I N THE SUPREME COUKT OF THE STATE OF M N A A OTN
I N 3 E THE APPLICATION OF J . VAUGHAN RARRON FOR A WRIT OF MANDATE
and No. 13328
!J . WrJLLLIAM LEAPHART, C o u r t - a p p o i n t e d c o u n s e l f o r Merrel C l i n e and S h i r l e y C l i n e ,
P l a i n t i f f , Respondent and C r o s s - A p p e l l a n t .
COUhTY LOP~PALSS IOTJERS o f Lewis and C l a r k County, S t a t e o f Montana,
D e f e n d a n t s and R e s p o n d e n t s ,
-VS - No. 13345
ROBERT WOODAHL, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l o f t h e S t a t e o f Montana and Head o f t h e Department of J u s t i c e ,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . O R I G I N A L PKOCEED1:NG : C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Appellants :
J . Vaughan B a r r o n a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana S t u a r t L. K e l l n e r a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana
' o r Respondents:
Hon. R o b e r t L. Woodahl, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana J o c k 0 . Anderson, A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana Thomas Honzel a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana
Submitted: May 2 8 , 1976
I>ec d e d : i Filed: 3UL
JkfQliitHS 1. ADi8$EY C l e r k Supreme C o u r t
Hon. W . W . L e s s l e y , D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e James T . H a r r i s o n , d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.
T h i s i s a c o n s o l i d a t i o n of an a p p e a l from t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Lewis and C l a r k County, and an o r i g i n a l w r i t of mandate from t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Cascade County; b o t h c a u s e s b a s i c a l l y d e a l w i t h t h e payment f o r s e r v i c e s of a p p o i n t e d c o u n s e l of c r i m i n a l d e f e n s e of Workmen's Compensation c a s e s .
P e r i p h e r a l m a t t e r s i n t h i s a p p e a l a r e t h e c l a i m of Timothy S. Thane, c o u r t r e p o r t e r , f o r p r e p a r a t i o n of t r a n s c r i p t s of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t r i a l ; Leaphart, a c o u r t appointed a t t o r n e y ' s c l a i m f o r h i s f e e s on t h i s a p p e a l i n one of t h e s e c a u s e s ; and t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of B a r r o n ' s a t t o r n e y f e e s .
I t i s admitted t h e s e r v i c e s of t h e c o u r t appointed c o u n s e l were performed. I t i s f u r t h e r admitted t h e f e e s f o r t h e s e r v i c e s performed i n t h e Lewis and C l a r k County c a s e a r e r e a s o n a b l e . The r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of c o u n s e l f e e s i n t h e Cascade County c a s e i s not admitted.
The c e n t r a l i s s u e t o be answered on t h i s a p p e a l i s who pays f o r t h e a t t o r n e y s ' s e r v i c e s and c o s t s . Both d i s t r i c t c o u r t s have h e l d t h a t i n t h e s e Workmen's Compensation c a s e s t h e department of j u s t i c e must pay.
The a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l a s head of t h e department of j u s t i c e appeals.
These c r i m i n a l c a s e s b e f o r e us a r e t h e r e s u l t of a s t a t e -wide program i n v e s t i g a t e d and prosecuted by t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l a s head of t h e department of j u s t i c e .
The a u t h o r i t y t o s o a c t comes t o t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l by s e c t i o n 79-2315, R.C.M., 1947. The s t a t u t e was e n a c t e d i n 1974 and p r o v i d e s :
"The a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l s h a l l conduct on b e h a l f of t h e s t a t e , a l l prosecutions f o r public offenses disclosed by an a u d i t of a s t a t e agency performed by t h e l e g i s l a - t i v e a u d i t o r .I1
This Court p r i o r t o enactment of t h i s s p e c i a l s t a t u t e h e l d t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l had no such a u t h o r i t y . S t a t e ex r e l . Woodahl v. D i s t r i c t Court, 159 Mont. 112, 495 P.2d 182.
