months with two (2) years special. probation. A standard range sentence. The maximum term for aviolation of Intercourse/Sexual Contact with Student, 18 Pa. C.S. §3924.2 (a.2)(1), graded as afelony of the third degree is seven (7) years. IS ] Pa. C.S. § 1103(3). The Appellant had an offense gravity score of six (6) and aprior record score of zero (0). Under the sentencing guidelines for such scores, the standard range of rninimmrm sentence is three (3) to twelve (12) months. The aggravated range of minimum sentence for the above scores is eighteen (18) months. This Court sentenced the Appellant to twelve (12) - thirty-six (36) months with two (2) years special probation. This Court found that the Appellant's actions were predatory since 2016, and the — 43 — Appellant appeared undeterred by the consequences she caused towards the victim and the community, which Justified incarceration in astate correctional. (N.T. January 14, 2020 p.13). On Count % Endangering the Welfare of Children- Parent(Gmdian, IS Pa. C.S. § 4034( a)(1), this Court sentenced the Appellant to twelve ( 12) — twenty- four ( 24) months with (2) years special probation A standard range sentence.The maximum term for aviolation of I+rndangering the welfare of Children ParentlGuardian,IS Pa.C.S. § 4034( a)(1), graded as a felony of the third degree due to the jury's finding of a "course of conduct;'" is seven (7) years. 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103( 3). The Appellant had an offense gravity score of six ( 6) and aprior record score of zero ( 0). Under the sentencing guidelines for such scores, the standard range of minimum sentence is three ( 12) months.The aggravated range of minimum 3) to twelve ( sentence for the above scores is eighteen (18) months. This Court sentenced the Appellant to twelve ( 12) — twenty- four ( 24) montH• with two (2)years special probation.This Court found V►•c m tha - e p ---Hmff - sedhiereva lo••ifian-afauthari 1 5 not consider or prioritize best interests.( N.T. January 14, 2020 p. 13). On Count III, Corruption of MinorsDefendant age 18 or above, 18 Pa C.S. §6301( a)(1)(n),this Court sentenced the Appellant to six ( 6) -- twelve ( 12) months. A standard range sentence. The maximum term for aviolation of Conniption ofMinars-Defendant age 18 or above,18 Pa C. S. §6301( a)(1)(i),graded as afelony of the third degree due to the jury' sfording 7) years.18 Pa.C.S. § 1103( of a "course of cvndnut,' is seven ( 3). The Appellant had an offense gravity score of six ( 6) and aprior record score of zero ( 0). Under the sentencing guidelines for such scores, the standard range of minimum sentence is three (3) to twelve (12) months.The aggravated range ofminimum sentence for the above scores i seighteen (18) months. ' 6) -- twelve ( Phis Court sentenced the Appellant to six ( 12) months.This Court found — 44 — that the Appellant facilitated opportunities to develop and support sexual victimization of• m Ot Vh Vi and deter I= from reporting the abuse. (N.T. January 14, 2020 p.13). On Count IV, Failure to Report/Refer, 23 Pa. C.S. §6319(a)(1), (2)()(ili), this Court sentenced the Appellant to two ( 2) years special probation. The maximum term for aviolation of Failure to Repott(Refer, 23 Pa. C.S. §6319(a)(1), (2)(O(ih), graded as afelony of the third degree is seven (7) years. 18 Pa. C.S. § 1103(3). The Appellant had an offense gravity score of five (5) and aprior record score of zero (0). Under the sentencing guidelines for such scores, the standard range of minimum sentence is restorative sanctions — nine (9) months. The aggravated range of mniimum sentence for the above scores is twelve ( 12) months. This Court sentenced the Appellant to two (2) years special probation. Lastly, on Count V, Furnish Liquor or Malt Beverage to aMinor, 18 Pa. C.S. §010.1(a), this Court sentenced the Appellant to one (1) year special probation. The maximum term for a violationo. misdemeanor of the third degree is one (1) year. 18 Pa. C.S. § 1104(3). The Appellant had an offense gravity score of one (1) and aprior record score of zero (0). Under the sentencing guidelines for such scores, the standard range of minimum sentence is restorative sanctions. The aggravated range of minimum sentence is Restrictive Intermediate Punishment (RIP) - three (3) months. This Court sentenced theAppellant to one (1) year special probation. Indeed, sentencing is amatter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and asentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent amanifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a — 45 — manifestly unreasonable decision Commonwealth v. ShuH t148 A.3d 828, 831 (Pa. Super. 