McGUIRE v. NELSON

No, 12216 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1973

DOUGLAS R McGUIRE, . Plaintiff and Respondent,

HOWARD NELSON, d /b/a HARMONY HOUSE, Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Honorable W. W. Lessley , Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Bennett and Bennett, Bozemn, Montana Lyman H, Bennett 111 argued, and Lyman Bennett, Jr. appeared, Bozeman, Montana Bolinger and Wellcome, Bozeman, Montana Page Wellcome appeared, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent : Berger, Anderson, Sinclair and Murphy, Billings, Montana Richard Anderson argued, Billings, Montana

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Submitted: January 24, 1973

M r , J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.

T h i s i s an a p p e a l from judgment e n t e r e d on a j u r y v e r d i c t i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of t h e e i g h t e e n t h j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , county of G a l l a t i n . The j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t i n t h e amount of $45,000 i n f a v o r of p l a i n t i f f . A f t e r d e n i a l of d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l , defendant appealed t h e f i n a l judgment and o r d e r denying a new t r i a l , P l a i n t i f f brought t h e a c t i o n t o r e c o v e r damages f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s s u s t a i n e d i n a motorcycle a c c i d e n t which occurred on J u l y 5 , 1970. Defendant Howard Nelson, d / b / a Harmony House, i s an a u t h o r i z e d Honda d e a l e r . P l a i n t i f f purchased a used 1966 Honda T r a i l 90 motorcycle from a f r i e n d i n A p r i l 1970. The f r o n t t i r e of t h e Honda was badly worn so p l a i n t i f f d e s i r e d t o r e p l a c e i t . Since p l a i n t i f f was working f u l l time d u r i n g t h e day and a s a musician a t n i g h t , he s e n t h i s g i r l f r i e n d , now h i s w i f e , S h e r r i e Johnson McGuire, t o Harmony House t o purchase t h e new t i r e . He i n s t r u c t e d h e r t o a s k f o r a t i r e f o r a "1966 Honda T r a i l Bike go'', S h e r r i e con- tended she went t o Harmony House and purchased a t i r e , although defendant and h i s employees denied s e l l i n g h e r any t i r e , Plain- t i f f ' s w i t n e s s e s p l a c e d h e r n e a r t h e s t o r e w i t h a t i r e a t t h e time of t h e a l l e g e d purchase. She t e s t i f i e d she s p e c i f i e d a t i r e "for a 1966 T r a i l Bike Honda 90". A l l e g e d l y , an employee of Harmony t h e n checked some c a t a l o g s , conversed w i t h o t h e r employees, and then brought o u t a t i r e from t h e back room and s o l d it t o h e r . She took t h e t i r e t o t h e s t o r e where p l a i n t i f f worked and placed t h e t i r e i n h i s car. P l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d t h a t a day o r two l a t e r he took t h e t i r e and motorcycle t o a s e r v i c e s t a t i o n t o have t h e t i r e mounted. However, t h e owner of t h e s e r v i c e s t a t i o n contended p l a i n t i f f could n o t have had t h e t i r e mounted a t h i s s t a t i o n because h e had a s e t

