Lessee of Smith v. McCann

Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the'opinion of the court. This case comes up upon a writ of error to .revise the judgment of the Circuit Court for the district of Maryland, in an action of ejectment brought by the plaintiff in error against the defendant to recover certain lands lying in that State. The plaintiff, in order to show title to the land claimed, of-, fered in evidence, that Smith and Butt, lessors of the plaintiff, having sold cotton to Fenby & Brother, of Baltimore, in 1857, drew on them for the sum due, and their bills were protested to the amount of $13,708. They thereupon brought-suit on the 3d of June, 1857, and recovered judgment in the Circuit. Court on the 6th of April,. 1858; and on the 10th of the same month they issued a fieri facias, which was on the same'day levied by the marshal on the land in controversy; and after- *402 wards, on- the 2d of September next following, sold at public auction. At this sale the lessors of the plaintiff were the purchasers, and received from the marshal a deed in due form. The plaintiff’ further proved thgt a certain Robert D. Brown was seized in fee of the land at the times hereinafter mentioned, and read in evidence a deed from him and his wife, dated April 6th, 1857, whereby they conveyed it to Richard D. Fcnby, one of the defendants, against whom the judgment was afterwards obtained, stating at the time he offered it in evidence, that he impeached the- trusts in the deed for fraud, and intended, to show such trusts to be void against him. The deed purports to be in consideration of $7,800.50, and recited that the land was purchased by Fenby, from Brown, on the 13th of March, 1852, and then grants to Fenby, “as trustee,” the lands in question in fee simple, in “trust” for the-sole and separate benefit of Jane Feuby, the wife of the said Richard D. Fenby, for and during the term of her natural life, in all respects as if she was a femé sole, free from all liability for the debts of her husband, and from and immediately after the death of the said Jane Fenby, in trust for such child or children, and descendants of a deceased child or children of the said Jane, a3 she may leave living at the time of her death. Such child, children, and descendants, to take per stirpes. The deed gives authority to Fcnby to sell and dispose of any part of the trust property, and to invest the proceeds in safe securities upon the same trusts. The plaintiff further offered, evidence tending to prove that Feuby was hopelessly insolvent when this deed was made, and that he Was in possession of the land from the time he purchased it in 1852. The defendant, McCann, then read in evidence a deed from Fenby to him, dated March 23d, 1858, purporting to be made in execution of the .power conferred by.the trust deed, and conveying the property in fee simple in consideration of twenty-two thousand dollars. And the plaintiff thereupon offered evidence tending to show that this deed was. intended to cover the previous fraud of the one to Fenby: that McCann was privy to this design,' *403 and co-cperated in it; that he paid no money; and that notwithstanding this deed, Eenby continued in possession after the laud had been advertised for salé by the marshal, and that the possession was delivered to McCann only a few days before the sale was actually made. Therlefendant offered evidence for the purpose of rebutting ■the charge of fraud against Eenby and himself, and upon the whole testimony as offered,'several instructions to the jury were moved for by each of the parties, which were all refused, and the following instruction given by the court: nThe deed from'Robert B. Brown to Richard D. Eenby, of the 6th.of April, 1857,- conveyed only a naked legal interest to said Eenby, which could not be levied on and sold under &fi. fa. issued on1 a judgment against him; he having no beneficial interest therein. And as the plaintiff', to sustain this action, has offered the said deed in evidence, and as without it there •is no evidence of any legal title whatever in said Eenby at the date of the levying of said fi. fa., or at any other time, the plaintiff cannot recover in this action.” As this instruction disposed’of the case, it is unnecessary to state at large the prayers offered by the respective parties, or the testimony upon which they respectively relied- to prove or disprove the imputations of fraud. In discussing the question thus presented by the decision of the court below, it is proper to state, that in Maryland the distinction between common law and equity, as known to the English law, has been constantly preserved in'its system of jurisprudence; and the-action of ejectment is the'only mode of trying a title io lands. And in that action the lessor of the plaintiff must show a legal title in himself to the land he claims, and the right of possession under it, at-the time of the 'demise laid in the declaration, and at the time®of the trial. He cannot support the action upon an equitable title, however clear and indisputable it may be, but must seek his remedy in chancery; nor is the defendant.required to show.any title in , himself; and if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie legal title, the defendant may show an el (lor and superior, one in a stranger, and thereby defeat the action. *404 The law upon this subject is briefly and clearly stated by the Courj» of Appeals of the State, in 13 Gill and Johnson, 858, and 4'Maryland Reports, 140, 173. /..We state the law of Maryland upon this subject, because very few of the States have preserved the distinction between legal and Equitable titles to land. And in States where there is'no court of equity, the courts of common law necessarily deal with equitable interests as if they were legal, and exercise powers over them vvhich are unknown to court's of common law, where a separate chancery jurisdiction is established. Cases, therefore, decided in States which have no courts oi equity, as contradistinguished from courts of common law, can have no application to this case so far as trusts or any other equitable interest is. involved. And even in States-where the chancery jurisdiction has been preserved, the decisions of their respective courts do not always harmonize in marking the line of division between law and equity.- And as the title to real property, whether legal or equitable, and the mode of asserting that title in courts of justice, depend'.altogether upon the laws of the State in which the land is situated,, cases like that now before the..court are questions of local law only, in which we must be guided by the decisions of the State tribunals. Since the passage of the act of George 2d, which made lands in the American colonies liable to be sold under issued upon a judgment in a court of common law, the . process of extent has' fallen into disuse, and is regarded, as obsolete in Maryland. But this statute did not interfere with the established 'distinction between law and equity, and an equi-. table, interest could not be seized under a fi. 