2016). There exists adeferential standard when examining any sentence since "the sentencing court selitences flesh-and-blood defendants and the nuances of sentencing decisions axe dillcult to gauge from the cold transcript used upon appellate review.." . Commonwealth Y. Walls, 926 A.2d 957.,961 (Pa. 2007). Moreover the sentencing court is in asuperior position when deciding 6n an appropriate sentence because it observes the defendant and her articulation of remorse or indifference. Id. To that end, appellate review of asentence is constrained by 42 Pa. C.S. § 9781(c), which provides that a sentence may be vacated and remand for re-sentence only if (1) the court intended to sentence within the guidelines but "applied the guidelines ezroneousiy; (2) asentence was imposed within the guidelines "but the case involves circumstaLuces where the application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable; or (3) the sentencing count sentenced outside the sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable. In. all other cases, the appellate court shall affirm the sentence imposed by the se►rteriaing court. Id. "Unreasonable," connotes a decision that is `irrational' or not guided by sound judgment. Wags, at 963. A sentence not guided by sound judgment or irrational occurs in only two situations. First; it is unreasonable if the sentencing court did not weigh the "general standards applicable to sentencing found in Section 9721,1x, the protection of the public; the gravity of the offense in relation to the impact on the victim and the comnuinity; and the rehabilitative needs of the defeadp nt. 42 Pa. C.S. §9721(b).; ! Falls, at 964. Second, ifit is unreasonable under the guidelines provided by 42 Pa. C.S. §9781(d). In reviewing the record the appellate court shall have regard for: (1) Ile nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; — 46 — (2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the defendant, including any presentence, i nvestigation. (3) The findings upon which the sentence was based (4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission. Ld. Herein the Appellant complains that the guideline range sentence is unreasonable since the underlying case involves circumstances where application of the guidelines would be unreason le.,alleging that total confinetneut was unnecessary.Additionally, the Appellant complaint that this Court did not adequately consider mitigating factors and is asking the Pennsylvania gul r for Court to re-weigh those circumstances and remand for amore lenient sentence. ' See ConuRgoealth v. Madas,968 A. 2+1 773, 778 ( Pa.Super. 2009)(holftg that an appellate court cannot re- weWthe sentencing factors and impose judgment in the place of the sentencing court). There is no merit to the Appellant' sclaim that this Court failed to consider mitigating factors before imposing sentence. This Court heard statements in mitigation from both the mother and father of the Appellant.The trial court also considered Appellant' sallocution, in which she maintained her innocence and admitted to jeopardizing her family by allowing the victim i nto her life. Importantly,this Court did meaningfully consider the sentencing 9tudelines, as well as all section 9721( b) factors,i ncluding the Appellant's individual circumstances as explained in the PSL This Court articulated that it weighed the requisite factors when imposing its temp of imprisonment and therefore sufficient reasons exist in the record to support this Court's guideline sentence.See (N.T. JFanuary 144, 2424 p.12-13). For example,the nature and circumstances of the Appellant' soffenses support state incarceration because the Appellant repeatedly engaged in predatory behavior,and secreted her VIth•m VIGhW& actions and the actions of herhusband.It was in the context of IMand parents' trust — 47 — N,b m that the Appellant took advantage of the opportunity to groom and put M at risk to be Ur ,m sexually assaulted The Appellant' sauthority and position deterred from reporting the qI.Gtm is abuse as well as fostered belief that she had to obey the Appellant' sadvice and direction. The Appellant manipulated into believing that the Appellant held her best interest. During trial,the Commonwealth presented this Court with several incidents for review. This Court determined that the Appellant had shown adevelopment towards befrimding in preparation for sexual victimization over approximately two (2)years: The .Appellant LL&l r -O •f demonstrated apattern of conduct dimissive of societal roans and dismissive of best interest as astudent and aminor. The Appellant used her position in the Lakeland school community and Lakeland band comni unity and her offer of help to as amethod