State Ex Rel. Corette v. Dept. of R

No. 13856 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978

STATE OF MONTANA, ex rel., HOLT W. CORETTE, et al., Relators and Appellants, -VS- MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE et al.,

Respondents and Respondents, JACK C. SEITZ, et al., Intervenors and Respondents.

Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District, Honorable Peter Meloy, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Milodragovich, Dale & Dye, Missoula, Montana Harold Dye argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondents: David Jackson, Helena, Montana Robert Corcoran argued, Helena, Montana For Intervenors: Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana Ronald B. MacDonald argued, Missoula, Montana

Submitted: March 7, 1978

Filed: , $4 jC . r.. jq78

M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J . Shea d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court:

P l a i n t i f f s appeal from an order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court, Lewis and Clark County, denying t h e i r p e t i t i o n t o t h a t c o u r t f o r a w r i t of p r o h i b i t i o n and mandamus d i r e c t i n g t h e S t a t e Department of Revenue t o d e s i s t from allowing t h e t r a n s f e r of a l i q u o r l i c e n s e from ~ d d i e ' sClub t o t h e S i l v e r t i p Lounge and Liquor S t o r e i n Missoula.

P l a i n t i f f s a r e Missoula r e s i d e n t s i n t h e a r e a near t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n of Southwest Higgins and Bancroft Avenues i n Missoula, and l i v e c l o s e t o t h e new S i l v e r t i p Lounge and Liquor Store. I n seeking t o prevent intervenor Jack C. S e i t z from operating t h e new lounge and l i q u o r s t o r e , p l a i n t i f f s p e t i t i o n e d t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r t h e w r i t .

The d i s p u t e revolves around t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of s e c t i o n 4-4-203, R.C.M. 1947, which provides:

"Lapse of l i c e n s e f o r nonuse. From and a f t e r February 1, 1949, any r e t a i l l i c e n s e issued pursuant t o t h i s code *** n o t a c t u a l l y used i n a going establishment f o r a period of n i n e t y (90) days, s h a l l automatically lapse. Upon determining t h e f a c t of nonuser f o r such period the department s h a l l cancel such l i c e n s e of record and no p o r t i o n of t h e f e e paid t h e r e f o r s h a l l be refundable. * * *"(Emphasis added. )

P l a i n t i f f s contend t h a t S e i t z , i n t r a n s f e r r i n g t h e l i q u o r l i c e n s e t o h i s new place of b u s i n e s s , d i d not do so within t h e 90 day period and he t h e r e f o r e l o s t h i s r i g h t t o t h e l i c e n s e .

The D i s t r i c t Court issued a temporary w r i t and s e t March 4 , 1977, a s t h e d a t e f o r a show cause hearing. A t the hearing, l i c e n s e holder Jack S e i t z and o t h e r i n v e s t o r s i n the new l i q u o r establishment were allowed t o intervene without o b j e c t i o n from

plaintiffs. O March 29, t h e D i s t r i c t Court quashed t h e w r i t and n

dismissed t h e p e t i t i o n and p l a i n t i f f s appeal.

S e i t z i s t h e holder of an a l l beverage r e t a i l l i q u o r l i c e n s e used formerly a t Eddie's Club a t 428 North Higgins

Avenue i n Missoula. O August 9, 1976, he submitted an a p p l i c a t i o n n

t o t r a n s f e r the l o c a t i o n of t h e l i c e n s e t o t h e S i l v e r t i p Lounge, a proposed f a c i l i t y n o t then constructed, located a t t h e i n t e r -s e c t i o n of Southwest Higgins and Bancroft Avenues. The new locat i o n was zoned t o allow a b a r and was bordered by commercial businesses t o t h e west, apartments and o f f i c e s t o t h e south, and s i n g l e family r e s i d e n t s on the e a s t and n o r t h .

