Thomas Haney v. Tom Rice

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA §§§.,,§§ §UZ § § RASHEL§M¢b§§WCX CLE§KSEPR§MECGEHT BY fn Divisi0n THOMAS HANEY, an individual and qualified el@ct0r, App@llant, v. THE HONORABLE R. FULTON BROCK, DON STAPLEY, ANDREW KUNASEK, MAX W. W§LSON and MARY ROSE WILCOX, THK DULY ELECTED Or APPOINTRD MRMBERS OF THE NARICOPA COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, WHO ARE NAMED SOLELY IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY; THE MARICOPA COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; THH HONORABLE HELEN PURCELL, THE DULY ELECTED MARICOPA COUNTY RECORDER, WHO IS NAMED SOLELY IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY, AND ?HB HONORABLE KAREN OSBORNE, THE DULY APPOINTED MARICOPA COUNTY DIRECTOR OF ELECTIONS, WHO §§ NAMED SOLRLY IN HER OFFICIAL CAPAC§TY, AppelleeS, TOM RICE, an individual, Real Party in Int@r@St. Ari20na Supreme COurt N0. CV-08-O195-AP/EL Maric0pa C@unty Sup@ri0r C0urt N0. CV2008-Ol4333 MMDRANDUM DECISION (N0t for Publicati0n ~ Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. l1l) A§p@3l from th@ Sup@ri0r C0urt in Maric0pa C0unty Th@ H0n0rable D0uglas L. AFFIRMED R&y@S, Judq@ WELLIAMS § ZINMAN, P.C. Scottsdale By Scott E. williams Matk B. Zinman attorneys for Thomas Haney RAYMOND, GREER & SASSAMAN, P.C. PhOeniX By Michael J. Raymond Attorneys for Tom Rice B E R C H, vice Chief Justice il we have been asked to decide whether nominating petitions that contain only twelve signature lines per page com§iy with Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section l6M 3l5(A)(3) (2006). Under the facts of this case, we hold that they do. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY L2 Tom Rice seeks his party’s nomination to ron for Justice of the Peace of the Dteamy Draw Justice Precinct. To be eiigible, Rice needed to submit 441 valid signatures to the Maricopa County Eiections Department. Rice submitted forty-five petition sheets that contained €98 valid signatures. Only thirty-six of the forty»five petition sheets contained the statutorily prescribed fifteen signature lines; the other nine contained only twelve lines per page. Those nine sheets bore a total of sixty-seven valid signatures. T3 Thomas Haney, a qualified eiector, challenged Rice’s petitions on the ground that the nine petition sheets containing only twelve signature lines were invaiid, and therefore, Rice m 2 _ failed to submit the required del signatures (498 less 67 is 43l). On duhe 23, 2008, the superior court conducted a hearing and held that the deficient petition sheets substantially complieci with § Yl6W3l5(A)(3). haney subsequently appealed to this Court, and by an order dated July i, 2008, we affirmed. In that order we informed the parties that a written decision would follow; this is that decision. I4 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Rule S.l of the Arizona Ruies of Civil Appeiiate Procedure and A.R.S. § i635l(A) (2006). II . DISCUSSION L5 Ari2ona law prescribes the form in which nominating petitions must be made. st the center or this controversy is A.R.S. § l6~3l5(A)(3), which provides as follows: A. The nomination petitions shall be in substantially the following form: 3. There shall he fifteen lines spaced three-eighths of an inch apart and consecutively numbered one through fifteen. §§ Haney argues that the text of § 16-3l5(A){3) is clear on its face s that is, because the statute uses the word “shall,” the doctrine of “substantial compliance” does not apply, and the petitions are therefore deficient because they contain only twelve lines. To support his argument, Haney asserts that our decision in Ciark v. Pima County Board of Supervisors, 128 Ariz. l93, 624 P.2d 8 ?l (l9Bl), requires strict adherence to the statute's teXt. he also maintains that accepting Rice’s position would open the door to future interpretations of § l6»3l5(A), which would frustrate the statute’s purpose. Haney urges us to reject the nine petitions containing only twelve signature iines. H7 Rice agrees that the text of § l6e3l5(A) governs. Uniike Haney, however, Rice argues that the prefatory clause of § l6-3l5{A) requires only that the petition substantially comply with the specific enumerated subsections. Rice distinguishes Clark' and_ asserts thatr our decisions in Moreno v. Jones, 2l3 Ari2. 94, 139 P.3d 612 (2006), Clifton v. Decillis, l87 Ariz. li2, 927 P.2d 772 (l996), and Marsh v. Haws, lll Ariz. l39, 526 P.2d 161 (l9?4}, support the textual conclusion that substantial compliance suffices. I8 Resolution of this case requires us to answer two related inguiries: first, whether substantial compliance is the correct standard, and second, if so, whether Rice’s petitions satisfy that standard. Both questions present issues of law, which we review de novo. Moreno, 2l3 Ari2. at lOl~O2, § 40, l39 P.3d at 619-20. A. The Applicable Standard 39 we agree with the trial court that the correct standard is substantial compliance. Although Haney is certainly correct that § l6~3l5(A) uses the term “shall,” the term must he viewed in context with the remaining parts of § l6~3i5(A). See Ariz. Dep’t of Rev. v. Action Marine, Inc., 218 Ariz. l4l, l43, I lO, 181 P.3d l88, l9O (2008) (construing statutes as a whole, considering context, language, and purpose). The prefatory clause of § l6-3l5(A) requires the nominating petitions to be in “substantiaily the . . . form” of ijNe enumerated suhsections. Reading subsection (3) in isolation, as Haney does, without reference to the prefatory ciause, would strip the words “substantially the following form” of meaning and purpose. Although the term “shall” and the phrase “suhstantially the following form” are not entirely consistent, the statute should he read to avoid. a construction that would render the latter meaningless, while also giving due weight to the former. 