Gregory v. City of Forsyth

No. 14584 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979

ARTHUR A. GREGORY and DOROTHY R. GREGORY, Plaintiffs and Appellants, VS.

THE CITY OF FORSYTH et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, Honorable A. B. Martin, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Lee Overfelt argued, Billings, Montana For Respondents: William Meisburger argued, Forsyth, Montana

Submitted: December 14, 1979 Decided : E 19 1984 B Filed: E# 3 l 1 m

Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B . Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t .

P l a i n t i f f s a p p e a l from a f i n a l judgment o f t h e D i c t r i c t Court, s i t t i n g without a jury, i n the Sixteenth Judicial District, i n and f o r t h e County o f Rosebud, i n a n a c t i o n f o r r e f u n d of t a x e s p a i d under p r o t e s t t o t h e C i t y of F o r s y t h . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , s e c t i o n 9 3 - 2 6 0 7 ( 4 ) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 27-2-203, MCA, b a r r e d p l a i n t i f f s ' c l a i m and t h a t t h e d i s p u t e d l a n d was annexed t o t h e C i t y o f F o r s y t h by a c q u i e s c e n c e .

P l a i n t i f f s , A r t h u r and L o r o t h y G r e g o r y , a r e t h e owners o f t h r e e p a r c e l s o f r e a l p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d i n Rosebud County, Montana. The G r e g o r i e s p u r c h a s e d t h e s e p a r c e l s i n 1964 and r e c e i v e d a q u i t c l a i m deed a s t i t l e . The d e e d d e s c r i b e d t h e p a r c e l s by metes and bounds and r e f e r r e d t o o n e of t h e p a r c e l s a s p a r t o f " L o r d ' s A d d i t i o n t o F o r s y t h , Montana." L o r d ' s A d d i t i o n was p l a t t e d and d e d i c a t e d t o t h e C i t y o f F o r s y t h i n 1907. The d e e d d i d n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y d e s i g n a t e w h e t h e r t h e o t h e r two p a r c e l s , " t h e d i s p u t e d p r o p e r t y " comp r i s i n g o n e a c r e o f l a n d , w e r e w i t h i n t h e C i t y of F o r s y t h .

From t h e t i m e o f t h e p u r c h a s e u n t i l 1976, b o t h t h e C i t y o f F o r s y t h and t h e G r e g o r y s c o n s i d e r e d t h e d i s p u t e d p r o p e r t y

t o be i n s i d e t h e m u n i c i p a l b o u n d a r i e s of t h e c i t y . Property t a x e s w e r e r e g u l a r l y a s s e s s e d and p a i d ; c i t y o r d i n a n c e s were

e n f o r c e d ; and c i t y s e r v i c e s , i n c l u d i n g sewer, w a t e r , f i r e and p o l i c e p r o t e c t i o n , w e r e p r o v i d e d .

C i t y maps d a t i n g back t o 1938 and 1945 show t h e d i s p u t e d property t o be w i t h i n c i t y l i m i t s . A l s o , i n 1961 a f t e r publ i c a t i o n o f n o t i c e , a l l o f t h e c i t y o r d i n a n c e s were r e c o d i f i e d , and t h e d i s p u t e d p r o p e r t y was a g a i n i n c l u d e d w i t h i n c i t y boundaries.

I n 1 9 6 7 , f o r r e a s o n s u n r e l a t e d t o t h i s a p p e a l , Gregory o b t a i n e d a n a b s t r a c t o f t i t l e f o r h i s l a n d and checked f o r m o r t g a g e s , l i e n s and s a t i s f a c t i o n o f l i e n s . The a b s t r a c t d i d n o t i n d i c a t e w h e t h e r t h e p r o p e r t y was i n s i d e t h e c i t y limits. I n 1972, a p l a t o f t h e G r e g o r y s ' l a n d was p r e p a r e d by a s u r v e y o r . The p l a t e x p r e s s l y d e f i n e d t h e p r o p e r t y , including t h e disputed p o r t i o n , a s "a p a r c e l of land s i t u -a t e d i n t h e C i t y o f F o r s y t h , Montana."