p o l i c y n o t t o mount motorcycle t i r e s . F u r t h e r , h e d i d n o t have proper equipment t o mount motorcycle t i r e s . I n any e v e n t , t h e t i r e was mounted on t h e Honda T r a i l Bike 90. P l a i n t i f f maintains t h e c r u x of t h e c a s e l i e s i n t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e proper f r o n t t i r e s i z e l i s t e d i n t h e manufacturer's s p e c i f i c a t i o n s and t h e s i z e o f t h e t i r e a c t u a l l y mounted on t h e motorcycle. The s i z e of t h e t i r e purchased by S h e r r i e McGuire and mounted on t h e motorcycle was a 2,75 x 17, The proper f r o n t t i r e , according t o m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s s p e c i f i c a t i o n s , was a 2.50 x 17 s i z e . The t i r e S h e r r i e purchased was t h e proper s i z e f o r t h e r e a r wheel b u t a t t h e time of t h e purchase she d i d n o t s p e c i f y whether she wanted a f r o n t o r r e a r t i r e . The day o f t h e a c c i d e n t , p l a i n t i f f and S h e r r i e went t o an a r e a c a l l e d "the p i t s " n e a r Bozeman. The motorcycle was designed a s a t r a i l b i k e and p l a i n t i f f intended t o use i t t h e r e f o r t h a t purpose. S h e r r i e was h e s i t a n t about r i d i n g down a p a r t i c u l a r i n c l i n e and p l a i n t i f f t e a s e d h e r by edging t h e b i k e over t h e h i l l . A s t h e b i k e began t o r o l l , i t encounted a r i s e o r bump i n t h e t e r r a i n about 2 112 f e e t from t h e t o p of t h e h i l l . The motorcycle suddenly p i t c h e d forward throwing S h e r r i e t o t h e s i d e , Plaintiff plummeted down t h e h i l l w i t h t h e b i k e l a n d i n g on t o p of him. He s u s t a i n e d a f r a c t u r e d p e l v i s and d i s l o c a t e d h i p . Sherrie received no s e r i o u s i n j u r y and makes no c l a i m f o r any. That p l a i n t i f f r e q u i r e s f u r t h e r s u r g e r y and perhaps even t o t a l h i p replacement was n o t c o n t e s t e d by defendant, The e x a c t c a u s e of t h e a c c i d e n t was unknown t o p l a i n t i f f a t t h a t time. He s p e c u l a t e d t o a n ambulance d r i v e r t h a t he may have a p p l i e d t h e f r o n t brake. Some n i n e months a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t , p l a i n t i f f was r i d i n g t h e same c y c l e , w i t h t h e same equipment, over a bumpy t e r r a i n of f i s t - s i z e rocks. A s he drove over t h e r o c k s , he f e l t a momentary s e i z i n g of t h e f r o n t wheel. He observed t h a t when he h i t a rock t h e wheel would move up i n t h e f r o n t f e n d e r housing and f r e e z e a s i t h i t t h e upper l i m i t of t r a v e l . He told

f r i e n d s w i t h him t h a t he had j u s t discovered t h e cause of t h e accident. One f r i e n d t r i e d t h e same t h i n g and observed t h e same results, L a t e r , p l a i n t i f f compared h i s c y c l e w i t h one n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l t o h i s and n o t i c e d t h a t h i s f r o n t t i r e was a 2-75 x 1 7 , w h i l e t h e o t h e r c y c l e ' s f r o n t t i r e was a 2.50 x 17, He then took h i s b i k e t o a c y c l e shop o p e r a t o r , Ron Abelin, f o r f u r t h e r checking. the Abelin placed a f u r n i t u r e clamp on/handlebars and t h e f r o n t wheel ax.le t o compress t h e f r o n t shock a b s o r b e r t o t h e l i m i t of t r a v e l . Upon doing s o , t h e f r o n t t i r e would n o t t u r n , This same demonstration was conducted a t t r i a l . When t h e clamp was placed on t h e l e f t s i d e t h e t i r e would t u r n s l i g h t l y ; when placed on t h e r i g h t s i d e t h e t i r e would n o t t u r n a t a l l . When t h e 2.75 x 17 t i r e was r e p l a c e d w i t h t h e 2,50 x 17 t i r e , t h e t i r e r o t a t e d f r e e l y w i t h t h e clamp placed on e i t h e r s i d e . Defendant o b j e c t e d t o t h e demonstration on t h e grounds t h a t s i m i l a r i t y of c o n d i t i o n s could n o t be shown; t h a t i s , t h e r e was no showing t h e normal o p e r a t i o n of t h e c y c l e would p l a c e t h e same p r e s s u r e on t h e f r o n t f o r k a s d i d t h e f u r n i t u r e clamp. The demonstration was performed; defendant was allowed a c o n t i n u i n g objection. J u s t p r i o r t o t r i a l on December 10, 1971, p l a i n t i f f moved t o amend h i s complaint t o encompass a t h e o r y of implied warranty of f i t n e s s , a s provided i n s e c t i o n 87A-2-315, R.C.M. 1947. Hearing on t h e motion t o amend was h e l d t h e day of t r i a l , December 14, 1971. Defendant maintained t h e motion was n o t t i m e l y i n t h a t i t changed t h e t h e o r y of t h e law on t h e c a s e f o r which defendant had no time t o prepare. P l a i n t i f f contended t h e amendment merely e x p l a i n e d and c l a r i f i e d t h e complaint. The c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e motion t o amend, denied d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r continuance, and ordered t h e t r i a l t o begin, Defendant p r e s e n t s seven i s s u e s f o r review on a p p e a l , b u t we w i l l d i s c u s s only t h o s e i s s u e s d e t e r m i n a t i v e of t h i s case,

