Roth v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In Re Roth)

FILED APR 16 2013 SUSAN M SPRAUL, CLERK 1 U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT [2] 3 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL 4 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 5 In re: ) BAP No. AZ-11-1233-RnPaKi ) 6 JANET ROSE ROTH, ) Bk. No. 09-00317-RJH ) 7 Debtor. ) Adv. No. 10-0764-RJH ______________________________) 8 ) JANET ROSE ROTH, ) 9 ) Appellant, ) 10 v. ) O P I N I O N ) 11 EDUCATIONAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT ) CORPORATION, ) 12 ) ) 13 Appellee. ) ) 14 ______________________________) 15 Submitted Without Oral Argument on September 20, 20121 16 Filed - April 16, 2013 17 Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona [18] Honorable Randolph J. Haines, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding 19 _________________________________ 20 Appearances: Appellant Jane Rose Roth on brief; Julie K. Swedback, Esq. on brief for appellee 21 Educational Credit Management Corporation. _________________________________ [1] 25 Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8012, after notice to the parties, the Panel by order entered July 3, 2012, unanimously 26 determined after examination of the briefs and record that oral argument was not needed. 1 Before: RENN,2 PAPPAS and KIRSCHER, Bankruptcy Judges. 2 Opinion by Judge Renn Concurrence by Judge Pappas [3] 4 RENN, Bankruptcy Judge: 5 This pro se appeal arises from a judgment rendered after 6 trial in an adversary proceeding which excepted from discharge under [7] 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(8)3 Debtor Janet Roth’s (“Debtor”) student loan 8 debt to Educational Credit Management Corporation (“ECMC”). We 9 REVERSE and REMAND. 10 /// 11 /// 12 /// 13 /// 14 /// 15 /// 16 /// 17 /// 18 /// 19 /// 20 /// [21] 22 2 Hon. Thomas M. Renn, U. S. Bankruptcy Judge for the District 23 of Oregon, sitting by designation. 24 3 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter, section and rule references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 , and to 25 the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rules 1001-9037. [26] -2- 1 I. FACTS4 2 From 1989 to 1995 Debtor took out thirteen federally 3 guaranteed student loans totaling over $33,000 under the Federal 4 Family Educational Loan Program (“FFELP Loans”) to fund her 5 attendance at Mesa Community College and Arizona State University. 6 In addition to the FFELP Loans, Debtor also took out five direct 7 loans administered by the U.S. Department of Education (“DOE”). 8 During her attendance at school, Debtor studied communications, 9 information technology, and education, but she never graduated as a 10 family issue necessitated her quitting the programs. 11 Debtor’s employment history is long and varied. She has 12 worked for extended periods as an information management clerk for 13 the U.S. Defense Department, a ticketing counter clerk for several [14] 15 4 Debtor asks us to review “all appellant’s exhibits submitted 16 throughout [the adversary proceeding below].” Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 6. However, her excerpt of record does not include all of those 17 exhibits. Nevertheless, we have exercised our discretion to take judicial notice of the electronic record in the adversary, as “we 18 make reasonable allowance for pro se litigants and construe their 19 papers liberally.” Ozenne v. Bendon (In re Ozenne), 337 B.R. 214, 218 (9th Cir. BAP 2006); see also O’Rourke v. Seaboard Sur. Co.(In 20 re E.R. Fegert, Inc.), 887 F.2d 955, 957-58 (9th Cir. 1989)(court may take judicial notice of bankruptcy case below). We have not, 21 however, considered documents that neither we nor the parties have identified as part of the trial court record. Kirshner v. Uniden [22] Corp. of Am., 842 F.2d 1074, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1988). For example, 23 Debtor has adduced two pages of account statements, Aplt. ER at 1718, with line-items she argues indicate “voluntee [sic] payments,” 24 on the FFELP Loans, which she found [post trial] “digging through old student loan files.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 4. Those account 25 statements have not been considered. [26] -3- 1 airlines, an information technology technician for a collection of 2 used car dealerships, an administrative assistant for Arizona State 3 University, and a government contract analyst for the Veterans 4 Administration. Her last job was as a cake decorator for Wal-Mart. 5 She has often worked more than one job at the same time to make ends 6 meet. In 2008, her adjusted gross income was $34,789. In 2009, it 7 was $40,098. 8 Debtor made no voluntary payments on the FFELP Loans. She 9 defaulted on three of them in 1998, and on the rest in 2001. Pre10 default she was eligible for forebearances. At one point, she 11 testified she sent paperwork to Chicago regarding a forebearance, 12 but she never heard back and never followed up. Other than that 13 attempt, she did not seek any deferments or forebearances. Neither 14 did she make any efforts to restructure the loans to reduce the 15 payments or otherwise modify their terms. She testified that before 16 she filed bankruptcy, she did not know whom to call to obtain a 17 modification. 18 For a time the DOE administratively garnished her wages. 19 Debtor testified she was unaware she had two lenders and presumed 20 the collection activity pertained to the FFELP Loans. It appears at 21 some point one or more of ECMC’s predecessors-in-interest attempted 22 to also garnish Debtor’s wages but, because the DOE had a continuing 23 garnishment in place or she was unemployed, those attempts were 24 unsuccessful. It also appears that at certain times Debtor’s 25 federal and state tax refunds were offset against her student loan [26] -4- 1 obligations. The record, however, is unclear as to whether those 2 offsets were initiated by the DOE (or its agents) or by ECMC’s 3 predecessors. It is clear from the record that Debtor was unable to 4 identify which loans received payments or even that two lenders were 5 involved in administering the various loans. 