Bank of Gillett v. Botts

Hart, J., (after stating the facts). Sec. 6889 of Crawford & Moses’ Digest gives the landlord a lien upon the crop grown upon the demised premises in any year for rent. Sec. 6890 gives the landlord a lien for any necessary supplies, either of money, provisions, clothing, stock, or other necessary articles advanced to the tenant with which to make and gather the crop. The section further provides that the lien shall have preference over any mortgage of the crop made by the tenant. The bank insists, however, that it is only liable to the plaintiff for the amount of the rent due him,. and is not liable for the note signed by the plaintiff, because the plaintiff signed the same as surety for the tenant. Hence they claim that the ease falls within the doctrine of Kaufman v. Underwood, 83 Ark. 118, where it was held that the landlord may not claim a lien as for supplies furnished to his tenant where the tenant purchased a horse for whose purchase price the landlord went security. On the other hand, the plaintiff relies upon the case of Walker v. Rose, 153 Ark. 599. In that case it was held that where a landlord directed a merchant to furnish supplies to the tenant for which the landlord agreed to pay, and subsequently paid, the landlord, in effect, furnished the supplies to the tenant, and was entitled to a preference lien therefor. In that case, as here, a bank had a valid mortgage on the crop of the tenant, but knew that the tenant was raising the crop on the land of the plaintiff. The landlord had also become responsible to a mercantile company in the amount of certain advances made by it of money and supplies which were used by the tenant in the cultivation of his crops. The court held that the facts justified a finding that the money and supplies furnished through the mercantile company were ill reality furnished by the appellee. Hence it was held that it was not a case of a landlord becoming a mere surety for his tenant, but that the facts warranted the conclusion that the landlord himself was primarily responsible to the mercantile company. In the instant case, according to the testimony of the plaintiff, he in reality furnished the money to the tenant with which to buy the rice bags for the purpose of preserving the rice. It was absolutely necessary to put the rice in bags after it was thrashed' in order to preserve it. Although the note shows that Botts, the plaintiff, signed it as surety, yet, under the attending circumstances, the chancellor was warranted in finding that Botts was primarily liable for the money, which was used in purchasing the rice bags to preserve the crop. The landlord paid the note at the bank, and the purchase of the rice bags inured to the benefit not only of the landlord but his tenant, and to the bank, which was the tenant’s mortgagee. The bank knew that the rice was grown on the land of the plaintiff, and therefore it is liable to plaintiff for its value to the extent of the landlord’s lien for rent and the supplies furnished by him, which was established by the proof. It is next insisted that the judgment should be reversed because the suit was not brought within six months after the rent was due and payable*. The bank was not made a party to the suit until the 2nd day of September, 1921, and it is insisted that the rent Avas at least due at the end of the year 1920. It will be remembered, however, that this suit was commenced by the landlord against the tenant and some laborers who were attempting to assert laborers’ liens on the rice crop. The object of the suit was to establish the landlord’s lien as superior to that of the laborers for the rent, and also the money advanced by him for supplies. Menard, the tenant, was appointed receiver by the chancery court to take charge of the rice and hold it in a designated warehouse until the further orders of the court. It is true that the bank testified that it took the rice from the warehouse and sold it under authority given by the tenant. The court was warranted, however, in finding from the evidence of the plaintiff and the tenant that no authority Avas given to the bank to take charge of the rice and sell it under its mortgage. The action of the bank therefore amounted to a conversion of the rice which was in the hands of the court. Hence the limitation of six months provided by the statute for the continuance of a landlord’s lien after the rent shall become due has no application. It folloAvs that the decree will be affirmed.