Dinsman v. Wilkes

Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court. This cáse was. before the court on a former occasion, and is fully reported in 7 How. 89. The present defendant in error was then the plaintiff, and the judgment of the Circuit Court was reversed, and a venire de novo awarded, the new trial to be governed by the principles decided by this court. Upon the trial under the mandate the judgment was in favor of the present defendant, and the plaintiff thereupon brought this writ of. error. The testimony, so far as the questions of law upon the merits are concerned, is substantially the same with that offered at the former trial. The case, as it now comes before the court, is somewhat confused by the number of instructions asked for by the counsel for the different parties, and which are merely given or refused, without any explanatory instructions''by the court itself. This mode of proceeding complicates the case and makes it difficult to understand, from the exceptions, what principle of law the Circuit Court intended to decide. *402 ;But it would seem, from the various instructions moved for by counsel and given or refused, that the court likened the case to- a suit for a malicious prosecution, and supposed it was to be governed by the same principles. And if the Circuit Court understood the opinion of this court to be placed on that ground, they were evidently mistaken. For by referring to the report of the case, in page 130, it will be seen that, the court said, in express terms, “ that for acts beyond his jurisdiction, or attended with circumstances of excessive severity, arising from ill-will or a depraved disposition, or vindictive feeling, he can claim no exemption.” The case has no analogy to a suit for a malicious prosecution. That action will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without a probable cause. Johnston v. Sutton, 1 D. & E. 524. The action was originally applied to criminal proceedings; to cases where a party had maliciously, and without probable cause, procured the plaintiff to be indicted or arrested for an offence of which he' was not guilty. In cases of that kind, where the facts are admitted, or found by the jury, the court, and not the jury, decide whether there was probable cause or not for the prosecution; and if there was probable cause, an action for malicious prosecution will not lie, although the party who procured the arrest or indictment was actuated by malicious motives. And the reason for the rule, as stated by Blackstone, 3 Com. 126, is “ that it would be a very great discouragement to public justice if prosecutors, who had a tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law whenever their -indictments miscarried.” The action has been extended to civil as well as criminal cases where legal process has been maliciously used against another without probable cause. But .the action for a malicious prosecution is the only one in which the party is not liable, although he acts from malicious motives, and has in-' flicted unmerited injury upon another. The rule is not of a character to recommend it to favor; nor to induce a court of-justice to extend it beyond the limits to which it has heretofore been confined. And this is not an action for a malicious prosecution ; but for an assault and false imprisonment. And whether the acts charged were done or not,' and what motives actuated the defendant, are questions of fact exclusively for the jury; and probable cause or not is of no further -importance than as evidence to be weighed by them in connection with all th(e other evidence in the case, in determining whether the defendant acted from a sense of duty or from ill-will to the plaintiff. It is an action by a marine against his commanding officer, for punishment inflicted upon him for refusing to do duty, in a foreign port-, upon the ground that the time of his enlistment *403 had expired, and that he was entitled to his discharge. The case is one of much delicacy and importance as regards our naval service. For it is essential to its security and efficiency that the authority and command confided to the officer, when it has been exercised from proper motives, should be firmly supported in the courts of justice, as well as on shipboard. And if it is not, the flag of the United States would soon be.' dishonored in every sea. But at the same time it must be borne in mind that the nation would be equally dishonored, if it permitted the humblest individual in its service to be oppressed and injured by his commanding officer, from malice or ill-will, or the wantonness of - power, without giving him redress in the courts of justice. At the time these events happened Captain Wilkes was in a distant sea, charged with the execution of a ¡high public duty. He was bound, by all lawful means in his power, to preserve the strength and efficiency of the squadron intrusted to his care, and was equally bound to respect the rights of every individual under his command. It is hardly necessary to inquire whether the plaintiff was or was not entitled to his discharge at the time he demanded it. It is, however, very clear that he was not. But to guard against a misconstruction of this opinion, it is proper to say that the right to determine the question was, for the time being, in Captain Wilkes. In his position as commander, the law not only conferred upon him this power, but made it his duty to exercise it. If, in his judgment, the plaintiff' was entitled to his discharge, it was his duty to give it, even, if it was inconvenient to weaken the force he commanded. But (if he believed he was not entitled, it was his duty to detain him ip the service. Captain Wilkes might err in his decision. But that decision, for the time being, was final and conclusive; and it was the duty of the plaintiff to submit to it, as the judgment pf the tribunal which he was bound by law to obey; and for any error of judgment in this respect; no action would lie - against the defendant. Nor did the belief of the plaintiff as to his rights, furnish any justification for his disobedience to orders. For there would be an end of all discipline if the seamen and marines on board a ship of war, on a distant service, were permitted to act upon their own opinion of their rights, and to throw off the 'authority of .the commander whenever they supposed it to be unlawfully exercised. And whether the plaintiff was legally entitled to his discharge or not, his disobedience, when the question had been decided against him by the proper tribunal, was an act of insubordination for which he was fiable-to punishment. So, too, as regards the degree of punishment to which he was subjected. It was-the duty of Captain Wilkes to maintain *404 proper discipline and order among the officers and men under his command, .and if a spirit of disobedience and insubordination manifested itself in the squadron, he was bound to suppress it; and he might use severe measures for that purpose, if he deemed such measures necessary. And if, in his judgment, the continued refusal of the plaintiff to do duty made it proper to confine him on shore, rather- than on shipboard, in order to reduce him to obedience, — or necessary as an example to deter others from a like offence, he was justified in so doing; and while he acted honestly and from a sense of duty, and with a single eye to the welfare of the service in which he was engaged, the law protects him. He is not liable to an action for a mere error in judgment, even if the jury suppose that milder measures would have accomplished his object. But, on the other hand, he was equally bound to respect and protect the rights of those