6 At present, Debtor suffers from several chronic medical 7 conditions including a thyroid condition, diabetes, macular 8 degeneration, cataracts, high cholesterol, and depression. Some of 9 her medical conditions required surgery. Debtor has also incurred 10 serious shoulder, knee, and wrist injuries that have limited her 11 activities. All of her medical ills necessitate many medical 12 appointments, which in some instances have precluded eligibility for 13 new employment. Although hampered by her ailments, Debtor feels she 14 is not totally disabled from working unless her “sight goes and . . 15 . [she] can’t read.” [Trial Tr. (April 27, 2011) 42:22]. 16 On January 8, 2009, Debtor filed for Chapter 7 relief pro se. 17 On April 27, 2010, she commenced an adversary proceeding in the 18 bankruptcy court seeking to have both the FFELP and DOE Loans 19 discharged. Shortly thereafter, the FFELP Loans were assigned to 20 ECMC. As of January 5, 2011, the aggregate balance on the FFELP 21 Loans was at least $95,403.86. Based on an administrative discharge 22 of the DOE loans, the DOE was dismissed from the adversary 23 proceeding pursuant to an order entered June 1, 2010. 24 From July 2009 to January 2011, Debtor applied unsuccessfully 25 for over 280 federal jobs. She concentrated on this employment [26] -5- 1 sector, because she had previously been a federal employee and 2 believed she had preferential rehiring rights. She also applied for 3 non-federal positions. She testified that she’s worked for forty4 five years and wanted to find a job, although it would only be 5 justified to do so if it paid above minimum wage. She further 6 testified that if her discharge was denied, she might either enroll 7 in the income-based repayment plan discussed below, or remain 8 unemployed. 9 Approximately six months after the adversary proceeding was 10 filed, ECMC sent Debtor information and an application to 11 administratively discharge her FFELP debt based on total and 12 permanent disability. Debtor did not apply because she did not 13 consider herself sufficiently disabled. Approximately three months 14 later, ECMC advised Debtor she was eligible under the federal 15 William D. Ford program to consolidate all thirteen of her FFELP 16 loans and participate in the “income-based repayment plan” (“IBRP”). 17 The IBRP requires the borrower to make a twenty-five-year commitment 18 to dedicate on a monthly basis 1/12th of fifteen percent of the 19 amount her average gross income exceeds 150% of the federal poverty 20 level for the debtor’s family size.5 34 C.F.R. § 685.221 . The plan [21] 22 5 The IBRP should be distinguished from the “Income Contingent 23 Repayment Program” (“ICRP”), 34 C.F.R. § 685.209 (a), another repayment plan offered under the Ford program and referenced in many 24 student loan cases. E.g., Braun v. Sallie Mae (In re Braun), 2012 WL 5199163 at *8 (Bankr. E.D. Va. October 19, 2012)(comparing 25 the IBRP and ICRP). [26] -6- 1 term would be twenty-five years; thereafter, any remaining balance 2 would be forgiven. 34 C.F.R. § 685.221 (f).6 Because Debtor’s 3 income did not exceed the federal poverty level, her initial monthly 4 IBRP payment would have been zero, and would have remained so until 5 the 150% income threshold was met. Debtor understood the terms and 6 conditions of the IBRP but did not apply for it, reasoning she could 7 do so at any time, even if the bankruptcy court denied discharge of 8 her student loans, and that her energy was best put toward regaining 9 her health so she could get back to work. When the adversary 10 proceeding was tried on April 27, 2011, Debtor was sixty-four years 11 old, unemployed, and had no dependents. Her only income was social 12 security of $774 per month. Despite living frugally, her monthly 13 expenses regularly exceeded her income. 14 In reaching its decision to except the FFELP Loans from 15 Debtor’s discharge, the bankruptcy court applied the Brunner7 test, 16 which has three prongs. The court had no trouble concluding Debtor 17 had met the first two prongs. That is, the evidence showed that, 18 based on her current income and expenses, she could not maintain a 19 minimal standard of living if forced to repay the FFELP Loans, and, [20] 21 6 Under the present Internal Revenue Code, this forgiveness of 22 debt would be taxable income, 26 U.S.C. § 61 (a)(12), except to the extent the debtor was, at that time, insolvent. 26 U.S.C. 23 § 108(a)(1)(B),(a)(3),(d)(3). 24 7 See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs., Inc. (In re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987), aff’g and adopting 46 25 B.R. 752, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). [26] -7- 1 further, additional circumstances indicated it was more likely than 2 not that her financial difficulties would persist for a significant 3 portion of the Loans’ repayment period. [Trial Tr. at 58:20-59:16]. 4 The court, however, struggled with Brunner’s third prong, 5 which, as discussed in detail below, requires that a debtor make 6 “good faith” efforts to repay the loans. It agreed that Debtor’s 7 participation in the IBRP was not required to find good faith, 8 because imposing such a requirement would replace rights given under 9 § 523(a)(8) with those of an administrative remedy. [Id. at 61:210 17]. Further, in examining past efforts, the court questioned 11 whether good faith played a role at all when the evidence indicated 12 that, even assuming best or good faith efforts, Debtor could never 13 have paid the FFELP Loans in full and in fact, notwithstanding such 14 efforts, would still be faced with a balance that was an “undue 15 hardship” to pay. [Id. at 59:17-60:16]. Despite such concerns, 16 however, the court felt constrained by Ninth Circuit precedent which 17 it felt required consideration of past efforts to reduce the balance 18 of the student loan debt. Thus, the court concluded that Debtor’s 19 lack of voluntary payments, and her lack of efforts to renegotiate, 20 obtain a forebearance, or obtain a disability discharge, tipped the 21 good faith balance away from her. [Id. at 60:17-24]. 