State Ex Rel. Iron Bear v. Dist. Co

No. 12405

I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA F F

Petitioner,

DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O THE STATE O MONTANA, I N AND F F FOR THE C U T OF ROOSEVELT AND THE HONORABLE O NY M. JAMES SORTE, D i s t r i c t J u d g e ,

Respondents.

PROCEEDING : Coun.se1 o f Record:

For P e t i t i o n e r :

R o b e r t L. LaRoche a r g u e d , Wolf P o i n t , Montana.

F o r Respondents :

James McCann, County A t t o r n e y , Wolf P o i n t , Montana. John T. McDennott a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana

Amicus C u r i a e

Hen. R o b e r t L. Woodahl, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Helena, Montana. William Jensen argued, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, Helena, Montana.

Submitted : December 21, 1972

Decided : MAY - 2 1n

Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court.

This is an original proceeding wherein petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus directing respondent district court to take jurisdiction and determine the merits of a divorce action filed by petitioner in that court. Amicus Curiae briefs were filed by the Attorney General of the state of Montana,District Court Judge R. D. McPhillips, and the United States ~ttorney's office. John T. McDermott of the University of Montana Law School filed a brief on behalf of the respondent district court of the fifteenth judicial district, county of Roosevelt, and Hon. M. James Sorte, Judge. Petitioner Mary Iron Bear filed a divorce action against Harry Iron Bear in October 1971, Both petitioner and her husband are enrolled members of the Assiniboine-Sioux Tribes and have resided within the exterior boundaries of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation since their marriage in April 1954, which marriage was solemnized under state law, Harry Iron Bear was personally served with process on the reservation in October 1971. Subse- quently, on November 6, 1972, his default was entered by the clerk of the respondent district court. Petitioner then applied for judgment by default, On November 10, 1972, on its own motion, respondent dis- trict court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law and order dismissing the divorce action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The court based its decision on the conclu- sion th.ata certain 1938 tribal enactment purporting to cede jurisdiction over divorce matters to the state of Montana, was invalid. It relied specifically on three cases to deslare the tribal enactment invalid: Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 91 S.Ct. 480, 27 L ed 2d 507; Crow Tribe v. Deernose, 158 Mont. 25, 487 P,2d 2133; Blackwolf v. District Court, 158 Mont. 523, 493 P.2d 1293.

The 1938 Enactment by t h e executive board of t h e Assini- boine-Sioux Tribe reads i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : 'I* ** no marriage o r divorce of any member of t h i s Reservation s h a l l be v a l i d o r have any f o r c e o r e f f e c t unless entered i n t o o r granted o r decreed i n accordance with the laws of t h e S t a t e of Montana ** *.It

This Enactment bears t h e s i g n a t u r e s of t h e Chairman and Secretary of t h e F o r t Peck Indian Reservation Executive Board, and t h e recommended approval of Superintendent John G, Hunter. Respondent c o u r t noted i n i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t t h a t t h e Fort Peck Indian Reservation T r i b a l Court has i n t e r p r e t e d t h e language above c i t e d a s ceding j u r i s d i c t i o n over divorce matters t o t h e s t a t e of Montana. Since 1938 t h e T r i b a l Court has granted no d i v o r c e s , while t h e respondent d i s t r i c t c o u r t has granted hundreds t o members of t h e Assiniboine-Sioux Tribe and o t h e r Indians r e s i d i n g within t h e e x t e r i b r boundaries of t h e F o r t Peck Reservation. Here, two i s s u e s a r e involved which we combine f o r d i s - cussion inasmuch a s both go t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of s t a t e c o u r t s over domestic r e l a t i o n s of e n r o l l e d Indians on t h e Fort Peck Resew vation. The o r i g i n a l i s s u e r D s t a t e c o u r t s have j u r i s d i c t i o n o over divorce a c t i o n s brought by an Indian p l a i n t i f f a g a i n s t an Indian defendant, both e n r o l l e d members of Fort Peck T r i b e s and r e s i d i n g on t h e F o r t Peck Indian Reservation? The second i s s u e : Did t h e a c t i o n of t h e respondent d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n t h i s cause v i o l a t e t h e Indian p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t s t o t h e equal p r o t e c t i o n of t h e law? W answer both i s s u e s i n t h e a f f i r m a t i v e . e Some twenty years ago t h i s Court i n Bonnet v. Seekins, 126 Mont, 24, 243 P.2d 317, held t h a t t h e c o u r t s of t h i s s t a t e a r e open t o our Indian c i t i z e n s . L a t e r , i n S t a t e ex r e l . Kennerly v , D i s t r i c t Court, 154 Mont, 488, 493, 466 P.2d 85, t h e Court said:

I1 Indians resident in Montana, whether they be full blood or partial blood, allotted or unallotted, domiciled on the reservation or off of it, of one tribe or another, or whatever their status, are citi- zens of the State of Montana, They are entitled to the protection of our laws, * * * 11 The state cannot disenfranchise an Indian person nor can that Indian person disenfranchise the state simply by being an Indian person or by living within the external boundaries of an Indian reservation. Thus, our courts are open to Indian persons. They use the courts of this state for many things--divorces, contracts, torts, inheritance, and the entire spectrum of legal matters, Clearly, they are entitled to so do, See Bonnet v. Seekins, 126 Mont. 24, 243 P.2d 317." Kennerly was reversed by the United States Supreme Court, 400 U.S, 423, 91 S.Ct. 480, 27 L ed 2d 507, but it is important to note that the United States Supreme Court action was based on other grounds, Bonnet is still the law of this state. As Mr. Justice Angstman noted in Bonnet, Montzna is not unique in holding that Indian citizens have the full use of their state courts: Bem-Way-Bin-Ness v. Eshelby, 87 Minn. 108, 91 N,W. 291; Holden v. Lynn, 30 Okl, 663, 120 P, 246; Phillips v, Rey- nolds, 79 Neb, 626, 113 N.W. 234; Martinez v, Martinez, 49 M O M , 83, 157 P.2d 484; Red Hawk v. Joines, 129 Ore. 620, 278 P . 572; Missouri Pac, Ry, Co, w. Cullers, 81 Tex. 382, 17 S.W. 19, 41 Am, Jur.2~3,Indians, 520; 42 C.J.S. Indians, 58, The right of an individual Indian citizen to sue or be sued in the courts of this land was recognized by the United States Supreme Court recently in Poafpybitty v, Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 88 Sect, 982, 19 L ed 2d 1238, 1243, where it said: "Nor does the existence of the Government's power to sue affect the rights of the indivi- dual Indian. I A restricted Indian is not with- out capacity to sue or to be sued with respect to his affairs, including his restricted property * * * Both the Act of April 12, 1926 and the decision * * * in Heckman v. United States * * * recognize capacity in a restricted Indian to sue or defend actions in his own behalf subject only to the right of the Government to intervene."' Two United States Supreme Court cases, Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U,S, ( Pet.) 515 (1832) 6 and Williams v, Lee, 358 U.S, 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L ed 2d 251, 254, (1959), define the power of Indian tribal governments and the authority of the Congress of the United States as it concerns the jurisdiction question. As we noted in Bonnet, this state and other states have long held

t h a t an Indian has t h e same r i g h t s a s a r e accorded any o t h e r person t o invoke t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e s t a t e c o u r t s t o p r o t e c t h i s r i g h t s i n matters n o t a f f e c t i n g t h e f e d e r a l government, The p r o p r i e t y of l e g a l a c t i o n s by Indians a g a i n s t non- Indians i n t h e s t a t e c o u r t s has been recognized and approved by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n Williams. There t h e c o u r t speaking of t h e powers of s t a t e s on Indian r e s e r v a t i o n s l a i d down t h e t e s t : " ~ s s e n t i a l l y ,absent governing Acts of Congress, t h e question has always been whether t h e s t a t e a c t i o n i n f r i n g e d on t h e r i g h t of r e s e r v a t i o n Indians t o make t h e i r own laws and be r u l e d by them." Using t h i s t e s t t o judge j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , w e f i r s t examine t h e two e s s e n t i a l elements s e t f o r t h by t h e t e s t : 1. Whether t h e r e i s a governing Act of Congress? 2, Does s t a t e a c t i o n i n f r i n g e on t h e r i g h t of t h e F o r t Peck t r i b e t o make t h e i r own laws and be r u l e d by them? A s t o element No. 1, we n o t e t h a t t h e Montana Enabling Act imposed t h e requirement of what i s normally r e f e r r e d t o a s a "disclaimer" provision concerning t h e Indian population of t h e state. W adopted t h e d i s c l a i m e r with i d e n t i c a l language i n e Qrdinance No, 1, Sec.2, C o n s t i t u t i o n of Montana. W have never e before been required t o r u l e d i r e c t l y on t h i s p r o v i s i o n ' s impact on c i v i l j u r i s d i c t i o n , Other s t a t e s have s i m i l a r d i s c l a i m e r pro- v i s i o n s and have r u l e d on them, W w i l l consider some of the c i t e d e cases. ~ o n t a n ' s Enabling Act reads i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : a "$4. *** And s a i d conventions s h a l l provide, by ordinances i r r e v o c a b l e without t h e consent of t h e United S t a t e s and t h e people of s a i d s t a t e s : *** "second. That t h e people i n h a b i t i n g s a i d proposed s t a t e s do a g r e e and d e c l a r e t h a t they f o r e v e r d i s - claim a l l r i g h t and t i t l e t o t h e unappropriated pub- l i c lands l y i n g w i t h i n t h e boundaries t h e r e o f , and t o a l l lands l y i n g wi.thin s a i d l i m i t s owned o r h e l d by any Indian o r Indian t r i b e s ; and t h a t u n t i l t h e t i t l e t h e r e t o s h a l l have been extinguished by t h e United S t a t e s , t h e same s h a l l be and remain s u b j e c t t o t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e United S t a t e s , and s a i d Indian lands s h a l l remain under t h e a b s o l u t e j u r i s d i c t i o n and c o n t r o l of t h e congress of t h e United S t a t e s * * *."

