Wiedman v. Trinity Evangelical Luth

No. 14649 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980

MAUDE J. WIEDMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant,

VS.

TRINITY EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH and THE CITY OF KALISPELL, Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Honorable James M. Salansky, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant:

James A. Cumming argued, Columbia Falls, Montana For Respondents: Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn and Phillips, Kalispell, Montana I. James Heckathorn argued, Kalispell, Montana

Submitted: February 21, 1980 Decided: $pk 1 - MQ . . - ., '. - ,- p :L,; 4 Filed: &' . .. -, I

-- 5.: .-2

Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court.

Maude Wiedman b r o u g h t t h i s a c t i o n i n t h e E l e v e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , F l a t h e a d County, t o e s t a b l i s h a n easement by p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r t h e u s e of c e r t a i n l a n d which a d j o i n e d her property. By h e r s u i t s h e a l s o a t t e m p t e d t o e n j o i n t h e C i t y of K a l i s p e l l and t h e T r i n i t y E v a n g e l i c a l L u t h e r a n Church from implementing a s p e c i a l improvement d i s t r i c t p l a n f o r i n s t a l l a t i o n o f c u r b s and g u t t e r s a l o n g Washington S t r e e t i n K a l i s p e l l without c u t t i n g a curb a t the entrance t o p r o p e r t i e s s h e had used f o r a c c e s s f o r y e a r s .

The Honorable James M. Salansky held a t r i a l without a j u r y on t h e i s s u e of whether M s . Wiedman had e s t a b l i s h e d a n easement by p r e s c r i p t i o n o v e r t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n . Judge S a l a n s k y found M s . Wiedman's u s e of t h e p r o p e r t y had been p e r m i s s i v e and concluded t h a t s h e had n o t e s t a b l i s h e d a n easement by p r e s c r i p t i o n . Judgment was e n t e r e d a c c o r d -ingly. This appeal followed.

M s . Wiedman and h e r former husband p u r c h a s e d a p a r c e l o f p r o p e r t y from t h e K a l i s p e l l Townsite Company i n 1934. The p r o p e r t y w a s l o c a t e d j u s t o u t s i d e t h e c i t y l i m i t s of K a l i s p e l l on t h e n o r t h w e s t c o r n e r of Washington S t r e e t and F o u r t h Avenue. The p r o p e r t y i s marked a s t h e "Weidman P r o p e r t y " on t h e map below.

SDIWT. AUD

AO'IIYIS~TIOP

BUIWIYOS

bout a y e a r a f t e r t h e y purchased t h e p r o p e r t y , M s . ~ i e d m a nand h e r husband w e r e d i v o r c e d and t h e p r o p e r t y w a s conveyed t o M s . Wiecknun's s o l e ownership. She h a s remained t h e s o l e owner of t h e p r o p e r t y e v e r s i n c e .

When M s . Weidman and h e r former husband p u r c h a s e d t h e p r o p e r t y t h e y e x p e c t e d t h e Townsite Company t o e x t e n d F o u r t h Avenue northward a l o n g t h e e a s t e r n boundary o f t h e p r o p e r t y . They b u i l t a house on t h e p r o p e r t y o r i e n t e d t o t h e e x p e c t e d f u t u r e street. Ms. Wiedman used t h e w e s t p o r t i o n of t h e e x p e c t e d e x t e n s i o n o f F o u r t h Avenue i n a manner which a n t i -cipated i t s l a t e r dedication. She s i t u a t e d h e r g a r a g e s o t h a t i t s entrance faced t h e f u t u r e s t r e e t . Ms. Wiedman p a r k e d cars on t h e e x p e c t e d avenue, and when f r i e n d s and f a m i l y v i s i t e d t h e y parked t h e i r v e h i c l e s on t h e same l o c a -tion. T h i s u s e c o n t i n u e d d a i l y from 1934 u n t i l t h e p r e s e n t .

