Joshua Radwan v. County of Orange

MEMORANDUM ** Plaintiff Joshua Radwan appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unlawful search and seizure claim. Radwan says that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), does not bar this claim. Radwan also appeals the jury’s verdict in the defendants’ favor on his § 1983 excessive force claim. He says that the district court erred by allowing an in-court demonstration of the use of leg irons; admonishing Radwan’s counsel in front of the jury; and allowing the defense attorney to vouch for the defendant police officers. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. 1. The district court properly ruled that Heck bars Radwan’s § 1983 unlawful search and seizure claim. We have re *491 peatedly found Heck to bar § 1983 claims, even where the plaintiffs prior convictions were the result of guilty or no contest pleas. See, e.g., Szajer v. City of Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607 (9th Cir.2011); Whitaker v.Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 2007); Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 704 (9th Cir.2006). In his § 1983 suit, Radwan challenges the search and seizure of the marijuana that formed the basis of his conviction for marijuana possession under California Health and Safety Code § 11357(b). Were Radwan to succeed on his § 1983 search and seizure claim, such success would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction for marijuana possession. 1 Thus, Heck bars this claim. Moreover, even though Radwan could not pursue habeas corpus relief, Heck bars his § 1983 search and seizure claim because he failed to meet Heck’s favorable termination requirement due to his own lack of diligence. See Guerrero, 442 F.3d at 704-05; Cunningham v. Gates, 312 F.3d 1148, 1153 n. 3 (9th Cir.2002). 2. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the in-court demonstration of the use of leg irons. The demonstration was directly relevant to a disputed issue: whether the deputies safely could have checked, loosened, or removed Radwan’s leg irons after he complained they were too tight. The demonstration was not unduly prejudicial in light of its probative value and the limits the district court properly placed on the demonstration. 3. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it admonished Radwan’s counsel for showing a video montage with repetitive and potentially misleading video excerpts. See Pau v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Bennett, 702 F.2d 833, 836 (9th Cir.1983). 4.We do not decide whether the rule against vouching applies to civil trials because, even if certain of defense counsel’s statements would constitute vouching, any prejudice was dissipated by Radwan’s counsel’s objection, the court sustaining the objection, and the court instructing the jury that attorneys are not permitted to vouch and that attorney arguments do not constitute evidence. See Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1270-71 (9th Cir.2000). AFFIRMED. Footnotes [**] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. [1] Heck also bars Radwan’s state-law false arrest claims because success on those claims would call into question the lawfulness of his prior conviction for marijuana possession. See Yount v. City of Sacramento, 43 Cal.4th 885, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 787, 183 P.3d 471, 484 (2008) (acknowledging that Heck "is a rule of federal law that applies only to federal causes of action” but concluding that state law also bars a plaintiff from prosecuting state law claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prior state conviction).