Montana's l e g i s l a t u r e f u l l y i n t e n d e d t h i s s t a t e - w i d e program of i n v e s t i g a t i o n and p r o s e c u t i o n be c a r r e d on t o a f i n a l c o n c l u s i o n , i n what t h e media has c a l l e d t h e Workmen's Compensat i o n s c a n d a l s ; it a p p r o p r i a t e d money f o r t h a t s p e c i f i c t a s k . A r e a d i n g of H.B. 520, Laws of 1975, makes c l e a r t h e money i s a p p r o p r i a t e d f o r a d e f i n i t e purpose; t h e b i l l d e s c r i b e s t h a t purpose i n t h e s e words:
!'FOR INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION DIVISION RELATED MATTERS JC *.I1 * Armed w i t h t h e s p e c i f i c a u t h o r i t y of t h e s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n
79-2315, K.C.M. 1947, and f u r n i s h e d w i t h money by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e f o r t h a t purpose, t h e department of j u s t i c e , a c t i n g through i t s head, t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l , proceeded w i t h t h e t a s k . These c a s e s a r e now b e f o r e us because t h e department of j u s t i c e i s a c t i n g under t h e mandates of t h o s e s t a t u t e s .
W now r e a c h t h e c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n : e Who pays f o r t h e s e
c o u r t appointed s e r v i c e s ?
The answer must come from s e c t i o n 95-1005, R.C.M. 1947, enacted i n 1967, amended i n 1973, and i n i t s p r e s e n t form a s of 1974, and p r o v i d e s :
"Whenever, i n a c r i m i n a l a c t i o n o r proceeding, an a t t o r n e y a t law r e p r e s e n t s o r defends any person by o r d e r of t h e c o u r t , on t h e ground t h a t t h e person i s f i n a n c i a l l y unable t o employ c o u n s e l , such a t t o r n e y s h a l l be p a i d f o r h i s s e r v i c e s such sum a s a d i s t r i c t c o u r t o r j u s t i c e of t h e s t a t e supreme c o u r t c e r t i f i e s t o be a r e a s o n a b l e com-
p e n s a t i o n t h e r e f o r and s h a l l be reimbursed f o r r e a s o n a b l e c o s t s i n c u r r e d i n t h e c r i m i n a l pro- ceeding. Such c o s t s s h a l l be c h a r g e a b l e t o t h e county i n which t h e proceeding a r o s e , e x c e p t t h a t ( a ) i n proceedings s o l e l y i n v o l v i n g t h e v i o l a t i o n of a c i t y ordinance o r s t a t e s t a t u t e prosecuted i n a m u n i c i p a l , c i t y o r p o l i c e c o u r t wherein c o s t s s h a l l be c h a r g e a b l e t o t h e c i t y o r town i n which t h e proceeding a r o s e , and ( b ) i n a r r e s t s i n c r i m i n a l proceedings by a g e n t s of t h e department of f i s h and game and a r r e s t s by a g e n t s of t h e department of j u s t i c e , t h e c o s t s ( i n c l u d i n g a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s of a t t o r n e y s appointed by t h e c o u r t f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t ) must be borne by t h e s t a t e agency c a u s i n g t h e a r r e s t . " (Emphasis added).
A r e a d i n g of t h i s s t a t u t e makes e v i d e n t (1) c o s t s a r e c h a r g e a b l e t o t h e county w i t h two e x c e p t i o n s and ( 2 ) c o s t s i n c l u d e a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s f o r a t t o r n e y s a p p o i n t e d by t h e c o u r t i n criminal causes f o r t h e defendant.
Here, we a r e faced w i t h t h e more s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n of who
must pay under t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h i s s t a t u t e . W are dealing e
w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of s u b d i v i s i o n ( b ) . This i s a s i n g l e sentence s t a r t i n g w i t h t h e words " i n a r r e s t s " and concluding w i t h t h e
words "causing t h e a r r e s t . " The a t t o r n e y g e n e r a 1 , u n d e r l i n e s and 11 emphasizes t h e p h r a s e , a r r e s t s i n c r i m i n a l proceedings by
agents *** of t h e department of j u s t i c e . " He t a k e s one narrow s t e p f u r t h e r i n h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e and i n i t s a p p l i -c a t i o n t o t h e f a c t s h e r e , and s t a t e s t h a t i n t h e s e c a s e s no a g e n t of t h e department of j u s t i c e p h y s i c a l l y made an a r r e s t ; t h i s i s t r u e ; he f u r t h e r s t a t e s t h a t i n t h o s e c a s e s where a r r e s t s were n e c e s s a r y t h e a r r e s t s were p h y s i c a l l y made by l o c a l law enforcement a g e n c i e s o r a g e n t s , such a s t h e s h e r i f f of Toole County.