I t i s over t h i s access route t h a t M s . Wiedman now c l a i m s a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement. The p r o p e r t y i n c l u d e s t h e

w e s t 35 f e e t of what would have been F o u r t h Avenue f o r 75 f e e t n o r t h of Washington S t r e e t a d j a c e n t t o M s . Wiedmanfs

property. I t i s marked "claimed easement" on t h e map. It s h o u l d b e p o i n t e d o u t t h a t M s . Wiedman d o e s have a d o o r t o h e r house t h a t f a c e s s o u t h toward Washington S t r e e t . She

a l s o can g a i n a c c e s s t o her garage v i a an a l l e y running p a r a l l e l t o h e r p r o p e r t y on t h e w e s t , a l t h o u g h t h i s would

r e q u i r e h e r t o remove some t r e e s and change t h e d o o r on h e r

garage. About f i v e y e a r s a f t e r M s . Wiedman purchased h e r prop-

e r t y , t h e Townsite Company d e c i d e d n o t t o d e d i c a t e t h e e x t e n s i o n of F o u r t h Avenue f o r s t r e e t p u r p o s e s . t he Company approached M s . Wiedman w i t h a n o f f e r t o s e l l t h e p r o p e r t y t o her. She d i d n o t buy t h e p r o p e r t y , a p p a r e n t l y f e e l i n g no need t o buy p r o p e r t y t h a t was a p u b l i c s t r e e t . The Company subsequently sold the property t o a M r . S c o v e l , who l i v e d i n

a home l o c a t e d immediately t o t h e n o r t h of M s . Wiedman's property . Not l o n g a f t e r M r . Scovel purchased t h e property, he

and M s . Wiedman had a c o n v e r s a t i o n a b o u t t h e sale of h a l f t h e property t o Ms. Wiedman. Mr. S c o v e l i s now d e c e a s e d . M s . Wiedman r e c a l l e d t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n i n a d e p o s i t i o n t a k e n before t r i a l a s follows:

"Q. [Mr. Heckathorn] Who i s t h a t [who owned t h e p r o p e r t y b e f o r e T r i n i t y L u t h e r a n Church]?

"A. [Ms. Wiedman] Clyde S c o v i l l [ s i c ] . And he s a i d h e would n e v e r t r y t o s t o p m e from coming i n t h e r e -

"Q. H e had it a l l t h e t i m e u n t i l t h e T r i n i t y L u t h e r a n Church had g o t i t ?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And h e s a i d t h a t you c o u l d u s e i t anytime you wanted t o ?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And d i d t h e c h u r c h e v e r s a y you c o u l d n ' t ?

"A. No.

"Q. They have j u s t l e t you u s e i t , t o o , h a v e n ' t they?

"A. Yes."

A t t r i a l Ms. Wiedman t e s t i f i e d c o n c e r n i n g t h e c o n v e r s a -t i o n as follows:

"Q. [Mr. Heckathorn] And s o he [Mr. S c o v e l ] t h e n bought it [ t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n ] and he t h e n t o l d you t h a t a s f a r a s he was con- c e r n e d you c o u l d u s e t h a t a r e a and he w o u l d n ' t a t t e m p t t o s t o p you, i s n ' t t h a t c o r r e c t ?

"A. [Ms. Wiedman] And h e went on t o say-- I d o n ' t remember t h e e x a c t c o n v e r s a t i o n . I sup- p o s e i t was t o t h a t e f f e c t . But he s a i d he d i d n ' t t h i n k he c o u l d s t o p m e i f he wanted t o .

"Q. But anyhow h e conveyed t o you t h a t he d i d n ' t want t o t r y t o s t o p you and t h a t you c o u l d go ahead and u s e it.

"A. I t h i n k he wanted t o , a l l r i g h t , b u t he d i d n ' t want t o p u r s u e i t .

"Q. Did he i n d i c a t e t h a t you c o u l d c o n t i n u e t o u s e i t a s l o n g a s he had i t ?