5ee Kriz v. Buckeye Petroleum Co., l§5 Ariz. 374, 379, 791 P.2d ll82, 1187 (l985). Thus, we conclude that the best reading of § l6-3l5(A) gives weight to both; that is, the statute requires substantial comQliance with the s@ndatory enumerated statutory subsections. I1O we concluded similarly in Clifton. There, we decided whether nominating' petitions for a general election complied ,...5._. with the requirements of A.R.S. § 16-3él(D) when the petition forms did not designate the party affiliation of an independent candidate who left the party designation portion of the petition blank. lS7 Ariz. at ll3, 927 P.2d at 773 . Like § l6~3l5(A), the statutory provision at issue in Clifton required that “[t}he nomination petition shall be . . . substantially” in the form provided by the statutory text requiring the candidate to indicate the party name or its equivalent. To be sure, Clifton explored a different statute, but we find its analysis particularly persuasive because the prefatory clause ina § l6- 34l(A) is almost identical to that for § l6-3l5(A). ill The statutory purpose behind nominating petitions also supports our conclusion. As we stated in Clifton: §N§ominating petitions were designed to “in some measure [weedj out the cranks, the publicity seekers, the frivolous candidates who have no intention of going through with the campaign” . . . “yet not keep out those who are serious in their efforts and have a reasonable number of suppQrters.” 187 Ariz. at ll5, 927 P.2d at 775 {second alteration in Clifton) (quoting adams v. Bolin, 77 Ariz. 3l6, 320, 27l P.2d 472, 475 (l95G)). Reguiring only substantial compliance furthers this statutory purpose, and we therefore conclude thatr § l6~3l5(A) “does not mandate perfection but only that candidates substantially comply with its reguirements.” Id. at ll6, 927 P.2d at 776 , A12 Finally, we find Haney's citation to Clark unhelpful. The issue in Clark was whether “the signers of nominating petitions must sign with the exact name under which they are registered to vote,” not whether the forms themselves substantially' complied with the statutory reguirements. 128 Ari2. at 19é, 62é P.2d at 872. C1ark required only that the proponent be prepared to offer additional proof that the signatories were properly registered when their names did not match voter registration affidavits. Id. at 195, 624 P.2d at 873 ; see also 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 98, § 22 (lst Reg. Sess.) (modifying statutory section at issue in Clark). B. Substantia1 Compliance with A.R.S. § l6~3l5 Il3 Having determined. that substantial. compliance is the appropriate standard, we must now determine whether the petitions containing only twelve lines substantially comply with § 16-3l5. We conclude that they do. I14 “ln determining whether a nomination petition form substantially complies with the statutory reguirements, this court has focused on whether the omission of information could confuse or mislead electors signing the petition.” Mbreno, 213 Ariz. at lO2, 9 42, 139 P.3d at 620» fo be sure, § 16~315(A) “allows a measure of inconsistency" so long as it does not affect the result. Id. (guoting Clifton, 187 Ariz. at 116 , 927 P.2d at 776 ). §15 Here, the nominatingc petition_ sheets containingc only twelve signature lines were identical, in both form and snbstance, to the unchallenged petition sheets with the exception that the bottom three lines were cut off, This was likely the result of copier error. Indeed, all the information necessary to understand the petitions was present - the name of the court and office songht, the party affiliation, the name of the candidate, the candidate's address, the county, and the date of the election. No potential signer would distinguish between the deficient and non-deficient sheets, and any signer would be able to reject or accept the petition on its face. L16 We believe that having fewer lines than required by § l6~3l5 does nothing to confuse or mislead an elector. Finally, having fewer lines is considerably less snbstantial than those deficiencies that were not disqualifying in hHreno, 213 Ariz. at lO2, J 44, 139 P.3d at 620 (omission of day and month of primary election date}, Clifton, l87 Ariz. at ll6, 92? P.2d at 7T6 (omission of party designation for independent candidate), and Marsh, iii Ariz. at léO, 526 P.2d at 162 (nsing “SG, PHX. Precinct” as an abbreviationt for the Sonth Phoenix Precinct), ?hns, we hold that the petitions in this case substantially comply with § 16-3l5{A)(3). III. CONCLUSION 317 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the superior conrt. Rebecca White Berch, vice Chief Jnstice CONCURRING; Michael D. Ryan, 3nstice W. Scott Bales, Jnstice