22 II. JURISDICTION 23 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over this proceeding 24 under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(I). We have jurisdiction 25 under 28 U.S.C. § 158 (b). [26] -8- 1 III. ISSUE 2 Whether the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that Debtor 3 failed to make a good faith effort to repay her student loans.8 4 IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 5 Under § 523(a)(8), student loans are excepted from the 6 discharge a debtor receives in bankruptcy unless repaying those 7 loans would “impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s 8 dependents.” In United Student Aid Funds v. Pena (In re Pena), [9] 155 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit adopted the 10 three-pronged test set out in Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396 , to determine 11 whether the undue hardship standard has been met. The last of those 12 prongs requires the court to determine whether the debtor made “good 13 faith efforts to repay the loans.” Id.9 The primary issue in this [8] 15 Contrary to Rule 8006, Debtor did not submit a statement of issues on appeal. However, her opening and supplemental briefs 16 sufficiently identify the issues. ECMC has responded to those issues and has claimed no prejudice from the lack of the Rule 8006 17 statement. Further, based on the briefs and the record, we are able to completely understand the issues. Debtor may therefore go [18] forward without a separate Rule 8006 statement. Gertsch v. Johnson 19 & Johnson, Fin. Corp. (In re Gertsch), 237 B.R. 160, 166 (9th Cir. BAP 1999). [9] As referenced above, the first two prongs require a showing: [21] (1)that the debtor cannot maintain, based on [22] current income and expenses, a “minimal” 23 standard of living for herself and her dependents if forced to repay the loans; and (2) 24 that additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist 25 (continued...) [26] -9- 1 appeal is whether the bankruptcy court erred in reaching its 2 conclusion on the “good faith” prong. A threshold question is under 3 what standard should that determination be reviewed. In light of 4 seemingly contradictory language in Ninth Circuit precedent, we 5 publish this opinion to clarify the appropriate standard of review. 6 What is clear from the caselaw is that the ultimate undue 7 hardship determination is reviewed de novo, as it requires a 8 determination of the “legal effect of the bankruptcy court’s 9 findings regarding the student’s circumstances.” Educ. Credit Mgmt. 10 Corp. v. Mason (In re Mason), 464 F.3d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 11 2006)(quoting Rifino v. United States (In re Rifino), 245 F.3d 1083 , 12 1087 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001)). More particularly, the undue hardship 13 determination is a mixed question of fact and law. Hedlund v. Educ. 14 Res. Inst. Inc., 468 B.R. 901, 906 (D. Or. 2012); Educ. Credit Mgmt. 15 Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 398 (4th Cir. 16 2005); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Blackbird (In re Blackbird), 2008 17 WL 8444793 at *3 (9th Cir. BAP 2008).10 “A mixed question of law 18 and fact occurs when the historical facts are established; the rule 19 of law is undisputed . . .; and the issue is whether the facts [9] (...continued) 21 for a significant portion of the repayment 22 period of the student loans. [23] Id. 24 10 Under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 9th Cir. BAP Rule 80131(c)(2), Blackbird may be cited for its persuasive, but not 25 precedential, value. [26] -10- 1 satisfy the legal rule.” Murray v. Bammer (In re Bammer), 131 F.3d 2 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). Because “[m]ixed questions . . . require 3 consideration of legal concepts and the exercise of judgment about 4 the val ues that animate legal principles,” they are reviewed de 5 novo. Id. De novo review is independent and gives no deference to 6 the trial court’s conclusion. Warfield v. Salazar (In re Salazar), [7] 465 B.R. 875, 878 (9th Cir. BAP 2012). 8 It is also clear that the bankruptcy court’s determinations 9 of the historical facts underlying its undue hardship determination 10 are reviewed for clear error. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Howe (In 11 re Howe), 319 B.R. 886, 888 (9th Cir. BAP 2005). The clear error 12 standard applies to implied as well as express factual findings. 13 Tighe v. Valencia (In re Guadarrama), 284 B.R. 463, 477 (C.D. Cal. 14 2002). Review for clear error is “significantly deferential.” 15 Baker v. Mereshian (In re Mereshian), 200 B.R. 342, 345 (9th Cir. 16 BAP 1996). The appellate court should not reverse unless it is left 17 with “a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 18 committed.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). The reviewing court 19 may not reverse simply because it is convinced it would have decided 20 the case differently. Id. “Where there are two permissible views 21 of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice between them cannot be 22 clearly erroneous.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Further, the 23 reviewing court must give due regard to the opportunity of the 24 bankruptcy court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Rule 8013; 25 Thiara v. Spycher Bros. (In re Thiara), 285 B.R. 420, 427 (9th Cir. [26] -11- 1 BAP 2002). “This deference is also given to inferences drawn by the 2 . . . [bankruptcy] court.” Id. 3 To summarize, the ultimate undue hardship determination is 4 reviewed de novo because it is a mixed question of fact and law, and 5 the factual findings regarding the circumstances underpinning that 6 determination are reviewed for clear error. What is not so clear is 7 the standard of review to be applied to the three individual Brunner 8 prongs. Are they factual determinations reviewed for clear error or 9 mixed questions reviewed de novo? In Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance 10 Agency v. Birrane (In re Birrane), 287 B.R. 490 (9th Cir. BAP 2002), 11 without discussing the issue, we held, at least by implication, that 12 the Brunner prongs are mixed questions entitled to de novo review. [13] Id. at 500-501 (bankruptcy court did not commit an error of law in 14 applying prong one to those factual findings, but it did err as a 15 matter of law in applying prongs two and three). Birrane has 16 subsequently been followed for this proposition. See, e.g., 17 Hedlund, 468 B.R. at 913 .11 These holdings, however, do not end the 18 inquiry as they must be squared with language in Pena, Rifino, and 19 Mason. In each of those cases, while acknowledging the ultimate 20 undue hardship determination is a question of law reviewed de novo, 21 the court nevertheless used “clear error” language in its analysis [23] 24 11 Likewise, in Blackbird, an unpublished memorandum, we expressly held that review of the good faith prong is de novo. 2008 25 WL 8444793 at *3. [26] -12- 1 of the individual Brunner prongs.12 Because the two positions 2 (i.e., de novo (mixed question) review of the ultimate undue 3 hardship determination and clear error review of the individual 4 prongs) are inherently contradictory, we are called to determine 5 which one must yield. We hold that it must be the latter. 