While w a r r a n t i e s of f i t n e s s f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose, a s expressed i n s e c t i o n 87A-2-315, R.C.M. 1947, a r e n o t novel b e f o r e t h i s Court, t h i s c a s e p r e s e n t s t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e i n which we need c o n s i d e r t h e s u b s t a n t i v e problems r a i s e d under t h e statute. W w i l l f i r s t c o n s i d e r whether t h e motion t o amend e should have been g r a n t e d , W cannot a g r e e t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s amendment merely c l a r i f i e d e t h e o r i g i n a l complaint, The o r i g i n a l complaint was c l e a r l y based on t h e a l l e g e d n e g l i g e n c e of defendant. The p r e t r i a l o r d e r was no d i f f e r e n t . This remained t h e t h e o r y of t h e c a s e u n t i l v e r y shortly before the t r i a l . In f a c t , a s heretofore noted, the motion t o amend was n o t g r a n t e d u n t i l t h e v e r y day of t r i a l . I f t h e complaint and p r e t r i a l o r d e r s o c l e a r l y s t a t e d a t h e o r y of implied warranty of f i t n e s s , a s p l a i n t L f f contends, why was i t not expressly stated? Obviously, i t was n o t contemplated u n t i l s h o r t l y b e f o r e t h e motion t o amend was f i l e d . It w a s e r r o r f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o g r a n t p l a i n t i f f ' s motion t o amend t h e complaint t o i n c l u d e t h e theory of implied warranty of f i t n e s s , Although Rule 15 ( a ) , M.R,Civ. P, , estab- l i s h e s t h a t l e a v e t o amend s h a l l be f r e e l y g r a n t e d , amendments should n o t be allowed where t h e t h e o r y p r e s e n t e d by t h e amend- ment i s t o t a l l y i n a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e c a s e , a s i s t h e s i t u a t i o n here. Negligence, e i t h e r on t h e p a r t of defendant o r p l a i n t i f f , h a s no p l a c e i n an a c t i o n f o r an a l l e g e d breach of warranty. S i m i l a r l y , warranty t h e o r i e s a r e i r r e l e v a n t t o a n e g l i g e n c e c a s e . I n P i c k e r X-Ray Corp, v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919,922, t h e Municipal Court of Appeals f o r t h e D i s t r i c t of Columbia, s a i d : 11There seems t o b e some confusion i n understanding

t h e n a t u r e of implied warranty l i a b i l i t y . I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , concepts of n e g l i g e n c e and f a u l t , a s d e f i n e d by n e g l i g e n c e s t a n d a r d s , have no p l a c e i n warranty recovery c a s e s , Proof of negligence i s un- n e c e s s a r y t o l i a b i l i t y f o r breach of implied w a r r a n t y and t h e l a c k of i t i s immaterial t o defense t h e r e o f , Since t h e warranty i s implied, e i t h e r i n f a c t o r i n

