Drake v. Taylor

BLATCHFORD, District Judge. The claim of the plaintiffs to have an injunction restraining the assignees from disposing of sc much of the assigned property as shall leave in their hands insufficient to pay the plaintiffs the $200,000, is based on the proposition that the plaintiffs have am equitable lien on the insurance money, and on that which is the substantial representative thereof, in the hands of the assignees, and that they are entitled to a decree that they have a prior lien in equity upon so much of the assigned estate in the hands of the assignees, as will pay the $200,000. In regard to the $200,000 insurance money, the bill avers, that it was converted by Taylor and Hubbell to their own uses, and was placed in their general business, for the benefit of their estate, either joint or several, and was applied by them to and for the benefit of their individual interests. The bill does not pretend that the money, or any specific substitute for it, can be identified. The money was received by Hubbell alone, and Taylor swears that no part of it ever came into his hands or possession, or was added to his estate, and that the property assigned by him to the assignees did not embrace any portion of the proceeds of the policies of insurance. Hubbell swears that the money was applied to the joint adventures of himself and Taylor, and in paying drafts and notes, and other joint indebtedness of Taylor and Hubbell, and was used generally, with other means and funds of Taylor and Hubbell, in protecting and paying their debts and liabilities on joint account Under these circumstances, the money having been mixed and confounded with other money, and neither it nor any substitute for it being shown to be capable of ascertainment or identification, or to be in existence anywhere, the right of the plaintiffs to follow the money, and to claim a lien upon any thing in respect of it, is gone. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. 1258. 1259. It may very well be, that Hubbell. when he received the insurance money, received it subject to a trust, either to pay it over to De Visser, or to apply it toward the payment of .the drafts accepted oy the plaintiffs, and that it was wrongfully misapplied by Hubbell. But, unless its identity, or the identity of some property into which it has been wrongfully converted, can be traced, the rights which the plaintiffs may have had in regard to it, while it remained in the hands of Hubbell, or which they would have had in regard to any traceable property into which it was wrongfully converted, are gone. This being so, the plaintiffs are not entitled to a decree that they have a prior lien in equity upon so much of the assigned estate in the hands of the assignees, as will pay the $200,-000, nor to an injunction restraining the assignees from disposing of so much of the property assigned by Taylor and Hubbell, as shall leave in their hands insufficient to pay to the plaintiffs the $200,000. The instrument of the 1st of August, 1807, was a very strange paper to be given by Taylor and Hubbell,"and accepted by De Vis-ser, on the existing facts of the case. The merchandise had been lost at sea, to the knowledge of the parties, and yet the paper purports to be a receipt for the merchandise by Taylor and Hubbell, with an agreement by them to hold it on storage, as the property of the plaintiffs, with liberty to sell it, and account to the plaintiffs, or to De Vis--ser, for its proceeds, until the drafts accepted by the plaintiffs, for the purchase of the merchandise, should have been satisfactorily provided for; and the paper declares the object of the arrangement to be, to protect and preserve unimpaired the lien of the plaintiffs in the property. The agreement is signed by Hubbell, individually, and by Taylor, individually, and purports, on its face, to be a joint and several agreement by them. This agreement, taken in connection with the accompanying delivery of the bills of lading by De Visser to Hubbell, for himself and Taylor, on the faith of the agreement, must, I think, be construed to be an agreement by Taylor and Hubbell, jointly and severally, to account to the plaintiffs for the proceeds of the bills of lading, and for the insurance money received as such proceeds, until the drafts accepted by the plaintiffs should be provided for. It created an obligation or duty in Taylor, individually, and in Hubbell, individually, as well as in Taylor and Hub-bell, jointly, to fulfill such agreement, and, as a consequence of the diversion of the money, it makes each of them individually, as well as the two jointly, liable to respond, as debtors, to the plaintiffs, for the $200,000. The plaintiffs, coming into this court by this bill, have a right to say, under these circumstances, if they choose to do so, that they will come in first as creditors of Taylor and of Hubbell, individually, and exhaust their remedies, under the assignments, against the separate estate of each of them, and afterward come in upon the surplus, if there 1058 should be any, of the joint estate of the two, after the payment of the joint debts of the two. The plaintiffs say, by their bill, that they desire to have the debt treated by the assignees as the separate and individual debt of Taylor, and claim that, therefore, they are entitled to have it paid out of the property assigned by Taylor, individually, before any payment shall be made by the assignees on account of any of the joint indebtedness of Taylor and Hubbell. I think this claim is well founded. It i§ doubtful whether any thing passed to the assignees by the joint assignment of the 20th of October. The two .assignments of the 24th of October assigned to the assignees all the estate, real and personal, of each assignor, of every name and description, and wheresoever situated, then owned and possessed by him, or in which he was in any manner interested, and the trust in each of these assignments is, to pay every debt owing by the assignor, or for which he is in any manner liable, without preference. It would seem, therefore, that the assignees must hold all the assigned property under the first two assignments, and must administer it under the trusts therein declared. This being so, the plaintiffs, coming into court with a claim against Taylor, individually, as they do, are entitled to a decree that they are creditors of Taylor, individually, for the $200,000, and, as such, are entitled to be paid out of the property assigned by Taylor, individually, prior to any payment, by the assignees, of any debts for which Hubbell and Taylor are jointly, and Taylor is not severally, liable, and that the assignees so marshal the assets of the assigned estates, and so appropriate the payments therefrom. This being so, they are also entitled to an injunction restraining the assignees, until the final decree in the cause, from making any transfer or disposition of any of the property assigned to them by Taylor, individually, which can interfere with such right of the plaintiffs. It does not appear whether the property assigned by Taylor, individually, will be sufficient to pay in full all the debts of Taylor, individually. Therefore, so much of the injunction asked for as would compel the assignees to keep in their hands sufficient of the property assigued by Taylor, individually, to pay the plaintiffs their $200,000 in full, cannot be granted. But they are entitled to an injunction restraining the assignees from disposing of so much of the property assigned to them by Taylor, individually. as shall leave in their hands less than will be sufficient to pay the plaintiffs, out of the separate estate of Taylor, the proper pro rata proportion thereof properly applicable to their claim, upon the principle of payiug out of the property assigned to them by the individual assignment executed by Taylor on the 24th of October, all the debts of Taylor, individually, prior to paying therefrom any debts for which Hubbell and Taylor are jointly, and Taylor is not severally, liable. It may be, that the assignees cannot close their trusts without bringing into some proper court, by a direct proceeding, other creditors, whose interests may be affected by the manner in which those trusts are administered. But that is no reason why the plaintiffs, on making out, as they have done, a proper case for the special relief they ask for, should not have it. So far as any other creditors, who claim under the assignments, are concerned, they are represented, sufficiently for the purposes of this suit, by and through the assignees, against whom alone the plaintiffs ask any relief.