to groom vic,,W M to sad* the soxtW needs of her husband and herself without any regard to the damage that resulted therein. The Appellant caused s6vere mental anguish and emotional damage to J -oei a a may N rtxe ersx b &a•i•did [ rrS•uLatiarmry rc8•, sentence. AltholTh the Appellant did not have aprior record,this Court had the opportunity to view the Appellant at both trial and at sentence,and assessed the sincerity ofher pleas for mercy. This Court did not find the Appellant' sstatements to be sincere or honest. Ldtewise,this Court noted that it received several letters from family and friends and while the Appellant may be able to convince friends and relatives of her innocence,this Court found her denial of culpability extremely incredible. During allocution, the Appellant shifted blame towards the vicuna, stattng: "I should have never allowed her into our lives [ . . - ] Iwill never allow someone or something to jeopardize my relationsbip with my daughter, my husband,or my family!, (N.T.J ►uary 14, 2020 p.10); See Commonwealth v. Beelev,780 A. 2d 645,644 (Pa.2001); Commonwealth Y. — 48 — Constantine, 478 A.2d 39 (Pa. Super. 2984); Commonvfealth v. GalIap-her, 442 A.2d 820 (Pa. Super.1982)(holding that asentencing court may determine adefendaxtt's potential for rehabilitation by considering demeanor, apparent remorse, manifestation of social conscience, and cooperation with law enforcement agents)- The Appelignt did not appreciate the seriousness of her conduct, which is an obvious gauge ofher potential for rehabilitation. This Court cannot reward the Appellant's tolerant attitade.towards sex assault with leniency in sentence. This Court opined that the victim among many others will suffer long term effects in placing frost in adults. Thus, deterrence and incapacitation are necessitated to assist the Appellant in. rehabilitatip and recognition of the wrongfi&ess of her behavior as an educaior, adult, and mentor. The Appellant's sentence will provide protection to the community and deter future sexual assaults amongst educators and minor students, especially in situations with trusting parent as well as encourage the utmost compl'anc- e -fpTmWa. This Court also had the benefit of pre-sentence investigation report (hereinafter ,Tsr ) which was thoroughly reviewed As such, this Court became aware of the Appellant's specific characteristics, zero prior record score and lack of involvement in the criminal justice system. NotMthstandin& the guidelines inherently give credit to those who have led it relatively law abiding life, alack of prior record is one element utilized in determining the guideline sentence range. The guideline sentence as computed in this case is based on aprior record score ofamro (0), thus to assign the lack of aprior record as areason for deviating from the guidelines is to, in effect give the Appellant credit for the same factor twim, which would be improper. See Commonwealth v. Mahlon lDramgoole, 491 A.2d 1352 (Pa. Super. 71955). In fact; relying on an offender's clean criminal record to impose probation where the Sentencing Guidelines call for — 49 — aminimum. prison term is reversible error and grounds for aCommonwealth appeal of that sentence. See also Commonwealth v. Celestin, 825 A.2d 670 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal dented, 844 A.2d 551 (Pa. 2004); Commonwedth v. Seutak, 518 A.2d 12984 (Pa. Super. 1986). The Appell noes guides ne sentence is not disproportionate to the facts and particular circumstances of the Appellant's offenses; the victim involved, in light ofher age and vulnerabilities, the length of time in which the Appellant manipulated the victim, choosing to secret her husband's actions and her own, risking her livelihood, demonstrating alack of insight as an adult, albeit her previous law-abiding life and educational training. The Appellant produced severe emotional and psychological impact on the victim and other students within her class and comm„nity as well as trusting parents. The Appellant's actions completely contravene her educational tirainiug and eduoational positions. The Appellant's role and conduct on some occasions was at least reckless, if not knowing on most occasions. It appeared to this Court that the p 'role and.co- n tm= -tcrda- to-aflrerwisa- would seriously depreciate the seriousness of the crimes, if not mock and "fly in the face" of mandated reporter legislation. This Courfs sentencing discourse indicates it properly relied upon the evidence adduced at trial, testimony during the sentencing hearing, and the PSI when it sentenced Appel]snt This Court simply could not ignore the length of time in which the abuse occurred and the means