T h i s d i s c l a i m e r of a r i g h t and t i t l e t o I n d i a n l a n d s i s a d i s c l a i m e r of a p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t t h e r e i n and c o n t r o l t h e r e o f , and n o t a d i s c l a i m e r of governmental c o n t r o l , Organized V i l l a g e of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 82 S e c t . 562, 7 L ed 2d 573,583; Paiz v. Hughes, 76 N.M, 562, 417 P,2d 51; County o f Beltrami v. County of Hennepin, 264 Minn. 406, 119 N,W.2d 25; S t a t e v. Daniel- son, 149 Mont. 438, 427 P.2d 689; F o u r n i e r v. Roed, (N.D, 1968), 161 N,W,2d 458; Sangre De C r i s t o Dev,Corp,, Inc. v. C i t y of Santa Fe, 84 N.M. 343, 503 P.2d 323, A s noted above, h e r e p e t i t i o n e r does n o t seek t o a s s e r t any p r o p r i e t a r y a u t h o r i t y over l a n d s o f t h e I n d i a n , b u t r a t h e r , governmental a u t h o r i t y . Mast western s t a t e s w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of South Dakota, Smith v , Temple, 82 S,D, 650, 152 N.W.2d 547, seem t o h o l d t h a t t h e d i s c l a i m e r p r o v i s i o n i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e where t h e i s s u e does n o t concern I n d i a n l a n d s ; we b e l i e v e t h e c a s e s a r e p e r s u a s i v e and w e so hold. Having s o h e l d , we now d e c i d e j u s t what i s t h e n a t u r e of that s t a t e jurisdiction. I n Williams and Organized V i l l a g e o f

- Kake, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court s t a t e d : "* * * even on r e s e r v a t i o n s s t a t e laws may b e a p p l i e d t o I n d i a n s , u n l e s s such a p p l i c a t i a n would i n t e r f e r e w i t h r e s e r v a t i o n s e l f -government o r i m - p a i r a r i g h t g r a n t e d o r r e s e w e d by f e d e r a l law," 7 L ed 2d 583.. W r e c o g n i z e t h a t P u b l i c Law 280 of t h e 1953 Congress e (67 S t a t . 588) and t h e C i v i l Rights A c t of 1968 (82 S t a t , 78, 25 U,S.C.A. $ 5 1321-1326) concerned j u r i s d i c t i o n a l problems on I n d i a n r e s e r v a t i o n s , b u t w e concern o u r s e l v e s w i t h what e f f e c t , i f any, t h o s e a c t s have on p r e e x i s t i n g s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n . In Organized V i l l a g e o f Kake, a post-Public Law 280 c a s e , t h e c o u r t made t h i s statement: "* **'absolute' federal jurisdiction i s not invariably exclusive j u r i s d i c t i o n , " 7 L ed 2d 579. It would appear from t h i s s t a t e m e n t t h a t even a f t e r P u b l i c Law 280, s t a t e s had some j u r i s d i c t i o n . S e v e r a l s t a t e s have considered t h i s q u e s t i o n and found some p r e e x i s t i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n remained

. .

