Philadelphia & Reading Railroad v. Derby

55 U.S. 468 (1852) 14 How. 468 THE PHILADELPHIA AND READING RAILROAD COMPANY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. ELIAS H. DERBY. Supreme Court of United States. *472 It was argued by Mr. Campbell and Mr. Fisher, for the plaintiff in error, and Mr. Binney and Mr. Wharton, for the defendant in error. *483 Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court. This action was brought by Derby, the plaintiff below, to recover damages for an injury suffered on the railroad of the plaintiffs in error. The peculiar facts of the case, involving the questions of law presented for our consideration, are these: The plaintiff below was himself the president of another railroad company, and a stockholder in this. He was on the road of defendants by invitation of the president of the company, not in the usual passenger cars, but in a small locomotive car used for the convenience of the officers of the company, and paid no fare for his transportation. The injury to his person was caused by coming into collision with a locomotive and tender, in the charge of an agent or servant of the company, which was on the same track, and moving in an opposite direction. Another agent of the company, in the exercise of proper care and caution, had given orders to keep this track clear. The *484 driver of the colliding engine acted in disobedience and disregard of these orders, and thus caused the collision. The instructions given by the court below, at the instance of plaintiff, as well as those requested by the defendant, and refused by the court, taken together, involve but two distinct points, which have been the subject of exception here, and are in substance as follows: 1. The court instructed the jury, that if the plaintiff was lawfully on the road at the time of the collision, and the collision and consequent injury to him were caused by the gross negligence of one of the servants of the defendants, then and there employed on the road, he is entitled to recover, notwithstanding the circumstances given in evidence, and relied upon by defendant's counsel as forming a defence to the action, to wit: that the plaintiff was a stockholder in the company, riding by invitation of the president — paying no fare, and not in the usual passenger cars, &c. 2. That the fact that the engineer having the control of the colliding locomotive, was forbidden to run on that track at the time, and had acted in disobedience of such orders, was not a defence to the action. 1st. In support of the objections to the first instruction, it is alleged, "that no cause of action can arise to any person by reason of the occurrence of an unintentional injury, while he is receiving or partaking of any of those acts of kindness which spring from mere social relations; and that as there was no contract between the parties, express or implied, the law would raise no duty as between them, for the neglect of which an action can be sustained." In support of these positions, the cases between innkeeper and guest have been cited, such as 1 Rolle's Abr. 3, where it is said, "If a host invite one to supper, and the night being far spent, he invites him to stay all night, and the guest be robbed, yet the host shall not be chargeable, because the guest was not a traveller;" and Cayle's case, (4 Rep. 52,) to the same effect, showing that the peculiar liability of an innkeeper arises from the consideration paid for his entertainment of travellers, and does not exist in the case of gratuitous lodging of friends or guests. The case of Farwell v. The Boston and Worcester Railroad Company, (4 Metcalf, 47,) has also been cited, showing that the master is not liable for any injury received by one of his servants, in consequence of the carelessness of another, while both are engaged in the same service. But we are of opinion, that these cases have no application to the present. The liability of the defendants below, for the negligent and injurious act of their servant, is not necessarily *485 founded on any contract or privity between the parties, nor affected by any relation, social or otherwise, which they bore to each other. It is true, a traveller, by stage coach, or other public conveyance, who is injured by the negligence of the driver, has an action against the owner, founded on his contract to carry him safely. But the maxim of "respondeat superior," which, by legal imputation, makes the master liable for the acts of his servant, is wholly irrespective of any contract, express or implied, or any other relation between the injured party and the master. If one be lawfully on the street or highway, and another's servant carelessly drives a stage or carriage against him, and injures his property or person, it is no answer to an action against the master for such injury, either, that the plaintiff was riding for pleasure, or that he was a stockholder in the road, or that he had not paid his toll, or that he was the guest of the defendant, or riding in a carriage borrowed from him, or that the defendant was the friend, benefactor, or brother of the plaintiff. These arguments, arising from the social or domestic relations of life may, in some cases, successfully appeal to the feelings of the plaintiff, but will usually have little effect where the defendant is a corporation, which is itself incapable of such relations or the reciprocation of such feelings. In this view of the case, if the plaintiff was lawfully on the road at the time of the collision, the court were right in instructing the jury that none of the antecedent circumstances, or accidents of his situation, could affect his right to recover. It is a fact peculiar to this case, that the defendants, who are liable for the act of their servant coming down the road, are also the carriers who were conveying the plaintiff up the road, and that their servants immediately engaged in transporting the plaintiff were not guilty of any negligence, or in fault for the collision. But we would not have it inferred, from what has been said, that the circumstances alleged in the first point would affect the case, if the negligence which caused the injury had been committed by the agents of the company who were in the immediate care of the engine and car in which the plaintiff rode, and he was compelled to rely on these counts of his declaration, founded on the duty of the defendant to carry him safely. This duty does not result alone from the consideration paid for the service. It is imposed by the law, even where the service is gratuitous. "The confidence induced by undertaking any service for another, is a