United States v. Sylvester Walker

USCA4 Appeal: 21-4335 Doc: 29 Filed: 10/04/2022 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-4335

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SYLVESTER DEANGELO WALKER, a/k/a DBOS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. John Preston Bailey, District Judge. (5:20-cr-00041-JPB-JPM-1)

Submitted: August 31, 2022 Decided: October 4, 2022

Before WYNN and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Frank C. Walker II, FRANK WALKER LAW, Clairton, Pennsylvania, for Appellant. Shawn Michael Adkins, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. *2 USCA4 Appeal: 21-4335 Doc: 29 Filed: 10/04/2022 Pg: 2 of 4

PER CURIAM:

Sylvester Deangelo Walker pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to distribution

of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). The district court

calculated Walker’s advisory range under the Sentencing Guidelines at 100 to 125 months’

imprisonment and sentenced Walker to 100 months’ imprisonment and three years of

supervised release.

On appeal, Walker’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but

questioning whether the district court abused its discretion in sentencing Walker to 100

months in prison. Walker filed a pro se supplemental brief in which he questions whether

the district court erred in calculating his base offense level under the Sentencing

Guidelines. The Government declined to file a brief and does not seek to enforce the appeal

waiver in Walker’s plea agreement. 1 We affirm.

“This Court reviews all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly

outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard,” United

States v. Torres-Reyes, 952 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up), for procedural and

substantive reasonableness, United States v. Fowler, 948 F.3d 663, 668 (4th Cir. 2020). In

determining procedural reasonableness, this court considers whether the district court

1 Because the Government fails to assert the waiver as a bar to this appeal, we may consider the issues raised by counsel and Walker and conduct an independent review of the record pursuant to Anders. See United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2007).

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properly calculated the defendant’s Guidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to

argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and

sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. When rendering a sentence, the district

court must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented, state in open

court the reasons supporting its chosen sentence, address the parties’ nonfrivolous

arguments in favor of a particular sentence and, if it rejects them, explain why in a manner

allowing for meaningful appellate review. United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218

(4th Cir. 2019). If there are no procedural errors, this court then considers the substantive

reasonableness of the sentence, evaluating “the totality of the circumstances to determine

whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose

satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212

(4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Any sentence within a properly

calculated Guidelines range is presumptively substantively reasonable, and the defendant

bears the burden of demonstrating the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the

§ 3553(a) factors. United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212, 230 (4th Cir. 2016).

After review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not reversibly err

in calculating Walker’s Guidelines range. Contrary to Walker’s suggestion made in the

pro se brief, the district court did not plainly err in calculating his base offense level.

See United States v. Kobito, 994 F.3d 696, 701 (4th Cir. 2021) (stating standard of review).

The district court also afforded counsel an adequate opportunity to argue for an appropriate

sentence and properly heard allocution from Walker. After considering these arguments

and Walker’s allocution, the advisory Guidelines range, and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) *4 USCA4 Appeal: 21-4335 Doc: 29 Filed: 10/04/2022 Pg: 4 of 4

factors, the district court determined that a 100-month prison term was warranted based on

the nature and circumstances of Walker’s offense conduct, his history and characteristics,

and the sentencing range established under the Guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),

(4)(A). The district court’s explanation was sufficient to support the imposition of this

term, and Walker does not overcome the presumption of reasonableness afforded to it. We

thus discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s imposition of the 100-month

prison term.

In accordance with Anders, we also have reviewed the remainder of the record and

have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the criminal judgment.

This court requires that counsel inform Walker, in writing, of the right to petition the

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Walker requests that a petition

be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state

that a copy thereof was served on Walker. 2

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

2 Walker’s counsel has moved for leave to withdraw from representation. We deny this motion without prejudice to counsel’s ability to refile it after he has discharged his obligation to inform Walker of his right to petition the Supreme Court for further review.