a f t e r Public Law 280. Ghahate v. Bureau of Revenue, 80 N.M. 98, 451 P,2d 1002; Vermil.lion v , Spotted Elk, (N.D. 19571, 85 N.W.2d

I n Montana, t h e s t a t e asstuned j u r i s d i c t i o n a f t e r Public Law 280 on only one r e s e r v a t i o n , Flathead. It has n o t a c t e d con- cerning t h e o t h e r s i x Montana r e s e r v a t i o n s and i t still r e t a i n s j u r i s d i c t i o n over a r e z s of t h e law where t h e r e i s n e i t h e r a governing Act of Congress nor an infringement with r e s e r v a t i o n self-government. The 1938 Enactment of t h e Assiniboine-Sioux t r i b e s , which p r e e x i s t s by some years both Public Law 280 (1953) and t h e C i v i l Rights Act of 1968, i s n o t changed by those a c t s . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t o t h e c o n t r a r y based on Kennerly, Deernose, and Blackwolf i s i n e r r o r , Kennerly did n o t consider t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n remaining i n t h e s t a t e a f t e r f e d e r a l a c t i o n o r t r i b a l assumption of government, r a t h e r i t emphasized t h e procedural a s p e c t s f o r t r i b a l consent f o r jurisdiction. The guide l i n e s a r e s e t down i n Willi.ams and a s long a s t h e s t a t e does n o t v i o l a t e those guide l i n e s and does not attempt t o e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n over a r e a s of t h e law where t h e r e i s e i t h e r a governing Act of Congress o r an infringement on r e s e r v a - t i o n self-government, i t may continue t o e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n , With t h e above i n mind, does t h e s t a t e of Montana have j u r i s d i c t i o n over divorce a c t i o n s brought by an Indian p l a i n t i f f a g a i n s t an Indian defendant, both r e s i d i n g on an Indian r e s e w a - tion? W cannot f i n d any Act of Congress o r t h e executive branch e of t h e f e d e r a l government, nor a r e w e c i t e d any by amicus, s e t t i n g f o r t h who has j u r i s d i c t i o n over divorce on an Indian r e s e r v a t i o n . The Bureau of Indian A f f a i r s r e g u l a t i o n s provide law and o r d e r codes b u t leave t o t h e a u t h o r i t i e s of each t r i b e t o d e f i n e what c o n s t i t u t e s divorce, 25 C.F.R., 5 11.28, There a r e no f e d e r a l l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e s t a t e ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n over divorce,

. . i -.

A examination of t h e 1938 T r i b a l Enactment i n d i c a t e s n t h e i n t e n t was t o do away with t r i b a l j u r i s d i c t i o n over marriages and divorces and t o r e l y on t h e laws of t h e s t a t e of Montana. W can f i n d no i n t e r f e r e n c e e with r e s e r v a t i o n self-government by t h e s t a t e of Montana here. A r t i c l e 111, Sec, 6 of t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n provides: Il Courts of j u s t i c e s h a l l be open t o every person, and a speedy remedy afforded f o r every i n j u r y of person, property o r c h a r a c t e r ; and t h a t r i g h t and j u s t i c e s h a l l be administered without s a l e , d e n i a l o r delay. I f Section 83-102, R.C.M. 1947, concerning j u r i s d i c t i o n , provides : "The sovereignty and j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h i s s t a t e extend t o a l l places w i t h i n i t s boundaries, a s e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n , excepting such places a s a r e under t h e exclusive j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e United S t a t e s ** *.It

Here, i t was s t i p u l a t e d and agreed, and t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t found, t h a t p l a i n t i f f Mary I r o n Bear and h e r husband a r e r e s i d e n t c i t i z e n s of t h e s t a t e of Montana and had been f o r some years be- f o r e t h e f i l i n g of t h i s a c t i o n . Applying t h e test of j u r i s d i c - t i o n set f o r t h i n Williams, we f i n d no exclusive c o n t r o l by t h e United S t a t e s government nor an i n t e r f e r e n c e with t r i b a l s e l f - government, t h e r e f o r e t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n denying access t o t h e s t a t e c o u r t i n seeking a divorce, I n two r e c e n t c a s e s , Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, No, 71-738, decided March 27, 1973, 41 L.W. 4451, and McClanahan v. Arizona S t a t e Tax Commission, No. 71-834, decided March 27, 1973, 41 L.W. 4457, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court considered: (1) t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of a s t a t e t o impose taxes on a tribal-owned e n t e r p r i s e located o u t s i d e t h e l i m i t s of a r e s e r v a t i o n , Mescalero; and (2) t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of a s t a t e t o impose a t a x on t h e income of a t r i b a l member r e s i d i n g on a r e s e r v a t i o n whose income i s wholly derived from r e s e r v a t i o n sources, McClanahan, I n Mescalero, t h e Supreme Court held t h a t t h e s t a t e of New Mexico could impose a nondiscriminatory gross r e c e i p t s t a x on a tribal-owned e n t e r p r i s e located o u t s i d e t h e l i m i t s of a reserva- t i o n , b u t t h a t the s t a t e could n o t t a x personalty which has merged

