The Sally Magee

Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court. * When a vessel is liable to confiscation, the first presumption is that the cargo is in the same situation. † The bills of lading in the case are in evidence. The goods were consigned to parties living in Richmond. This vested the ownership in them. Such is the legal effect of a bill of lading as regards the consignee, unless the contrary is shown by the bill of lading itself or by extrinsic evidence. ‡ Upon the proofs there Avas clearly a prima facie case for the condemnation of the entire cargo. We will consider, first, the claim in behalf of Coleman & Co. In our opinion the law was correctly laid doAvn by the counsel of the appellants. If the facts alleged are made out by the proofs, the claimants are entitled to restitution. The cases referred to in 8th Cranch are in point, and are decisive upon the subject. General principles, in the absence of these authorities, would have led us to the same conclusion. When an agent exceeds his authority, the principal is not bound unless he ratifies. Upon being informed he must exercise his election. Whatever may be the motives of his decision, the result is the same. His acceptance or rejection determines his rights and obligations. Here, if Coleman & Co., as factors, bought the coffee at a *458 price exceeding the limit prescribed by Davenport & Co., and tbe latter, upon learning the fact — no matter when that was, or what the circumstances — repudiated the purchase, the title of the factors thereupon became absolute, and none passed to the principals for whom the purchase was made. It remains to consider how far the facts alleged by the claimants are sustained by their proofs. The burden of the affirmative rests upon them. The language of the test affidavit implies clearly that the correspondence to which it refers was in their possession. It is not produced, and its absence is not accounted for. The court is asked to take the averment of the affiant as to its existence and construction, in place of the correspondence itself. This no sound system of jurisprudence would tolerate. If the coi’respondence was not in the .possession of the claimants, doubtless that and other evidence was at the command of Davenport & Co. Between the filing of the claim and the time when the decree was rendered more than two years elapsed. There was time to communicate repeatedly with Rio. Coleman & Co. could have furnished full testimony. .If the facts were as alleged it would have been conclusive in their favor. Nothing is produced from them. It does not appear they were applied to, nor does if appear — large as is the amount involved — that they have done any act, or manifested any interest touching the controversy since it began. We can draw but one inference from these facts. It is, that if the evidence were produced, it would be fatal to the claim. The appellants insist tbat an order of the court, made sud sponie, after the hearing upon the preparatory evidence, was indispensable to enable them to introduce any additional testimony; that it was not competent for them to apply for such an order; and that none having been made, the test affidavit should have been held sufficient. Such is not the rule as to further proof. If it were, the claimants would not be excused for withholding the correspondence, or not accounting for its absence when the test affidavit was submitted. Cases of prize are usually heard, in the first instance, upon *459 the papers found on board the vessel, and the examinations taken in preparatorio; and it is in the discretion of the court thereupon to make or not to make the order. But the claimant may move for the order, and show the grounds of the application by affidavit, or otherwise, at any time before the final decree is rendered. Such an order may also be made in this court. In one case affidavits were submitted in support of the application, and the order was made after the cause was heard. * In another case a parol statement was submitted by the counsel for the claimant before the hearing, and the consequences were the same. † The result is always in the discretion of the court, and that discretion is controlled by the circumstances of each case. The order is made with great caution, because of the temptation it holds out to fraud and perjury. It is made only when the interests of justice clearly require it. In the case before us no application was made in the court below, and none in this court. If it be said the court erred in not making the order without an application, and without a showing, we cannot assent to the proposition. The state of the evidence warranted the decree; and, as the case was presented, there was no reason to believe that further evidence would benefit the claimants. The other claim relates to the coffee consigned to Dunlap & Co., of Richmond, and it is not denied that this was enemy property. The claimants allege a lien. The claim states that Dunlap & Co. owed them a balance of upwards of $35,826, and that they were authorized and directed by that firm to receive and sell the coffee, and apply the proceeds, as far as necessary, to the payment of the debt, and to hold the balance for the account of the debtor firm. The same affiant made the test affidavit, as in the other ease. He referred, as in that case, to an important correspondence, and failed to produce it. The same remarks apply upon the subject. It is to be inferred, also, that the *460 letters were written after the shipment of the caigo, and, indeed, after the capture. In either ease the arrangement was made too late to have any effect. The ownership of property in such cases cannot be changed while it is in transitu. The capture clothes the captors with all the rights of the owner which subsisted at the commencement of the voyage, and anything done thereafter, designed to incumber the property, or change its ownership, is á nullity. No lien created at any time by the secret convention of the parties is recognized. Sound public policy and the right administration of justice forbid it. This rule is rigidly enforced by all prize tribunals. The property was shipped to the enemy. It was diverted from its course by the capture. The allegation of a lien wears the appearance of an afterthought. It strikes us as a scheme devised under pressure, to save, if possible, something from the vortex which it was foreseen inevitably awaited the vessel and cargo. The claimants invoke the aid of the act of March 3,1863. It cannot avail them. The facts relied upon as fundamental to the claim are not established to our satisfaction. It is, therefore, unnecessary to consider the subject of the proper construction of the act, or the effect of the facts, if they had been sufficiently proved. Decree affirmed. Footnotes [*] Nelson, J., not having sat; having “been indisposed. [†] 2 Wheaton, Appendix, 24. [‡] Laurence v. Minturn, 17 Howard, 100. [*] Wheaton on Captures, 284-5. [†] The London Packet, 2 Wheaton, 372.