I t was n o t u n t i l 1976 t h a t t h e G r e g o r y s f i r s t s u s p e c t e d t h a t p a r t o f t h e i r p r o p e r t y was o u t s i d e t h e c i t y l i m i t s . In a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h a l o c a l r e s i d e n t , Gregory w a s t o l d t h a t h i s p r o p e r t y was n o t annexed t o t h e c i t y . Upon i n v e s t i g a t i o n , Gregory d i s c o v e r e d t h a t t h e d i s p u t e d p r o p e r t y was n o t p a r t o f t h e d e d i c a t e d L o r d ' s A d d i t i o n and had n e v e r been s t a t u t o r -i l y annexed. T h e r e a f t e r t h e Gregorys p a i d t h e i r c i t y t a x e s under p r o t e s t .

On J a n u a r y 2 0 , 1 9 7 7 , t h e G r e g o r y s f i l e d s u i t f o r r e c o v e r y o f t h e t a x e s p a i d u n d e r p r o t e s t and f o r a j u d i c i a l d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t t h e disputed property i s o u t s i d e t h e c i t y boundaries and t h e r e f o r e nontaxable. A t t r i a l on August 1 5 , 1978, t h e o n l y w i t n e s s was A r t h u r A. Gregory. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he t h o u g h t t h e d i s p u t e d p r o p e r t y was i n s i d e t h e c i t y l i m i t s by r e a s o n o f t h e c i t y maps h e had o b s e r v e d p o s t e d on t h e d o o r o f t h e County A t t o r n e y ' s O f f i c e .

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t h e l d , among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h a t t h e 1964 d e e d and 1967 a b s t r a c t c o n s t i t u t e d means o f knowledge s u f f i c i e n t t o p u t t h e G r e g o r y s upon i n q u i r y a s t o t h e e x t e n t o f t h e c i t y l i m i t s and t h a t t h e i r f a i l u r e t o d i s c o v e r t h e t r u e f a c t s w i t h i n t h e t i m e p r e s c r i b e d by t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s , s e c t i o n 9 3 - 2 6 0 7 ( 4 ) , R.C.M. 1947 b a r r e d t h e i r claim. The c o u r t a l s o c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e d i s p u t e d p r o p e r t y was annexed by a c q u i e s c e n c e . The p l a i n t i f f s a p p e a l from t h a t f i n a l judgment.

T h r e e i s s u e s have been p r e s e n t e d t o t h i s C o u r t f o r review:

1. Whether f a i l u r e t o comply w i t h t h e s t a t u t o r y annexa t i o n p r o c e d u r e s f o r towns and c i t i e s d e f e a t s t h e c i t y ' s c l a i m t h a t t h e s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y i s w i t h i n t h e c i t y l i m i t s of F o r s y t h , Montana.

2. Whether t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n h o l d i n g t h a t t h e G r e g o r y s ' c l a i m was b a r r e d by t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s .

3. Whether t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n h o l d i n g t h a t t h e G r e g o r y s a c q u i e s c e d t o t h e i n c l u s i o n o f t h e i r l a n d i n t h e c i t y and w e r e t h e r e f o r e e s t o p p e d from a s s e r t i n g t h e c o n t r a r y .

The p a r t i e s ' a r g u m e n t f o r t h e most p a r t i s a s h a l l o w s w i p e a t t h e second and t h i r d i s s u e s , i . e . t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , d i l i g e n c e , d i s c o v e r y r e q u i r e m e n t s and a c q u i e s c e n c e . The f i r s t i s s u e was c a r e f u l l y a v o i d e d and t h e r e was no i n d e p t h t r e a t m e n t of t h e n e c e s s i t y o f compliance w i t h s t a t u t o r y annexation procedures.

