Clontz v. Clontz

NO. 12658

I N THE SUPREME COURT O T E STATE O M N A A F H F OTN

JOHN J . CLONTZ , SR. , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,

-VS - ELENA CLONTZ ,

~ e f e n d a n tand Appellant.

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable R e D o McPhillips, Judge p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel of Record :

For Appellant :

Hoyt, Bottomly and G a b r i e l , Great F a l l s , Montana Richard V. Bottomly, argued, Great F a l l s , Montana

For Respondent :

Church, H a r r i s , Johnson and Williams, Great F a l l s , Montana Douglas C. A l l e n and Robert P. Groff, argued, Great F a l l s , Montana

Submitted: November 15, 1974

Decided : FEB 1 4 1975 ~ i l e :FEE d !4 !9F

M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.

This i s an a p p e a l from a judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , H i l l County. The judgment appealed amends a judgment e n t e r e d by t h e same c o u r t on October 1 6 , 1973, which modified alimony p r o v i s i o n s of an o r i g i n a l decree e n t e r e d January 5 , 1971. The o r i g i n a l a c t i o n was commenced i n t h e f a l l of 1970 by p l a i n t i f f husband who sought a divorce. He a l l e g e d mental c r u e l t y a s g r d s and r e q u e s t e d a d i v i s i o n of p r o p e r t y . Defendant w i f e answered by a g e n e r a l d e n i a l and crossclaimed f o r s e p a r a t e mainten- ance and a t t o r n e y f e e s . She too r e q u e s t e d a d i v i s i o n of property. On January 5 , 1971, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t h e l d t h a t each p a r t y was g u i l t y of extreme mental c r u e l t y and each was e n t i t l e d t o a d i v o r c e ; b u t , s i n c e t h e husband was t h e only p a r t y who p e t i t i o n e d f o r d i v o r c e , he was g r a n t e d t h e d i v o r c e . I n t h e d i v i s i o n o f p r o p e r t y , t h e husband was awarded t h e j o i n t l y owned farm and was r e q u i r e d t o pay t h e w i f e f o r h e r i n t e r e s t i n t h e land which was found t o be $19,350. She was paid $3,000 down and t h e remaining amount was t o b e p a i d i n 120 monthly i n - s t a l l m e n t s w i t h i n t e r e s t a t t h e r a t e of 6% p e r annum on t h e unpaid balance. She was a l s o given a l i f e e s t a t e i n t h e mineral i n t e r e s t on t h e farm land. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t f u r t h e r v e s t e d t i t l e t o a l o t i n F l a t h e a d County i n t h e husband. The c o u r t gave t h e w i f e h e r c h o i c e of household f u r n i t u r e ; one h a l f of t h e proceeds of t h e s a l e of c e r t a i n Burlington Railway s t o c k ; a 1968 Volkswagen; and, awarded h e r $125 p e r month alimony. The w i f e on January 1 5 , 1971, p e t i t i o n e d f o r a m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e d e c r e e seeking f u r t h e r r e l i e f a s t o t h e v a l u e of t h e p r o p e r t y settlement. A f t e r f u r t h e r h e a r i n g s , t h e c o u r t on March 3 , 1971, modified t h e decree by r a i s i n g t h e w i f e ' s i n t e r e s t i n t h e farm land from $19,350 t o $20,276.50. O February 28, 1973, t h e w i f e f i l e d h e r p e t i t i o n f o r modifica- n t i o n o f t h e d e c r e e r e q u e s t i n g an i n c r e a s e i n alimony payment, d i v i - s i o n o f p r o p e r t y , and a t t o r n e y f e e s a l l e g i n g a change o f circum-

