Teal v. Felton

Mr. Justice WAYNE delivered the opinion of the court. . This suit was brought in a justices’ court to recover from the plaintiff in error the value of a newspaper, received by him as postmaster at Syracuse, which he refused to deliver to the defendant in error to whom it was addressed. The plaintiff in error had charged the newspaper with letter-postage, on account of a letter or initial upon the wráppér of it, distinct from the-direction. This the defendant refused to pay, at the same time tendering the. lawful postage of a newspaper. The postmaster would not receive it, and retained the paper against the will of the defendant; upon that' demand and refusal the suit was brought. The actiori was trover, and the general issue was pleaded. In the course of the trial when the defendant in error, who was plaintiff in. the suit below, was introducing testimony in support of his case, the’ defendant objected to a further examination of the case by witnesses, upon the ground that the court had not jurisdiction of the case. The objection having been overruled, the trial of the case was continued; and after the plaintiff had proved that he demanded from the defendant the-newspaper, tendering the lawful postage, and that the postmas-' ter refused to deliver it to him, he rested his- cáse. The defendant below then moved for a nonsuit, which having been denied, he offered in evidence a circular from the Post-Office Department of the 4th December, 1846, marked in the record as A,-and also the Post-Office act of 1845. The case wa,4 submitted to a jury. A verdict was rendered by it against the' defendant, upon which a judgment was entered. The defendant carried the case to the Court of Appeals, and the judgment of the lower court was affirmed. It is brought to this court by a writ of error. As the Corn-t of Appeals could not have adjudicated the ease without having denied to the defendant a ,defence which he claimed- under a law of the United States, the case is properly here under the 35th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The circular from the Post-Office Department is as follows : “ The wrappers of all such newspapers, pamphlets and magazines, when they "have reached their destination, should be care-. fully removed; and if upon inspection they are found to contain any manuscript or memorandum of any kind, either written 'or stamped, or by marks or signs made in any way, either, upon any newspaper, &c.,.&c., or the wrapper upon which it is inclosed, by which information shall be asked or communicated, except the name of the person to whom it is directed, such newspaper, . *290 &c., &c., with, the wrapper in which it is inclosed shall be charged with letter-postage by weight.” If the person to whom the newspaper is directed, refuses to pay the letter-postage, the postmaster is directed to transmit the same to the office whence it came, with a request that the person who sent it may be prosecuted for the penalty of five dollars, according to the 30th section of the act of 1825. Those parts of the 30th section mentioned, upon which the circular was issued, and of the 13th section of the act directing that a memorandum which shall bo written on a newspaper, shall be charged with letter-postage are : “ If any person shall inclose or QQnceal a letter or other thing, or any memorandum in writing in a newspaper, pamphlet or magazine, or in any package of newspapers, &c., &c.', or make any writing or memorandum thereon, which he shall have delivered in ariy post-office or to any person for that, purpose, in order that the same may be carried by post, free of letter-postage, he shall forfeit the sum of five dollars for every Such offence, and the letter, newspaper, package, memorandum or other thing, shall not be delivered to the person to whom it is directed until the amount of single letter-postage is paid for each article of which the package is composed. That part of the 13.th section of the act mentioned is : “ Any memorandum which shall be written on a newspaper or other printed paper, pamphlet or magazine, and transmitted by mail, shall be charged with letter-postage.” 4 Laws of the United States, 105-111. Those parts of the law of 1845, in any way applicable to this case, .are the 1st and 2d sections fixing the rates of postage upon letters and newspapers, and the 16th section, which defines a newspaper to be a printed publication issued in numbers, consisting of not more than two. sheets, and published- at short intervals of not more than a month, conveying intelligence of passing events, and the bond fide extras and supplements of any such publication. ' 5 U. S. L. 732,737. From the' evidence in this case, we do not think that the initial or letter upon the wrapper of the newspaper in this case, subjected it either under the 13th or 30th section of the act of-1825 to letter-postage. Why it was placed there, supposing it not to havebeen accidental, cannot be found out from this record, and if must have been a meaningless mark to the postmaster. It may have excited a suspicion, that it was a sign arranged between the person sending it and the person to whom it was directed, to convey information of some sort or other, for which letter-postage would have been charged, if it had been conveyed in words. The act forbids a memorandum in the 13th section; and in the 30th, providing for a penalty, the terms are, “any writing or memorandum;” but in neither are found, the terms “marks *291 or- signs,” as used in the circular. No provision is made for such a .case. It must be obvious too, that frauds of that kind eannot be prevented in the transmission of newspapers, without legislation by Gongress, subjecting newspapers conveyed by mail to letter-postage, whenever there shall be,'either upon the news-' -paper or the wrapper of it, any letter, sign, or mark, besides the address of the person to whom it