The g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t m u n i c i p a l b o u n d a r i e s may b e e x t e n d e d o n l y a s p r e s c r i b e d by law. 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 7.14 a t 317 ( 3 r d r e v . e d . 1 9 7 9 ) . Since the j u r i s d i c t i o n of a c i t y t o extend i t s boundaries i s a s p e c i a l power, c o n f e r r e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , a s u b s t a n t i a l c o m p l i a n c e w i t h a l l t h e mandatory r e q u i r e m e n t s o f s t a t u t o r y law i s essential. M c Q u i l l i n , s u p r a , 5 7.29 a t 422; P o o l v . Town o f Townsend ( 1 9 2 0 ) , 58 Mont. 297, 304, 1 9 1 P.385, 386. In P o o l , i t was a r g u e d t h a t c e r t a i n l a n d was b r o u g h t w i t h i n t h e town b o u n d a r i e s by common law d e d i c a t i o n and a l s o by t h e f i l i n g o f a p l a t which d i s p l a y e d t h e l a n d a s w i t h i n t h e Town o f Townsend. T h i s C o u r t r e j e c t e d t h e s e c o n t e n t i o n s and held:

" ' I n t h i s s t a t e t h e r e i s no common law i n any c a s e where t h e law i s d e c l a r e d by t h e Code.' ( S e c . 6213, Rev. Codes [ S e c t i o n 12-104, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 1-1-108, M C A I . ) I f then, t h e Codes p r o v i d e t h e means by which a n a d d i - t i o n becomes a p a r t o f a c i t y o r town and sub- j e c t t o i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n , t h e means s o p r o v i d e d must be h e l d t o be e x c l u s i v e . " P o o l , s u p r a , a t 304, 1 9 1 P . a t 386.

M o n t a n a ' s a d h e r e n c e t o t h i s view was r e c e n t l y u n d e r s c o r e d i n M i s s o u l a R u r a l F i r e D i s t r i c t v . C i t y o f M i s s o u l a ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168 Mont. 70, 540 P.2d 958. The C i t y o f M i s s o u l a u r g e d t h a t e a r l i e r law which p r o v i d e d f o r summary a n n e x a t i o n o f l a n d " w h o l l y s u r r o u n d e d " by a c i t y ( s e c t i o n 11-403, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n s 7-2-4501 t o 7-2-4504, MCA) was s u f f i c i e n t a u t h o r i t y f o r a n n e x a t i o n by t h a t method. This Court held t h a t s i n c e summary a n n e x a t i o n was n o t p r o v i d e d f o r u n d e r t h e P l a n n e d Community Development A c t o f 1973 ( s e c t i o n 11-514, R.C.M. 1947, e t s e q . , now s e c t i o n 7-2-4701, MCA, e t seq.), t h e s t a t e d p u r p o s e o f which was t o d e v e l o p a s y s t e m f o r " a d d i n g t o and i n c r e a s i n g c i t y b o u n d a r i e s " ( s e c t i o n 11-515, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 7-2-4703, MCA), i t was e x c l u d e d a s a method o f a n n e x a t i o n . Missoula Rural F i r e D i s t r i c t , s u p r a , a t 74, 540 P . 2d a t 960-961.

T h e r e a r e i m p o r t a n t p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which f a v o r a t l e a s t s u b s t a n t i a l compliance w i t h s t a t u t o r y annexation p r o c e d u r e . The l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y o f M o n t a n a ' s a n n e x a t i o n l a w s d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t p u b l i c n o t i c e and p a r t i c i p a t i o n ( p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r t h e p e r s o n s a f f e c t e d by a p r o p o s e d annexation) a r e cardinal. T h e r e i s , however, no argument t o b e h e a r d t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y scheme f o r a n n e x a t i o n i s n o t e x c l u s i v e .

The s e c o n d i s s u e c o n c e r n s t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e

o f l i m i t a t i o n s by t h e t r i a l c o u r t , i. e. , s e c t i o n 93-2607 ( 4 ) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 27-2-203, MCA.