through which the abuse was facilitated This Court found the amount of phone contacts at all hours with the victim &eit only one-sbxffi of the approximate length of the abuse to be not only an additional means of control over the victim, but also entirely inappropriate and the content xepugnant. The Appellant relied on tho victim's musical interests, and hobbies, especially her troubledfinauentive family scenario to draw the victim towards her and her husband, and isolate the victim from her parents, friends, co-workers, and other *50 educators, The Appellant took advantage of the victim's vulnerabilities and deluded the victim into thinking the Appellant and the Appellant's husband were the only individuals who were concerned about her. The victim impact stated: "she knew what was going on and didn't do anything about it. Sho had spent alot of time talking to me and learirning about my life. She spent hours helping me with things music related [ .. , Jaft all of the time it crushes me that she would go along with Nick in letting him manipulate me to do what he wanted. It makes me feel sick and disgusted and it most likely always will. She had the power to report it or stop what was going on and she chose to let it go." Thus, the above-delineated findings upon which the Appellant's incarceration was based were valid grounds for aguideline sentence. This Court's sentence was neither mlation lnor unguided by soundjudgment and does not warrant reversal. Second, even setting aside the presumptive reasonableness of the standard range sentence the Appellani received,hpllatl n " sironfi at ct0atiun farapp'eHaterevie . There is no dispute that this Court imposed asentence within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines. An allegation that the sentmeing court failed to consider certain mitigating factors generally does not necessarily raise asubstantial question. See Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A..2d 162,171(Pa. Super. 2014), citing Commonwealth V. McNabb, 819 a:.2d 54, 57 (Pa. Super. 2003); Commonwealth v. W&Ror, 731 A.2d IA 155 (Pa. Super. 1999)(reiterating allegation that sentencing court "failed to consider" or "did not adequately consider" certain factors generally does not raise substantial question), Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263,1272 n. 8 (Pa. Super. 2013)( ("Careful. litigants should note that arguments that the sentencing court failed to consider the factors p:roffmd in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721 does not present asubstantial question). — 51 — If apresentence investigative report exists, Pennsylvania Appellate Courts shall inuu ne that the sentencing.court "was aware of relevant informations concerning the defendant's character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors. A pre-sentence report constitutes the record and speaks for itself." Commonwealth v. IDevers, 546 A.2d 12,18 (Pa. 1988). The IDevers court further articulated that `fit would be foolish, indeed, to take the position that if acourt is iu possession of the fads, it will mil. to apply them to the case at hand." M. See Commonwealth v BaYer, 855 A.2d 149 (Pa. Super. 2404); Commonwealth v. Burns, 78 A.2d 1144 (Pa. Super. 2000 Prior to sentencing, this Court heard and considered the testimony of-the victim, numerous character witnesses testifying on behalf of the Appeliaxity and the Appellant andreviewed all exhibits, specifically the Pen-La evidence documenting over 23,000 phone contacts/texts combined between the Appellant and the Appellant's husband with JoeHa (representing only one sixth of the time in which the allegations occurre o, :IY, I, sco , had abweht of aPST. That thrs a r- -a iwei _l Oar, proposed mitigating factors as the Appellant wished, absent more, does not raise asubstantial question. Ultimately, where asentence is within the standard range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the Sentencing Code. See Comnonwealtb V. QruzCenteno, 658 A.2d 536 (Ps. Super. 1995), appeal denied, 676 A.2d 1195 (1996)(stating combinaii on ofPS1 and standard range sentence, absent mare, cannot be considered excessive or unreasonable). There is no indication on the record that this Court's sentence was based upon inaccurate, insufficient or improper information. Where a "trial court took areasoned approach and sentenced [adefendant] after taking into account multiple factors," — 52 — as in the current appear areviewing court will "discern no abuse of discretion." See Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 Aid 1169,1178 (Pa. Super. 2018'). 