"A. W e l l , I used i t a s l o n g a s he had i t and I have used i t e v e r s i n c e .

"Q. A f t e r t h a t d i s c u s s i o n d i d you and he e v e r have any f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n a b o u t t h a t ?

"A. I don't believe we did. There w a s n o t h i n g t o discuss. H e w o u l d n ' t s e l l m e h a l f of it f o r a driveway s o i t w a s dropped.

"Q. And t h e n t h e T r i n i t y Church p e o p l e came i n and bought i t and, a s I u n d e r s t a n d i t , t h e y j u s t bought o u t S c o v i l l ' s [ s i c ] i n t e r e s t and you had no c o n t a c t w i t h them and t h e y had no c o n t a c t w i t h you.

"A. None w h a t s o e v e r . "

Respondent T r i n i t y E v a n g e l i c a l L u t h e r a n Church purc h a s e d t h e p r o p e r t y o v e r which M s . Wiedman now c l a i m s t h e easement from M r . S c o v e l i n 1957. The c h u r c h c o n s t r u c t e d a n e l e m e n t a r y s c h o o l on p r o p e r t y a d j a c e n t t o t h e d i s p u t e d property. T r i n i t y made l i t t l e u s e of t h e d i s p u t e d p r o p e r t y a f t e r it w a s acquired. The c h u r c h now p l a n s t o expand t h e school f a c i l i t i t e s , The p l a n s i n c l u d e e x t e n s i o n of t h e s c h o o l playground t o u t i l i z e t h e p r o p e r t y o v e r which M s . Wiedman c l a i m s t h e easement. I n expanding t h e p l a y g r o u n d , T r i n i t y p l a n s t o f e n c e t h e p r o p e r t y and have c u r b i n g i n -s t a l l e d a l o n g Washington S t r e e t . The C i t y of K a l i s p e l l agreed t o i n s t a l l t h e curbing. Ms. Wiedman b r o u g h t t h i s s u i t when t h e C i t y began i n s t a l l i n g c u r b i n g w i t h o u t c u t t i n g o u t a p o r t i o n o f t h e c u r b t o a l l o w h e r a c c e s s t o t h e prope r t y o v e r which s h e c l a i m s t h e easement.

The s o l e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d by t h i s c a s e i s whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n finding t h a t M s . Wiedman's u s e of

t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n was p e r m i s s i v e .

To e s t a b l i s h a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement, t h e p a r t y c l a i m -i n g t h e easement must show open, n o t o r i o u s , e x c l u s i v e , a d v e r s e , c o n t i n u o u s and u n i n t e r r u p t e d u s e of t h e easement f o r the s t a t u t o r y period. Medhus v . D u t t e r ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,

, Mont. - 603 P.2d 669, 672, 36 St.Rep. 2044, 2047; G a r r e t t

, v . J a c k s o n ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont. - 600 P.2d 1177, 1179, 36

St.Rep. 1769, 1771; Hayden v. Snowden ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mon t . -I 576 P.2d 1115, 1117, 35 St.Rep. 367, 369; T a y l o r v . P e t r a n e k ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 3 Mont. 433, 437, 568 P.2d 120, 122; Harland v . Anderson ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 447, 451, 548 P.2d 613, 615. The c o n t r o v e r s y h e r e c e n t e r s around t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t M s . Wiedman's u s e of t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n w a s permissive r a t h e r than adverse. I n Taylor, supra, t h e Court stated:

"The l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s g o v e r n i n g d e f e n d a n t s ' a t t a c k on t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e e v i d e n c e t o support the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s findings a r e c l e a r . Rule 5 2 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P., provides i n pertinent part: I' I ... F i n d i n g s of f a c t s h a l l n o t be s e t a s i d e u n l e s s c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s , and due re- g a r d s h a l l be g i v e n t o t h e o p p o r t u n i t y of t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o judge t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e witnesses .. .' " T h i s C o u r t ' s f u n c t i o n on a p p e a l i s s i m p l y t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s and w i l l n o t r e v e r s e them u n l e s s t h e r e i s a clear preponderance of e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t them. M e r r i t t v . M e r r i t t , 165 Mont. 1 7 2 , 526 P.2d 1375; F i n l e y v . R u t h e r f o r d , 1 5 1 Mont. 488, 4 4 4 P.2d 306." 173 Mont. a t 437, 568 P.2d a t 1 2 2 .