P l a i n t i f f s contend t h a t t h e s t a t u t e d i d n o t s t a r t t o r u n u n t i l d i s c o v e r y o f t h e f a c t s by t h e a g g r i e v e d p a r t y .

Ordinary d i l i g e n c e should be exercised i n discovery. Ray v . D i v e r s ( 1 9 2 8 ) , 8 1 Mont. 552, 264 P . 673, 675.

The g i s t o f t h e C i t y ' s argument i s t h a t p l a i n t i f f s d i d n o t e x e r c i s e d u e d i l i g e n c e b e c a u s e of t h e i r f a i l u r e t o r e a d t h e d e e d and a b s t r a c t c a r e f u l l y . But t h e s e documents d o n o t i n d i c a t e whether t h e l a n d i s w i t h i n t h e c i t y l i m i t s . Rather, t h e c i t y map formed t h e b a s i s f o r p l a i n t i f f s ' c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e l a n d was i n s i d e t h e c i t y .

R e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e would r e q u i r e i n s p e c t i o n o f t h e c i t y map and o r d i n a n c e . These w e r e t h e o n l y d i r e c t o f f i c i a l evidence of t h e C i t y ' s boundaries. A s such, any r e l i a n c e on them was j u s t i f i e d . Any o t h e r method would i n v o l v e , f i r s t , a n a s s u m p t i o n t h e o r d i n a n c e was d e f e c t i v e , and s e c o n d , a search of a l l annexation proceedings. Clearly, t h i s is beyond t h e p a l e o f r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e .

I n f a c t , p l a i n t i f f s ' discovery of t h e d e f e c t i n t h e o r d i n a n c e came a s a r e s u l t o f a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h a l o c a l resident. The C i t y c o n t e n d s t h a t f o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s , s e c t i o n 9 3 - 2 6 0 7 ( 4 ) , R.C.M. 1947, t h e " d i s c o v e r y " r e q u i r e m e n t s are i d e n t i c a l t o I s r a e l s o n v . Mountain T r a c t o r s Co. ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 155 Mont. 69, 73, 467 P.2d 149, 152, wherein t h i s Court explained t h a t an aggrieved p a r t y must show some i n t e n t i o n a l c o n c e a l m e n t and d i l i g e n c e b e f o r e he can r e l y on t h e discovery exception t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t t h e s t a t u t e b e g i n s r u n n i n g upon t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f the fraud. Here, p l a i n t i f f a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e r e had been no c o n c e a l m e n t , and t h u s p l a i n t i f f s ' c a u s e o f a c t i o n e x p i r e d i n 1966.

Before addressing the parties' points of argument as to when the two year statute of limitations, section 93-2607(4), R.C.M. 1947, now section 27-2-203, MCA, started running, the issue of whether this statute of limitations applies to plaintiffs' claim deserves discussion. Section 27-2-203, MCA provides:

"Actions for relief on ground of fraud or mistake. The period prescribed for the commencement of an action for relief on the ground of fraud or mis- take is within 2 years, the cause of action in such case not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake." In Opp v. Boggs (1948), 121 Mont. 131, 140, 193 P.2d 379,

385, this Court stated: "This section of our statute 'applies only to actions for fraud or mistake within the common acceptance of the term.'" "Mistake" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "some

unintentional act, omission or error arising from ignorance, surprise, imposition or misplaced confidence . . .A Mistake

exists when a person, under some erroneous conviction of law or fact, does, or omits to do, some act which, but for the

erroneous conviction, he would not have done or omitted." Black's Law Dictionary 1152 (4th Ed. 1968). The "mistake"

provision of section 93-2607(4) has rarely been discussed by this Court. In a suit for reformation and enforcement of a contract for the sale of corporate assets based on mutual mistake, this Court deemed the statute to be applicable and to have commenced running when the plaintiff realized the mistake. Favero v. Wynacht (1962), 140 Mont. 358, 373374,

The mistake in the instant case was a mutual mistake of fact. Both the City and the Gregorys (as well as their predecessors i n t i t l e ) erroneously believed the disputed property t o be i n s i d e t h e c i t y l i m i t s . Application of s e c t i o n 93-2607(4) t h u s a p p e a r s t o b e a p p r o p r i a t e .

