Lessee of Mercer v. Selden

The opinion of the court was delivered by Mr. Justice McLEAN. This case is brought before this court, from the Circuit Court of the eastern district of Virginia, by a writ of error. . An action of ejectment was commenced by the lessors of the plaintiff, to recover possession of certain undivided interests in a tract of land in Loudon county. On the trial, the jury found a statement of facts, on which the questions of law mainly arise. Mary Mason Selden was seised and possessed in fee simple of certain tracts of land in the. county of Loudon, estimated to contain four thousand acres, a part of which is the land in controversy. She intermarried with Mann Page, who died in 1779, leaving his wife and three infant children, John, William Byrd,, and Jane Byrd. Mrs. Page continued a widow, seised in her own right, until 1782, when she married Wilson Cary Selden; who in right of his wife entered upon and held the lands. Soon Pfter the marriage, Selden became guardian of the three infant children aforesaid, gave bonds, &c., and continued to act as guardian during the minorities .of the two sons, and until the marriage of the daughter. On the 22d Decembér, 1784, Selden and wife conveyed in fee simple to Cary Selden, father of the husband, the whole of the four thousand acres of land, with the exception of two thousand acres deeded to W. B. Page. Mrs. Selden was privily examined as the statute requires. This deed was acknowledged and recorded by Selden the 14th April, 1818, long alter the decease of the grantee. On the 1st January, 1785, Cary Selden and wife re-conveyed the land, with the exception above stated, to Wilson C. Selden; which deed was also recorded the 14th April, 1818. ' Selden and wife, previously to the execution of the above *49 deed to Cary Selden, made a deed to William Byrd Page, son of Mrs. Selden by her first marriage, for two thousand acres, part of the above tract of four thousand acres; which deed was never recorded and cannot now be found. From the time of their marriage, Selden and wife had their permanent dwelling in the county of Gloucester, until they removed to the county of Elizabeth City, where they established their residence. In September, 1787, Mrs. Selden, being in a low state of health, accompanied by her husband on a return from the Springs, was taken extremely ill at Winchester, in Frederick county, Virginia, where she died on the 17th of that month. Two days previous to her death Mrs. Selden, with her husband, executed a second deed to William Byrd Page, for two thousand acres by certain metes and bounds, and also a deed to Doct. Robert Mackay for two thousand acres, being the residue of the four thousand acres in Loudon aforesaid. On the 17th, it being the day of her decease, the privy examination of Mrs. Selden was taken to the above deeds, by three justicés of the peace of Frederick county, under a commission issued by the clerk of Loudon county. Selden, on the 8th October, 1787, acknowledged the above deeds, and they were ordered to be recorded. On the 17th September aforesaid, and after the decease of Mrs. Selden, Mackay re-conveyed the land conveyed to him as above stated, to Wilson C. Selden. This deed was recorded the 8th October ensuing. From the time of his marriage to the decease of Mrs. Selden, Selden, in right of his wife, held possession of the premises in controversy. After her death he continued to hold possession, taking the rents, issues, and profits for his own use; claiming the land under the above deed. In 1818, when the legal sufficiency of that deed was questioned, he caused the deeds to and from his father to be recorded, as above stated, and so continued to claim the premises under both deeds, and to exercise acts of ownership over the land until his death, in 1835. Between the years 1796 and 1812, Selden sold, conveyed, and delivered possession to different persons, and among others to Thomas Swann, who had intermarried with Jane Byrd Page, various parcels of the land. In April, 1794, Jane Byrd Page, with the consent of her guardian, she being. under twenty-one -.years of age, married *50 Thomas Swann; and died the 31st October, 1812, leaving seven infant children, .her heirs at law. Among others, Mary Scott, one of the lessors of the plaintiff, who, in June, 1818, being under twenty-one years of age, intermarried with John Mercer, one of the lessors of the plaintiff. In 1796, having received from Selden ¿8640, Thomas Swann executed a receipt, fully discharging him as guardian. John Pagé, the eldest son of Mrs, Selden, died in 1800, having devised all his estate, real and personal, aftér the death- óf his widow, -Elizabeth K. Page, to two of the children of his brother William Byrd Page, to wit: William B. Page and Mary M. Page, and to three of the children of his sister, Jane B. Swann, to wit: Edward, Maryland Thomas, as tenants in common. Edward and Thomasedied intestate, and without issue. Mary intermarried as above stated with John Mercer. ~ After John Page, the above testator, had attained full- age, on the 21st December, 1792, he settled, with Selden, his guardian, and executed to him a release from all demands. Thomas Swann, surviving his wife, conveyed by deed duly executed'all.his interest in the premises to his surviving children. After William Byrd Page, had attained full age, he made a claim against Selden, on account of. inequality in the partition of the aforesaid four thousand acres of land, which claim was finally adjusted sby the payment of one thousand pounds, and the purchase of five hundred acres of his land .by Selden. And after-wards, on the 23d July,.1794, Page, having received full satisfac- - tion from Selden as guardián, executed to him a release, &c. From the death of Wilson Cary Selden Up to the present time, the defendant, his son, has held the actual possession of the pre-' mises in dispute, claiming the same as his own, undér the will of his father. On the 6th