13. Whether the trial court erred regarding the sentencing of the Endangering the Welfare of Children count as athird degree felony, when'the Criminal Information failed to allege a "course of conduct"required for the enhanced giadhig, regardless of the specific question posed to the jury on the verdict slip? Appellant was convicted by aju ry of one (1) count of Endangering the 'Welfare of Children, athird degree felony. The jury specifically found that there was a "course of conduct," with regard to the Endangering Welfare of Children charge. See Verdict Slip June 19, 2019.; Compare Commonwealth ,y. Morales, 251 A.3d 1222 (Pa. Super. 2021)(under the EWOC statute, in order to grade the offense as athird-degree felony, aspecific determination must be made that ' the actor engaged in acourse of conducf' of endangering the welfare of achild). In analyzing agrading issue, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has recognized that "course •ue•ii3'•CBtt•l•ti• Eirdarrgeriug•th•We•re•en;but•iti additional fact, ajury question that impacts the grading of the offense. Commonwealth v. )?opow, 844 A.2d 13,18 (Pa. Super. 2004). Here, the Commonwealth alleged facts in the initial Criammal Information and Amended Criminal Information, which were proven at the time of trial to support the grading. Count ir of the Criminal Information and Amended Criminal Information alleged between March 2015 and Tanuary 2018: - dangering Welfare of ChildrenParentlGuardianlOther Commits Offense 18 Pa. C.S. 4304(a)(1)- Grade: Feloay 3; $15,000; 7years; being aparent, guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of achild under 18 years of age, or aperson that employs or supervises such aperson, commits an offense if he knowingly endangers the welfare of the child by violating aduty of care, protection or support, to wit: The defendant Ruth Baggetta, did allow Nicodemo Baggetta to engage in sexual activity and conversation with I.L. afemale, age 16 ( aminor child]. — 53 — Further, in support of the endangerment charge and the additional factor of "course of . conduct," the Commonwealth provided the. extensive and detailed testimony of•describing conduct that occurred over atwo year period, coupled with 11.,000 phone contacts via text or call with the Appellant,and 12,000 phone contacts via text or call with the Appellant' shusband within afive month period.Additionally,the Appellant admitted to purchasing acamera lens as agi% dinners, invitations to `hang out," approximately adozen or more sleepovers, obta►nbg matcling tat toos, visits toijob, inviting to her wedding!exchanging Christmas gifts V'I Gh(VI withOW The jurors listened to the Appellant tell them that she did not notify administration, nor refer o the guidance counselor despite being concerned aboutv hmental health or saicidal ideations throughout atwo ( 2) year period.Importantly,the Appellant did not notify administration when she became aware of the sexual contact occurring with her husband and Wr -h CAW :-. so . tsi•••rah-ex-on-th-e -Appellant' s-husbandshu dtaneousiy — •11 with the Appellant.SO stated: `Ihad stopped there to visit before Iwas going to hang out with friends [ .. , ] Ruth and Nick were supposed to go to dinner with Ruth's pare. .And when Igot there, she had told me that she told Nick that if he went to her parents'house for that dinner that we would both give him oral:' (N.T. June 17, 2019 p. 50). "'atified that she and the Vi•fivYl Appellant simultaneously performed oral sex on the Appellant' shusband M. at 51, 83. UM explained she saw the Appellant and the Appellant' shusband weekly, and that she would regularly sleep at the Appellant' shouse overnight.The Appellant provided her access to "hang" in the house often.. The Appellant even allowed v to shower at the house.Id. at 41,51, 7s. She stated: "Iwouldn't be able to remember how many tiroes. It was oftem Like, if Iwas seeing usually Iended up sleeping there quite abit C... ]Iusually would sleep in their bed with them, — 54 — them [ . , . Ithere were afew tinges where Islept in the middle between the two of theme." lyd. at Vl 6VIA 58. also explained that on some occasions,the Appellant' shusband groped her on the outside of her clothes and underneath her clothes,all over her stomach,butt, and in between her 1G M legs, while she slept next to him and the Appellant Yd. at 5859. testified that the Vi Appellant's husband purchased avibrator for' and operated the vibrator on bShe noted that the vibrator was kept in the Appellant's upstairs bathroom drawer, easily within the purview and access of the Appellanit. d> r. at 60. At the. outset of the relationship, recalled aconversation with the .Appellant's Vi C;KV l husband, wherein he told Oft 'UAt the Appellant believed they should act on their urges and V1(,IVA -. kiss. Id, at 43. 