The G r e g o r y s c o n t e n d t h e two y e a r s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a -t i o n s commenced r u n n i n g when t h e y d i s c o v e r e d i n 1976 t h a t t h e d i s p u t e d l a n d was n o t annexed o r p a r t o f t h e d e d i c a t e d L o r d ' s A d d i t i o n . They m a i n t a i n t h a t r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e would n o t r e q u i r e i n q u i r y and a s c e r t a i n m e n t o f f a c t s i n c o n -s i s t e n t w i t h t h e c i t y o r d i n a n c e s and maps. The c r i t i c a l q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r t h e G r e g o r y s had e i t h e r c o n s t r u c t i v e o r a c t u a l n o t i c e b e f o r e 1976 o f f a c t s which s h o u l d have p u t them o n i n q u i r y . F a l l s Sand and G r a v e l Co. v . Western Concrete, Inc. (D. Mont. 1 9 6 7 ) , 270 F.Supp. 495, 503-504. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h e 1964 q u i t c l a i m d e e d and 1967 a b s t r a c t c o n s t i t u t e d such n o t i c e . The d e e d m e r e l y d e s c r i b e d t h e p a r c e l s conveyed by metes and bounds. A p a r t from l o c a t -i n g t h e p a r c e l s , t h e f a c t t h a t one p a r c e l w a s d e s i g n a t e d a s p a r t o f L o r d ' s A d d i t i o n t o F o r s y t h h a s no i n d e p e n d e n t s i g n i -ficance. A s s t a t e d i n American Min. Co. v . B a s i n & Bay S t a t e Min. Co. ( 1 9 0 9 ) , 39 Mont. 476, 482, 104 P . 525, 526:

"We t h i n k t h e b e t t e r r u l e t o b e e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h i s s t a t e i s t h a t t h e r e c o r d i n g of t h e i n s t r u m e n t i s t o be considered w i t h o t h e r f a c t s and circumstances i n determining whether t h e p l a i n t i f f i s t o be charged w i t h n o t i c e , e i t h e r actual o r constructive, but t h a t the f a c t o f r e c o r d i n g a l o n e w i l l n o t s o c h a r g e him."

Here, t h e r e c o r d i s c l e a r t h a t a t l e a s t s i n c e 1938 t h e c i t y maps a n d o r d i n a n c e s d e f i n e d t h e d i s p u t e d p r o p e r t y t o b e within t h e C i t y of Forsyth. Mr. Gregory t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e r e l i e d on t h e s e o f f i c i a l documents. The a b s t r a c t l i k e w i s e c o n t a i n s n o t h i n g t o p u t t h e G r e g o r y s on i n q u i r y . The l a s t page of t h e a b s t r a c t i n d i c a t e s t h a t a l l t a x e s w e r e p a i d a s o f t h a t d a t e . I t i s a l s o n o t a b l e t h a t i n 1972, when t h e G r e g o r y s ' s p r o p e r t y , i n c l u d i n g t h e d i s p u t e d p o r t i o n , was p l a t t e d by a p r o f e s s i o n a l s u r v e y o r , t h e l a n d was d e f i n e d a s " a p a r c e l o f l a n d s i t u a t e d i n t h e C i t y o f F o r s y t h , Montana." These c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i n c o m b i n a t i o n w i t h t h e C i t y ' s a c t i v e and c o n t i n u i n g e x e r c i s e of j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e d i s p u t e d p r o p e r t y f a i l t o c o n s t i t u t e n o t i c e of any e r r o r i n t h e d e s i g n a t i o n of municipal boundaries.