Merely t o s t a t e t h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n and t h e meaning i n f e r r e d by t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l i s t o show and emphasize i t s narrowness. He i n s i s t s t h e s t a t u t o r y e x c e p t i o n s d e a l w i t h and a r e i n t e n d e d t o d e a l o n l y w i t h a r r e s t s a c t u a l l y made by game wardens and highway patrolmen in their respective departments, fish and game and justice.
When we consider what was actually done here in the Cline cases now before us, we illustrate the absurdity of such a narrow
approach. There the department of justice, through Dzivi, requested the warrants of arrest; the warrants, after issue by the court, were returned to the department of justice; a telephone call was made by an agent of the department to Sheriff Brooks of Toole County; later a teletype copy of the warrant was sent to the sheriff by an agent of the department of justice and the sheriff was asked to apprehend and physically take into custody the Clines and then notify the department of that occur-
rence; the Clines were physically taken into custody by the sheriff, the department notified, and then the Clines were phy-
sically transported to Helena by investigators of the department
of justice. In the other cases before us no actual physical act of
arrest was made; it is clear however that the defendants appeared at arraignments as the result of Informations filed by officers and agents of the department of justice. The record is barren of any acts by any agents of any counties except Sheriff Brooks' directed activities by the department of justice.
Is the mere ministerial physical act of arrest to determine
the operative effect of the subsection (b) exception? We think not. Are we to say the single physical act of arrest by a sheriff in Toole County or the lack of a physical act of arrest is the pivotal question? Surely we must not gather the intent and
purpose of the legislature on such narrow ground.
The l e g i s l a t u r e ' s purpose of s e c t i o n 95-1005, R.C.M. 1947, was t o a s s u r e payment of t h e s e r v i c e s of appointed d e f e n s e c o u n s e l i n c r i m i n a l proceedings.
I n S t a t e e x r e l . Langan v. D i s t r i c t Court, 1 1 Mont. 178, 1
180, 107 P.2d 880, i t was s a i d :
" I n c o n s t r u i n g a s t a t u t e c o u r t s must look t o t h e language employed and t h e o b j e c t sought t o be accomplished . I '
The f u r t h e r purpose of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e was t o e s t a b l i s h a s p e c i f i c and p r a c t i c a l payment f o r such c o u r t appointed c o u n s e l s ' services.
By t h e two amendments t o s e c t i o n 95-1005, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e made i t c l e a r t h a t a l l c o s t s of p r o s e c u t i o n does i n c l u d e a t t o r n e y f e e s f o r c o u r t appointed c o u n s e l ; i t was and i s a workable, p r a c t i c a l p l a n i n t h a t i t p r o v i d e s : (1) Where t h e c a s e i s p r o s e c u t e d i n c i t y c o u r t , t h e c i t y o r town i s r e s p o n s i b l e . ( 2 ) Where t h e department of f i s h and game o r t h e department of j u s t i c e c a u s e s t h e a r r e s t , t h e n c o s t s of t h e r e s u l t i n g c r i m i n a l proceedings must be borne by t h e agency. (3) I n other cases t h e c o s t s a r e properly chargeable t o t h e county wherein t h e proceeding a r o s e .
The l e g i s l a t u r e s e t i n e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t c o u n t i e s s h a l l pay. The e x c e p t i o n we a r e concerned w i t h i s s u b s e c t i o n (b) on department of j u s t i c e . It must be g i v e n meaning and purpose.