'fa. until the law of Maryland was in this respect altered by an act of Assembly of the State in. 1810. ■ But this law does not convert the equitable interest into-a legal one, in the hands of the purchaser. He buys precisely the .interest' which the debtor had at' the ' time the execution was levied: and if he purchased an equitable interest and desires to .perfect, his title,'he must go into equity, where the court vill decree a'convey anee to him from *405 the holder of the legal' title, if he. shows that the debtor was entitled to it at the time of the levy. But the statute of George 2d, which authorized the sale of lands under a ji.fa., did not authorize the sheriff to deliver them, nor the court to issue the writ of hab. fac. poss. upon the return of the process. And the result of this was, that the purchaser was compelled to bring an ejectment to obtaiu the possession, in which, as we have already said, he must show a legal title to the land; and consequently must show that the debtor, at the time of the levy, had a legal title, aud such a title as was subject to seizure and sale under the fieri facias. And if the debtor had but an equitable title, the purchaser was compelled to go into equity, and obtain a legal one before he could support an action of ejectment against the party in possession. X more summary process in certain cases has been since provided by a law of the. State passed in 1825. But up to that time the principles above stated were the set: tied law of the State; and remain so, except in so far as they are altered by that act of Assembly. It is unnecessary to state the provisions of that act, because the plaintiff did not proceed under it.. He has resorted to the action of ejectment to obtain possession, and cannot recover, unless he can show a legal title' to the premises.. It is not, however, every legal interest that is made liable to sale on aji.fa. The debtor must have a beneficial interest in the. property. And in Houston v. Newland, 7 Gill and Johnson, 493, where a party had sold the land to another bona fide, but had not conveyed the legal title, the court held that the title remaining in the vendors was a barren legal title, in trust for the purchaser, and could not be sold for the payment of his debts. And a still later case, 10 Gill and Johnson, 443, 451, 452, Matthews v. Ward’s Lessee, where land had been conveyed to a trustee, in trust for third persons, and the cestuys que trust had died without heirs, the court decided that the land escheated to the State, although the heirs of the trustee to whom the legal estate was conveyed wore still living, and said that “the rights of such trustee, who is a mere instrument, are treated with no respect, and the State deals with the property as her own.” *406 ; . 'We-proceed to apply these principles to the casé béforé us. The deed, to Fenby; in plain and unambiguoüs-:\voríls, conveyed to him a naked legal title; he took nnderit no interest that could be seized and sol'd by the marshal ;upon a fi. fa.; and the deed of the marshal, therefore, conveyed no title to the lessors.of the plaintiff. Standing only upon this title, derived under this deed to Fenby, and showing no other title, he certainly could not'recover in an action of ejectment. But the plaintiff offers evidence to prove that the trusts in ‘. the deed are fraudulent, and that Fenby purchased, the land and procured the deed from Brown in this form, in order to .hinder .and'defraud his creditors. And he offers-this proof .to show that Fenby had a beneficial interest in the property, liable to be seized and sold for the payment of his debts. " The proposition to enlarge or change the legal estate of the grantee in a deed, by parol evidence, against the plain words of-the instrument, is without precedent in any court of common law. And in the case of Remington v. Linthicum, relied on by the plaintiff, the evidence was offered, not to change the»estatc limited in the grant, but to show that the grant was fraudulent, and utterly void, and conveyed no interest whatever to the grantee named in it. The party offering the evidence did not claim under that deed, but against it: And if, in this case, the evidence was offered for a like purpose, and the deed proved to be fraudulent and void, it would defeat the plaintiff’s action instead of supporting it.- He does not, however, offer the parol evidence for this purpose, but offers it to enlarge the estate of Fenby, and to show that he had not- merely a barren legal title, but a beneficial interest, which-was liable for -the payment of his debts. But if the evidence were- admissible, we do not perceive how the fraudulent character of the trusts, as against his creditors,could enlarge his legal-interest beyond the terms of the deed. It is true he paid the money for the property. And if this circumstance could be supposed tó create a resulting trust for the benefit of Fenby, it would be a mere equitable right exclusively within the jurisdiction of a court -of chancery, and a court of common law could neither enforce it nor notice it; *407 and. consequently, it would not be a title .upon which an action of .ejectmentcould.be maintained. But it obviously is not. a case to which the doctrine- of resulting trú'sts can- be ápplied; for, as between Eenby and the cestuys que trust, he cari' have no equity .against the express trusts to which* lie assented,'and-which,, indeed, according to the plaintiff’s aileg'ation, he procured to be- made.- And when the deed is offered- in evidence by the plaintiff, in order-to derive to himself-a 'legal title'uiider it, the 'interests -and estates thereby conveyed cannot- bé'énlarged or diminished by testimony dehors the deed.' The deed must speak, for itself... - . If these trusts are fraudulent, the lessors of the plaintiff-have a plain and ample-remedy .in the court of chancery, which has the exclusive jurisdiction of trusts and trust estates. In that forüm!,all of the parties interested in"the controversy cam bé brought before the court,-and heard in'defence of. their iA speetive claims. But as the case now stands, the only interest which the plaintiff 'seeks to impeach is that of the cestuys que. trust; yét they .are not before the court, nor can--they by any procéss be made parties in this-ejectment suit, nor. even, be permitted to make themselves parties-if they desired to do* so, and cannot have an opportunity of adducing testimony in defence'of. their rights. IJuder such circumstances, an inquiry into the validity,of these trusts would not only be inconsistent wjth the established principles' and jurisdiction of courts of common law, but also inconsistent with that great fundamental rule in the administration of justice, which requires -that every one shall have an opportunity of defending his rights before judgment is pronounced against him. . ffhe judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore affirmed.