Clover v. Gobindram

SUMMARY ORDER Appellants Kailash Gobindram and Jacqueline Melson, proceeding pro se, appeal from a May 25, 2011 judgment of the District Court granting the plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and the New York Labor Law, N.Y. Labor Law § 663(1). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. We review the District Court’s award of attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion. McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411, 416 (2d Cir.2010); see also Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir.2008) (explaining that the term of art “abuse of discretion” includes errors of law). “[Ajbuse of discretion — already one of the most deferential standards of review— takes on special significance when reviewing fee decisions because the district court, which is intimately familiar with the nuances of the case, is in a far better position to make [such] decisions than is an appel *403 late court, which must work from a cold record.” McDaniel, 595 F.3d at 416 (alterations in original and internal quotation marks omitted). We have carefully reviewed the District Court’s opinion and order and the record on appeal, and determine that the Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees and awarding $83,035 in fees and costs against the defendants. 1 The judgment of the District Court is hereby AFFIRMED. Additionally, Mel-son’s motion for leave to file a supplemental appendix is hereby DENIED, as the documents that she seeks to include in the appendix are not part of the record, see Fed. R.App. P. 30(a)(1), and, in any event, are not relevant to our decision. Footnotes [1] Melson argues on appeal that she was not an officer, director, or shareholder of the corporate defendants in this case, and that therefore she should not be liable for attorneys fees. Melson’s argument fails in light of her written agreement to the settlement. By signing the settlement documents, she entered into a contract to become liable to the plaintiffs, jointly and severally with the other defendants, for both the awards to the plaintiffs themselves and for reasonable attorneys fees to the plaintiffs’ attorneys — whether or not she was originally a proper party to the litigation. See Yonkers Fur Dressing Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 435, 444, 160 N.E. 778, 781 (1928) (“A contract of settlement, if valid in *404 itself, is final and is to be sustained by the court without regard to the validity of the original claim.”). We therefore do not consider, much less decide, whether Melson was in fact a proper party prior to signing the settlement agreement.