6 The three Brunner prongs are not elements a court throws into 7 a vial, and then mixes and spins to arrive at an amalgam called [12] 9 Applying . . . [the Brunner] test, the bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding that 10 (1) the Penas could not maintain a minimal standard of living and repay their student loans, (2) their 11 unfortunate financial situation was likely to continue for 12 a substantial portion of the repayment period, and (3) they made a good-faith attempt to pay the loans. [13] Pena, 155 F.3d at 1114 (emphasis added). [14] We conclude that the bankruptcy court did not [15] clearly err in finding that Rifino's standard of 16 living would fall below a minimal level if she were required to repay her student loans. [17] . . . . [18] 19 [W]e hold that the bankruptcy court clearly erred in concluding that Rifino's circumstances 20 are likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of her student loans. [21] Rifino, 245 F.3d at 1088-89 (emphasis added). [22] 23 [W]e conclude that the bankruptcy court clearly erred in finding that Mason demonstrated good 24 faith efforts to repay his loans. 25 Mason, 464 F.3d at 885 (emphasis added). [26] -13- 1 “undue hardship.” Rather, they are stand-alone requirements. 2 Failure to prove any one precludes discharge. Carnduff v. U.S. 3 Dep’t of Educ. (In re Carnduff), 367 B.R. 120, 127 (9th Cir. BAP 4 2007). Thus, if the ultimate undue hardship determination is 5 reviewed de novo because it is a mixed question, and mixed questions 6 involve “the exercise of judgment about the values that animate 7 legal principles,” Bammer, 131 F.3d at 792 (emphasis added), it must 8 then follow that the three independent prongs are also mixed 9 questions requiring de novo review. If not, and they instead are 10 simply factual determinations, the reviewing court, upon finding no 11 clear error as to each prong, would be bound to uphold the 12 bankruptcy court as to the ultimate undue hardship determination. 13 Such a mechanical application of the prongs, however, would negate 14 the reviewing court’s ability to “exercise judgment.” 15 Our conclusion is buttressed by precedent outside the Ninth 16 Circuit. Most courts which have directly addressed the issue, 17 including the Third and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals, have held 18 that each Brunner prong is reviewed de novo. E.g., Educ. Credit 19 Mgmt. Corp. v. Mosko (In re Mosko), 515 F.3d 319, 324 (4th Cir. 20 2008); Brightful v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re 21 Brightful), 267 F.3d 324, 327 (3d Cir. 2001); Educ. Credit Mgmt. 22 Corp. v. Curiston, 351 B.R. 22, 27 (D. Conn. 2006); But see Krieger 23 v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 2013 WL 1442305 at *2 (7th Cir. April 24 10, 2013). [26] -14- 1 Returning to the appeal at bar, the main issue is whether 2 Debtor met her burden of proof on Brunner’s good faith prong. We 3 will review the factual underpinnings of that determination under 4 the deferential clear error standard, but will conduct a non5 deferential de novo review of the bankruptcy court’s ultimate good 6 faith conclusion. 7 V. DISCUSSION 8 Under § 523(a)(8), the lender has the initial burden to 9 establish the existence of the debt and that the debt is an 10 educational loan within the statute’s parameters. Lavy v. U.S. 11 Dep’t of Educ. (In re Lavy), 2008 WL 4964721 at *3 (Bankr. W.D. 12 Wash. Nov. 14, 2008). ECMC has met those burdens.13 The burden [13] Prior to the trial, Debtor stipulated that the loans in [14] question were educational loans as contemplated in § 523(a)(8). 15 [“Joint Pre-trial Statement,” Adv. Doc. #59 at 6:4-5]. The bankruptcy court then granted ECMC’s motion for partial summary 16 judgment on this issue. Debtor has not challenged this ruling on appeal. 17 Debtor also stipulated that the loans had an “outstanding 18 aggregate balance of no less than $95,403.86 as of January 5, 2011.” [Id. at 6:6-7]. On summary judgment the bankruptcy court held that 19 the aggregate principal amount of the debt was $33,160, which accrued annual interest at a minimum of 3.28% on each of the 20 thirteen loans since they were originally disbursed. Although 21 somewhat disjointed, Debtor’s briefs could be construed to challenge the amount of the aggregate debt. At trial, ECMC’s witness Julie 22 Swedback computed it at $95,890.20 as of April 26, 2011. However, the parties did not seek liquidation of the debt as a contested 23 issue. [Id. at 6:26]. Further, the bankruptcy court did not liquidate the debt in either its partial summary judgment or its [24] judgment denying discharge. Neither party argues this was error. 25 Thus, for purposes of this appeal, we need not concern ourselves (continued...) [26] -15- 1 then shifts to the debtor, Id., to prove all three Brunner prongs, 2 Rifino, 245 F.3d at 1087-88 , by a preponderance of the evidence. 3 Nys v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Nys (In re Nys), 308 B.R. 436 , 4 441 (9th Cir. BAP 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 446 F.3d 938 (9th 5 Cir. 2006). The bankruptcy court held that Debtor met Brunner’s 6 first two prongs but failed to prove the third. The only issue on 7 appeal is whether its conclusion as to prong three was in error.14 8 As noted, under Brunner’s third prong, a debtor must make 9 good faith efforts to repay the student loans.15 “Good faith is [13] 11 (...continued) with the exact amount of debt, and may, even disregarding Ms 12 Swedback’s testimony, rely in our analysis on Debtor’s stipulation that the debt was at least $95,403.86 as of January 5, 2011, [13] approximately four months before trial. 14 14 While ECMC, as the prevailing party at trial, could have, 15 without cross-appeal, defended the bankruptcy court’s judgment on any ground it properly raised below, Valencia, 284 B.R. at 477 , it 16 has chosen not to challenge the bankruptcy court’s conclusions as to the first two prongs. [15] 18 The “good-faith” requirement fulfills the purpose behind the adoption of section 19 523(a)(8). Brunner, 46 B.R. at 754–55. Section 523(a)(8) was a response to “a ‘rising incidence 20 of consumer bankruptcies of former students 21 motivated primarily to avoid payment of education loan debts.’ ” Id., (quoting the 22 Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, House Doc. No. 93–137, Pt. 23 I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) at 140 n. 14). This section was intended to “forestall students [24] . . . from abusing the bankruptcy system.” Id. [25] (continued...) [26] -16- 1 measured by the debtor's efforts to obtain employment, maximize 2 income, and minimize expenses.” Mason, 464 F.3d at 884 (internal 3 quotation omitted). “Courts will also consider a debtor's effort-- 4 or lack thereof--to negotiate a repayment plan,” Id. (internal 5 quotation omitted), as this is an “important indicator of good 6 faith.” Birrane, 287 B.R. at 499 . However, failure to negotiate or 7 accept an alternative repayment plan is not dispositive. Educ. 8 Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Jorgensen (In re Jorgensen), 479 B.R. 79 , 89 9 n.4 (9th Cir. BAP 2012)(debtor’s failure to accept ECMC’s “Graduate 10 Repayment Option” was not de facto evidence of a lack of good 11 faith). Any offered repayment plan’s terms, duration, and 12 consequences need to be examined. Carnduff, 367 B.R. at 136-37 . 13 These consequences include future tax liability and negative credit 14 ratings. Id. 15 Courts also examine: 1) whether the debtor has made any 16 payments on the loan prior to filing for discharge, Jorgensen, 479 17 B.R. at 89, “although a history of making or not making payments is, 18 by itself, not dispositive[,]” Mason, 464 F.3d at 884 (internal 19 citation omitted); 2) whether the debtor has sought deferments or 20 forebearances, East v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re East), 270 21 B.R. 485, 495 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2001); 3) the timing of the debtor’s 22 attempt to have the loan discharged, Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. 23 DeGroot (In re DeGroot), 339 B.R. 201, 214 (D. Or. 2006); and 4) [15] 25 (...continued) Pena, 153 F.3d at 1111. [26] -17- 1 whether the debtor’s financial condition resulted from factors 2 beyond her reasonable control, Birrane, 287 B.R. at 500 , as a debtor 3 may not willfully or negligently cause her own default. Id. The 4 “good faith” obligation continues even after an adversary proceeding 5 is filed to determine the dischargeability of the student loan debt. [6] Id. 7 Examining the factors, Debtor did not make any voluntary 8 payments. However, lack of even minimal voluntary payments is not 9 lack of good faith if the debtor did not have the financial 10 wherewithal to make them. England v. United States (In re England), [11] 264 B.R. 38, 48 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001); Hurley v. Student Loan Acq. 12 Auth. of Ariz., et. al., (In re Hurley), 258 B.R. 15, 25-26 (Bankr. 13 D. Mont. 2001). While the bankruptcy court found Debtor was able to 14 make payments in the “few good earning years” she had [2008 and 15 2009],16 [Trial Tr. at 60:12-14], it made no findings as to how much 16 those payments would have been. The record, however, is complete 17 enough for us to find that any payment would have been modest as it 18 is uncontroverted Debtor has never had significant income above 19 necessary expenses. Veal v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc. (In re [16] 21 In her closing argument, Debtor stated that even though she made $40,000 [in 2009], she still had obligations, including a 22 mortgage, and still had children at home, which is why “she worked a job and a half.” [Trial Tr. at 57:24-58:3]. She further stated in 23 argument that she had “four kids [she] . . . had to support” when she moved to Arizona. [Id. at 58:7-8]. We have not considered [24] these statements in our factual analysis. United States v. 25 Lazarenko, 564 F.3d 1026, 1037 (9th Cir. 2009) (statements in argument are not evidence). [26] -18- 1 Veal), 450 B.R. 897, 919 (9th Cir. BAP 2011) (an appellate panel may 2 conduct review if a complete understanding of the issues may be 3 obtained from the record as a whole or if there can be no genuine 4 dispute about omitted findings). Further, implied in the court’s 5 findings as to 2008 and 2009 is a finding, which we will not 6 disturb, that, except for those years, Debtor was unable to make 7 voluntary payments. See Johnson Sw., Inc. v. Habert Energy Corp. 8 (In re Johnson Sw., Inc.), 205 B.R. 823, 827 (N.D. Tex. 1997)(“A 9 reviewing court may assume that the trial court made an implied 10 finding consistent with its general holding so long as the implied 11 finding is supported by the evidence.”). Indeed, this inability may 12 have been due to the DOE’s ongoing garnishments and the tax refund 13 offsets. At least one court has held that making payments through 14 garnishment or offsets with the debtor’s consent demonstrates good 15 faith. Hamilton v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Hamilton), 361 B.R. 16 532, 558 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2007). In this regard, Debtor testified 17 she did not realize she had two separate lenders and assumed the 18 FFELP loans were being paid through these forced collection efforts. 19 The bankruptcy court made no express findings as to Debtor’s overall 20 credibility or her credibility on this particular point. However, 21 it did accept Debtor’s testimony relevant to prongs one and two, and 22 thus we can infer the court thought Debtor generally credible. 23 Habert Energy Corp., 205 B.R. at 827 . Given this inference, 24 Hamilton’s rationale should also apply to Debtor’s good faith, even [26] -19- 1 if mistaken, belief she was paying ECMC’s predecessor through forced 2 collection. 3 The bankruptcy court found Debtor made no effort to obtain 4 forebearances, apparently discounting her testimony that at one 5 point she mailed forebearance paperwork to Chicago but never heard 6 anything afterwards. Given the testimony’s lack of detail, we will 7 not set aside this finding as clearly erroneous. 8 Debtor has admitted she did not attempt to negotiate a 9 payment plan or make any effort to apply for an administrative 10 discharge when presented with that option. In mitigation of such 11 failures, Debtor testified that prepetition she did not know 12 restructuring arrangements were available. Even were this true, the 13 evidence shows Debtor to be an intelligent person who, if unsure 14 about available restructuring options, had the sophistication to 15 make appropriate inquiries. Her failure to do so was within her 16 reasonable control. Birrane, 287 B.R. at 500 . 