State v. Blaha

By the Court, Norcross, C. J.: 1-3. Appellant was convicted of the crime of burglary of the first degree, and appeals. Evidence was introduced establishing the fact that a burglary was committed on the night of the 25th day of July, 1915, in the city of Reno, and certain jewelry taken from a trunk stored in a building upon the property of one R. T. Harwell. Upon the afternoon of the day following the burglary appellant was arrested by a police officer of the city of Reno while in the act of. attempting to dispose of the stolen jewelry, and was at once taken to the police station. The arresting officer and another member of the city police force, over the objection of counsel for the defendant, were permitted to testify to statements made by the defendant to the effect that he purchased a ring, which was part of the stolen jewelry, in the city of Chicago, and a necklace, which was also a part of the stolen jewelry, in the city of Seattle. Shortly subsequent to making these statements the defendant made a confession to the chief of police that he had committed the burglary. Error is assigned in the admission of the statements and confession upon the ground that no proper foundation had been laid. The transcript of the testimony discloses no objection whatever to the admission of the confession. Counsel for appellant advises the court that objections to the admissibility of the confession because a proper foundation had not been laid may have been inadvertently omitted in transcribing the record. No proof appears that this is the case, and no request [118] has been made for diminution of the record; hence the suggestion of counsel for appellant cannot be considered. The objection which counsel for appellant asserts was, in fact, made, even if embodied in the record, would not justify this court in holding the same to be substantial error. Assuming that the same objection was made to the testimony of the chief of police as that made to the testimony of the two other officers, the error, if any, amounts simply to the sustaining of an objection to questions propounded to the witnesses whether any inducements, threats, or offers of reward were made to procure the statements or confession. Even assuming that the court may have committed technical error in permitting the witnesses to testify to conclusions, it also appears that the whole conversation between the defendant and the officers was detailed, and from all of the facts and circumstances there was no room for serious question that the statements and confession were made otherwise than freely and voluntarily. Besides, it was not necessary to lay any foundation for the admission of the statements made by the defendant as to how he came into possession of the jewelry in question. “Self-serving statements made by or for the accused out of court, explaining suspicious circumstances, may be proved against him, and their falsity may then be shown. The fact of their falsity admits them as indicating an attempt to explain away incriminating circumstances by falsehoods.” (12 Cyc. 429.) Error is assigned in the refusal to give certain instructions requested by defendant. With the exception of one requested instruction, hereafter to be referred to, the instructions requested and refused, so far as they were material, were substantially covered by other instructions given by the court. 4. Error is assigned in the failure of the court to give • an instruction of its own motion upon the maxim, “Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.” If counsel for defendant was of the opinion that an instruction of [119] this kind was material, it was incumbent upon him to request the same. 5. The following instruction requested by counsel for the defendant was refused: “The defendant has offered himself as a witness, and has testified in his own behalf. This is his legal right, and you are not permitted under the law to discredit or reject his testimony simply on the ground that he is the accused, and on trial on a criminal charge.” . Section 310 of the criminal practice act (Rev. Laws, 7160), as amended by the legislature of 1915 (Stats. 1915, c. 157), provides: “In the trial of all indictments, complaints, and other proceedings against persons charged with the commission of crimes or offenses, the person so charged shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be deemed a competent witness, the credit to be given his testimony being left solely to the jury, under the instructions of the court; provided, that no special instruction shall be given relating exclusively to the testimony of the defendant, or particularly directing the attention of the jury to the defendant’s testimony.” It clearly appears from the reading of the section as amended that purpose of the statute is to forbid the giving of instructions with direct reference to the testimony of the defendant. The court is permitted to,- and did in this case, give general instructions applicable to all witnesses. The purpose of the amended statute was, doubtless, to obviate in the future the giving of an instruction heretofore frequently given in criminal cases and sustained by a number of decisions of this court, and reading as follows: “The defendant has offered himself as a witness on his own behalf, and in considering the weight and effect to be given his evidence, in addition to noticing his manner and the probability of his statements taken in connection with the evidence in the cause, you should consider his relation and situation under which he gives his testimony, the consequences to him relating from [120] the results of this trial, and all the inducements and temptation which would ordinarily influence a person in his situation. You should carefully determine the amount of credibility to which his evidence is entitled; if convincing, and carrying with it a belief in its truth, ¡act upon it; if not, you have a right to reject it.” The foregoing instruction, while approved by the earlier decisions of the courts of a number of states, has in recent years been severely criticised. The Supreme Court of California, after repeatedly holding this instruction not to be error, later admonished trial courts not to give it, and finally reversed cases where the instruction had been given. From a reading of the transcript in this case we are unable to see how the jury could have reached any other verdict than the one returned. The defendant was deprived of no substantial right, and no substantial error appears. Judgment affirmed.