is sent. A single letter or initial upon the wrapper of a newspaper, is neither a memorandum nor a writing in the sense in which either of those terms are ordinarily used, or as we think they were intended to be used in the 30th section of the act. Both mean something in words to convey intelligence, a remerábrance for one’s self or to another. The act speaks of something concealed in a newspaper or package of newspapers, of a writing or memorandum, from which it may be seen to have been the intention pf the sender. to convéy .information clandestinely under the'wrapper, or upon it in a form, though not disclosing what it is, which will leave no doubt of his intention. The initial'm this case does not seem to have been one or' the other It is not a memorandum certainly, and a single letter of the alphabet can convey no other idea than that it belongs to it, unless it is .used numerically. This was -not a case in which judgment couL - be used to determine any fact, except by some other evidence than the letter itself. Nor was it one calling for. discretion in the legal acceptation of that term in respect to officers who are called upon to discharge public duties. What was done by the, postmaster, was a mere act of his own, and ministerial, as that is understood to be, distinct from judicial. It could not have been the intention of Congress to put it in the power of postmasters, upon a mere suspicion raised by a single letter or initial, to arrest the transmission of newspapers from the presses issuing them, or when they were mailed by private hands. • This view of the law, disposes also of that point in the argument, claiming for the postmaster an- exemption from the suit-of- the plaintiff, upon the ground that he was called upon, in the act which he did,' to exercise discretion and judgment. In Kendale v . Stokes, 3 How. 97, 98, will be found this court’s exposition upon that subject, with the leading authorities ’ in support of it. The -lifference between the two, must at all times be determined by the law under which an officer is called upon to act, and by the character of the act. It is the law which gives the justification, and nothing less than the law can give irresponsibility to the officer, although he may be acting in good faith under the instructions of his superior of the department to which he belongs. Here the instructions expeed the law, as marks and signs of themselves, without some knowledge of their meaning, and *292 the intention in the use of them, are, as we have said, , neither memoranda nor writings. Tracy v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 80. But it is said that the courts of New York had not jurisdiction to try the case. The objection may be better answered by reference to the laws of the United States, in respect to the services to be rendered in the transmission of letters and newspapers by mail, and by the Constitution‘of the United States, than it can by any general reasoning upon the concurrent .civil jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, and the courts of the States, or concerning the exclusive jurisdiction given by the Constitution to the former. The United States undertakes, at fixed rates of postage, to convey letters and newspapers for those to whom they are directed, and the postage may be prepaid by the sender, or be paid when either reach their destination, by the person to whom they are addressed. When tendered by the latter or by his agent, he has the right to the immediate possession of them, though he has not had before the actual possession. If then they be wrongfully withheld- for a charge of unlawful postage, it is a conversion for which suit may be brought. His right to sue existing, he may sue in any court having civil jurisdiction of such a case, unless for some cause the suit brought is an exception to the general jurisdiction of the court. Now the courts in New York- having jurisdiction in trover, the case in hand can only be excepted from it by such a case as this having been made one of exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of the United States, by the Constitution of the United. States. That such is not the case, we cannot express our view better than Mr. Justice Wright has done in Ms opinion in this case in the Court of Appeals. After citing the 2d section of the 3d article of the Constitution, he adds, “ this is a mere grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts, and limits the extent of their power, but without words of exclusion or any attempt to oust the State courts of concurrent jurisdiction -in any of the specified cases in which concurrent jurisdiction existed prior to the adoption of the Constitution. The apparent object was not to curtail the powers of the State courts, but to define the limits of those granted to the federal judiciary.” We will add, that- the legislation of Congress, immediately after the Constitfition was carried into operation, confirms the conclusion of the learned judge. We find, in the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, under which this case is before us, that such a concurrent jurisdiction in the courts of the States and of the United States was contemplated, for its first provision is for a review of cases adjudicated in the former, “ where is drawn in question, the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their valid *293 ity.” "We are satisfied that there was no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case, and the same is affirmed by this court. Order. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Supreme Court of the State of New York, and was- argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged, by this court, that the judgment of the Court of Appeals of the said State of New York in this cause, and as remitted to the said Supreme Court be, and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.