December, 1819, the lessors of the plaintiff, claiming as heirs of Mrs. Swann, with others,- instituted their suit in the Superior Court of Chancery held at Winchester, against Wilson Cary Selden and others, claiming the lands now in controversy, Upon certain defects, in' the conveyances under which Selden claimed, and upon alleged equities. Answers were filed, and upon the final hearing in October, 1830, a decree was pronounced, whereby the court, “ disclaiming jurisdiction of the alleged imperfections in the conveyances, aforesaid, but taking jurisdiction *51 of the matters of equity, adjudged and decreed that the plaintiffs’ bill should be dismissed with cpsts, but without prejudice to any suit at law-which the plaintiffs might be advised to prosecute on account of thei,alleged legal defects, or want of validity in the said deeds.” This decree, on an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals, was affirmed the 17th of April, 1837. This cause has been ably and elaborately argued. Some .points have been made and illustrated with great research ánd ingenuity, which, from the view taken of the case by the court, are not essentially involved in the decision. Among these are the construction of the statutes under which the deed from Selden and wife to Cary Selden, in 1784, was executed and recorded; and also the deed from Selden and wife to Mackay, in 1787. We will consider the case in reference to the statute of limitations. The.statute of 1785 bars the right of entry, unless suit be brought within twenty years next after the cause of action accrues. The savings are “infancy,coverture, non compos mentis, imprisonment, or not being within the commonwealth at the lime the right of action accrued.” And such persons are barred if they do not bring their action within ten years next after their disabilities shall be removed. Selden took possession of the premises in controversy, claiming them as his own under the deed from Mackay, in the fall of 1787. Prior to that time, his possession was in right of his wife. Under-the deed from Mackay his possession was adverse to the right of the lessors of the plaintiff. He avowed his ownership by placing the deed upon record, by enjoying the profits of the land, and by . selling and conveying different parcels of it. In no sense can he be considered as holding possession, in virtue of his rights as guardian of the heirs of his deceased wife, or as tenant by the courtesy. The right under which he held possession during the life of his wife terminated .at her death, there being no issue of the marriage. From this time he possessed and claimed the premises as his own. This was notorious to the ■public, and especially to the heirs of his wife. John Page, in his lifetime, settled with ■Selden as guardian, and executed to him a release of all demands,. William Byrd Page received from him one thousand' pounds, the estimated difference in value between *52 the part of the four thousand acres conveyed to him over that which was conveyed to'Page. Thomas Swann, the husband of Jane Byrd Page, actually purchased from Selden a part of the land conveyed to him by Mackay. Swann, at the time of the purchase, was a highly respectable lawyer, and not only knew that Seldén claimed the land adversely, but he recognised the validity of such claim by the purchase. Until his death in 1835, Selden continued in possession of the premises, and his son, the defendant, still holds the same adversely under his father’s will. From these facts it is clear that the lessors of the plaintiff are barred by the statute, unless they shall bring themselves within its exceptions. The right of action accrued in 1787, At that time Jane Byrd Page, being an infant, was within the exception of the statute, and it is insisted that her marriage with Swann before she was twenty-one years of age, added to her first disability that of coverture. Mr. Preston, in his Abstracts, 2 vol. 339, says, “ If the right accrues to a person who is at that time under a disability, the fine will not begin to run against him till he shall be free from disability; and successive disabilities, without any intermission, will continue to him a protection against being • barred by non-claim : but any cessation of disability will call the statute into operative force, and no subsecpient disability will arrest the bar produced by the statute.” The saving in the Virginia statute is the same as that of the 21st of Jac. 1, but it has received in this country a different construction from that stated by Mr. Preston. In Parsons v. McCracken and wife, 9 Leigh. 495, Mr. Justice Parker says, speaking of this statute, “ I am of opinion that cumulative disabilities ought not to prevent its operation; and that upon a sound con- • struction of the act, a party claiming the benefit of the proviso can only avail himself of the disability existing when the right of action first accrued; since, otherwise, the assertion of claims might be postponed for the period of the longest life’, and possessions disturbed after sixty, eighty, or even a hundred years.” In that case, as in the one under consideration, the female in whom the right vested, married before the disability of infancy had ceased. *53 In the. same case Mr. Justice Brockenborough says, “If she married after she became of age, her subsequent coverture was not a disability which would obstruct the operation .of the statute; and even if she married while yet an infant, we cannot mount one disability on another so as to prevent a continuous obstruction to its operation.” Mr. Justice Tucker says, “It is true that Rebecca was an infant, but she came of age in 1824, when her disability ceased; for, notwithstanding some loose opinions to the contrary, she cannot tack the disability of marriage to that of infancy.” Tfte same doctrine was recognised by the Court of Appeals, in the chancery case lately decided in that court, between the parties now before us. The same- principle is sanctioned 2 Hen. and Munf. 306; and in Eager and wife v. Commonwealth, 4 Mass. 182; Jackson v. Wheat, 18 Johns. 