s t a n c e s s i n c e t h e g r a n t i n g of t h e o r i g i n a l decree. A t t h e time t h e o r i g i n a l a c t i o n was f i l e d t h e p a r t i e s had been married t h i r t y - t h r e e y e a r s . Husband i s employed a s a r a i l r o a d e n g i n e e r and earned $17,783 g r o s s e a r n i n g s i n 1971; $19,200 g r o s s e a r n i n g s i n 1972; $1,700 i n January 1973; and, $1,568 i n February 1973. When t h e f i r s t two months of 1973 a r e averaged f o r t h e balance of t h e y e a r i t would amount t o a y e a r l y income of approximately $19,600 f o r t h a t year. The farm y i e l d e d 1,000 b u s h e l s of wheat i n 1973, b u t g e n e r a l l y h a r v e s t s 2,000 b u s h e l s a y e a r . The husband h a s remarried. He and h i s w i f e a r e l i v i n g on t h e farm. H i s p r e s e n t w i f e has a son and t h e husband i s h e l p i n g p u t him through c o l l e g e . The w i f e , on t h e o t h e r hand, was never employed d u r i n g t h e marriage of t h i r t y - t h r e e y e a r s and has no s k i l l s f o r employment. Out of n e c e s s i t y she i s p r e s e n t l y l i v i n g w i t h h e r mother, r e c e i v i n g f r e e r e n t and u t i l i t i e s , a n d i s s h a r i n g t h e c o s t of t h e monthly g r o c e r i e s w i t h h e r mother. She claimed she lacked p r i v a c y and d e s i r e d t o g e t h e r own apartment b u t was unable t o do s o because t h e alimony payments she r e c e i v e d were t o o low. She a l s o had s i g n i f i c a n t medical expenses and had p a i d h e r own medical i n s u r a n c e . A f t e r a h e a r i n g on t h e p e t i t i o n f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n t h e c o u r t on October 1 6 , 1973, denied t h e change i n p r o p e r t y v a l u a t i o n , awarded t h e w i f e an i n c r e a s e of $35 per month i n alimony and ordered t h e husband t o pay $400 of t h e $1,200 a t t o r n e y f e e s owed by t h e w i f e . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e c o u r t ordered t h e husband t o c a r r y t h e w i f e on h i s medical and h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n i n s u r a n c e program, i f p e r m i s s i b l e under h i s program. Both p a r t i e s took exception t o t h e new o r d e r . In h i s petition t o amend t h e amended d e c r e e new a t t o r n e y s appeared f o r t h e husband. The w i f e challenged t h e new d e c r e e a s awarding an i n s u f f i c i e n t amount of alimony t o s u p p o r t h e r s e l f . The husband challenged t h e i n c r e a s e i n alimony a s b e i n g u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s i n c e s e c t i o n 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, provides f o r alimony o n l y f o r t h e w i f e and thereby

d i s c r i m i n a t e s a g a i n s t t h e husband which i s i n v i o l a t i o n o f A r t . 11,

Sec. 4 of the 1972 Montana Constitution which prohibits discrimina- tion on the basis of sex. He also challenges the award of attorney fees as being unconstitutional, since section 21-137, R.C.M. 1947, allows only the wife to recover attorney fees, it is in violation of the same Art. 11, Sec. 4 of the 1972 Montana Constitution. Finally, the husband challenges the original granting of alimony as being beyond the jurisdiction of the court since section 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, provides alimony can only be granted to a wife who has been granted a divorce for an offense of her husband and, since the husband in this case was granted the divorce, the court could not award alimony. The district court on February 28, 1974, after a hearing on the petitions, found the increase in alimony and the award of attorney fees to the wife to be unconstitutional and therefore void. It found, however, that since the husband had failed to appeal from the award of alimony and has paid alimony to the wife since the original award in 1971, it would be against public policy to allow the husband, after the passage of this amount of time, to set aside the alimony award. These preceding facts depict the case it stands before this Court. The wife and husband present three issues to be resolved by this Court: 1) Was the increase in alimony from $125 to $160 per month so insufficient as to constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial court? 2) Was the district court without jurisdiction to award alimony and later to increase the award of alimony, since the husband was granted the divorce and the divorce was not granted to the wife for an offense of the husband? 3) Are sections 21-137 and 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, unconstitutional under the 1972 Montana Constitution which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex?

I s s u e number 3 w i l l n o t be decided by t h i s Court a s i t i s improperly b e f o r e t h e Court. Rule 38, M.R.App.Civ.P., states: "It s h a l l be t h e d u t y of counsel who c h a l l e n g e s t h e con- s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of any Act of t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e i n any s u i t o r proceeding i n t h e supreme c o u r t t o which t h e s t a t e of Montana, o r any agency t h e r e o f , o r any o f f i c e r o r employee t h e r e o f , a s such o f f i c e r o r employee, i s n o t a p a r t y , upon t h e f i l i n g of t h e r e c o r d t o g i v e immediate n o t i c e i n w r i t i n g t o t h e c o u r t of t h e e x i s t e n c e of s a i d q u e s t i o n , s p e c i f y i n g t h e s e c t i o n of t h e Code o r t h e c h a p t e r of t h e s e s s i o n law t o be construed. The c l e r k s h a l l thereupon c e r t i f y such f a c t t o t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l of t h e s t a t e of Montana. I I Here, Rule 38 was n o t followed r e s u l t i n g i n no n o t i c e t o t h e attorney general. The a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l must be given an o p p o r t u n i t y under t h e circumstances s e t f o r t h i n Rule 38, t o appear i n defense of a l e g i s l a t i v e a c t which i s being challenged on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l grounds. I s s u e number 2--whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t was w i t h o u t j u r i s d i c t i o n t o award alimony and l a t e r t o i n c r e a s e t h a t award of alimony s i n c e t h e d i v o r c e was n o t g r a n t e d t o t h e w i f e f o r an o f f e n s e of t h e husband. S e c t i o n 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, provides i n p e r t i n e n t part : "Where a d i v o r c e i s g r a n t e d f o r an o f f e n s e of t h e husband, t h e c o u r t may compel him t o * * make * such s u i t a b l e allowance t o t h e w i f e f o r h e r support during her l i f e , o r f o r a shorter period, a s t h e court may deem j u s t * * *." The husband a r g u e s t h a t s i n c e t h e d i v o r c e was g r a n t e d t o him, t h e c o u r t was without j u r i s d i c t i o n t o award alimony and c i t e s Grush v. Grush, 90 Mont. 381, 3 P.2d 402. He acknowledges i n h i s b r i e f t h a t t h e f a c t s of Grush a r e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h e c a s e h e r e . The d i v o r c e i n t h a t c a s e was g r a n t e d on t h e grounds o f d e s e r t i o n , although t h e husband and w i f e were l i v i n g t o g e t h e r a t t h e time t h e d i v o r c e was i n i t i a t e d . The w i f e agreed n o t t o c h a l l e n g e t h e d i v o r c e upon t h e agreement t h a t he pay h e r alimony. The c o u r t r u l e d t h a t i n a d i v o r c e granted t o t h e husband f o r an o f f e n s e of t h e w i f e , alimony could n o t be awarded. The agreement was h e l d c o l l u s i v e and against public policy. The c o u r t , however, h e l d i n e f f e c t t h a t t h e husband was awarded t h e d e c r e e , accepted t h e b e n e f i t s of a d i v o r c e , and he i s estopped from seeking r e l i e f from i t s burdens, agreed t o by him i n w r i t i n g .