under his command, and to cause them to be respected by others; to watch over their health and comfort; and, above all, never to inflict any severer or harsher punishment than he, at the time, conscientiously believed to be necessary to maintain discipline and due subordination in his ships. The almost despotic powers with which the law clothes him, for tb 3, time, and which are absolutely necessary for the safety and efficiency of the ship, make it more especially his duty not to abuse it. And if, from malice to an individual, or vindictive feeling, or a disposition to oppress, he inflicted punishment beyond that which, in his sober judgment, he would have thought necessary, he is liable to this action. This is not a case where the punishment alleged to have been inflicted was forbidden by law, or beyond the power which the law confided to him. For, in such a case he would be liable whatever were his motives. But the fact to be ascertained in this case is whether, in the exercise of that discretion and judgment with which the law clothed him for the time, and which, is in the nature of judicial discretion, he acted from improper feelings, and abused the power confided to him to the injury of the -plaintiff. The case, therefore, turns upon the motive which induced Captain Wilkes to inflict the punishments complained of. And this question is one exclusively for the jury, to be decided by them upon the whole testimony. And the rule of law by which they must be governed in making up their verdict is contained in a single proposition. It is this: If they believe, from the whole testimony, that the defendant, in all the acts complained of, was actuated alone by an upright intention to maintain the discipline of his command and the interest of the service in which he was engaged, then the plaintiff is not *405 entitled to recover. But, if they find that the punishment of. the plaintiff was in any manner or in any degree increased or aggravated by malice or a vindictive feeling towards him on .the part of Captain Wilkes, or by a disposition to oppress him, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover. And, in deciding this question, they are to take into consideration the service in which Captain Wilkes was engaged; the place where these transactions happened; the condition of the vessels under his command; the spirit, and temper off the marines and seamen, as he understood it to be, in his own vessel and the other vessels of the squadron, gathering his knowledge from his own observation as well as the information of others; also the nature and character of the voyage yet before him, and which it was his duty, if possible, to accomplish; and how far the conduct and example of the. plaintiff might, in the judgment of the defendant, .be calculated to embarrass or frustrate it altogether, unless he was reduced, to obedience. And further, that, under the order to imprison him in the fort, if the jury believe it to be truly stated in the defendant’s testimony, the plaintiff was left at liberty to relieve himself from confinement at any moment by returning to his duty. . But, on the other hand, the jury must likewise take into consideration’ the different punishments he received; his confinement in the fort on shore; the situation and condition of the place; the character of the persons by whose authority it was governed; his food; his clothing and general.treatment; and whether Captain Wilkes, through proper officers, inquired into his treatment and condition during the time of his confinement.’ For, certainly, when, -from whatever motives he had placed him out of the protection which the ordinary place of confinement on shipboard afforded, in a prison belonging to and under the control of an uncivilized people, it was his duty, through proper and trustworthy officers, to inquire into his situation and treatr ment, and to see that it was not cruel or barbarous in any respect ; and that he did not' suffer for the want of those necessaries which the humanity of civilized countries always provides even for the hardened offender. As to the questions, of evidence, we thjAtT'thé letter of Mr. Emmons, with the papers attached "to it, mentioned in the first exception, was properly admitted, since it was calculated- to make an impression on the mind of Captain Wilkes- as to the temper and disposition of the marines in one óf the vessels, composing the squadron. But the proceedings of the courts-martial, mentioned in the second exception in the cases of Ward and Riley, ought not to have been received. For some of the offences with which-they *406 were charged were committed a long time before the refusal of the plaintiff to do duty, and were not, therefore, any evidence of a spirit existing at that time. And when the testimony in this exception is rejected, that offered by the plaintiff in the third exception to rebut it, will also be inadmissible, although it would be legal and admissible if the proceedings of the courts-martial could be legally received. But the evidence stated in both of these exceptions ought to have been refused. The evidence stated in the fourth exception, as to the punishment of Weaver and Waltham, was properly rejected, as it can have no application to the matter in issue. The opinion in the fifth exception is also correct. For, it appears from record, that Captain Wilkes claimed the right to detain the plaintiff in service during the. cruise, under the contract made by the plaintiff with Commodore Jones, in October, 1837, and not under the act of March 2, 1837. He could not, .therefore, certify that.he had detained him under that act. But the testimony offered by the plaintiff in the sixth exception ought to have been received. For, after the defendant had offered testimony to show that American seamen were confined in the fort at the time the plaintiff was imprisoned there, the plaintiff had a right to show that it was not the usual place of confinement, and that refractory seamen, who could not.be safely confined on board their own vessels, were uniformly or generally confined on board American ships of war. The testimony on the part of the defendant was admissible, to show that he was not actuated by vindictive feelings in imprisoning the plaintiff'' in the fort, and that offered by the plaintiff to rebut it, and to show the contrary. . But neither was admissible for any other purpose. And it is for the jury to consider what degree of weight, if any, the testimony on either side mentioned, in this exception is entitled to, in deciding upon' the motives of Captain Wilkes, taking it in connection with all the evidence in the case. . These six exceptions are the only ones which relate to questions of evidence. The rest of them apply to the merits of the eaue, ancl to the princlr!> s of law by which it is governed. Upon these we have airea- ( expressed the opinion of the court, without deeming it necesf vy to specify each particular instruction. given or refused, that ought, in our judgment, to be affirmed or reversed. We have already said, that there is but a single question of law and but one instruction proper. And, upon the grounds and for the reasons hereinbefore stated, the judgment of the Cirquit Court must be reversed and a venire de novo awarded. *407 Order. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of . the record, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, holden in and for the County, of Washington, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, reversed with costs, and that this cause be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the said Circuit Court, "with directions to award a venire facias de novo.