40; Demarest v. Wynkoop, 3 Johns. Ch. 129. Chancellor Kent says, in the last case cited, “ I am clearly of opinion, that the party can only avail himself of the disabilities existing when the right of action first accrued.” In 1 Plowd. 375, it is laid down that, “ if several disabilities exist together at the time the right of action accrues, the statute does not begin to run untibthe party has survived them all.” In Doe v. Jesson, 6 East, 80, it was held that cumulative disabilities in diiferont persons could not be added. At the time of her marriage, in April, 1794, Mrs. Swann wanted about three months, of being of full age. Of course, in July ensuing, she was of age, from which time the statute began to operate, and in twenty years would have barred her right of entry, had she survived. But her death in 1812 arrested the operation of the statute, and gave her heirs ten years within which to bring their action. The proviso in the statute, after enumerating the exceptions, among which are infancy and coverture, declares that “ every such person, and his or her heirs, shall and may, notwithstanding the said twenty years are, or shall be expired, bring and maintain his action, or make his entry, within ten years next after such disabilities removed, or the death of the person so disabled, and notafterwards.” By the settled construction of this proviso, the heir has ten yeárs to bring his action, where his ancestor is not barred. This *54 time is given him without reference to the time that has elapsed or the disabilities of his ancestor, if the right of entry has not been, tolled. But it is insisted that the right of entry did not devolve on the heirs of Mrs. Swann at her decease, as her husband, became tenant by. the courtesy. In 1 Coke on Litt.,29, c. 4, sect. 35, it is said, “ Tenant by the courtesy of England is, where a man tak'eth a wife seised' in fee simple, .or in fee tail general, or seised as heir in tail special, and hath issue by the same wife, male or female, born alive, albeit the issue after dieth or liveth, yet if the wife dies,'the husband shall hold the land during his life, by the laws of England.” • “ And first, of what seisin a man shall be tenant by the courtesy. There is in law a twofold seisin, viz., a seisin in. deed and a seisin in law. And here Littleton intendeth a seisin in deed, if it may be attained unto, as if a man dieth seised of lands in fee simple, or fee tail general, and these lands descend to his daughter, and she taketh a husband and hath issue, and dieth before any entry, the husband shall not be tenant by the eourtesy; and yet in this case she. had a seisin in law; but if she or her husband had during her life entered, he should have been tenant by the courtesy.” The wife at common law was ,endowable where there had been no actual possession, and the reason is, that during coverture she could not take possession of the lands of her_husband. But actual seisin was necessary to enable the husband to claim as- tenant by the courtesy. This rule was not inflexible. It yielded, to circumstances, as in the case of an advowson, or rent, or where an entry was prevented by force. Litt. s. 417, 418. In like manner, if a man have a title of entry into lands, but does not enter for fear of bodily , harm, and he approach as ne'a? the land as he dare, and-claim the land as his own, he hath presently, by such claim, a possession and seisin in the land, as if he had entered in deed. Litt. s. 419. And, under some circumstances, living within view of the land will give the feoffee a seisin in deed, as fully as if hé had made an entry. It has been held that the husband may claim as tenant by the courtesy, without entry, wild lands of which his.wife was seised, and which were not held adversely. But the general rule of law is, that *55 there must be an entry during coverture, to enable the husband to claim by the courtesy, At no time during the life of Mrs. Swann, does it appear that there was an entry upon the premises in controversy by herself or her husband. On the contrary, it- appears the defendant and his ancestor held the land adversely. It is -clear, therefore, that Swann could not claim as tenant by the courtesy, and consequently no such right could interpose to prevent the entry of th'e heirs of his wife. They were -bound, without regard to their infancy or other disabilities, to bring their action in ten years from the decease of their ancestor. This results from the fact, that the'right of action accrued in the lifetime of their ancestor, and the rule of-law, which does not admit of cumulative disabilities, By the same principles, the devisees of John Page, who died in 1800, are also barred. The statute also bars the right of entry in William Byrd Page. From this view of the case, it can scarcely be necessary to notice the bill of exceptions taken on the trial by the plaintiff. So far-as evidence was offered to disprove the consideration named in the deed to Mackay, with the view of rendering it invalid, the evidence was properly rejected. And so far as regards the circumstances which the plaintiff offered to prove, they could have no other, if any effect, than to create a suspicion of unfairness or fraud in the execution of the deed. All matters of fraud and trust arising out of this transaction were considered and decided in the case in equity lately brought before the Court of Appeals of Virginia, by the parties to the present suit. If that jurisdiction wpre rightfully exercised, it concludes all questions óf fraud in this case. Udoii the whole, we affirm the'judgment of the. Circuit Court. ORDER. This cause came on to be heard o.n the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern district'of Virginia, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be and. the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.