Kuhn v. National Bank

The opinion of the court was delivered by Smith, J.: Two objections to the action of the court in this case are presented: (1) The exclusion of evidence offered .to show that the plaintiff had no actual knowledge of the existence of the judgments or judgment liens on the land at the time he purchased it; (2) that, upon the facts, not the defendants but the plaintiff was entitled to judgment. If, as it has uniformly been decided, a purchaser of either real or personal property is bound to take notice of the facts affecting the title to the property which the records of the county show, and which records the statutes provide shall be public notice, then it is quite immaterial whether or not Kuhn had actual knowledge of the existence of the judgments. In the absence of conduct on the part of the person who afterward as- ■ serts the facts shown by the records to the prejudice of the purchaser which prevents an examination of the records or induces the purchaser not to make such examination, it is negligence for a purchaser of either ■real or personal property to make the purchase without ascertaining the facts shown by the records which may affect the title to be acquired. In the absence of such fraudulent conduct the purchaser will be presumed to have bought with knowledge of all the facts which the records at the time would have disclosed. Equity cannot be invoked to relieve one from the consequences of his own negligence. (Hargis v. Robinson, 63 Kan. 686, 66 Pac. 988.) If, then, as is to be presumed, Kuhn bought the land with knowledge that the three mortgages and two judgments were subsisting liens thereon, and assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage debts but ignored the judgment liens, is he entitled, having paid one mortgage, [459] to be substituted to the position of the holder of the mortgage paid and to have the mortgage considered unpaid when an attempt is made to sell the land on execution to satisfy the judgments? If so, having paid the senior mortgage lien, could he not, in a suit to foreclose the second mortgage, claim subrogation as to the first? Or, having paid the first and second, could he not claim subrogation as to both, in a suit to foreclose the third ? Sufficient answer it is to say that the equitable relief of subrogation was not designed to aid speculation nor to relieve litigants, from the consequences of their own negligence, ignorance or mistakes of judgment. (Hargis v. Robinson, supra.) This equitable relief originated in the evident justice of substituting a surety who has been compelled to pay the debt of his principal to the place of the creditor as against other creditors affected by the transaction. It has on principle been extended to the relief of junior lien-holders who, to protect their own interests, have been compelled to pay off prior liens, and to other cases where natural justice required its application and where no violence was done to legal rights of others. It is urged in behalf of plaintiff that at the time he bought the land in question it was of no greater value than the amount of the three mortgages and taxes due thereon. We are not cited to any evidence and have scanned the record in vain to find evidence in support of this assertion. Whether the land was worth more or less than the debts assumed, which constituted the only consideration for the purchase, is probably immaterial. At the time Kuhn made the purchase he had no interest in the land to protect. At the time he paid the Myers mortgage he did not stand in the relation of surety for its payment; by his contract he had made it his debt. He became the principal 'debtor, and his grantor, who executed the note and mortgage, became the surety. (Schmucker v. Sibert, 18 Kan. 104, 26 Am. Rep. 765; Rouse v. Bartholomew, 51 Kan. 425, 32 Pac. 1088.) [460] We have not been cited to any authority, nor have we found any, supporting the proposition that an independent purchaser of real property encumbered with liens who has no interest to protect therein, and no other equitable claim, can assume the payment and pay such lien or liens as he may choose and claim subrogation as against all inferior liens, save the cases of Darrough v. Herbert Kraft Co. Bank, 125 Cal. 272, 57 Pac. 983, and Matzen v. Shaeffer, 65 Cal. 81, 3 Pac. 92. These cases do not appear to be in accord with the weight of authority nor with the accepted reason for granting this equitable relief, and are disapproved. The case of Young v. Morgan, 89 Ill. 199, does not appear to be in point, as the land in question was a homestead at the time of the sale and the judgment creditor had no lien thereon; the homesteader had a right to sell the land clear of creditors’ claims. The case of Plumb v. Bay, 18 Kan. 415, is cited in support of plaintiff’s claim. In that case the mortgage paid by Plumb, the lien of which was preferred to an apparently prior judgment lien, was given for the purchase-price of the land. In Bowling v. Garrett, 49 Kan. 504, 31 Pac. 135, 33 Am. St. Rep. 377, the purchaser had a mechanic’s lien on the land to protect at the time he purchased it, and his equity for this and for a mortgage on the land which he had assumed and agreed to pay as a part of the purchase-price, and afterward had in part paid, was preferred to the lien of a judgment rendered in an action begun after the mechanic’s and mortgage liens had attached. The decisions of this court have been liberal in allowing subrogation where any equity required it and no legal right of others was encroached upon, but in no case does it appear the court has gone to the extent demanded in this case. Whether Kuhn would have purchased the land had the judgment liens been brought to his attention, assuming he had no knowledge of them, is a question of pure speculation, as they were for small amounts. Being charged with the knowledge [461] of these liens, and having no interest to protect, he must be held to have simply stepped into his grantor’s shoes. When he paid off a mortgage that was prior to the judgment lien it had the same effect as if the payment had been made by the grantor before he parted with his title. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. All thé Justices concurring.