The required s t a t u t o r y n o t i c e of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t r a n s f e r was published, and t h e Liquor Division of t h e Department of Revenue ( t h e l i c e n s i n g a u t h o r i t y ) conducted a hearing i n

Helena on September 10, 1976. N one appeared t o p r o t e s t t h e o

transfer. Nor did S e i t z o r any of h i s i n v e s t o r s appear a t t h e hearing. O n September 16, 1976, t h e l i c e n s i n g a u t h o r i t y granted t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t r a n s f e r s u b j e c t t o compliance with h e a l t h r e g u l a t i o n s and f i n a l i n s p e c t i o n .

Following t h i s c o n d i t i o n a l approval of t h e l i c e n s e t r a n s f e r , S e i t z and h i s i n v e s t o r s obtained financing f o r t h e purchase of t h e property and f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e new b u i l d i n g . Seitz continued t o operate Eddie' s Club u n t i l February 13, 1977, a t which time he closed t h e business t o h e l p complete c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e new b u i l d i n g .

O n A p r i l 28, 1977, the l i c e n s i n g a u t h o r i t y inspected t h e new premises and completed t h e t r a n s f e r of the l i c e n s e . On May 5 , 1977, S e i t z requested an extension of time f o r nonuse of t h e l i c e n s e p a s t 90 days, pursuant t o s e c t i o n 4-4-203, because he was

not q u i t e ready t o open f o r business. A extension was granted n

from May 1 3 t o May 31, b u t S e i t z used only one day of t h e extension before he opened f o r business on May 14.

P l a i n t i f f s contend t h a t a t t h e time t h e l i c e n s e t r a n s f e r was approved, A p r i l 28, 1977, t h e 90 day nonuse provision of s e c t i o n 4-4-203 had already expired, and t h e r e f o r e t h e l i c e n s i n g a u t h o r i t y had no r i g h t t o complete t h e t r a n s f e r . They argue t h e period of nonuse commences t o run a s of t h e d a t e t h a t c o n d i t i o n a l approval f o r t h e l i c e n s e t r a n s f e r i s obtained. Accordingly, they contend t h e l i c e n s e automatically lapsed 90 days from September 16, 1976, t h e d a t e t h e c o n d i t i o n a l approval was granted.

Section 4-4-203 i s s i l e n t a s t o whether i t a p p l i e s t o t r a n s f e r s of an e x i s t i n g l i c e n s e t o another place of business. However, p l a i n t i f f s contend t h a t an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n ( MAC 42-2.12(6)-S1298(8)) r e q u i r e s such c o n s t r u c t i o n . That r e g u l a t i o n provides :

"Any l i c e n s e e o r a p p l i c a n t requesting an extension of t i m e f o r non-use of a l i c e n s e *** s h a l l f u r n i s h w r i t t e n evidence, c e r t i f i e d t o be c o r r e c t , of t h e reasons f o r h i s f a i l u r e t o place s a i d l i c e n s e i n operation w i t h i n t h e time prescribed."

This r e l i a n c e i s misplaced. This r e g u l a t i o n does not apply t o t r a n s f e r of a l i c e n s e . I t a p p l i e s only t o one who o r i g i n a l l y a p p l i e s f o r a l i c e n s e o r one who has t h e l i c e n s e but has n o t y e t put i t i n t o operation by a c t u a l l y commencing business. A separate

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n ( A 42-2.12(6)-S12013) MC specifically

covers l i c e n s e t r a n s f e r s and says nothing about t h e e f f e c t of nonuse of a l i c e n s e while a t r a n s f e r i s pending.

To adopt p l a i n t i f f s ' argument would mean t h a t i n t h e absence of an extension obtained from t h e l i c e n s i n g a u t h o r i t y , an a p p l i c a n t f o r t r a n s f e r of a l i c e n s e must, within 90 days of the d a t e of c o n d i t i o n a l approval of the l i c e n s e , o b t a i n a l l t h e financing, purchase t h e property, b u i l d new premises and a c t u a l l y commence business. This approach i s supported by n e i t h e r l o g i c nor fairness.

