Dorsch v. State

Phipps, Judge. Dennis Dorsch appeals his conviction for DUI, challenging the legality of the traffic stop. Because the record reveals that the stop was permissible, we affirm. [140] Decided April 19, 2002. Gregory W. Holt, Jerome Lee, for appellant. Alan R. Tawse, Jr., Solicitor-General, Arthur J. Creque, Assistant Solicitor-General, for appellee. The officer who stopped Dorsch testified at trial that at about 11:50 p.m. on September 18, 1998, the car that Dorsch was driving caught his attention when it “made a very abrupt lane change.” For about a mile, the officer paced Dorsch’s car, i.e., compared Dorsch’s speed to his own.1 During that time, the officer observed Dorsch exceed the speed limit and stopped him. An officer may make a brief investigatory stop if such stop is “justified by specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.”2 A stop of a vehicle is authorized if the officer observed a traffic offense.3 Because the officer saw Dorsch violate a traffic law, the resulting traffic stop was permissible.4 Judgment affirmed. Andrews, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. Footnotes [1] See Patel v. State, 240 Ga. App. 178, 179 (522 SE2d 760) (1999) (pacing is an established method of determining vehicle speed); Staley v. State, 224 Ga. App. 806 (1) (482 SE2d 459) (1997); Turner v. State, 236 Ga. App. 592, 594 (1) (512 SE2d 699) (1999). [2] Chiasson v. State, 250 Ga. App. 63, 64 (1) (549 SE2d 503) (2001); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968). [3] See Cotton v. State, 237 Ga. App. 18 (513 SE2d 763) (1999); Brantley v. State, 226 Ga. App. 872, 873 (1) (487 SE2d 412) (1997); Freeland v. State, 223 Ga. App. 326, 327 (1) (477 SE2d 633) (1996). [4] Cotton, supra; Brantley, supra; Freeland, supra.