I n B u r r i t t and Safeway v. C i t y of B u t t e , 161 Mont. 530,
534,535, 508 P.2d 563, t h e Court s t a t e d : 11 The C o u r t ' s f u n c t i o n i s t o c o n s t r u e t h e language of t h e s t a t u t e i n accordance w i t h i t s u s u a l and o r d i n a r y a c c e p t a n c e , w i t h a view t o be g i v i n g v i t a l i t y t o and making o p e r a t i v e a l l p r o v i s i o n s of t h e law and accomplishing t h e i n t e n t i o n of * * *. t h e l e g i s l a t u r e when a s c e r t a i n a b l e
"The g o a l of s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s i s t o g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e purpose of t h e s t a t u t e . * 9 9 To g i v e ; ; e f f e c t t o t h e purpose of t h e s t a t u t e a s intended
by the legislature, the context in which the words are used is more important than precise grammatical rules or a dictionary definition."
The phrase in subsection (b) "must be borne by the state agency causing the arrest" goes beyond the mere act of arrest.
758, it was said:
"* * * A if In Doull v. Wohlschlager, 141 Mont. 354, 364, 377 P.2d
statute will not be interpreted to defeat its evident,.object or purpose * *. The objects sought to be achieved by legislation are of prime consideration in interpretation of such legislation. Corwin v. Beiswanger, 126 Mont. 337, 251 P.2d 252."
Let us look at the peripheral problems here presented.
J. Vaughan Barron serving as attorney for the defendant in Cause No. 6537B, was allowed $9,068.74 for services rendered,
plus costs. The reasonableness of that fee has been challenged.
The statute providing such fees is section 95-1005, R.C.M.
"Whenever, in a criminal action or proceeding, an attorney at law represents or defends any person by order of the court, on the ground that the Derson is financially unable to employ counsel, such attorney shall be paid for his services such sum as a district court or justice of the state supreme court certifies to be a reasonable compensation therefor and shall be reimbursed for reasonable costs incurred in the criminal proceeding .I1 (Emphasis added. )
The record before us is barren of any evidentiary hearing, of affidavits, of time estimates, or of guide lines used to
arrive at the reasonableness of the fee allowed to Barron by Judge Truman G. Bradford. Such procedures must be before us, that we may determine the reasonableness of the fees allowed. State v. Mempa, 78 Wash 2d 530, 477 P.2d 178, 182 (1970); State v. Horton, (qq?, .2d 34 N.J. 518, 170 A.2d 1 (1961), Gant v. State, (l), Fa' 216 S f
44 (1968).
W . William Leaphart seeks f e e s f o r h i s s e r v i c e s on t h i s appeal. S t a t e ex r e l . Stephens v. D i s t r i c t Court, Mont . 9
P.2d , 33 St.Rep. 469, i s c o n t r o l l i n g , t h i s i s allowable. He i s g r a n t e d $1,000 f o r h i s a t t o r n e y f e e on t h i s appeal.
W deny t h e w r i t of mandamus and r e t u r n t h e cause t o t h e e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r hn e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g i n conformity w i t h t h e guide l i n e s suggested a s t o t h e amount and reasonableness of J . Vaughan B a r r o n ' s f e e s and c o s t s .
I t i s conceded W. William L e a p h a r t ' s f e e s and c o s t s a r e
r e a s o n a b l e and they w i l l be g r a n t e d . W r e f e r t o our previous e
o r d e r of June 11, 1976, on Court Reporter Thane's c l a i m f o r transcript.
W a f f i r m t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t s and hold t h e department e
of j u s t i c e must pay t h e appointed a t t o r n e y s ' compensation and costs.
Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e James T . Harrison.
W Concur: e
Justices.
- 8 -M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison s p e c i a l l y concurring:
While I concur w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y i n t h e above m a t t e r , I d e s i r e f o r t h e information of Montana's l e g i s l a t u r e , t o put focus upon t h e r i s i n g c o s t s of defense i n t h e v a r i o u s c o u n t i e s of t h e s t a t e . The m a j o r i t y opinion provides t h a t t h e c o s t s a r i s i n g o u t of c a s e s i n t h e Workmen's Compensation i n v e s t i g a t i o n s h a l l be paid by t h e s t a t e . However, d u r i n g r e c e n t y e a r s s e v e r a l c o u n t i e s of t h e s t a t e have had t o shoulder heavy t r i a l c o s t s due t o t h e n e c e s s i t y of providing counsel f o r i n d i g e n t defendants.