The C i t y l a y s g r e a t stress on t h e f r a u d c a s e s c o n s t r u i n g t h e "discovery" element i n s e c t i o n 93-2607(4). Israelson, s u p r a ; Lasby v. B u r g e s s ( 1 9 3 0 ) , 88 Mont. 49, 289 P . 1028; a n d K e r r i g a n v . O'Meara ( 1 9 2 4 ) , 7 1 Mont. 1, 227 P . 819 a r e c a s e s t h a t r e q u i r e a n a f f i r m a t i v e showing o f i n t e n t i o n a l concealment a s a c o n d i t i o n precedent t o recovery under s e c t i o n 93-2607(4). However, t h e s e c a s e s a r e a l l fundament a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e i n t h a t fraud, unlike mistake, i s an i n t e n t i o n a l a c t o f m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . M i s t a k e , by d e f i n i t i o n , i s unintentional.

A n n e x a t i o n c a n o n l y b e a c c o m p l i s h e d by s t a t u t o r y p r o c e -dures a s set f o r t h , supra. However, w e do n o t wish t o l e a v e t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t a c q u i e s c e n c e h a s no p l a c e i n t h e law.

"The g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t p r o p e r t y owners are e s t o p p e d by reason of long-continued acquiescence t o q u e s t i o n d i r e c t l y t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e extension of boundaries of a municipality s e e m s t o be w e l l s e t t l e d . " 56 Am.Jur.2d Municipal c o r p o r a t i o n s 8 80 a t 134 ( 1 9 7 1 ) . See a l s o , 2 McQuillin, supra, § 7.09 a t 294. A l t h o u g h Montana h a s n e v e r r e c o g n i z e d t h i s p r i n c i p l e , o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s have a p p l i e d t h e d o c t r i n e o f a c q u i e s c e n c e t o after-the-fact challenges of a l l e g e d l y d e f e c t i v e annexation proceedings. Annot., 1 0 1 A.L.R. 581 ( 1 9 3 6 ) ; 1 8 A.L.R.2d 1255 ( 1 9 5 1 ) . A c q u i e s c e n c e h a s a l s o been found t o b e p r o b a t i v e in ascertaining the location of municipal boundaries which,

by their description, are uncertain or obscure. 2 McQuillin, supra, § . 7.05 at 280, S 7.09 at 294; Town of Brookline v. Town of Newfane (Vt. 1966), 224 A.2d 908, 911; Crescent City v. Dodd (1933), 131 Cal.App. 153, 18 P.2d 999, 1001. However, "neither usage and custom nor contemporaneous construction will prevail over a plainly designated boundary line." 56 Am.Jur.2d Municipal Corporations $ 41 at 103; Town of Stephens City v. Zea (1963), 204 Va. 82, 129 S.E.2d 14, 18. As

stated in McQuillin, "the rule - to establishment - municipal - - - as of

boundaries - acquiescence - - apply where the period by does not of acquiescence is short or -- boundary involved - where the is clearly otherwise than claimed." McQuillin, supra, § 7.09 at 295 (emphasis added). See also, La Porto v. Village of Philmont (N.Y.App. 1976) 346 N.E.2d 503, 506; Crescent City, supra, at 1001; - -of Brookline, supra, at 911. Town

In the instant case, the boundaries of the City of Forsyth are clear. T h ~ ~

. - & Furthermore, the Gregorys are not, by this suit, attacking the validity of annexation

proceedings. No such proceedings were ever conducted. Therefore, the doctrine of acquiescence could not apply to these facts. Therefore, we find the City of Forsyth failed to substan- tially comply with the annexation procedure and the property in dispute is not, therefore, subject to municipal taxes. Under the circumstances of this case, the statute of

limitations, section 93-2607(4), now 27-2-203, MCA, is

deemed to have commenced running in 1976. The doctrine of acquiescence does not apply to boundaries that are easily or clearly defined.

The judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s v a c a t e d and t h e c a u s e remanded f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h i s opinion.

Justice W e concur:

Chief J u s t i c e

ae Justices . ~