4M testified: "he had told me that they had kind of talked about it and that she saidthat at some point that we should land of act on those feelings [ ... ] that she had said that we should just kind of kiss and get over it." xd. at 44, * Clearly, the Appellant's instructions were -M •Cfo ep •iing•r nvtectcn•th•weifia X-of•hrfa + ted the- — YYN Appellant's awareness of the initial sexual encounter. explained thief while the Appellant conducted at a: music festival, and the Appellant's husband engaged in sexual activity. She staffed that upon the Appellant's return home, "Nick ended up telling her what had actually happened, because he said that he felt bad [ ... Jthat it wasn't supposed to go that far." rd. at YY1 46. Since that initial sexual encrnmter, testified to "more than ten" other sexual encounters with the Appellant' shusband,involving oral sax, digital penetration,and anal sex M. at 46-56. Clearly, the allegations and evidence did not comprise asingle event, but separate and distinct instances of sexual activity and conversation. Here, the Commonwealth, presented evidence of multiple events,wherein the Appellant possessed awareness of the sexual activity vl chin, occurring with her husband,disregarded her husband' sactions and communications with — 55 — hw and even participated in the sexual activity with her husband and Mt The Appellant VLCLW encouraged an imamate relationship among and her husband. She be:6rientled 1 Vitbm manipulated her role as teacher and band instructor, exhaustively communicated with IMand promoted bad behaviors. She permitted unrestricted access to her personal life and home, including multiple overnight stays and sleeping in the same bed. Over atwo year period, the Appellant failed to take protective action and fostered opportunities for sexual activity to occur. Ultimately, the Appellant engaged in multiple acts of her purpose of having sexual activity and an intimate relationship withWW For these reasons, the evidence supported a "course of conduct" finding. Importantly, this Court properly defined "course of conduct" in its instruction and the jury was charged to determine and making afinding on "course of conduct." ( N.T. Jane 1.9, 2019 p. 119), Prun.sylvania law defines "course of conduct' as "multiple acts over time" or "apattern of actions composed of more than one act-over aperaod-ofItffe-;-however sh`M e- 3; FwF: continuity of conduct." Commonwealth v. Smith, 206 A.3d 565, 566 (Pa. Super. 2019); Pommanwealth v. Grav, 251 A.3d 1220 (Pa. Super. 2021). As such, the jury was able to determine facts to support the grading of the Endangering Welfare of Children as athird-degree felony and understood that it was making afinding on "course of conduct." The record reflects that the Commonwealth alleged in the criminal information/ amended criminal information, and presented evidence at trial, of the additional factor of "course of conduct," and this Court instructed the jury on "course of conduct." Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to establish the crime of Endangering the Welfare of Children as athird-degree felony, and this Courtproperly graded this offense at sentencing. Therefore, this Court's sentence as athird-degree felony is legal and the Appellant's claim is — 56 — without merit. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 206 A.3d 551,565 (Pa. Super. 2019)(finding appellant's grading argument meritless where the criminal information charged conuption of minors as athird degree fel(ny, consistent with the Commonwealth's evidence presented at trial that the Appellant engaged in the aforementioned actions on multiple occasions, and where the trial court gave aproper jury instruction with the "course of conduct" requirement), Commonwealth V. Suarez, 2016'WL 5210886 (Pa. Super. 2016)(finding that it is clear from the record that where the Commonwealth alleged in the criminal information and presented evidence at trial of the additional factor, and the jury was instructed on the element of "course of conduct," in order to convi4 the trial courtproperly graded the offense at sentencing). 14. Whether the trial court erred In denying Defendants Motion for Bail Pending Appeal when there was already asiguificant amount of time In Jail served, and Ddendant presents no threat to the community and/or vic", has both famfly and community support, presents no flight r1s); as evfdeaced by the fact that while previously on bail and on home confinement she appeared for all required canrt appearabces and 'committed no ball. or home confinement violations, and desfxes to bum actively partl4atelrth preparation of her appeal7b The Pennsylvania Superior Court has explained; "[w]e will review the lower court's order denying abail application for an abuse of discretion and will only reverse when the trial court misapplies the kw, or its judgment is manifestly unreasonable, or the evidence of record show that [its] decision is aresult of partiality, prejudice, bias, or in wi11." Commonwealth v. Bishop, 829 A.2d 1170,1172 (Pa. Super. 