Hale v. Gaines

Mr. Justice CATRON delivered the opinion of the court. ; A contest for the ownership of the Hot Springs, in Arkansas, lias been pending for some years before the General Land *158 Office, and in the courts of that State. One party derive their title through a pre-emption claim, as an occupant under the acts of Congress of 1830 and 1832, and the other by the location of a New Madrid warrant on the same land. In December, 1851, the heirs of Belding were allowed to enter the quarter section, including the springs. This entry was held to be valid by the State courts, and to clothe them with a sufficient legal title to sustain an action of ejectment, according to the laws of Arkansas. They held the decision of the register and receiver, in favor of the occupant claimants, to be conclusive evidence of title, as against all persons who could not show a better opposing claim. As between the titles of the United States and Belding’s heirs, the State courts did not decide; but only, that the outstanding title in the United States could not be relied on by the defendant in this action; nor is the validity of the entry jf Belding’s heirs drawn in question in this court. The defendant relied on a survey made in June, 1838, founded on a New Madrid certificate for 200 arpens. To support this survey, an application was produced, dated 27th January, 1819, signed by S. Hammond and Elias Rector, addressed to William Rector, surveyor of the piblie lands, &c., asking to have surveyed and to be allowed to enter the recorder’s certificate for 200 arpens, granted by him to Francis Langlois, or his legal representatives, and dated the 26th November, 1818, (No. 467.) The survey to be made in a square tract; the lines to correspond to the cardinal points, and to include the Hot Springs in the centre. In 1818, the spring was in the Indian country, to which, of course, no public sui’veys extended. And as the act of 1815, providing for the New Madrid sufferers, only allowed them to enter their warrants on lands “the sale of which was authorized by law,” the unsurveyed lands could not be legally appropriated; and, of necessity, the surveyor general disregarded the application to have a survey made for Langlois. And thus the claim stood from 1818 to 1838. v The defendant offered in evidence the certificate of a private survey of the claim of Langlois, made by James S. Conway, *159 D. S., dated July 16th, 1820, which includes the spring. This paper the court also rejected,. Until the survey on Langlois’s claim was presented to the recorder of land titles at St. Louis, and recognised by him as proper and valid, it could have no force, as this was the only mode of location contemplated by the act of 1815. So it has been uniformly held. Bagnell v. Broderick, 13 Peters, 436; Lessure v. Price, 12 Howard, 9. The act of April 26th, 1822, validated locations of New Madrid certificates then existing, and which had been made in advance of the public surveys; but the second section of the act declared that future locations should conform to the public surveys, and that all such warrants should be located within one year after the passage of that act. As the public surveys then existing in Missouri and Arkansas Territory were open to satisfy these claims, there was no difficulty in complying with the act of 1822. Reliance is placed on the act of Congress of March, 1843, to maintain the survey of 1838, of the New Madrid cei’tificate. That act provides, that locations before that time made on New Madrid warrants, on the south side of Arkansas river, if made in pursuance of the act of 1815 in other respecte, shall be perfected into grants, in like manner as if the Indian title to the lands on the south side of the river had been completely extinguished at the time of the passage of said act of 1815. The act of 1843 does not apply to the survey and location of Langlois made in 1838, for several reasons: 1. The sale of the land thus surveyed was not authorized by law; the act of April 20th, 1832, haying reserved from location or sale the Hot Springs, and four sections of land including them as their centre. 2. The attempted location was void, because barred by the act of 26th April, 1822, which act was not repealed or modified by the act of 1843. This act referred to locations made on the south of the river Arkansas, of lauds regularly surveyed and subject to sale, and which locations had been made on or before the 26th April, 1823, when the bar was interposed. We are of the opinion that the New Madrid survey of 1838 *160 was altogether invalid, and properly rejected by the State courts. It has been earnestly pressed on our consideration, that the entry of Belding’s heirs is also void, because the land it covers was not subject to entry by an occupant claimant, or any one else, after the act of April 20th, 1832, had reserved it from sale. Admitting it to be true, that the act of April, 1832, was .passed when no individual claimant had a vested right to enter the land in dispute', still the 25th section of the judiciary act only gives jurisdiction to this court in cases where the decision of the State court draws in question the validity of an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against its validity. Here, however, the decision was in favor of the defendant’s entry, and sustained the authority exercised by the department of public lands, in allowing Belding’s heirs to purchase. Moreover, the plaintiff in error is not in a condition to draw in question the validity of Belding’s entry. He relies on an outstanding title in the United States to defeat the action. Being a trespasser, without title in himself, he cannot be heard to set up such title. “To give jurisdiction to this court, the party must claim for himself, and not for a third person, in whose title he has no interest.” Henderson v. Tennessee, 10 How., 323. The plaintiff in error must claim (for himself) some 'title, right, privilege, or exemption, under an act of Congress, &c., and the decision must be against his claim, to give this court jurisdiction. Setting up a ■ title in the United States, by way of defence, is not claiming a personal interest affecting the subject in litigation. This is the established construction of the 25th section of the judiciary act. Montgomery v. Hernandis, 12 Whea., 132. If it was allowed to rely on the United States’ title in this instance, the right might be decided against the Government, where it was no party, and had not been heard. A claim is set up in defence, that John Percifull was .entitled to a preference of entry under the act of 1814; which act, it *8 insisted, was revived by that of 1843, section 3. Suppose *161 that Pevcifull’s right to appropriate the land in dispute was. undoubted, and that the register and receiver had allowed the heirs of Belding to enter wrongfully; still, the courts of Arkansas, in this action of ejectment, had no right to interfere, and set up Pevcifull’s rejected claim. But this is of little consequence, as, when the act of April, 1882, was passed, reserving the Hot Springs from sale, Percifull had no vested interest in the land that a court of justice could recognise. Then, the United States Government was the legal owner, and had the power to reserve%-fi^om_salep.so that the offer to purchase in 1851, under the assumed'preference to entry claimed for Percifull, was inadmissible. Had the entry been allowed, in face of the act of Congress, such proceeding would have been merely void. These being the only questions within" our jurisdiction worthy of consideration in the causes Nos. 15, 16, 17, 18, aud 19, it is ordered that the respective judgments rendered there in by the Supreme Court of Arkansas be affirmed.