P l a i n t i f f s i g n o r e r e a l i t y by contending t h e 90 day p e r i o d of nonuse commences upon c o n d i t i o n a l a p p r o v a l , and t h e r i g h t t o t r a n s f e r v e s t e d on t h a t d a t e , s u b j e c t t o divestment only upon f a i l u r e t o meet h e a l t h requirements and i n s p e c t i o n . The f a i r and l o g i c a l answer i s t h a t t h e l i c e n s e c o n t i n u e s i n t h e o l d p l a c e of b u s i n e s s ( a s long a s i t i s a c t i v e l y b e i n g used) u n t i l t h e u l t i m a t e t r a n s f e r i s approved by t h e l i c e n s i n g a u t h o r i t y .

The o r d e r of t h e l i c e n s i n g a u t h o r i t y g r a n t i n g c o n d i t i o n a l a p p r o v a l on September 1 6 , 1976, s t a t e d :

"The a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t r a n s f e r of ownership a n d / o r l o c a t i o n of t h e l i c e n s e above-described i s approved, s u b j e c t t o f a v o r a b l e f i n a l i n s p e c t i o n of t h e premises and compliance w i t h t h e r u l e s and regu- l a t i o n s of t h e Department of H e a l t h and Environmental S c i e n c e s .'I

A r e l a t e d l e t t e r d a t e d October 29, 1976, s t a t e d : "This l e t t e r does n o t c o n s t i t u t e a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e purchase a n d / o r s a l e of a l c o h o l i c beverages." S u r e l y t h e purchase and s a l e of l i q u o r a r e t h e primary r i g h t s of a l i c e n s e h o l d e r which a r e implied under s e c t i o n 4-4-104, R.C.M. 1947. The t r u e u s e of t h e l i c e n s e does n o t t a k e p l a c e a t t h e new premises u n t i l l i q u o r can be s o l d .

The bureau c h i e f of t h e l i c e n s i n g a u t h o r i t y t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e u s u a l procedure of t h e l i c e n s i n g a u t h o r i t y i s n o t t o r e c o g n i z e t r a n s f e r of t h e l i c e n s e u n t i l t h e d a t e of f i n a l a p p r o v a l . u n t i l t h a t time t h e l i c e n s i n g , a u t h o r i t y a l l o w s t h e a p p l i c a n t to o p e r a t e under t h e l i c e n s e on t h e former premises.

A s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n was faced i n P a s s a r e l l a v . Board of Commissioners of A t l a n t i c C i t y , (1949), 1 N.J.Super. 313, 64 A.2d 361, 363, where t h e c o u r t s t a t e d :

"* * * V e n a f r o ' s a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t r a n s f e r of h i s l i c e n s e was j u s t i f i e d , t o t h e end t h a t he might a s c e r t a i n t h e a t t i t u d e of t h e municipal body w i t h r e s p e c t t h e r e t o . Otherwise, he would have been burdened w i t h t h e e x p e n d i t u r e of a l a r g e sum of

money t o e r e c t and c o n s t r u c t a b u i l d i n g on t h e vacant l o t i n question a t the r i s k of t h e p o s s i b l e r e f u s a l of t h e municipal body t o approve such a t r a n s f e r .I1

The N w J e r s e y c o u r t a l s o recognized t h a t t h e e s t a b l i s h e d prac- e

t i c e of t h e board allowing use of t h e l i c e n s e i n the former locat i o n was given " g r e a t weight * * *, e s p e c i a l l y where no l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i o n has been subsequently taken t o i n d i c a t e a contrary view

Here, i t i s a l s o c l e a r t h a t t h e l i c e n s i n g a u t h o r i t y i s empowered by s t a t u t e t o take t h e a c t i o n i t d i d . Under t h e Alcoholic Beverage Code of 1975, t h e powers of t h e l i c e n s i n g a u t h o r i t y include the following under s e c t i o n 4-1-302, R.C.M. 1947:

"(h) To g r a n t and i s s u e l i c e n s e s under and i n pursuance t o t h i s code;

" ( i ) Without i n any l i m i t i n g , o r being l i m i t e d by t h e foregoing, t o do a l l such t h i n g s a s a r e deemed necessary o r a d v i s a b l e by the department f o r t h e pur- pose of c a r r y i n g i n t o e f f e c t t h e provisions of t h i s code, o r t h e r e g u l a t i o n s made thereunder."