The i n s t a n t c a s e can be brought under t h e same exception. The husband took t h e b e n e f i t of t h e d i v o r c e and agreed t o pay alimony a s p a r t of a p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t proposal. T h i s proposal i n t h e o r i g i n a l a c t i o n , was a proposed p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t i n t h e form of a communication d a t e d October 8 , 1970, from husband's c o u n s e l t o wife's. This c a s e can a l s o be f u r t h e r d i s t i n g u i s h e d from Grush i n t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t found i n i t s f i n d i n g o f f a c t No. IV and conclusion of l a w No. I t h a t b o t h p a r t i e s were g u i l t y of extreme mental c r u e l t y and both were e n t i t l e d t o a d i v o r c e . T h e r e f o r e , had t h e w i f e r e q u e s t e d a d i v o r c e s h e would have been granted one. She f a i l e d t o do s o ; i n s t e a d she f i l e d f o r s e p a r a t e maintenance which was denied. According t o t h e husband's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of s e c t i o n 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, t h e only f a c t o r which p r e v e n t s t h e w i f e from r e c e i v i n g alimony i s t h a t s h e f a i l e d t o a s k f o r a d i v o r c e , b u t r a t h e r asked f o r s e p a r a t e maintenance. W f i n d such i n t e r p r e t a t i o n much too h a r s h . e N e i t h e r do we f e e l t h a t i t p r o p e r l y r e f l e c t s t h e i n t e n t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e when i t enacted t h e s t a t u t e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n view of t h e d o c t r i n e t h a t

where a d i v o r c e i s g r a n t e d t o both husband and w i f e , t h i s Court h a s allowed an award of alimony t o t h e w i f e . Burns v. Burns, 145 Mont. 1, 400 P.2d 642. The f i n a l i s s u e f o r d i s c u s s i o n , i s s u e No. 1, i s whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n i t s award of $160 p e r month alimony t o t h e wife. She u r g e s t h a t $160 i s an i n s u f f i c i e n t amount. A f t e r reviewing t h e f a c t s , we f i n d no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n on t h e p a r t of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . W considered a l l t h e evidence concerning e b o t h p a r t i e s ; t h e amount of money t h e w i f e i s r e c e i v i n g i n payment f o r h e r s h a r e of t h e l a n d ; h e r r o y a l t y i n t e r e s t i n t h e l a n d ; h e r alimony payments; t h e assumption by t h e husband of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h e r h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y payments; and t h e f i n d i n g of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t h a t t h e w i f e was capable of some employment t o h e l p

pay f o r h e r own l i v i n g c o s t s .

The judgment e n t e r e d on February 26, 1974 and appealed t o t h i s Court i s reversed. The judgment e n t e r e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t on October 1 6 , 1973, i s r e i n s t a t e d i n i t s e n t i r e t y . Each p a r t y t o b e a r h i s o r her own c o s t s on appeal.

Justice

W Concur: e

Chief ~ u s ' t i c e

................................ Justices.

Mr. Justice Wesley Castles concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I concur in the result here; which, if I can read reinsta tes the judgment of October 16, 1973. However, I dissent as to the reasons given. Again, I have to wonder if I really understand the reasons. The majority first considers Issue No. 3; that is, the district court's ruling that sections 21-137 and 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, are unconstitutional. We refuse to rule on the issue because the attorney general was not notified. Aside from any view of the meaning of Rule 38 of this court's Appellate Rules, what effect is our holding to have? We refuse to review the district court's holding of uncon- stitutionality---which as applied here affirms the holding. Or, have we reversed the holding? I just do not know, but my basis for dissenting is that I believe this Court should rule on the constitutionality of these statutes.