17 While the bankruptcy court made no detailed findings as to 18 the timing of the bankruptcy, the evidence was uncontradicted that 19 Debtor’s attempt to discharge her student loans came at least a 20 decade after they went into repayment, and thus there was no “rush 21 to the courthouse.” Cf. Brunner, 831 F.2d at 397 (declining to find 22 good faith when debtor filed adversary proceeding seeking discharge 23 within a month of when her loans first became due). 24 Likewise the bankruptcy court made no express findings on 25 Debtor’s efforts to obtain employment, maximize income, and minimize [26] -20- 1 expenses. However, in holding for her on Brunner’s first and second 2 prongs, the court necessarily found that, at least going forward, 3 Debtor had minimized her expenses and maximized her earning 4 potential. Birrane, 287 B.R. at 496 (minimized current expenses are 5 part of first prong); In re Nys, 446 F.3d at 947 (maximized income 6 potential (which subsumes possibility of obtaining more lucrative 7 employment) part of second prong). Given the evidence on Debtor’s 8 frugality, education, age, health, earning potential, and desire to 9 work, these findings are not clearly erroneous. As to Debtor’s 10 historical efforts, ECMC does not dispute them. In any event, the 11 record is sufficiently developed to allow us a complete 12 understanding, Veal, 450 B.R. at 919 , and upon our review, the 13 preponderance of the evidence indicates Debtor: 1)remained full-time 14 employed until shortly before she filed Chapter 7, often working two 15 jobs; 2) used her job skills as productively as she could; and 3) 16 lived frugally, all indicating historical good faith efforts to 17 obtain employment, maximize income, and minimize expenses. 18 Thus, to sum up the factual findings underlying the good 19 faith analysis, Debtor made good faith efforts to obtain employment, 20 maximize income, and minimize expenses. Further, she did not come 21 to bankruptcy court seeking discharge until many years after the 22 loans were in repayment status. In contrast, she made no full or 23 even partial voluntary payments despite being able to do so in 24 select years. However, this deficiency is mitigated somewhat by her 25 good faith belief in other years that the FFELP Loans were being [26] -21- 1 paid through garnishments and tax offsets. Further, she did not 2 seek forebearances. However, a forebearance would merely have 3 deferred payment, and, given Debtor’s limited finances, would not 4 have materially improved her prospects to pay on her loans. She 5 also did not submit an application to administratively discharge the 6 loan, claiming she did not meet the eligibility requirements for 7 that program. That claim has not been contradicted, and we will not 8 hold against her the failure to engage in a futile exercise. 9 Finally and perhaps of most significance, Debtor refused to 10 enroll in the IBRP. In light of Ninth Circuit caselaw, we cannot 11 discount this refusal. In fact, it has often tipped the good faith 12 balance against a debtor. See, e.g., Mason, 464 F.3d at 885 13 (failure to enroll in the ICRP); Birrane, 287 B.R. at 500 (same). 14 The question is whether, in light of Debtor’s individual 15 circumstances, Rifino, 245 F.3d 1087 n.2 , it should do so here. The 16 evidence and the bankruptcy court’s findings show that not only 17 would Debtor currently not be required to make a payment under the 18 IBRP, but it is more probable than not she would never be required 19 to make a payment. Given that forecast, which is not clearly 20 erroneous, we conclude that Debtor’s refusal to participate in the 21 IBRP should not be weighed against her, especially given her age, 22 poor health, and limited income or prospects. 23 Potentially disastrous tax consequences could await her at 24 the termination of the twenty-five year payment period or could 25 await her estate and thus her heirs upon her death. Perhaps more [26] -22- 1 concretely, we see no real purpose in making Debtor jump through the 2 hoops of applying for, and enrolling in, the IBRP and then reporting 3 her income every year. The IBRP was set up to allow borrowers to 4 pay an affordable amount toward retirement of their student loan 5 debt. However, when absolutely no payment is forecast, the law 6 should not impose negative consequences for failing to sign up for 7 the program. This is consistent with the general maxim that the law 8 does not require a party to engage in futile acts. Ohio v. Roberts, [9] 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980), abrogated on other grounds, Crawford v. 10 Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Congress could not have intended 11 such a lengthy, empty commitment as a requirement for a 12 determination of undue hardship. 13 VI. CONCLUSION 14 In the end, we must, in our de novo review, weigh the 15 bankruptcy court’s factual findings (which were not clearly 16 erroneous) and our own findings (given the completeness of the 17 record) in “exercis[ing] [our] . . . judgment about the values that 18 animate,” Bammer, 131 F.3d at 792, “good faith efforts to repay.” 19 Although a close case, in considering all the factors, we conclude 20 Debtor has met her burden. We therefore REVERSE and REMAND this 21 matter to the bankruptcy court with instructions that it enter 22 judgment discharging the FFELP Loans. [23] 24 Concurrence begins on next page. 25 /// [26] -23- 1 PAPPAS, Bankruptcy Judge, Concurring: [2] 3 Given the bankruptcy court’s fact findings regarding Debtor’s 4 dismal financial history and circumstances, and applying a de novo 5 standard of review, I concur that the bankruptcy court erred in 6 declining to grant a hardship discharge of the student loan debt to 7 Debtor under § 523(a)(8). However, because I understand how the 8 bankruptcy court felt restricted by precedent in reaching its 9 decision, I write separately to highlight that the analysis required 10 by Pena/Brunner to determine the existence of an undue hardship is 11 too narrow, no longer reflects reality, and should be revised by the 12 Ninth Circuit when it has the opportunity to do so. Put simply, in 13 this era, bankruptcy courts should be free to consider the totality 14 of a debtor’s circumstances in deciding whether a discharge of 15 student loan debt for undue hardship is warranted. 