sufficient legal consideration to create a duty in the performance of it." See Coggs v. Bernard, and cases cited in 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 95. It is true, a distinction has been taken, in some cases, between simple negligence, and great or gross negligence; and it is said, that one who *486 acts gratuitously is liable only for the latter. But this case does not call upon us to define the difference, (if it be capable of definition,) as the verdict has found this to be a case of gross negligence. When carriers undertake to convey persons by the powerful but dangerous agency of steam, public policy and safety require that they be held to the greatest possible care and diligence. And whether the consideration for such transportation be pecuniary or otherwise, the personal safety of the passengers should not be left to the sport of chance or the negligence of careless agents. Any negligence, in such cases, may well deserve the epithet of "gross." In this view of the case, also, we think there was no error in the first instruction. 2. The second instruction involves the question of the liability of the master where the servant is in the course of his employment, but, in the matter complained of, has acted contrary to the express command of his master. The rule of "respondeat superior," or that the master shall be civilly liable for the tortious acts of his servant, is of universal application, whether the act be one of omission or commission, whether negligent, fraudulent, or deceitful. If it be done in the course of his employment, the master is liable; and it makes no difference that the master did not authorize, or even know of the servant's act or neglect, or even if he disapproved or forbade it, he is equally liable, if the act be done in the course of his servant's employment. See Story on Agency, § 452; Smith on Master and Servant, 152. There may be found, in some of the numerous cases reported on this subject, dicta which, when severed from the context, might seem to countenance the doctrine that the master is not liable if the act of his servant was in disobedience of his orders. But a more careful examination will show that they depended on the question, whether the servant, at the time he did the act complained of, was acting in the course of his employment, or in other words, whether he was or was not at the time in the relation of servant to the defendant. The case of Sleath v. Wilson, (9 Car. & Payne, 607,) states the law in such cases distinctly and correctly. In that case a servant, having his master's carriage and horses in his possession and control, was directed to take them to a certain place; but instead of doing so he went in another direction to deliver a parcel of his own, and, returning, drove against an old woman and injured her. Here the master was held liable for the act of the servant, though at the time he committed the offence, he was acting in disregard of his master's *487 orders; because the master had intrusted the carriage to his control and care, and in driving it he was acting in the course of his employment. Mr. Justice Erskine remarks, in this case: "It is quite clear that if a servant, without his master's knowledge, takes his master's carriage out of the coach-house, and with it commits an injury, the master is not answerable, and on this ground, that the master has not intrusted the servant with the carriage; but whenever the master has intrusted the servant with the control of the carriage, it is no answer, that the servant acted improperly in the management of it. If it were, it might be contended that if a master directs his servant to drive slowly, and the servant disobeys his orders, and drives fast, and through his negligence occasions an injury, the master will not be liable. But that is not the law; the master, in such a case, will be liable, and the ground is, that he has put it in the servant's power to mismanage the carriage, by intrusting him with it." Although, among the numerous cases on this subject, some may be found (such as the case of Lamb v. Palk, 9 C. & P. 629) in which the court have made some distinctions which are rather subtile and astute, as to when the servant may be said to be acting in the employ of his master; yet we find no case which asserts the doctrine that a master is not liable for the acts of a servant in his employment, when the particular act causing the injury was done in disregard of the general orders or special command of the master. Such a qualification of the maxim of respondeat superior, would, in a measure, nullify it. A large proportion of the accidents on railroads are caused by the negligence of the servants or agents of the company. Nothing but the most stringent enforcement of discipline, and the most exact and perfect obedience to every rule and order emanating from a superior, can insure safety to life and property. The intrusting such a powerful and dangerous engine as a locomotive, to one who will not submit to control, and render implicit obedience to orders, is itself an act of negligence, the "causa causans" of the mischief; while the proximate cause, or the ipsa negligentia which produces it, may truly be said, in most cases, to be the disobedience of orders by the servant so intrusted. If such disobedience could be set up by a railroad company as a defence, when charged with negligence, the remedy of the injured party would in most cases be illusive, discipline would be relaxed, and the danger to the life and limb of the traveller greatly enhanced. Any relaxation of the stringent policy and principles of the law affecting such cases, would be highly detrimental to the public safety. The judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore affirmed. *488 Mr. Justice DANIEL dissents from the decision of this court in this cause, upon the ground that the said railroad company being a corporation, created by the State of Pennsylvania, is not capable of pleading or being impleaded, under the 2d section of the 3d article of the constitution, in any of the courts of the United States; and that therefore the Circuit Court could not take cognizance of the controversy between that corporation and the plaintiff in that court. Order. This cause came on to be heard, on the transcript of the record, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, and adjudged, by this court, that the judgment of the said circuit court, in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed, with costs and interest until the same is paid at the same rate per annum that similar judgments bear in the courts of the State of Pennsylvania.