Vasse v. Smith

Marshall, Ch. J. delivered the opinion of tha court as follows: The first error, alleged in this record, consists in sustaining the plea of infancy tó the first count in the declaration. This count states a contract between the plaintiff and defendant, by which the plaintiff committed seventy-barrels of flour to the care of the defendant, to be carried, to Norfolk, and there sold for money, or on. sixty' days’ credit payable'in drafts on Alexandria negotiable in the bank. The plaintiff. then alleges that the defendant did not perform his duty in selling conformably to his instructions, but, by his negligence, permitted the flour to be wasted so that it was lost to the plaintiff. This case, as stated, is corripletely a case of contract, and exhibits no. feature of such a tort as will charge an infant. .Therecan be no doubt-but that the court did right in. sustaining the plea. The second count is in trover, and charges a conversion of the flour. That an infant is liable for á conversion is not contested. The circuit court was of itself of. that opi- - nion, and therefore sustained the demurrer to this plea. But, in the progress of the cause, it appeared *231 that the goods were not taken wrongfully by the defendant,. but were committed to his Care by the plaintiff, and that the conversion, if made, was made while they were in his custody under a contract. The court then permitted infancy to be given in evidence on the plea of not guilty. To this opinion an exception was taken. If infancy, was a bar to a suit of trover brought in such a case, the court can perceive hg reason why it may not be given in evidence on this plea. If it may be given in evidence on non assumpsit,- because th' infant cannot contract, with at least as equal reasoi may it be given in evidence in an action of trover it) a case in which he cannot convert. - But this court is of opinion that infancy is no compíete bar to an action of trover, although the goods converted be in his possession, in virtue of a previous contract. The conversion- is still in its nature a fort; it is not an act of omission but of commission, and is within that class of offences for which infancy cannot afford protection. Yet it maybe given in evidence, for it may have some influence on the question, whether the act complained of be really a conversion, or not. The court, therefore, does not consider the-admission of this testimony as error. The defendant exhibited the letter of instructions under which he acted, which is in these words: “ Sir,” &c. but the plaintiff offered evidence that the flour was not sold in Norfolk, but was shipped by the defendant to the West Indies, for and on account of a certain Joseph Smith, as by the bill of lading which was produced. The defendant then gave his infancy in evidence, and prayed the court to instruct the jury, that, if they believed the testimony, he was not liable on the second count stated in the plaintiff’s declaration, which instruction the court gave, and to thi§ opinion an exception was taken: This instruction of the court must have been found» ed on the opinion, that infancy is a bar to an action of *232 trover for goods committed to the infant,..under a contract, or that; the fact proved did not amount tp a conversion. This court has already stated its opinion to. be,, that an infant is chargeable with á conversion, although it be 'of goods whkh came lawfully to his possession. It remains to inquire whether this is so clearly shown not to be a conversion, as to justify the court in saying to the jury, the defendant was not liable in this action. The pfoof offered was, that the defendant shipped the goods on account of Joseph Smith. This fact, standing unconnected with, any other, would unquestionably be testimony which, if not conclusive in favour of the plaintiff, was, at least, proper to be left, to the jury* But it is urged that this statement refers to the bill of lading, from the notes in the' margin of which it appears that, although the bill of lading, which was for a much larger quantity of flour, was made' out in the name of Joseph Smith, yet, in point of fact, the shipment was made for various persons, and, among others, for the plaintiff. .The court perceive, in this bill of exceptions, no evidence explanatory of the terms,under which this shipment was made, and the marks in the margin of the bill of lading do not, in themselves, prove that-the' shipment was not made for the person in whose name the bill was filled up. It is possible that it may have been proved to the jury that this flour was really intended to be shipped on account of the plaintiff, and that the defendant did not mean to convert it to his own úse. ■ But the letter did-not authorize him so to-.act. It was not, therefore, a complete discharge; and should it be admitted that an infant is not chargeable with a conversion made by mistake, this testimony ought still to have been left to the jury. The defendant would certainly be at liberty to prove that the shipment was in fact made for Vusse, and that he acquiesced in it so. far as to consider the transaction not as a conversion; but without any of *233 these circumstances which, if given in evidence, ought to have been left to the-'jury, the court has declared the action not sustainable. This court is of opinion that the circuit court has erred, in directing the jury that, upon the evidence given, the defendant was not liable under the second count; for which their judgment is to be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. * Footnotes [*] The Chief Justice noticed also the phraseology of the third hill of exceptions. It prays the opinion of the court upon certain, facts, without stating that Any evidence of those facts was given to the jury. ' It is doubtful whether those facts exist in the case, and whether the court - would he bound to give an opinion upon thém.