16 Congress has never defined the circumstances constituting the 17 sort of undue hardship justifying the discharge of an educational 18 debt under § 523(a)(8), apparently preferring that bankruptcy courts 19 craft a working definition. While it might have been appropriate 20 and helpful when adopted, respectfully, the Brunner test for 21 determining undue hardship is truly a relic of times long gone. 22 Brunner was decided by the Second Circuit in 1987 to 23 implement the original student loan hardship discharge exception 24 included in a still-new Bankruptcy Code. Brunner v. N.Y. State 25 Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987). That [26] -1- 1 early version of § 523(a)(8) provided that a debtor’s student loan 2 debt could not be discharged unless either it first became due five 3 years before the date of the bankruptcy filing or excepting such 4 debt from discharge would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and 5 the debtor’s dependents. Importantly, in those days, without regard 6 to the debtor’s current finances, if a student loan had not been 7 collected within the five years after it became due, Congress 8 directed that it would be discharged in the student’s bankruptcy 9 case. 10 Brunner typified the sort of student loan discharge cases 11 encountered by bankruptcy courts at that time. The debtor sought to 12 discharge $9,000 in student loans in a bankruptcy case filed just a 13 few months after she obtained her master’s degree, immediately after 14 the grace period before payments became due expired, after only a 15 few months of unemployment, and having made no efforts to pay 16 anything on the loans. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Serv. 17 Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 831 18 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1987). Not surprisingly, in addition to 19 articulating its now-famous “test,” the Brunner court held that the 20 debtor had not made a case for an undue hardship discharge in part 21 because, given her circumstances, she had not made a good faith 22 effort to repay the modest debt. 831 F.2d at 396-97 . 23 In 1990, Congress amended § 523(a)(8), significantly 24 expanding the discharge exception to apply to more than just 25 educational “loans” to include any “educational benefit, [26] -2- 1 scholarship, or stipend payment.” Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. 2 L. No. 101-647 (1990). The discharge exception was further widened 3 to encompass any obligation “that first became due more than 7 years 4 (exclusive of any extension of the repayment period) before the date 5 of filing of the [bankruptcy] petition.” Id. This was the version 6 of the Code applied by the Ninth Circuit when it adopted the Brunner 7 test for undue hardship in In re Pena in 1998. United Student Aid 8 Funds, Inc. v. Pena (In re Pena), 155 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 9 1998). 10 In In re Pena, the court affirmed the grant of a hardship 11 discharge of the debtor’s $9,300 in student loans used to acquire 12 technical training that the court described as “useless” to him in 13 obtaining employment. 155 F.3d at 1110 . Moreover, Mrs. Pena 14 suffered from a chronic mental disability, the debtors’ income was 15 inadequate to pay their normal living expenses, and there was no 16 evidence that their situation would improve in the future. Under 17 these facts, and applying the Brunner factors (or any other test, 18 for that matter), the decision to grant the debtors a hardship 19 discharge of the student loans is certainly defensible. 20 Over the years, Congress made more changes to § 523(a)(8), 21 all excepting a broader array of educational obligations from 22 discharge in bankruptcy. For example, in 1998, Congress did away 23 with the requirement that only those student loan debts that were 24 less than seven years into the repayment period could be excepted 25 from discharge in bankruptcy. See Higher Education Amendments of [26] -3- 1 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 971 (a) (1998). Under this amendment, 2 student-debtors could no longer hope to discharge even the oldest of 3 their educational obligations without demonstrating that repayment 4 would constitute an undue hardship to them or their dependents. 5 Most recently, in 2005, under pressure from lenders and 6 lobbyists, Congress expanded the discharge exception to include, for 7 the first time, private student loans. Given the geometric 8 increases in the amount of new and outstanding educational loans, 9 this change to § 523(a)(8) meant that the pool of potentially 10 nondischargeable education-related debts was now a truly huge one. 11 As can be seen, while at one time bankruptcy courts were 12 required to focus on a debtor’s circumstances only during the five 13 to seven years after student loans became due, after 1998, the 14 relevant time for examining whether a debtor had made good faith 15 efforts to repay a student loan had no limits. And after the 2005 16 amendment, the number and kinds of student loan debts potentially 17 excepted from discharge skyrocketed. 18 In addition to these significant changes in the statutory 19 landscape, educational borrowing has also changed drastically since 20 the Brunner test was formulated and In re Pena adopted it. Back 21 then, bankruptcy courts only infrequently dealt with student loan 22 discharge issues, and as shown by the facts of those cases, the 23 amounts in controversy were usually modest. As a practical matter, 24 if a student loan was excepted from discharge, the debtor could be 25 expected to repay it within a reasonable time. [26] -4- 1 But things are different now. Unlike the loans made mostly 2 to traditional students by local banks and colleges in the 1970s, 3 today, a variety of lenders now compete to provide “financial 4 assistance” for a broad assortment of study and training, without 5 regard to the wisdom of a student’s decision to borrow or their 6 particular circumstances, and with nary a thought given to the 7 borrower’s ability to repay the debts. Today, facing the mammoth 8 costs of a modern education, nearly all students must borrow heavily 9 to finance their futures. Much of that student loan debt is not 10 incurred to finance a traditional college education, but instead 11 goes to pay for other types of training, frequently delivered by 12 “for-profit” companies, which may not significantly improve the 13 debtor’s chances for employment or substantial earnings. 