Custiss v. The Georgetown and Alexandria Turnpike Company

Marshall, Ch. J. delivered the opinion of the court as follows: At the opening of this case, some doubt Was entertained respecting the jurisdiction of the supreme court, but that doubt is removed by an inspection of the act by which the circuit court of the district of Columbia is constituted. The words of that act, descriptive of the appéllate jurisdiction of this court, are more ample than those employed in the judicial act. They are, that “ any final judgment, order or decree in said circuit court, wherein the matter in dispute, exclusive costs, shall exceed the value of 100 dollars, may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the supreme court.. The jurisdiction of this court being admitted, the proceedings of the circuit court, in ordering the inqui *236 sition taken between these parties to be quashed, copies on t0 be examined. The first objection to this proceeding is, that the •court of Alexandria could take no cognisance of the subject, by way of motion. The validity of this objection depends entirely on the act of congress, under which this inquisition was taken. If it was to be recorded by order of the court, if the judgment of the court was,- in any manner, tó be exercised upon it, then, in all which has been done, the court has exercised its jurisdiction, and the inquiry will be whether there was sufficient cause for refusing to permit the inquisition to be recorded. If, on the other hand, the clerk was a mere ministerial officer directed, by law, to perform a ministerial act, without Uny superintending agency, on the part of the court, then the court could not, upon motion,, prohibit the clerk to perform his duty, and could not legitimately quash the inquisition. The act of congress directs “ that the inquisition, when taken, shall be signed by the marshal and by the jurvmen present, and returned by the marshal to the clerk of the county, to be by him recorded.” That the legislature may direct the clerk of a court to perform a specified service, without making his act the act of the court, will not be controverted: and, if this maybe done, it is difficult to ..conceive-, words which .convey this idea more clearly.than those which are employed in this c.ct. The inquisition is not returnable to the court, but to the clerk. • If is not to be recorded by order of the court, but is to be recorded-by the clerk, on receiving it from the marshal. It does not derive its-validity from being recorded, but remains afterwards liable to all the objections which might be taken to it, previous thereto. lidiar example, an inquisition should be recorded which was found, by eleven jurors, that inquisition would neither. vest the land in the company, nor give a right tó *237 the former proprietor to demand the money to which it was valued. The inquisition, then, is to be recorded solely for preservation, and the'act of recording is a ministerial act which the law directs the clerk to perform, without submitting the paper to the judgment of thé court. The law asks not the intervention of the court, and requires no. exercise of judicial functions. The difference between this act and those, the execution of which is superintended by the court, is apparent. In those cases, the instrument is to be brought into court, and acted upon by the court: in this it is to be delivered to the clerk at any time, and acted on by him without the intervention of the court. This court is unanimously of opinion that the cjrcuit court for the county of Alexandria could not legally entertain the motion for quashing the inquisition found in this case, nor legally prevent their clerk from recording it. Their- judgment, therefore, is reversed, and the motion to be .dismissed.