The e v i d e n c e b e f o r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t t h e u s e was p e r m i s s i v e c o n s i s t s m a i n l y o f t h e t e s t i m o n y of M s . Wiedman concerning her conversation with M r . S c o v e l a b o u t h e r u s e of t h e property. In her deposition T r i n i t y Lutheran's attorney a s k e d M s . Wiedrnan, "And h e [Mr. S c o v e l ] s a i d t h a t you c o u l d u s e i t [ t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n ] anytime you wanted t o ? " Ms. ~ i e d m a nanswered "Yes." A t t r i a l the church's attorney a s k e d M s . ~ i e d m a n , "And s o he [ M r . S c o v e l ] t h e n bought i t

[ t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n ] and he t h e n t o l d you t h a t a s f a r a s he w a s concerned you c o u l d u s e t h a t a r e a and he w o u l d n ' t

a t t e m p t t o s t o p you, i s n ' t t h a t c o r r e c t ? " Ms. Wiedman responded, "And he went on t o say-- I d o n ' t remember t h e

exact conversation. - suppose - - -o t h a t e f f e c t . I i t was t - But

h e t o l d m e h e d i d n ' t t h i n k he c o u l d s t o p m e i f he wanted to. " (Emphasis added. )

P r e s e n t e d w i t h t h i s t y p e of e v i d e n c e , i t c a n n o t be s a i d t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t were c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s . T h e r e c e r t a i n l y i s no clear preponderance of t h e e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t t h e f i n d i n g t h a t t h e u s e of t h e d i s p u t e d p r o p e r t y w a s permissive. I n f a c t , t h e testimony i n d i c a t e s M r . Scovel d i d i n d e e d g i v e M s . Wiedrnan p e r m i s s i o n t o u s e t h e p r o p e r t y .

W t h e r e f o r e uphold t h e f i n d i n g o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t M s . e

Wiedman's u s e o f t h e d i s p u t e d p r o p e r t y was p e r m i s s i v e .

When a p a r t y ' s u s e of p r o p e r t y i s p e r m i s s i v e a t i t s inception, t h e use cannot r i p e n i n t o a p r e s c r i p t i v e r i g h t u n l e s s t h e r e i s a l a t e r d i s t i n c t a s s e r t i o n of a r i g h t h o s t i l e t o t h e owner, which i s b r o u g h t t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e owner, and t h e u s e i s c o n t i n u e d f o r t h e f u l l p r e s c r i p -t i v e p e r i o d . Medhus, s u p r a , 603 P.2d a t 672, 36 S t - R e p . a t 2047-2048; T a y l o r , s u p r a , 173 Mont. a t 438, 568 P.2d a t 123; Wilson v . C h e s t n u t ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 164 Mont. 484, 491, 525 P12d 2 4 , 27.

The above d i s c u s s i o n shows t h a t M s . Wiedman's u s e of t h e disputed property w a s i n i t i a l l y permissive. ~ e f o r e er h

u s e of t h e p r o p e r t y c o u l d become h o s t i l e and e v e n t u a l l y r i p e n i n t o a p r e s c r i p t i v e r i g h t , M s . Wiedman would have had t o make some p o s i t i v e a s s e r t i o n of t h e h o s t i l e n a t u r e of h e r u s e of t h e p r o p e r t y and b r i n g t h e f a c t of h e r h o s t i l e u s e t o t h e a t t e n t i o n o f t h e owner o f t h e p r o p e r t y . The r e c o r d i s t o t a l l y d e v o i d of any s u c h a c t i o n by M s . Wiedman. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e and M r . S c o v e l d i d n o t d i s c u s s h e r u s e of t h e p r o p e r t y a f t e r t h e i r c o n v e r s a t i o n i n which he g r a n t e d her permission t o use t h e property. The e v i d e n c e a l s o shows t h a t M s . Wiedman n e v e r d i s c u s s e d h e r u s e of t h e p r o p e r t y w i t h t h e owners of T r i n i t y E v a n g e l i c a l L u t h e r a n Church.