law, no e x p r e s s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o r agreements by t h e manufacturer [ o r r e t a i l e r , a s t h e c a s e may b e ] a r e needed. Implied warranty recovery i s based on two f a c t o r s : (a) The product o r a r t i c l e i n q u e s t i o n h a s been t r a n s f e r r e d from t h e manufacturer ' s [ r e t a i l e r ' s ] possession while i n a 'defective' s t a t e , more s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e product f a i l s e i t h e r t o b e I reasonably f i t f o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r purpose i n t e n d e d '

o r of 'merchantable q u a l i t y , ' a s t h e s e two terms, s e p a r a t e b u t o f t e n overlapping, a r e d e f i n e d by t h e law; and (b) a s a r e s u l t of being 'defective: t h e product causes p e r s o n a l i n j u r y o r p r o p e r t y damage, II .[Paraphrased m a t e r i a l added]. See a l s o : 2 Frurnrner & Friedman, Products L i a b i l i t y , $ 16.01 [ I ] ; 3 ~ e n d e r ' sU.C.C. S e r v i c e , Duesenberg & King, S a l e s and Bulk T r a n s f e r s 5 7.01 141. A s a r e s u l t of t h e amendment, defendant had t o be prepared f o r an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t defense t h e o r y , The p r e j u d i c i a l n a t u r e of t h e amendment becomes more a p p a r e n t when viewed i n l i g h t o f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s given, The i s s u e s became s o confused t h a t both t h e o r i e s were combined i n t o a s i n g l e i n s t r u c t i o n . The q u e s t i o n should n o t have been whether t h e r e was a breach of an implied warranty o r f i t n e s s f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose, b u t r a t h e r , whether t h e defendant was n e g l i g e n t . The c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n No. 6 , r e l a t i n g t o t h e two t h e o r i e s upon which p l a i n t i f f p r e d i c a t e d h i s c a s e , f a i l e d t o p r o p e r l y d i s - tinguish the theories. The i n s t r u c t i o n s t a t e d only t h a t c o n t r i - b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e was no defense t o a breach of warranty, It d i d n o t i n d i c a t e t o t h e j u r y t h a t any n e g l i g e n c e on t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s p a r t was t o t a l l y i n a p p o s i t e t o recovery under t h e warranty theory. T h i s , when coupled w i t h c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n No. 8 , must n e c e s s a r i l y have l e f t t h e j u r y completely i n doubt a s t o any d i s t i n c t i o n s between t h e t h e o r i e s . I n s t r u c t i o n No. 8 speaks i n terms of r e l i a n c e on t h e s e l l e r ' s s k i l l i n s e l e c t i n g t h e merchandise, a warranty element, b u t concludes t h a t t h e r e s u l t a n t improper s e l e c - t i o n of merchandise by f a i l u r e t o e x e r c i s e r e a s o n a b l e c a r e i s negligence. This Court i n Brothers v , Surplus T r a c t o r P a r t s Corp., Mon t . 9 -- P.2d , 30 St.Rep. 265,268, r u l e d t h a t