with r e a l t y exempt under 25 U.S.C. 465. I n McClanahan, t h e Supreme Court h e l d t h a t t h e s t a t e of Arizona has no j u r i s d i c t i o n t o impose a t a x on t h e income of Navajo Indians r e s i d i n g on t h e Navajo Reservation and whose income i s wholly derived from r e s e r - v a t i o n sources. A s a preface t o i t s discussion of t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e s t a t e over t r i b a l e n t e r p r i s e s o u t s i d e r e s e r v a t i o n boundaries i n Mescalero, the court said: "At t h e o u t s e t , we r e j e c t - - a s d i d t h e s t a t e court-- t h e broad a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e Federal Government has exclusive j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e Tribe f o r a l l purposes and t h a t t h e S t a t e i s t h e r e f o r e p r o h i b i t e d from en- f o r c i n g i t s revenue laws a g a i n s t any t r i b a l e n t e r p r i s e ' [wlhether t h e e n t e r p r i s e i s located on o r o f f t r i b a l land. 1 Generalizations on t h i s s u b j e c t have become

mission of Arizona, a n t e , Organized V i l l a g e of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 6 0 7 L 7 3 (1960). The upshot has been t h e repeated statements of t h i s Court t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t even an r e s e r v a t i o n s s t a t e laws may be applied u n l e s s such a p p l i c a t i o n would i n t e r f e r e with r e s e r v a t i o n self-government o r would impair a r i g h t ranted o r reserved b f e d e r a l law, Organized V i l l a g e f f Kake, supra, a t 7 5 3 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (19 N w York ex r e l . Ray v. Martin, 326 U,S, 496, 499 (1946) e Draper v , United S t a t e s , 164 U.S, 240 (1896). Even s o , i n t h e s p e c i a l a r e a of s t a t e t a x a t i o n , absent c e s s i o n of j u r i s d i c t i o n o r o t h e r f e d e r a l s t a t u t e s p e r m i t t i n g i t , t h e r e has been no s a t i s f a c t o r y a u t h o r i t y f o r taxing Indian r e s e r v a t i o n lands o r Indian income from a c t i v i t i e c a r r i e d on w i t h i n t h e boundaries of t h e r e s e r v a t i o n , and McClanahan v. S t a t e Tax Commission of Arizona, a n t e-9 l a y s t o rest any doubt i n t h i s r e s p e c t by holding t h a t such t a x a t i o n i s n o t permi-ssible absent congressional consent ." 41 L,W, a t 4452, (Emphasis s u p p l i e d ) , The c o u r t t h u s , i n Mescalero, r e i t e r a t e d t h e proposition t h a t t h e t e s t a s t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of s t a t e laws on r e s e r v a t i o n s i s whether: (1) such a p p l i c a t i o n would i n t e r f e r e with r e s e r v a t i o n self-government, o r (2) whether such a p ~ l ~ c a t i a n would impair a r i g h t preempted by f e d e r a l law. The s t a t e thus has r e s i d u a l j u r - i s d i c t i o n i n a r e a s where t h e f e d e r a l l a w has not preempted s t a t e a c t i v i t y and the t r i b e s have determined n o t t o e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c - tion,