Moreover, s e c t i o n 4-4-206(3), R.C.M. 1947, allows a t r a n s f e r of l o c a t i o n " t o do j u s t i c e t o t h e l i c e n s e e applying f o r t h e t r a n s f e r " s u b j e c t t o " s a n i t a r y , h e a l t h and s e r v i c e f a c i l i t i e s ** *.I1 These s t a t u t e s s u r e l y empower t h e l i c e n s i n g a u t h o r i t y t o allow t h e l i c e n s e t r a n s f e r a p p l i c a n t t o continue h i s l i v e l i h o o d while f i n a l approval of t h e t r a n s f e r i s pending.

P l a i n t i f f s a l s o argue t h a t only t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i l l prevent abuse of the l i q u o r l i c e n s e system through s p e c u l a t i o n on population growth. They use the example of a t r a n s f e r of a r u r a l l i c e n s e t o a l o c a t i o n j u s t o u t s i d e t h e c i t y l i m i t s , and then holding the l i c e n s e a t t h e o r i g i n a l l o c a t i o n u n t i l t h e c i t y l i m i t s incorporate the l o c a t i o n of the proposed l i q u o r l i c e n s e t r a n s f e r , thereby automatically increasing t h e value of t h e l i c e n s e under an urban classification. While t h e p o s s i b i l i t y may e x i s t , i t does n o t e x i s t under t h e f a c t s here. Immediately upon c o n d i t i o n a l approval, S e i t z and h i s i n v e s t o r s obtained financing and commenced construct i o n of t h e new f a c i l i t y , n o t i f y i n g t h e l i c e n s i n g a u t h o r i t y t h a t completion would be i n mid-May 1977. Completion occurred on schedule. Furthermore, we cannot b e l i e v e t h e l i c e n s i n g a u t h o r i t y i s without power t o prevent speculation i n t h e manner suggested by plaintiffs.

Under the circumstances presented h e r e , i t i s c l e a r t h a t nonuse of t h e l i c e n s e a s contemplated by s e c t i o n 4-4-203 d i d not commence u n t i l S e i t z closed ~ d d i e ' sClub on February 13. Within 90 days t h e r e a f t e r he was obligated t o e i t h e r open f o r business i n h i s new establishment o r o b t a i n an extension. He obtained an extension within t h e 90 day period and a c t u a l l y used only one day of t h e extension. Accordingly, S e i t z was n o t i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e statute.

P l a i n t i f f s d i d n o t r a i s e t h e i s s u e of t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e n o t i c e of a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t r a n s f e r . However, f o r f u t u r e cases we f e e l i t necessary t o comment on t h e n o t i c e i n t h i s c a s e a s i t r e l a t e s t o t h e p u b l i c ' s r i g h t t o know. It i s doubtful p l a i n t i f f s -would have f i l e d t h i s a c t i o n i f they had received a meaningful n o t i c e of t h e hearing t o be held on S e i t z ' s a p p l i c a -t i o n f o r t r a n s f e r of h i s l i c e n s e .

S e c t i o n 4-4-302(1), R.C.M. 1947, r e q u i r e s , i n t e r a l i a , , t h a t n o t i c e of a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a l i q u o r l i c e n s e o r t r a n s f e r of a l i q u o r l i c e n s e be published once a week f o r two consecutive weeks i n a l o c a l newspaper and t h a t a hearing d a t e i n Helena be s e t t o hear anyone who has a p r o t e s t . The s t a t u t o r y form of n o t i c e which applied t o t h i s case provided:

"NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR RETAIL ALL-BEVERAGES LICENSE

"Notice i s hereby given t h a t on t h e - day of 19 , one (name of a p p l i c a n t ) f i l e d an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a r e t a i l all-beverages l i c e n s e with t h e Montana department of revenue, t o be used a t (describe l o c a t i o n of premises where beverages a r e t o be s o l d ) , and p r o t e s t s , i f any t h e r e be, a g a i n s t t h e issuance of such l i c e n s e w i l l be heard a t t h e hour of - M , on t h e - day of -, 1 9 , a t t h e o f f i c e of t h e Montana department of revenue i n Helena, Montana." (Emphasis added.)