confusing i n s t r u c t i o n s concerning t h e t h e o r i e s of n e g l i g e n c e and implied warranty were grounds f o r r e v e r s a l . P l a i n t i f f i s n o t r e s t r i c t e d from p l e a d i n g i n t h e a l t e r - native. But where, a s h e r e , i t becomes r e a d i l y a p p a r a n t t h a t any warranty t h e o r y i s f o r e i g n t o t h e proper pleading of t h e c a s e , any combination of t h e two t h e o r i e s cannot be t o l e r a t e d . The i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h e warranty t h e o r y becomes e s p e c i a l l y obvious when i n a r t f u l l y drawn i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e merely a conglomeration of t h e two t h e o r i e s . What p l a i n t i f f a c t u a l l y s u g g e s t s i s n o t t h a t t h e t i r e i t s e l f was d e f e c t i v e , b u t t h e s a l e of t h e t i r e t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s a g e n t was d e f e c t i v e . But, such s u g g e s t i o n only f u r t h e r confuses the issue. To say t h e s a l e was d e f e c t i v e n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e s t h e s a l e was n e g l i g e n t . W f i n d l i t t l e support f o r t h e t h e o r y t h a t e an a l l e g e d l y n e g l i g e n t a c t i s a d e f e c t . A l l cases facing the issues p r o p e r l y i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e d e f e c t must be i n t h e product i t s e l f , A quick sampling of r e c e n t c a s e s i s h e l p f u l : Van Winkle v. F i r e s t o n e T i r e and Rubber Co., 117 I l l , A p p , 2 d 324, 253 N.E.2d 588, an a l l e g e d l y d e f e c t i v e t i r e ; P e t e r s v. Lyons, (Mich. 1969), 168 N.W.2d 759, an a l l e g e d l y d e f e c t i v e dog c h a i n ; Kirk v . S t i n e - way Drug S t o r e Com., 38 111,Appe2d 327, 187 N.E.2d 307, an a l l e g e d l y d e f e c t i v e s t e p l a d d e r ; Utley v. Standard Magnesium & Chemical Co, , (Okl. 1970), 478 P, 2d 953, a n a l l e g e d l y d e f e c t i v e metal l a d d e r ; C o n t i n e n t a l Cas. Co. of I l l . v , Westinghouse Elec, Corp., (D.C.Mich. 1970), 327 F.Supp. 720, an a l l e g e d l y d e f e c t i v e s p o t weld on a h e a t i n g - a i r c o n d i t i o n i n g u n i t ; P a u l l u s v. L i e d k i e , 92 Idaho 323, 442 P,2d 733, a l l e g e d l y d e f e c t i v e b r e e d e r hogs because of d i s e a s e ; DeLamaw Motor Co. v , White, 249 Ark. 708, 460 S,W,2d 8 0 2 , a n a l l e g e d l y d e f e c t i v e t r u c k ; Waddell v , American Breeders S e r v i c e , I n c . , Mnt o . , 505 P,2d 417, 30 St.Rep, 91, a l l e g e d l y d e f e c t i v e b u l l semen. P l a i n t i f f c i t e s Lewis v. Mobil O i l Corp., ( 8 t h C i r , 1971), 438 F.2d 500, i n support of h i s theory. It i s d i f f i c u l t t o r e - concile - - Lewis w i t h t h e c a s e s noted above. Although t h e c a s e i s somewhat d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e , t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between n e g l i g e n c e and warranty was overlooked. The c o u r t i n Lewis h e l d , i n e f f e c t , t h a t