2003). Here, the Appellant c. aima that this Court should have granted her motion for bail because the Appellant served periods of incarceration and house arrest programing without incident and was neither athreat to the community or flight risk Pa. R. Crim. P. 521(b)(2) provides, in relevant part as follows: eTechnically, to invoke judsdiedon to rr4ow an orderpertaining to mail, Hie Appellant should have fled apetition for review pursuant to Chepta 15 of the Pennsylvania Rules ofAppellate Procedure. Pa. RA.P.1.7620)(2). — 57 — when the sentence imposed includes imprisonment o£ 2years or more, the defendant Aal Inot have the same right to bail as before verdict:but bail may be allowed in the discretion of the judge Id. Pa. X Crim. P. 521(d)(2) provides, in relevant part as follows: The decision whether to change the type ofrelease on bail or what conditions of release to impose shall be based on the judge's evaluation of the information about the defendant as it relates to the release criteria set forth iu Rule 323. The judge shall also consider whether there is an increased likelihood of the defendant=s ileeing,the jurisdiction or whether the defendant is adanger to any other person or to the community or to himself or herself. Id. Accordingly, this Court presided over the Appellant's trial and sentencing and, as such, is familiar with the nature of the offense, the character of the Appellant, her circumstances, and thus held pertinent information on which to conclude that bail should be denied pending appeal. Contrary to the Appellant's claims, this Court denied bail pending appeal because she presented athreat to the community. As noted by this Court when considering the Appellants sentence, this Court found the Appellant's actions to be predatory in nature and therefore presented arisk to the community, especially Lakeland Highschool students and band members, primarily; the victim. In the victim impact statement, the victim revealed to this Court that she is in a "difficult place" and disgusted by the Appellants power to stop what was occurring but then did nothing. The Appellant demonstrated to this Court acognitive distortion in that she is an adult and is incapable of managing and understanding sexually inappropriate behaviors towards minors. This Court found the Appellant's preoccupation with the victim troubling; especially where the Appellant held the control to notify law enforcement. The Appellant did not posit to this Court any treatment plan to assist with her cognitive abnormalities. While, the Appellant shows evidence of positive support systems within hex family, the Appellant held those positive support r — 58 — systems at the time of the instant offenses and chose to engage in and tolerate sexually inappropriate behavior for at least two (2 )years,including investing an excessive amount of time,money, and energy in grooming the victim.It is in the context of trust that the Appellant exploited the studentlteacherhaentor relationship. As such, this Court found the AppeIIant's support system to be an unavailing factor, weighed among the nature and circumstazzres of the offenses,Moreover,the Appellant held ateaching ==3whicb was terminated due to the instant offenses, and has not demonstrated to this Court any other employment prospects Unrelated to education or minors, while previously on bail.Since the Appellant is not gainfully employed, this factor is likewise unavailing.Finally,regardless of the Appellant' szero prior record,the Appellant was convicted of four serious felony offenses, and the issues raised as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions have little, if any, likelihood to prevail. Additionally,the impact of incarceration on the Appellant is not exceptional from others s•entenuedfar•exunH.yv•appropriat•e-offenses-to'v•arcls•uainors; -izrtiglxt•af-fihe•ipella•-s•rirvi••--to the victim In making this bail determination,this Court balanced the appropriate factors, and did not abuse its discretion . BY THE C CC: Notice of the entry of the foregoing Memorandum has been p • ; ' ded to each party pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 114 by mailing time- stanped copies to the following individuals: Lisa Swift; Esq. Sara Vareia, Esq. Lackawanna County District Attorney' sOffice Jason Shrive, Esq. Attorney for Appellant