The n o t i c e published i n the i n s t a n t case s t a t e d i t was an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a t r a n s f e r of a l i c e n s e , and complied with t h e s t a t u t e i n a l l important p a r t i c u l a r s .

P l a i n t i f f s s t a t e d they d i d n o t see t h e n o t i c e when i t was published i n the newspaper and f o r t h i s reason d i d n o t a t t e n d t h e hearing t o p r o t e s t t h e b u i l d i n g of a l i q u o r establishment so n e a r t h e i r homes. They f i r s t r e a l i z e d what was being b u i l t on t h e property involved a f t e r S e i t z s t a r t e d c o n s t r u c t i o n . P l a i n t i f f s f r e e l y admit t h e i r only purpose i n applying f o r t h e w r i t and mandamus was a l a s t d i t c h attempt t o prevent t h e l i q u o r s t o r e from being operated a t i t s new l o c a t i o n .

The n o t i c e published i n t h e newspaper described t h e proposed new premises by i t s l e g a l d e s c r i p t i o n . This i s hardly terminology t h a t a layman could understand. The n o t i c e i n t h e s e s i t u a t i o n s i s such t h a t it i s meaningless t o a l l but t h e well versed i n l e g a l e s e .

Notice i s the f i r s t procedural cornerstone of due process of law. Without i t t h e remaining procedural r i g h t s cannot be e f f e c t i v e l y exercised, i f a t a l l . The n o t i c e provisions s e t out i n s t a t u t e s a r e minimum requirements and t h e r e i s no c e r t a i n t y t h a t a l l of them g i v e adequate n o t i c e . Those p u b l i c agencies t h a t a r e charged with conducting t h e p u b l i c ' s business through h e a r i n g s , have t h e r i g h t and indeed, o f t e n t h e d u t y t o provide a d d i t i o n a l n o t i c e o t h e r t h a n t h e minimum r e q u i r e d by s t a t u t e o r by t h e i r own rules.

For example, i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e t h e s t r e e t of t h e proposed l i q u o r e s t a b l i s h m e n t could have been g i v e n , t o g e t h e r w i t h a s t a t e -ment t h a t i t would be l o c a t e d a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n of Southwest Higgins and B a n c r o f t Avenues. I n a d d i t i o n , a proposed new e s t a b l i s h m e n t may be l o c a t e d n e a r f a m i l i a r landmarks, long e s t a b l i s h e d and w e l l known s t o r e s o r o t h e r b u s i n e s s e s , and could be e a s i l y p i n p o i n t e d by such r e f e r e n c e s . I t would be a simple m a t t e r t o t i e t h e p r o p e r t y t o t h e landmarks i n v o l v e d , s o t h a t c i t i z e n s most l i k e l y a f f e c t e d would have a b e t t e r chance t o know t h e proposed l o c a t i o n of t h e new b u s i n e s s . The n o t i c e c o u l d t e l l t h e p u b l i c they could send w r i t t e n and s i g n e d p r o t e s t s t o Helena i n advance of t h e h e a r i n g d a t e . I f t h e s e l e t t e r s were t o be used a s a b a s i s t o deny t h e a p p l i c a t i o n , t h e a p p l i c a n t could be n o t i f i e d b e f o r e a f i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n and he could be g r a n t e d an o p p o r t u n i t y t o meet t h e i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n t h e l e t t e r s .