14 Astoundingly, today there is nearly $1 trillion in outstanding 15 educational debt, see Donghoon Lee, Household Debt and Credit: 16 Student Debt at 2 (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Feb. 28, 2013), 17 http://newyorkfed.org/newsevents/mediaadvisory/2013/Lee022813.pdf; 18 the average student loan balance is close to $25,000, Id. at 7; and 19 over 12 percent of borrowers owe $50,000 or more. Id. at 6. On the 20 heels of a record recession with high unemployment, it is not 21 surprising that many of the students who borrowed to finance their 22 education and training did not complete those programs. It is also 23 hardly surprising that the proportion of student loans that are 24 delinquent is at near-record high levels. Id. at 11 and 15 [26] -5- 1 (explaining that 17 percent of borrowers in repayment programs are 2 ninety-plus days delinquent). 3 As with the debtor in this appeal, many outstanding student 4 loan debts are now decades old, owed by borrowers who never really 5 had the ability to make substantial payments on the balances. Id. 6 at 4 (noting that 34 percent of all student loans are 40 years old 7 or older). And so, with accruing interest, those loan balances grow 8 large. It is also increasingly common that the debtor seeking 9 bankruptcy relief from student loan debt is not the student but, 10 instead, a family member or friend who agreed to co-sign or 11 guarantee the loans. 12 Unlike in Brunner and Pena, today, bankruptcy courts must 13 frequently attempt to predict a debtor’s potential to repay a six14 digit educational obligation over his or her entire lifetime. In 15 many of those cases, the benefit the debtor received from the 16 education or training financed with these “loans” may be marginal, 17 and the balances due to creditors exceed the debtor’s debt-service 18 abilities. It would seem that in this new, different environment, 19 in determining whether repayment of a student loan constitutes an 20 undue hardship, a bankruptcy court should be afforded flexibility to 21 consider all relevant facts about the debtor and the subject loans. 22 But Brunner does not allow it. In addition to requiring that a 23 debtor demonstrate a current inability to pay a student loan while 24 maintaining a minimal standard of living, Brunner mandates that the 25 debtor show “additional circumstances” to prove that his or her [26] -6- 1 impecunious status will persist into the future. Brunner, 831 F.2d 2 at 396; Pena, 155 F.3d at 1111 . Requiring that a debtor demonstrate 3 that his or her financial prospects are forever hopeless is an 4 unrealistic standard. 5 Brunner’s additional requirement that a debtor show that he 6 or she has made “good faith efforts” to repay a student loan is also 7 of little utility in determining true undue hardship. Of course, as 8 a matter of statutory construction, this “prong” of the test lacks 9 any textual basis in the Bankruptcy Code. As a practical matter, 10 requiring a debtor to clear this hurdle can condemn the student11 borrower to a lifetime of burdensome debt under one or more of the 12 creditors’ long-term repayment programs, some of which may span 13 thirty-to-forty years. This aspect of the Brunner test also fails 14 to account for the potentially devastating debt-forgiveness tax 15 consequences to the debtor resulting from the “successful” 16 completion of such a program, which is one reason that the repayment 17 programs are not that popular with borrowers. At bottom, requiring 18 debtors to participate in these creditor programs as a condition to 19 obtaining a bankruptcy discharge simply means that creditors, not 20 bankruptcy judges, will decide which loans can be repaid, and which 21 should properly be forgiven. This is surely not what Congress 22 intended in enacting § 523(a)(8). 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// [26] -7- 1 The Ninth Circuit should reconsider its adherence to Brunner. 2 It should instead, like a few other courts,17 craft an undue 3 hardship standard that allows bankruptcy courts to consider all the 4 relevant facts and circumstances on a case-by-case basis to decide, 5 simply, can the debtor currently, or in the near-future, afford to 6 repay the student loan debt while maintaining an appropriate 7 standard of living. This approach could allow the bankruptcy court, 8 after weighing the facts of each case, to decide that a student9 debtor, whose debt financed training that did not allow him or her 10 to achieve any significant earnings, to discharge a large loan 11 balance even in the absence of a debilitating illness or handicap. 12 It could allow an elderly debtor to escape the burden of decades-old 13 student loans when her prospects for repayment have disappeared, 14 even though the debtor has not participated in a repayment plan with 15 the creditor. And this hardship test would focus on the 16 contemporary world of student loan debt, not circumstances that 17 existed thirty or more years ago. [19] 20 17 To be sure, Brunner still predominates in the circuits as 21 the go-to test for assessing undue hardship. The advantages to the more timely and enlightened “totality of circumstances” approach is 22 explained in the First Circuit BAP’s decision in Bronsdon v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bronsdon), 435 B.R. 791 (1st Cir. BAP 23 2010); see also Long v. Educational Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003) (observing that “fairness and [24] equity require each undue hardship case to be examined on the unique 25 facts and circumstances that surround the particular bankruptcy [case].”). [26] -8- 1 As America’s experience in the recent “mortgage crisis” 2 should have taught us, employing an undue hardship discharge test 3 that requires those who cannot repay educational loans, most of 4 which are government-backed, to attempt to do so creates problems 5 for all. Under § 523(a)(8), Congress did not draw bright lines, but 6 instead presumably intended that bankruptcy courts have the 7 flexibility to make fact-based decisions in individual cases about 8 the need for student loan debt relief. Pena/Brunner restricts the 9 bankruptcy courts’ ability to do so, and its application in the 10 Ninth Circuit should be reconsidered. [26] -9-