Estate of Sargent v. Benton State Bank

Steele Hays, Justice. Charlie Frank Sargent was fatally shot on February 18, 1980. His wife Kate, and his three sons Donald, Roy and Cecil were all charged with first degree murder. The charges against Cecil and Roy were dismissed, Donald was convicted of first degree murder and Kate Sargent of second degree murder. Charlie Sargent died intestate and the administrator of his estate petitioned to exclude the wife and sons from inheriting because of their involvement in his death. The Chancellor found that all four had participated in the murder and excluded them from the estate. Cecil Sargent is appealing the order on the grounds that the evidence is insufficient to show his participation in his father’s murder. We agree with appellant and reverse the Chancellor. Appellee’s petition charged that Cecil had participated in a conspiracy to murder the father. He argues that the evidence would support Cecil’s participation as an accomplice or an accessory after the fact, as well as a conspirator in the wrongful and unlawful death of his father. Under Arkansas law for reasons of sound public policy one who wrongfully kills another is not permitted to profit by the crime. Wright v. Wright, 248 Ark. 105, 449 S.W.2d 952 (1970). Horn v. Cole, 203 Ark. 361, 156 S.W.2d 787 (1941). We believe the evidence presented in this case was not sufficient to find involvement by Cecil on any theory. The trial court’s findings that related to Cecil are as follows: 1) Donald Sargent had discussed killing the father with other members of the family; 2) Donald shot his father while all of the family members were in the home; 3) the wife and three sons removed the father from the home after the shooting; while he was still alive, and took him to the place where the body was found. The deposition of the Medical Examiner reflects that when the body was doused with kerosene Mr. Sargent was dead at the time. Mr. Sargent lived a very short time after receiving the four wounds. The only way the Court can reconcile the testimony of the parties to Dr. Malak’s report and deposition is that after Mr. Sargent was taken in the truck to the place where the body was found, one or more bullet wounds was inflicted at that time. Mr. Sargent died before the kerosene was poured on him; 4) the wife and all three of the boys participated in the murder of the father. With nothing more, the first two findings tell us nothing of Cecil’s participation. The third adds very little and is tempered by other considerations surrounding the incident which we will discuss further on. The last finding is simply conclusory. The appellee cites the following evidence in support of the trial court’s findings: Cecil was at the table with his father when Donald first shot him; Cecil testified that his father asked him to call an ambulance but Cecil said he didn’t know the number, and that he also helped carry his father to the truck; Cecil, Roy and the mother followed the truck in their car; Roy had placed gasoline in a firebomb in the car before the left to follow Donald; Roy saw Cecil keep the father in the truck as Donald was pouring gasoline on him; Donald watched as the truck in which his father was placed was set on fire with the firebomb; Cecil helped push the truck after the firebomb didn’t work; Roy testified that all four family members discussed what to tell the police; Cecil did not tell the police the whole truth when first questioned. We believe the disputed factual issue here is to be decided by a preponderance of the evidence, as in civil cases generally. [See Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 10, 53 N.W.2d 809 (1952)]. Still, it may be well to examine relevant criminal laws. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-7071 requires that one have the purpose of promoting a criminal offense and agrees with another that he will engage in that activity or will aid in planning it. None of the evidence appellee offers goes at all convincingly to any of these elements. Cecil’s presence at the home at the time of the shooting tells us nothing of his purposefulness or indicates any agreement. Nor is mere association or presence at the scene sufficient to prove conspiracy. U.S. v. James, 528 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1976). As to Donald discussing the killing of the father, the appellee points to no evidence that goes beyond mere discussion. Evidently, Donald was given to loose talk about his intentions, but the indications are that no one took him seriously. More importantly, there is no evidence that shows with whom Donald had discussions and no evidence that Cecil was present. Nothing points to anything even suggesting that Cecil was involved in any agreement to purposefully murder his father. The activities Cecil was involved in that followed Donald’s shooting Sargent leave us with many questions. Absent any evidence of conspiracy, even assuming the father was still alive at the time the family moved his body in the truck, we can’t say that there were conspiratorial acts. The Commentary to § 41-707 emphasizes this point by noting that the statute excludes from its provisions “application to persons who engage in conduct that furthers the ends of a conspiracy but who have no purpose to do so. This is so even if the persons knows his conduct assists in the accomplishment of the criminal objective.” Nor could we say that Cecil’s acts made him an accomplice. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-3032 requires one have the purpose of promoting the offense and that he solicits or encourages another in committing the offense or aids or attempts to aid another in committing the offense. Cecil’s actions themselves, with no evidence of conspiring, or any other evidence of purpose to commit the crime coupled with the fact that Donald had already delivered the fatal wounds leaves an accomplice theory unsupported. The offense of accessory after the fact has now been abolished (see Commentary to Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-302) and such activity now comes under the authority of Chapter 28, Obstructing Governmental Operations. Cecil’s activities might constitute such an offense, but the competing considerations surrounding his acts, and the acts themselves make his involvement far too attenuated to sustain the results of the court’s decision. In sum, it was the burden of the appellee to show that Cecil was aware of a plan to kill his father and that he participated in the furtherance of that plan, or, at least, he concurred in it. Failing in that, there must be evidence of Cecil’s actions after the shooting from which those same conclusions can be rationally inferred. Here, there is nothing in the evidence before the shooting to implicate Cecil, except that he happened to be in the house where he lived eating supper along with the rest of the family. Moreover, Cecil’s actions after the shooting are as consistent with a fear of his older brother, as with a desire to carry out a murder scheme. The two explanations are equally plausible. That being so, when the circumstances in their entirety are weighed, i.e. Cecil’s immaturity, Donald’s threats and occasional physical abusiveness of his brothers, the fact that Cecil was said to be close to his father, the absence of any motive by Cecil, and the state of shock and confusion which may well have accompanied the witnessing of those extraordinary events, they lead us to the conclusion that a finding that Cecil knowingly participated in the death of his father is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. (ARCP 52). The decree is reversed and the cause remanded for further orders not inconsistent with this opinion. Adkisson, C.J., and George Rose Smith and Dudley, JJ., dissent. Footnotes [1] 41-707. Criminal conspiracy. — A person conspires to commit an offense if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of any criminal offense he: (1) agrees with another person or other persons: (a) that one or more of them will engage in conduct that constitutes that offense; or (b) that he will aid in the planning or commission of that criminal offense; and (2) he or another person with whom he conspires does any overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy. [2] 41-303. Criminal Liability for conduct of another — Accomplices. (1) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense, he: (a) solicits, advises, encourages, or coerces the other person to commit it; or (b) aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it; or (c) having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort to do so. (2) When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, a person is an accomplice in the commission of that offense if, acting with respect to that result with the kind of culpability sufficient for the commission of the offense, he (a) solicits, advises, encourages or coerces another person to engage in the conduct causing the result; or (b) aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid another person in planning or engaging in the conduct causing the result; or (c) having a legal duty to prevent the conduct causing the result, fails to make proper effort to do so.