Nor do we t h i n k i t n e c e s s a r y o r a d v i s a b l e t o s t o p a t t h e l e g a l s e c t i o n of t h e newspapers f o r t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of n o t i c e s . The agency could a l s o i s s u e a news r e l e a s e which would be more l i k e l y t o r e a c h t h e p u b l i c and, a c c o r d i n g l y , t h o s e who may b e

most a f f e c t e d by t h e proposed a c t i o n . W t h i n k i t s a f e t o assume e

t h a t only t h o s e who have a s p e c i f i c i n t e r e s t i n t h e l e g a l n o t i c e s e c t i o n of t h e newspaper w i l l e v e r t a k e t h e time t o read i t

regularly. W do n o t t h i n k t h e r e i s a duty t o read t h e l e g a l n o t i c e e

s e c t i o n of t h e newspaper every day i f one wants t o be n o t i f i e d t h a t a lounge and l i q u o r s t o r e might be b u i l t n e x t t o h i s home.

I n t h e s i t u a t i o n h e r e i t i s most l i k e l y t h e r e s i d e n t s n e a r t h e proposed new lounge and l i q u o r s t o r e would have t h e g r e a t e s t i n t e r e s t i n providing i n p u t t o t h e l i c e n s i n g a u t h o r i t y , a s t o t h e p r o p r i e t y of t h e l o c a t i o n . I f the licensing authority i s i n f a c t i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e o p i n i o n s of t h e c i t i z e n r y i t would be simple enough t o r e q u i r e t h e p o s t i n g of t h e p r o p e r t y involved. This could be done w i t h conspicuous s i g n s and conspicuous l e t t e r i n g , p l a c e d a t o r n e a r t h e proposed l o c a t i o n where t h e a f f e c t e d p u b l i c would be most l i k e l y t o s e e them. The s i g n s , f o r example, could s t a t e t h a t t h e l o c a t i o n was proposed f o r a new lounge and l i q u o r s t o r e and s t a t e t h e time and p l a c e f o r t h e h e a r i n g of any p r o t e s t s . In this r e g a r d t h e s t a t e s of Arizona ( 2 A r i z . Rev.St. Anno. $4-201) and New Mexico (N.M.Stat. Anno. $46-4-11) r e q u i r e n o t i c e t o be conspicuo u s l y p o s t e d a t t h e proposed p l a c e of b u s i n e s s of a new l i q u o r

establishment . I n view of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n t h i s c a s e , we do n o t deem i t

unusual t h a t no p r o t e s t o r s t r a v e l e d t o Helena o r wrote t o Helena, and t h a t t h e a p p l i c a n t and h i s i n v e s t o r s were s o a s s u r e d of a s u c c e s s f u l t r a n s f e r t h a t they d i d n o t b o t h e r t o show up a t t h e h e a r i n g . Too o f t e n t h e d e a l i n g s of commerce a r e enshrouded i n s e c r e c y , encouraged by governmental a c q u i e s c e n c e . T h i s cannot be t o l e r a t e d where t h e p u b l i c h a s t h e r i g h t t o b e informed by t h e government of t h e proposed a c t i o n s of t h e commercial world. I t i s t h e o b l i g a t i o n of government t o e f f e c t i v e l y inform t h e p u b l i c wherever t h e p u b l i c h a s a r i g h t t o know, and t h e government cannot squeak by i n e v e r y c a s e by complying o n l y w i t h t h e minimum s t a t u t o r y requirements of n o t i c e . Due p r o c e s s of law i s more meaningful t h a n t h a t .

I n view of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s a s e x i s t i n t h i s c a s e , and t h a t t h e i s s u e of n o t i c e was n o t r a i s e d i n t h e trial c o u r t o r on a p p e a l , t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s a f f i r m e d . Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell, specially concurring:

I concur in the result and the interpretation of the statute on which it is based. However, the discussion of notice

is beyond the issues in the case and should not be included in the opinion in my view.

b d J.%&Q Chief Justice

Mr. Justices Gene B. Daly and Mr. Justice John C. Harrison:

We concur with the above special concurrence of Mr.