Weston v. Mt State Highway Commissi

No. 14835 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980

E. D. WESTON, Plaintiff and Appellant, VS.

MONTANA STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION, a body politic, Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District, Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Patrick Flaherty, Boulder, Montana For Respondents: Jack A. Holstrom, Legal Div., Dept. of Highways, Helena, Montana

Submitted on briefs: January 25, 1980 Decided : FEB 8 = l g- ~ g Filed: -Fa vb (: . $$989

Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court.

c his is an action for the recovery of allegedly unpaid overtime compensation filed in the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Montana, in and for the County of Lewis and Clark, the Honorable Gordon R. Bennett presiding. Appellant's original complaint was filed in District Court on June 13, 1972, and respondent thereafter moved for dismissal. The motion for dismissal was then con- verted into a motion for summary judgment on January 23, 1979 and granted by the District Court on May 9, 1979. From 1963 to 1971, appellant in this matter, Eldridge Weston, was employed by the Montana State Department of Highways. Appellant is now retired. During the tenure of his employment, appellant received two employment classifi- cations. He was first classified as a "sectionman". A sectionman is a person who is assigned a portion of roadway and is charged with fulfilling primarily maintenance duties upon that roadway. The maintenance duties include driving trucks, running a motor patrol and loader, and doing patrol work. A sectionman may also have some supervisory duties. In 1964, appellant was reclassified as a "Maintenance Super- visor I." The classification resulted from an employment contract between the Montana Highway Commission and the

Public Employees Craft Council, the union representative for Highway Maintenance Division employees. The position of

"Maintenance Supervisor I" included supervisory duties and a specified monthly salary. Appellant alleges that he performed primarily and substantially non-supervisory work during his employment.

It is upon this basis and the following provision of his employment contract that he alleges he is entitled to over-

time compensation for hours he worked in addition to his usual workweek: "Eight (8) hours shall constitute a day's work and forty (40) hours shall constitute a work week. All time worked in excess of eight (8) hours in any one work day, or all time worked in excess of forty (40) hours in any one week, or on days other than the designated work week, shall be paid at the rate of one and one-half times the regular rate .. ." Two other provisions of the employment contract, however, provided : "Pay for Overtime or Holiday Work. Overtime, when worked will be based on one and one-half times employee's regular salary rate for the preceding normal shift. (Employees in Main- tenance Supervisor I and I1 groups are super- visory employees and as such are expected to work such extra time over and above the eight (8) hour day and/or the forty (40) hour week without additional compensation as may be required to discharge their responsibilities.

"Supervisory Personnel, including Maintenance Supervisor I, are expected to work over the normal work day and/or work week as necessary to discharge their responsibilities. Super- visory personnel will not receive overtime or call-out pay . . ." The District Court held in granting the summary judgment

that the express terms of the employment contract were clear and unambiguous. It further held that there was no need for further interpretation and parole evidence, since the con-

tract expressly covered the subject of overtime. Upon that basis, the motion for summary judgment was granted. The issue presented to this Court for review is whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment and refusing appellant the right to offer additional evidence extraneous to the contract. Controlling in this matter is section 27-2-202, MCA,

which b a r s a p p e l l a n t from r e c o v e r i n g any u n p a i d wages due p r i o r t o J u n e 1 3 , 1964. The a p p e l l a n t ' s r i g h t t o wages v e s t e d on e a c h payday, and t h u s on e a c h payday h i s c a u s e o f a c t i o n a c c r u e d f o r wages e a r n e d d u r i n g t h a t p e r i o d . See C a r t w r i g h t v. J o y c e (19701, 155 Mont. 478, 486-487, 472 P.2d 515, 519-520, w h e r e i n t h e C o u r t h e l d t h a t when s e r v i c e s a r e r e n d e r e d o v e r an e x t e n d e d p e r i o d of t i m e , t h e t e r m of employment i s i n d e f i n i t e and t h e t i m e f o r t h e payment i s n o t e x p r e s s l y p r o v i d e d f o r , a s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s commences a t t h e end of e a c h month f o r s e r v i c e s performed d u r i n g t h e month ( a p p l y i n g s e c t i o n 39-2-602(2), MCA); B a r r e t t v. National Malleable & S t e e l C a s t i n g Company ( D . Pa. 1 9 4 6 ) , 68 F.Supp. 410, 417; Keen v. Mid-Continent P e t r o l e u m C o r p o r a t i o n ( D . Iowa 1 9 4 5 ) , 63 F.Supp. 120, 129, a f f i r m e d 157 F.2d 310, 316; and Smith v . C o n t i n e n t a l O i l Company (D.N.Y. 1 9 4 5 ) , 59 F.Supp. 91, 93.

Under t h e f a c t s i t u a t i o n p r e s e n t e d h e r e , t h e r e i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t e n t e r e d i n t o a n employment c o n t r a c t , was c l a s s i f i e d a s a s u p e r v i s o r , and p u r s u a n t t o t h a t c o n t r a c t , was e x p r e s s l y exempt from r e c o v e r i n g o v e r t i m e compensation. The l a n g u a g e i n t h e c o n t r a c t i s c l e a r and

unambiguous. W f i n d no need f o r f u r t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n e

and/or p a r o l e e v i d e n c e ; see s e c t i o n s 28-3-401, 28-3-303, MCA. The c o n t r a c t e x p r e s s l y c o v e r s t h e s u b j e c t of o v e r t i m e wages, and t h e r e i s no need f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n o f any i m p l i e d contract.