In McClanahan t h e c o u r t i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e t e s t f o r de- termining j u r i s d i c t i o n i s now whether t h e f e d e r a l t r e a t i e s o r s c a t u t e s have preempted s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n u s i n g I n d i a n s o v e r e i g n t y as a "backdrop a g a i n s t which t h e a p p l i c a b l e t r e a t i e s and f e d e r a l s t a t u t e s must be read." The c o u r t i n McClanahan determined t h a t based on t h e r e l e v a n t t r e a t i e s between t h e Navajos and t h e f e d e r a l government and f e d e r a l s t a t u t e s applying i n t e r a l i a t o t h e Navajos, t h e s t a t e of Arizona h a s no j u r i s d i c t i o n t o impose a t a x on t h e income o f Navajo I n d i a n s r e s i d i n g on t h e Navaja r e s e r v a t i o n and r e c e i v i n g income d e r i v e d whozly from r e s e r v a t i o n sources. Based on t h e h o l d i n g i n McClanahan, t h a t t h e determination of j u r i s d i c t i o n i s made by examining f e d e r a l s t a t u e s f o r pre- emption and f e d e r a l t r e a t i e s and s t a t u t e s f o r t h e s o v e r e i g n t y of t h e t r i b e , t h e r e s i d u a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e s t a t e over d i v o r c e s on t h e F o r t Peck I n d i a n Reservation remains v a l i d . There i s no f e d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n concerning t h e power t o g r a n t o r deny d i v o r c e s i n T r i b a l Court. Unlike t h e power t o t a x , which i s i n h e r e n t i n s o v e r e i g n t y , t h e power t o t e r m i n a t e a mar- r i a g e c o n t r a c t i s n o t one which w i l l i n t e r f e r e w i t h t r i b a l sover- eignty. Because t h e power t o g r a n t a d i v o r c e h a s n o t been pre- empted by t h e f e d e r a l government and does n o t i n t e r f e r e w i t h r e s e r v a t i o n self-government ( e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e t h e power g r a n t e d t o t h e s t a t e i s merely r e s i d u a l ) t h e r e i s j u r i s d i c t i o n and t h e d i s t r i c t court i s required t o exercise t h a t jurisdiction. Before a d i s t r i c t c o u r t can assume j u r i s d i c t i o n i n any m a t t e r submitted t o i t , i t must f i n d s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n by determining: (1) whether t h e f e d e r a l t r e a t i e s and s t a t u t e s a p p l i c a b l e have preempted s t e t e j u r i s d i c t i o n ; (2) whether t h e e x e r c i s e of s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n would i n t e r f e r e w i t h r e s e r v a t i o n self-government; and ( 3 ) whether t h e T r i b a l Court i s c u r r e n t l y e x e r c i s i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n o r h a s e x e r c i s e d j u r i s d i c t i o n i n such a manner a s t o preempt s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n .

This Court by this opinion has determined the district court has jurisdiction and petitioner's prayer for relief is granted, The trial court is directed to assume jurisdiction and determine the merits of the divorce action.

Mr. Justice Frank I. Haswell specially concurring: I concur in the result, but in my view the rationale of the majority opinion is flawed. In my opinion this will lead to no end of difficulties in future Indian jurisdictional cases that may come before this Court. The majority opinion is predicated on the jurisdictional test set forth in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L ed 2d 251, i.e. whether state action infringes on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. The Williams test was subsequently applied in Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 82 S.Ct. 562, 7 L ed 2d 573. In one of the latest cases discussing the Williams test, the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out that this test was useful in situations involving the rights of Indians and non-Indians where both the Tribe and the state could fairly claim jurisdi- tion. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, No. 71-834, decided March 27, 1973, 41 L.W. 4457. In McClanahan the court said: "It must be remembered that cases applying the Williams test have dealt principally with situations involvinq non-Indians. See also Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1962). In these situations, both the Tribe and the State could fairly claim an interest in asserting their respective juris- dictions. The ~illiams test was designed to resolve this conflict by providing that the State could protect its-interest up to the point where tribal self-government would be affected." In the instant case, the situation is entirely different, This case involves the respective rights of two reservation Indians in a divorce case in a mutually acceptable forum with no assertion of antagonistic jurisdictional interests between the tribe, the state, the two Indians, or the federal government. The Williams test simply has no application to this situation and its continued indiscriminate application to all Indian juris- dictional questions in this Court is a mistake. Continued ad-

herence to the Williams test has previously resulted in rever- sals in the judgments of this Court. See Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 91 S.Ct. 480, 27 L ed 2d 507. The controlling consideration in this case, in my opinion, is whether the federal government has preempted the field of divorce leaving the tribal government powerless in this area. See McClanahan, pages 8-11 for rationale. Having been cited no relevant treaties or statutes of preemption and having found none, I conclude that residual power and jurisdiction in divorce cases remains in the tribe which ceded such residual jurisdiction to state courts in 1938. For Montana to deny two reservation Indians the use of its state courts in a dkvorce case under such circumstances would amount to a denial of equal protection of the laws to our Indian citizens. I concur in the result of the majority on the foregoing basis.

Associate Justice