Ms. Wiedman's u s e o f t h e p r o p e r t y was t h u s p e r m i s s i v e a t i t s i n c e p t i o n and c o n t i n u e d t o be s o up t o t h e t i m e s h e i n i t i a t e d t h i s action. The t r i a l c o u r t t h e r e f o r e c o r r e c t l y concluded M s . Wiedman d i d n o t g a i n t h e r i g h t t o u s e t h e

d i s p u t e d p r o p e r t y by p r e s c r i p t i o n . W a f f i r m t h a t conclu- e

s i o n on t h i s a p p e a l .

W e concur: / #

P stl im Hono a b l e P e t e r G. M e t r i c t Judge, place of M r . Chief J u s t c e a s w e l l .

Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy dissenting:

I cannot agree that a person who has used as a drive-

way a strip of land belonging to three other successive owners over a period of forty five years has not established open, notorious, exclusive, adverse, continuous, and un- interrupted use of the easement to establish her prescriptive right to the continuance of that use. Medhus v. Dutter (1979), - Mon t . , 603 P.2d 669, 36 St.Rep. 2044, 2047. The ground upon which the majority find a permissive use here is that Mr. Scovel, prior to 1957, had a conversation with Mrs. Wiedman, which at best is equivocal, and out of which the court finds a permissive use. What is ignored here is that the ownership changed in 1957, and that since that time, Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, although the ostensible owner of the property, has done nothing in the face of the continued adverse, notorious and open use of the driveway by Mrs. Wiedman over what was then the church's property. Even if we assume that her use under Scovel was permissive, there is no presumption of law that continues such permissive use when the ownership changes hands and there is no indicia of any kind that the subsequent owner continues the permission. In this case, the prior owner had established a gate or barrier at the north end of the area over which Mrs. Weidman claimed an easement. This is strongly indicative that the prior owner acquiesced in Mrs. Wiedman's right under an adverse user. An owne2s acquiescence in an adverse user of a driveway across his land without more, does not show that the use, claimed to be adverse, was in fact permissive. Dozier v. Krmpotich (1949), 227 Minn. 503, 35 N.W.2d 696. -9-

There was no showing in this case that the user was permissive "in the inception", which is the foundation requirement for proof of a permissive use. The majority has confused "permissive" use in this case with the "acquiescence" that always accompanies an adverse use. ". . . The very foundation of a right to an easement by prescription is the acquiescence by the owner of the servient tenement in the acts relied upon to establish such prescriptive right. 17 Am.Jur., Easements, section 66. It is also the rule that, where the user is permissive on the part of the owner, there can be no prescriptive right, and that, if the user was permissive - - in its inception, it must become adverse to the knowledge of the owner of the servient estate before any prescriptive rights can arise (citing a case.) It must be apparent therefore, that 'acquiescence', regardless of what it might mean otherwise, means, when used in this connection, passive conduct on the part of the owner of the servient estate consisting of failure on his part to assert his paramount rights against the invasion thereof by the adverse user.. . ." Dozier v. Krmpotich, supra, 35 N.W.2d at 699. (Emphasis added.) The conversation with Scovel, beg* long after the inception of the use of the driveway, and after which Scovel acted in acquiescence in placing the barrier as he did, shows that Scovel agreed with plaintiff's claim of right, and acquiesced in a manner that made his land servient to the prescriptive right of Mrs. Weidman to her driveway. I would reverse.