Koonce v. Fordyce Lumber Co.

Kjrby, J., (after stating the facts). Attorneys for appellants concede that one who conveys a tract of land and thereafter executes a second conveyance with intent to defeat the first or with knowledge that such conveyance will be used for that purpose, commits an actionable wrong against the first grantee, holding an unrecorded deed, but insist that the instant case is entirely different from such cases. If appellee had recorded its deed to the timber, the 'Condition existing now could never have arisen, since the last grantees who were held to be innocent purchasers of the timber would have had constructive notice of appellee’s title from the record, their timber deed being in the chain of title. Gaines v. Summers, 50 Ark. 327. Our statute provides, section 1693-95, Kirby’s Digest, that if a person shall be a party to any conveyance or assignment of any real estate or interest therein with intent to defraud any prior or subsequent purchaser, or if any person shall bona fide sell any tract or parcel of land and shall make any written deed of conveyance or other.instrument of writing, assuring the title of such land to the purchaser thereof and shall afterwards sell and convey such tract of land to any subsequent purchaser, whether the subsequent purchaser have knowledge of the previous sale or not, such person shall he deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. Appellants contend that said section 1694 relative to the sale of lands does not apply to the facts of this case, since they had the right to sell the lands and it was not their intention to convey the timber which they did not ■ sell. Their testimony also shows that they had no intention in fact or rather did not make the conveyance of the land to the last grantees for the purpose of defrauding the lumber company of the timber already conveyed to it as they supposed its deed was of record and would protect its interest. However, this may be, it is unquestionably true that the conveyance of the land conveyed the timber standing thereon and that this fact was well known to appellants in making the deeds thereto. They also knew that their conveyances of the land contained no reservation or exception of the timber thereon from the grant, and were chargeable of course with knowledge that the conveyances of the land without such reservation or exception of the timber, carried the timber and would have effect to defeat their prior conveyances of the timber to the lumber company if said timber conveyance was not of record and the lands were afterwards (granted to a bona fide purchaser without notice of it. Their affirmative action in making such conveyances without proper exceptions and reservations to protect their grantee of the timber whose deed might not have been and was not recorded, had the same effect to defeat its right and defraud the grantee of the timber as though they had intended the result effected, and for which they must be held answerable. They were owners as tenants in common, each of an undivided half of the lands upon’which the timber stood, and conveyed the timber thereon to the lumber company by a warranty deed granting twenty years time for its removal, and their warranty was broken, and their grantee appellee, deprived of the timber by a bona fide purchaser through their subsequent conveyances of the lands within said time without reservation or exception of the timber, for the loss of which they became liable. Whether the action be regarded arising ont of contract or sounding in tort, the effect is the same, since the damage would not have resulted but for their subsequent conveyances of the land without reservation or exception of the timber, and although it is true that both appellants knew that they had already conveyed the timber to the lumber company, and neither in fact intended to defeat that conveyance, or deprive said company of the timber by his conveyance to the other of his undivided half of the land, still but for his said conveyance as made, the other would not have been able to convey the lands and wrongfully deprive their grantee of the timber. In other words, the act of Koonce in making the conveyance of his undivided half of the land to his co-tenant, McKee, contributed to the result attained by the conveyance of the lands without reservation or exception of the timber, thereby causing the damage to appellee in the loss of its timber. • There was therefore no misjoinder of parties as contended by appellants. The Supreme Court of Nebraska has reached the same conclusion as to liability in a case of like kind, in a well considered opinion. Hilligas v. Kuns, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 284. The testimony being undisputed as to the value of the timber, the court committed no error in directing the verdict. The judgment is affirmed.