Branscumb v. Whitaker

George Rose Smith, J. This action for personal injuries was brought by the appellant against his employer, the appellee. The defendant did not have workmen’s compensation insurance at the time of the injury, and the plaintiff elected to sue at common law rather than to file a claim under the compensation law. Ark. Stats. 1947, § 81-1304. This appeal is from a judgment entered upon a verdict for the defendant. A pivotal issue at the trial was whether the plaintiff at the time of the accident had so far deviated from the scope of his employment as to have become a mere licensee instead of an employee. Since we have concluded that the trial court gave an erroneous instruction upon this issue it is necessary for us to detail the facts only as they bear upon this question. The appellee operates a stave mill, at which the plaintiff had been employed for about two months before he was hurt. The evidence is in conflict as to the work for which the plaintiff was employed. According to Branscumb’s own testimony he was hired to haul and peel stave bolts outside the mill, but when that work was done he was required to go into the mill and work at the culling machine. This machine, which uses a large knife blade to cut the bolts into staves, is admittedly dangerous to anyone not skilled in its operation. The plaintiff testified that while he was working at this machine a fellow employee bumped his arm and knocked his hand into the machine, causing the loss of two fingers. It is conceded that the fellow servant doctrine is not available as a defense to an employer who fails to obtain compensation coverage. Ark. Stats., § 81-1304. The fellow servant in question testified that the injury was his fault. Other employees having the same duties as Branseumb testified that they too were required to work at the culling machine, either at the foreman’s direction or with his knowledge. At the trial the theory of the defense was that the plaintiff was employed to work outside the mill only. The foreman testified that only one employee was allowed to operate the culling machine, and when that man was absent the mill closed down. According to the foreman the plaintiff was neither directed nor permitted to enter the mill in the course of his work. Upon this theory the defendant requested, and the court gave, this instruction : ‘ ‘You are instructed that if you find from the evidence that the plaintiff was employed at the time of the injury to sort staves outside the mill proper and none of his duties required him to work at the operation of the machine at which he was injured, and you further find that he left the job that he was employed to do and without the knowledge or consent of the defendant or his foreman, but acting on his own volition and for his own purpose, undertook to operate the machine, and while doing so was injured, he would not be entitled to recover, and your verdict should be for the defendant.” The plaintiff objected to this charge on the ground that it required the employer to have known of or consented to the plaintiff’s work at the culling machine on the particular day of the injury, in spite of the testimony offered by the plaintiff to the effect that it was customary for the plaintiff and oilier like einployees to work at this machine when they were abreast of their other duties. This objection was well taken, for the jury would have been entirely justified in concluding from the language of the iilstruction that the defendant would be liable only if he or his foreman was actually aware that the plaintiff was working at the culling machine at the time of the accident. At common law it is certainly true that an employee cannot, except in an emergency, turn aside from his assigned tasks and undertake a different and unauthorized line of work without losing his status as an employee. A typical case of such a deviation from the scope of employment is Taylor v. Grant Lbr. Co., 94 Ark. 566, 127 S. W. 962, where we held that by his actions the servant had become a licensee. But the rule is different when the unauthorized conduct has been so habitual that the jury may conclude that the employer is aware of the practice. American Ry. Express Co. v. Davis, 152 Ark. 258, 2, 38 S. W. 50, and 1063. In a case much like this one on its facts, Ward Furn. Mfg. Co. v. Pickle, 174 Ark. 463, 295 S. W. 727, we held that the test is whether the employer should have anticipated that the employee might attempt the act that is later said to have been beyond the scope of his duties. In the case at bar if the jury had believed that the plaintiff and other similar employees habitually worked at the culling machine, their verdict might well have been for the plaintiff. Since the questioned instruction can fairly be said to have ruled out that line of thought it must be considered erroneous. Reversed.