W e held i n Keith v. K o t t a s ( 1 9 4 6 ) , 119 Mont. 98, 1 0 1 , 172 P.2d 306, 308, t h a t t h e r e can be no e x p r e s s and i m p l i e d c o n t r a c t f o r t h e same t h i n g e x i s t i n g a t t h e same t i m e .

I n a d d i t i o n i t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t a t no t i m e p u r s u e d t h e g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e p r o v i d e d by t h e employment c o n t r a c t w i t h t h e S t a t e .

The c a u s e o f a c t i o n h a v i n g a r i s e n d u r i n g t h e t i m e o f t h e 1889 C o n s t i t u t i o n and r e f e r e n c e h a v i n g been made t o same, w e n o t e t h a t u n d e r t h a t C o n s t i t u t i o n , A r t i c l e X V I I I , s e c t i o n s 4 and 5, and u n d e r s e c t i o n 39-4-107, MCA, there is no r i g h t t o r e c e i v e o v e r t i m e c o m p e n s a t i o n on t h e p a r t o f t h e appellant. A r t i c l e XVIII, section 4 i s not self-executing b u t i s d e p e n d a n t upon l e g i s l a t i v e e n f o r c e m e n t . Article XVIII, s e c t i o n 5; see S t a t e v . Boykin ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 109 ~ r i z .289, 508 P.2d 1 1 5 1 , 1154. S e c t i o n 39-4-107, MCA s t a t e s i n pertinent part:

"A p e r i o d o f 8 h o u r s c o n s t i t u t e s a d a y ' s work i n a l l works a n d u n d e r t a k i n g s c a r r i e d on o r a i d e d by a n y m u n i c i p a l o r c o u n t y government, t h e s t a t e government, o r a f i r s t - c l a s s s c h o o l d i s t r i c t , and o n a l l c o n t r a c t s l e t by them, and f o r a l l j a n i t o r s ( e x c e p t i n c o u r t h o u s e s o f s i x t h - and s e v e n t h - c l a s s c o u n t i e s ) , e n g i n e e r s , f i r e f i g h t e r s , c a r e t a k e r s , c u s t o d i a n s , and l a b o r e r s employed i n o r a b o u t a n y b u i l d i n g s , works, o r grounds used o r occupied f o r any p u r p o s e by s u c h m u n i c i p a l , c o u n t y , o r s t a t e government o r f i r s t - c l a s s s c h o o l d i s t r i c t . A p e r i o d o f 8 h o u r s c o n s t i t u t e s a d a y ' s work i n m i l l s and s m e l t e r s f o r t h e t r e a t m e n t o f o r e s , i n underground m i n e s , and i n t h e wash- i n g , r e d u c i n g , and t r e a t m e n t o f c o a l . In c a s e s o f emergency when l i f e o r p r o p e r t y i s i n imminent d a n g e r t h i s s u b s e c t i o n d o e s n o t apply " The p u r p o s e o f t h i s s t a t u t e was n o t t o c r e a t e a d u t y t o pay

o v e r t i m e wages b u t r a t h e r t o compel e m p l o y e r s t o r e s t r i c t t h e i r employees' workdays t o 8 h o u r s . See S t a t e v. Livingston C o n c r e t e Bldg. & Mfg. Co. ( 1 9 0 6 ) , 3 4 Mont. 570, 87 P . 980. The remedy f o r t h e v i o l a t i o n o f t h i s s t a t u t e i s p r o v i d e d i n 39-4-107(4), MCA, which d o e s n o t c o v e r o v e r t i m e c o m p e n s a t i o n .

The a p p e l l a n t h a s a r g u e d t h a t s e c t i o n 39-3-208, MCA b e a p p l i e d a s a n a d d i t i o n a l remedy. The s e c t i o n c a n n o t b e a p p l i e d f o r a t t h e t i m e t h i s a c t i o n was i n i t i a t e d , t h e S t a t e o f Montana was s p e c i f i c a l l y e x c l u d e d from t h e c l a s s o f e m p l o y e r s c o v e r e d by t h e Payment o f Wages A c t . Section 41-1 3 0 1 ( 3 ) ( b ) , R.C.M. (1947). In addition, a t t h a t t i m e there was a s i x month t i m e l i m i t t o a p p l y t h i s remedy. See s e c t i o n 41-1304, R.C.M. (1947). H e r e the appellant did not institute t h i s s u i t u n t i l nearly a year a f t e r h i s l a s t cause of a c t i o n had a c c r u e d .

The a c t i o n o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n g r a n t i n g summary judgment i s a f f i r m e d .

C-CL.U&- Justice 1

W e concur:

~Chief J u s t i c e ~U*& s .

Q,kt.u- Justices