State v. Board of Co. Commissioners

I N THE SUPREFILE COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA No. 14481 THE STATE OF MONTANA, U p o n t h e r e l a t i o n of PROFESSIONAL CONSULTANTS, INCORPORATED, P e t i t i o n e r and A p p e l l a n t , VS. THE BOARD O F COUNTY COMMISSIONERS O F THE COUNTY O F RAVALLI e t a l . , R e s p o n d e n t s and R e s p o n d e n t s . . < O R D E R P E R CURIAM: I n t h e above n a m e d cause on page on l i n e 8 a t t h e end of t h e f i r s t paragraph, t h e f o l l o w i n g sentence i s added: " P e t i t i o n e r q u a l i f i e s under both tests." DATED t h i s *day of M a r c h , 1 9 7 9 . L" Justices u No. 14481 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA THE STATE OF MONTANA, Upon the relation of PROFESSIONAL CONSULTANTS, INCORPORATED, Petitioner and Appellant, THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF RAVALLI et al., Respondents and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Honorable Edward Dussault, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: James L. Tillotson, Missoula, Montana For Respondents: Douglas G. Harkin, Hamilton, Montana Submitted on briefs: December 21, 1978 Decided : MAP C' ' ' z75 Filed: F. . . Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Professional Consultants, Inc., petitioned t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , R a v a l l i County, f o r a w r i t o f mandate t o compel t h e c o u n t y commissioners of R a v a l l i County t o a c t c o n c e r n i n g f i v e minor s u b d i v i s i o n s . From t h e d e n i a l of i t s p e t i t i o n , P r o f e s s i o n a l C o n s u l t a n t s , I n c . , appeals. The s o l e i s s u e b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t i s whether t h e D i s - t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n f i n d i n g t h a t p e t i t i o n e r had no s t a n d i n g t o maintain t h i s a c t i o n because i t lacked s u f f i c i e n t i n t e r e s t t o i n i t i a t e and m a i n t a i n t h e l i t i g a t i o n . P e t i t i o n e r , Professional Consultants, Inc., i s an e n g i n e e r i n g s u r v e y g r o u p which was h i r e d t o p l a t s u b d i v i s i o n s i n R a v a l l i County. On F e b r u a r y 2 1 , 1978, p e t i t i o n e r subm i t t e d f i v e minor s u b d i v i s i o n s t o t h e R a v a l l i County p l a n -n i n g board f o r r e v i e w and a p p r o v a l by t h e c o u n t y commiss i o n e r s a s r e q u i r e d under s e c t i o n 1 1 - 3 8 6 6 ( 6 ) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 76-3-609 MCA. The p l a n n i n g b o a r d approved t h e p l a t s and s u b m i t t e d t h e i r recommendations t o t h e c o u n t y commissioners. Respondent commissioners had n e i t h e r app r o v e d , d i s a p p r o v e d , o r c o n d i t i o n a l l y approved any o f t h e minor s u b d i v i s i o n s by May 1 7 , 1978. As a result, this a c t i o n w a s b r o u g h t a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e commissioners a r e i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e i r c l e a r l e g a l d u t y under t h e above s t a t u t e . I t should be noted t h a t t h e s u b d i v i s i o n q u e s t i o n n a i r e s u b m i t t e d by e a c h of t h e f i v e minor s u b d i v i s i o n s d i d n o t contain t h e s i g n a t u r e of p e t i t i o n e r . Rather, they contained t h e s i g n a t u r e s o f t h e owners o f t h e l a n d s i n q u e s t i o n . P e t i t i o n e r had no l e g a l i n t e r e s t i n any of t h e minor sub- d i v i s i o n s ; was n o t t h e l e g a l t i t l e owner of any of t h e f i v e minor s u b d i v i s i o n s ; and was n o t t h e p u r c h a s e r of any of t h e property involved. P e t i t i o n e r s e t f o r t h no l e g a l o r e q u i -t a b l e i n t e r e s t i n any of t h e l a n d c o n t a i n e d i n t h e f i v e minor s u b d i v i s i o n s . The p e t i t i o n d i d n o t a l l e g e t h a t p e t i -t i o n e r had been a u t h o r i z e d by any o f t h e owners of t h e p r o p e r t y t o commence any l e g a l a c t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e property. I t appears t h a t t h e only i n t e r e s t of p e t i t i o n e r i s t h a t i t s employees conducted s u r v e y work and e n g i n e e r i n g work on t h e p r o p e r t y . S e c t i o n 93-9103, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n s 27-26-102(2) and 27-26-201 MCA, h a s l o n g been a p a r t of o u r s t a t u t e s . It provides: "Writ--when and upon what t o i s s u e . The w r i t must be i s s u e d i n a l l c a s e s where t h e r e i s n o t a p l a i n , s p e e d y , and a d e q u a t e remedy i n t h e o r d i n a r y c o u r s e of law. I t must b e i s s u e d upon a f f i d a v i t , o n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e p a r t y bene- f i c i a l l y interested." W f i r s t n o t e t h a t under Rule 52, M.R.Civ.P., e that ". . . F i n d i n g s of f a c t s h a l l n o t be s e t a s i d e u n l e s s c l e a r l y erroneous . . ." T h i s s t a n d a r d f o r r e v i e w h a s been o f t e n r e p e a t e d by t h i s C o u r t and i s a p p l i c a b l e i n t h i s c a s e . See Lovely v . Burroughs Corp. ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 165 Mont. 209, 527 P.2d 557; I n re M i c k i c h ' s E s t a t e ( 1 9 4 3 ) , 1 1 4 Mont. 258, 136 P.2d 223. While a n a c t i o n i n v o l v i n g a w r i t of mandate i s one i n e q u i t y , numerous c a s e s have h e l d t h a t t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e D i s t r i c t Court should n o t be reversed i n an equity a c t i o n u n l e s s t h e e v i d e n c e c l e a r l y p r e p o n d e r a t e s a g a i n s t them. See Kosel v . S t o n e ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 146 Mont. 218, 4 0 4 P.2d 894; L a r s e n Farms v . C i t y of Plentywood ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 145 Mont. 509, 402 P.2d 410. I n a mandamus a c t i o n t h e p e t i t i o n e r f a c e s a heavy burden of p r o v i n g t h a t i t i s e n t i t l e d t o a w r i t of mandamus. See S t a t e v . F i r e Department R e l i e f A s s ' n ( 1 9 4 3 ) , 1 1 4 Mont. 430, 136 P.2d 989, and S t a t e ex r e l . S l e t t e n Const. Co. v . C i t y of G r e a t F a l l s ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 163 Mont. 307, 516 P.2d 1149. C o u r t s have employed t h e " s t a n d i n g " d o c t r i n e t o r e f u s e , t o d e t e r m i n e t h e m e r i t s of l e g a l a c t i o n , on t h e ground t h a t even though t h e c l a i m may b e c o r r e c t , t h e l i t i g a n t a d v a n c i n g i t i s n o t proper. See Wright, M i l l e r & Cooper, F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e and P r o c e d u r e : J u r i s d i c t i o n S3531. See a l s o Data P r o c e s s i n g S e r v i c e v. Camp ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 397 U.S. 1 5 0 , 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L Ed 2d 184. P e t i t i o n e r h a s s t a t e d no l e g a l i n t e r e s t i n any of t h e minor s u b d i v i s i o n s s u b j e c t of t h i s a c t i o n . It i s not the owner o r p u r c h a s e r o f any o f t h e p r o p e r t y i n v o l v e d i n t h i s c a u s e , and a d m i t s t h a t i t l a c k s any l e g a l o r e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t i n the land. Some form of ownership i n t h e l a n d i s n e c e s s a r y t o embark s t a n d i n g t o b r i n g a mandamus a c t i o n . S e e P e o p l e v . V a g l i c a ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 99 111.App.2d 213, 240 N.E.2d 271; Sun oil Co. v . Macauley ( 1 9 4 6 ) , 72 R . I . 206, 49 A.2d 917; and Boron O i l Company v . C i t y of S o u t h f i e l d ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 1 8 Mich.App. 135, 170 N.W.2d 517. The d e c i s i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e n y i n g s t a n d i n g t o t h e p e t i t i o n e r i s affirmed. W e concur: /' \ Chief J u s t i c e /- - ' , M r . Chief Justice Haswell dissenting: I would reverse and remand this case to the District Court for determination of the merits of the action. The majority deny "standing" to petitioner to prosecute a writ of mandamus because petitioner has no ownership interest in the land, relying on Vaglica, Sun Oil and Boron Oil cited in the majority opinion. In my opinion, none of these cases is authority for this holding. Vaglica, a criminal case not involv- ing mandamus, held that defendant had standing to seek suppres- sion of evidence seized in alleged violation of the rights of the owner of the premises where the evidence was seized. Sun Oil involved no issue of "standing" but was decided on the basis of insufficiency of the pleadings. Boron Oil was decided on the basis of whether petitioner for a writ of mandate was "the real party in interest." "The concepts of 'standing to sue' and 'real party in interest' are very different." Stewart v. Bd. of Cty. Cornrn'rs of Big Horn Cty. (19771, Mont. , 573 P.2d 184, 188, 34 St.Rep. 1594, 1599; 6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil S1542. Here I would grant standing to petitioner to prosecute a writ of mandamus. Petitioner is a professional engineering survey corporation hired by the landowners to survey, plot and qualify five minor subdivisions in Ravalli County. The corporation claims it cannot complete its contract because of the alleged failure of the county commissioners to act when they have a clear legal duty to do so. In my view, petitioner's contract rights are sufficient to invest it with standing to prosecute this action. We have twice previously permitted a surveyor to prosecute a writ of mandamus in similar situations. State ex rel. Swart v. Stucky (1975), 167 Mont. 171, 536 P.22 762; State ex rel. Swart v. Casne (1977), Mont . , 564 P.2d 983, 34 St.Rep. 394. As I see it, the essence of "standing" is twofold: (1) to insure that petitioner has such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy that concrete adverseness and full develop- ment of the issues in controversy is assured (cf. Flast v. Cohen (1968), 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L Ed 2d 947) and (2) to conserve the time and judicial resources of the courts by elirnin- ating adjudication of matters purely of academic interest (cf. Association of Data Processing Service Org., Inc. v. Camp (1970), 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L Ed 2d 184). The majority would limit "standing" in a mandamus action to those who possess "some form of ownership in the land." This is indeed a novel position that would exclude lessees, lien- holders, mortgagees and others who have legitimate contract and statutory interests to protect short of ownership. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. Chief Justice Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly concurs with the dissent. Justice I I/