t h e improper s e l e c t i o n of h y d r a u l i c system o i l breached an implied warranty of f i t n e s s . However, i n t h a t c a s e , t h e p l a i n - t i f f i n i t i a l l y r e q u e s t e d t h a t he b e s u p p l i e d w i t h t h e proper o i l f o r h i s system, and c o n t i n u a l l y r e i t e r a t e d h i s concern t h a t t h e o i l be t h e proper one. Mobil O i l c o n s i s t e n t l y s u p p l i e d an i m - proper o i l u n t i l n e a r l y two y e a r s a f t e r t h e o i l was f i r s t f u r - nished. Here, on t h e o t h e r hand, defendant d i d supply p l a i n t i f f w i t h a proper t i r e " f o r a 1966 T r a i l Bike Honda go", t h e t i r e was, i n f a c t , a c o r r e c t t i r e s i z e f o r t h e r e a r wheel of t h e c y c l e ; p l a i n t i f f ' s agent had n o t s p e c i f i e d which wheel. I n Van Winkle v. F i r e s t o n e T i r e and Rubber Co., 117 I l l , App.2d 324, 253 N.E.2d 588, 590, t h e A p p e l l a t e Court of I l l i n o i s had t h i s t o say concerning t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s burden: he p l a i n t i f f must ** k show a f f i r m a t i v e l y , t h a t t h e r e was some d e f e c t i n t h e a r t i c l e s o l d which rendered i t u n f i t f o r t h a t purpose and t h a t damage r e s u l t e d from such d e f e c t . " I n support of t h i s r u l e , t h e I l l i n o i s c o u r t c i t e d Kirk v. Stineway Drug S t o r e Com,which case related t o a defective stepladder f o r f a i l u r e t o i n s t a l l a s a f e t y c l e a t ; and Knab v . Alden's I r v i n g Park, I n c . , 49 111,App.Zd 371, 199 N.E.2d 815, r e l a t i n g t o a p a i r of t r o u s e r s d e f e c t i v e because of t h e h i g h l y inflammable n a t u r e of t h e m a t e r i a l . W a r e i n accord w i t h t h e I l l i n o i s c o u r t , e Here, defendant warranted t h a t t h e t i r e he a l l e g e d l y s o l d p l a i n t i f f ' s agent was f r e e of d e f e c t s a f f e c t i n g t h e p a r t i c u l a r purpose f o r i t s intended use. The t i r e was without q u e s t i o n a p e r f e c t l y good 2.75 x . 1 7 t i r e t h a t d i d n o t f a i l , a s t h e term i s o r d i n a r i l y used, i n i t s normal o p e r a t i o n . Plaintiff is not precluded from a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e s e l e c t i o n of t h e t i r e was i m - proper. Such a l l e g a t i o n , however, could only be p r e s e n t e d t o t h e j u r y on a n e g l i g e n c e t h e o r y , Since we f i n d a warranty of f i t n e s s i n a p p l i c a b l e , d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n concerning f a i l u r e t o r e c e i v e timely n o t i c e of t h e d e f e c t need n o t b e considered. While o t h e r i s s e s r a i s e d by defendant a r e n o t p e r t i n e n t t o t h e grounds f o r r e v e r s a l , they would, no doubt, be r a i s e d

a g a i n on r e t r i a l ; t h e r e f o r e we s h a l l determine them. Defendant o b j e c t e d a t t r i a l t o t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e f u r n i t u r e clamp demonstration. He c l a i m s e r r o r on t h e b a s i s t h a t no s i m i l a r i t y of c o n d i t i o n s was shown between t h e amount of f o r c e a p p l i e d by t h e clamp and t h e p r e s s u r e a c t u a l l y e x e r t e d by two persons r i d i n g the cycle. W agree, e The t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n a l l o w i n g t h e demonstration w i t h o u t proper foundation. This Court h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t s u b s t a n t i a l s i m i l a r i t y of c o n d i t i o n s must be shown b e f o r e experiments o r demonstrations can b e introduced. Bernhard v. Lincoln County, 150 Mont, 557, 561, 437 P.2d 377; Hurly v. S t a r T r a n s f e r Company, 141 Mont. 176, 181, 376 P,2d 504; Richardson v. Farmers Union O i l Co., 131 Mont. 535, 548, 312 P,2d 134. The p e r s u a s i v e e f f e c t of t h i s courtroom demonstration cannot be denied, Without a showing t h a t t h e clamp p r e s s u r e was n o t s i g n i f i c a n t l y g r e a t e r than t h e p r e s s u r e of two r i d e r s , t h e demonstration should n o t have been a d m i t t e d , Other- w i s e , the jury i s strongly influenced t o speculate t h a t t h e r e - s u l t shown i n t h e demonstration was, i n f a c t , t h e c a u s e of t h e accident. P l a i n t i f f ' s w i t n e s s Abelin admitted he d i d n o t know whether t h e p r e s s u r e a p p l i e d was s i m i l a r . The cause i s r e v e r s e d and remanded f a r a new t r i a l .

Associat Qu s t i c e s ,