The time has come, i n m opinion, f o r t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o s t u d y y
t h e r i s i n g c o s t s of defense and adopt one of s e v e r a l methods now i n use t o provide c o s t s of a t t o r n e y f e e s f o r i n d i g e n t defendants.
For example, i n two r u r a l c o u n t i e s of t h i s s t a t e , Pondera and Big Horn, because of prolonged murder t r i a l s , t h e taxpayers have had t o assume e x t r a o r d i n a r y expense. I n t h e i n s t a n c e of Pondera County defense a t t o r n e y f e e s a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t l e v e l amounted t o $28,000 p l u s $7,815.25 i n c o s t s . I n Big Horn County, i n a m u l t i p l e defendant murder c a s e , a t t o r n e y f e e s amounted t o $35,391.57 and c o s t s of $2,529.95. Both c a s e s a r e now on a p p e a l and t h e c o s t of a p p e l l a t e counsel remains t o be determined. These two examples, I f e e l , h i g h l i g h t t h e growing problem.
A number of j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t s of t h e s t a t e provide f o r a f u l l time defense counsel s t a f f f o r t h e i n d i g e n t and budget t h e c o s t s a s a p a r t of t h e j u d i c i a l budget. Whether t h e s a l a r i e s paid a r e adequate o r n o t may be d e b a t a b l e , b u t i n s e v e r a l c a s e s we have had c a l l e d t o our a t t e n t i o n , t h a t a defense counsel drawing a monthly s a l a r y , a s t h e county a t t o r n e y does, has been p a i d an a d d i t i o n a l f e e f o r some unusual c a s e t h a t h a s a r i s e n . Such an arrangement i s t h e b e s t of two worlds, b u t i s an unnecessary burden on t h e taxpayer.
A s t u d y by t h e N a t i o n a l Legal Aid and Defender A s s o c i a t i o n r e l e a s e d January 7 , 1976, provides a d r a f t r e p o r t and g u i d e l i n e f o r t h e d e f e n s e of e l i g i b l e persons. This r e p o r t c o v e r s b o t h t h e f e d e r a l system and t h o s e of t h e v a r i o u s s t a t e s . The f e d e r a l government s i n c e t h e passage of t h e Criminal J u s t i c e Act of 1964, h a n d l e s t h e payment of t h e d e f e n s e on a s e t f e e c o s t and a d m i n i s t e r s i t "under t h e s u p e r v i s i o n of t h e D i r e c t o r of t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e O f f i c e of t h e United S t a t e s Courts".
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e from a Summary of t h e Report of t h e Committee t o Implement t h e Criminal J u s t i c e Act t h a t throughout t h e f e d e r a l system payments a r e made on t h e b a s i s of $50 p e r hour c o u r t time and $20 p e r hour o f f i c e time. A r e p o r t on t h e cumulat i v e payments t o p r i v a t e a t t o r n e y s f o r t h e f i s c a l y e a r 1975 a s of December 31, 1975, i n d i c a t e s t h a t under t h e f e d e r a l system t h e following f i g u r e s cover t h e d e f e n s e of t h e i n d i g e n t i n Mortana:
Number of persons r e p r e s e n t e d ......................157 Number of c a s e s i n which counsel was p a i d ...........135 I n c o u r t compensation .............................$6,803.50 Out of c o u r t compensation .......................$30,239.86 Out of pocket e x p e n s e s , . . ....................... $2,430.19 T o t a l paid t o counsel .............. $39,473.55 Average payment t o counsel ..................... $292.39. During t h i s p e r i o d t h e f e d e r a l government p a i d f o r the defense
of two murder c a s e s i n t h e Montana d i s t r i c t . One f e e was s e t a t $1,570.00 and t h e o t h e r $1,914.00.
The time h a s come, i n m o p i n i o n , f o r t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o y
e i t h e r adopt a s e t f e e system a s i s done under t h e F e d e r a l Criminal J u s t i c e Act o r t o provide f u l l time d e f e n s e c o u n s e l i n each j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t of Montana.